Verdienen katholische Frauen mit Nichtrauchern als Ehemann weniger in der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit? - Ausgewählte Studien aus der empirischen Arbeitsökonomik by Heineck, Guido
  
 
 
 
 
Do Catholic women with non-smoking husbands 
earn less in a second job? 
– 
Assorted topics in empirical labor economics 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines 
doctor rerum politicarum (Dr. rer. pol.) an der Fakultät Sozial- und 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vorgelegt von 
Dipl.-Volksw. Guido Heineck 
Neuburg, 08. Oktober 2003 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gutachter: 
Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Johannes Schwarze 
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Burkhard Heer 
Tag der Promotion: 18. Februar 2004 
Bamberg: Universität, Diss., 2004 
  
Danksagung 
 
Diese Dissertation ist durch die Anregungen und Kommentare von Kollegen und lieben 
Freunden bereichert worden.  
 
In allererster Linie bedanke ich mich gleichwohl bei meinem Doktorvater, Prof. Dr. Johannes 
Schwarze. Die Fertigstellung dieser Arbeit basiert nicht zuletzt auf seiner Großzügigkeit, 
mich nach meinem ‚Ausflug’ wieder unter seine Fittiche zu nehmen, und ebenso seiner 
Offenheit, mich meine Interessen ausloten zu lassen. Darüber hinaus erstaunt und motiviert 
mich seine Fähigkeit, unvermittelt auf Schwachpunkte in Gedankengängen hinzuweisen, aber 
gleichsam weiterführende Ideen anzubieten, stets aufs Neue. 
 
Ich bedanke mich weiterhin bei Prof. Dr. Bernd Hayo, Marburg, sowie Fr. Dipl.-Volksw. 
Silke Anger, Berlin, die bereit waren, Auszüge dieser Arbeit hilfreich kommentierend gegen-
zulesen und auch sonst immer ein offenes Ohr für meine Belange hatten und haben. 
 
Meiner Familie, die nur zum Schluss ein wenig ungeduldig wurde, sei ebenfalls ein ‚Danke-
schön’ dargebracht. Nicht zuletzt bedanke ich mich bei meiner Frau, Friederike Dohrmann, 
die in den letzten Jahren, und insbesondere in den letzten Monaten so manches eigentlich 
wohlverdiente, aber mit Arbeit zugebrachte Wochenende hingenommen hat. 
 
Im Gedenken an meine Mutter – ein Roman oder gar ein Krimi hätte ihr sicherlich viel besser 
gefallen. 
 
 
G. Heineck 
Oktober 2003 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 i 
Index of Tables ............................................................................................................................ I 
Index of Figures ........................................................................................................................III 
List of Acronyms...................................................................................................................... IV 
 
1. Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1 
 
2. Panel estimation methods................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Introduction and notation................................................................................................. 5 
2.2 The pooled OLS estimator ............................................................................................... 7 
2.3 Extensions to the pooled OLS estimator.......................................................................... 9 
2.4 No correlation between individual effects and covariates: The random effects model . 10 
2.4.1 The between estimator ............................................................................................ 12 
2.4.2 The within estimator................................................................................................ 12 
2.5 Correlation between individual effects and covariates: The fixed effects model .......... 13 
2.6 Endogenous effects: The Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (IV) estimator ......... 15 
2.7 Two statistical tests for panel models ............................................................................ 19 
2.7.1 The Breusch-Pagan test ........................................................................................... 20 
2.7.2 The Hausman test.................................................................................................... 21 
2.8 A method for binary dependent variables: the fixed effects logit model....................... 22 
 
3. Religion and economic outcomes ........................................................................................ 26 
3.1 Introduction: The economists’ view of religion............................................................. 26 
3.2 Religion, attitudes towards mothers’ labor participation and wives’ employment........ 28 
3.2.1 Attitudes towards mothers’ employment: previous findings and expectations ....... 30 
3.2.2 Data and econometric methods ............................................................................... 33 
3.2.3 Empirical results...................................................................................................... 37 
3.2.3.1 Attitudes towards gender roles and female full- time employment .................. 37 
3.2.3.2 Husbands’ attitudes and wives’ employment................................................... 46 
3.3. The effect of religion on the labor supply of married women in Germany .................. 49 
3.3.1. Theoretical considerations ...................................................................................... 50 
3.3.2. Data and econometric methods .............................................................................. 52 
3.3.2.1 Cross-sectional analysis ................................................................................... 56 
3.3.2.2 Panel analysis ................................................................................................... 58 
3.3.3. Empirical results..................................................................................................... 62 
3.4. The impact of religion on male earnings in Germany................................................... 71 
3.4.1. Theoretical background and previous findings ...................................................... 73 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 ii 
3.4.2. Data and econometric methodology....................................................................... 76 
3.4.3. Empirical results..................................................................................................... 81 
3.5. Religion and economic outcomes: concluding remarks................................................ 90 
 
4. Smoking behavior and economic outcomes......................................................................... 94 
4.1 Introduction: Some remarks on health, smoking and economics................................... 94 
4.2 Smoking and absence from work ................................................................................... 96 
4.2.1 Evidence from the literature .................................................................................... 98 
4.2.2 Data and econometric methodology: count data models ...................................... 100 
4.2.3 Empirical results.................................................................................................... 108 
4.3 Smoking and earnings .................................................................................................. 112 
4.3.1 Background and previous findings........................................................................ 114 
4.3.2 Data and econometric methodology...................................................................... 116 
4.3.3 Empirical results.................................................................................................... 120 
4.4 Smoking, absenteeism and earnings: concluding remarks........................................... 128 
 
5. Atypical employment in Germany and the UK: The case of moonlighters....................... 131 
5.1 Introduction: Some remarks on atypical employment ................................................. 131 
5.2 Moonlighting in Germany and the UK ........................................................................ 133 
5.2.1 Background and findings from the literature on moonlighting............................. 134 
5.2.2 The theory of multiple jobholding ........................................................................ 138 
5.2.3 Data and econometric methods ............................................................................. 142 
5.2.4 Empirical results.................................................................................................... 149 
5.3 Imposing social security payments on ‘marginal employment’ and its impact on 
moonlighters in Germany................................................................................................... 166 
5.3.1 Background ........................................................................................................... 167 
5.3.2 Data and methods.................................................................................................. 171 
5.3.3 Empirical results.................................................................................................... 173 
5.4 Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................... 180 
 
6. Summary and conclusion................................................................................................... 183 
 
References .............................................................................................................................. 190 
Appendix  201 
Summary in German  263   
  I 
Index of Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Denominational affiliation, religious participation and attitudes towards gender role and 
female full-time employment; including control variables.........................................................43 
Table 3.2: Nationality, religious involvement and attitudes towards gender role and female full-time 
employment; including control variables .................................................................................45 
Table 3.3: Religious participation, denominational affiliation and female employment .....................46 
Table 3.4: Religious participation and denominational affiliation of males and wives’ employment...47 
Table 3.5: Husbands’ attitudes, religious involvement and labor participation of wives.....................48 
Table 3.6: Employment status by denominational affiliation, strength of belief and frequency of 
church attendance; Married women in Germany ......................................................................55 
Table 3.7: Strength of religious belief and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation 
including control variables......................................................................................................68 
Table 3.8: Church attendance and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation including 
control variables ....................................................................................................................70 
Table 3.9: Structure of denominational affiliation and importance of faith among German men ........76 
Table 3.10: Completed years of education and monthly gross earnings by religious involvement ......77 
Table 3.11: Denominational affiliation, religious belief, religious participation and earnings; cross-
sectional regressions including control variables ......................................................................81 
Table 3.12: Denominational affiliation, religious belief and religious participation interacted; cross-
sectional regressions including control variables ......................................................................82 
Table 3.13: Denominational affiliation and earnings; longitudinal regressions including control 
variables................................................................................................................................84 
Table 3.14: Religious belief and earnings; longitudinal regressions including control variables .........85 
Table 3.15: Religious participation and earnings; longitudinal regressions including control variables
.............................................................................................................................................86 
Table 3.16: Alternative specifications testing for hypotheses (1); longitudinal regressions including 
control variables ....................................................................................................................88 
Table 3.17: Alternative specifications testing for hypotheses (2); longitudinal regressions including 
control variables ....................................................................................................................89 
Table 4.1: Incidence of smoking in the sample of German workers ............................................... 101 
Table 4.2: Absenteeism among smoking and non-smoking German workers.................................. 104 
Table 4.3: Amount of cigarette consumption and absence from work ............................................ 109 
Table 4.4: Smoking, ex-smoking and absence from work ............................................................. 110 
Table 4.5: Smoking and absence from work; pooled negbin-model including control-variables....... 111 
Table 4.6: Smoking and absence from work; negbin-model accounting for random effects ............. 111 
Table 4.7: Characteristics of smokers and non-smokers ................................................................ 118 
Table 4.8: Tobacco consumption and earnings, panel regressions including control variables.......... 122 
  II 
Table 4.9: Smoking, ex-smoking and earnings, panel regressions including control variables.......... 124 
Table 4.10: Smoking and earnings; panel regressions including standard control variables.............. 126 
Table 4.11: Alternative model specifications testing hypotheses; panel regressions including control 
variables.............................................................................................................................. 128 
Table 5.1: Atypical employment in the EU.................................................................................. 131 
Table 5.2: Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation .................... 137 
Table 5.3: Moonlighting and wage ratios by preferences over hours worked.................................. 152 
Table 5.4: Job related expectations and moonlighting incidence in Germany and the UK................ 154 
Table 5.5: Occupational stratification of moonlighters in first and second job (row %)................... 155 
Table 5.6: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for males in Germany and the UK, 
including additional control variables .................................................................................... 156 
Table 5.7: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for males in 
Germany and the UK, including additional control variables................................................... 159 
Table 5.8: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for females in Germany and the UK, 
including additional control variables .................................................................................... 161 
Table 5.9: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for females in 
Germany and the UK, including additional control variables................................................... 165 
Table 5.10: Institutional framework of marginal employment prior to and after the reform............. 170 
Table 5.11: Dynamics of multiple jobholding, all employed persons ............................................. 173 
Table 5.12: Dynamics of multiple jobholding, married women ..................................................... 174 
Table 5.13: Dynamics of multiple jobholding (2000-2001), all employed persons......................... 175 
Table 5.14: Moonlighting status of 1998 moonlighters in 2000, marginal effects of the multinomial 
logit model.......................................................................................................................... 176 
Table 5.15: Moonlighting participation of 1998 female moonlighters in 2000 ................................ 178 
 
 
  III 
Index of Figures 
 
Figure 3.1: Attitudes towards the traditional gender role model, by country and gender ....................38 
Figure 3.2: Attitudes towards mothers’ full-time employment, by country and gender ......................39 
Figure 3.3: Denominational affiliation and attitudes towards the traditional gender role model and 
mothers’ full-time employment .............................................................................................40 
Figure 3.4: Religious participation and attitudes towards the traditional gender role model and 
mothers’ full-time employment .............................................................................................41 
Figure 3.5: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of homogenous unions and intermarriages ............63 
Figure 3.6: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of denominational affiliation and religious belief ..65 
Figure 3.7: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of church attendance and non-attendance..............66 
Figure 4.1: Health expenditures (% GDP) in selected OECD countries ............................................94 
Figure 4.2: Smoking prevalence (% of population) in selected OECD countries ...............................95 
Figure 4.3: Distribution of absenteeism across male and female workers ....................................... 102 
Figure 4.4: Distribution of absenteeism across non-smoking and smoking workers ........................ 103 
Figure 5.1: Utility maximizing hours-constrained double jobholder............................................... 139 
Figure 5.2: Utility maximizing non hours-constrained double jobholder ........................................ 140 
Figure 5.3: Moonlighting in Germany and the UK (% of all employed persons) ............................. 149 
Figure 5.4: Moonlighting in Germany and the UK (by full- and part-time employment) ................. 150 
Figure 5.5: Weekly second job hours in Germany and the UK....................................................... 151 
 
 
  IV 
List of Acronyms 
 
2SLS  Two-stage Least Squares 
3SLS  Three-stage Least Squares 
AFQT  Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
ALMP  Active Labor Market Policies 
BHPS  British Household Panel Survey 
CMLE  Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
CPS  Current Population Survey 
DIW  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 
FE  Fixed Effects Model 
GLS  Generalized Least Squares 
GMM  Generalized Methods of Moments 
GSOEP German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IV  Instrumental Variable 
ISSP  International Social Survey Program 
LM  Lagrange Multiplier 
ML  Maximum Likelihood 
Negbin Negative Binomial Regression Model 
NLSY  National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort 
NORC  National organization for research 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
OLS  Ordinary Least Squares 
PR  Pooled Regression 
PSID  Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
RE  Random Effects Model 
SIPP  Survey of Income and Program Participation 
WVS  World Value Surveys 
ZUMA Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen 
 
 
  1 
1. Introduction 
Empirical research on labor supply has always been one of the core topics in labor economics 
and, according to Pencavel (1999), who also gives a good overview of the historical 
development of this research, “… has become the most active area of all labor economics 
research”.1 In the last 20 years, the rapid increase in the literature of applied work then surely 
is caused and eased by the enhanced availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal micro 
datasets and in particular the progress in computing technology, leading to decreased costs 
(both in terms of hardware but mainly in terms of computing time) of applying multivariate 
statistical techniques to these data which then again stimulated the development of even more 
sophisticated statistical estimation methods. 
 
Now, this thesis is in line with tradition insofar that it presents essays on applied labor supply 
topics, using a variety of micro datasets and running a rather large number of regressions. At 
first glance, however, the questions addressed here both seem not to be part of mainstream 
labor economics and furthermore seem not to have much in common: Following an 
introducing chapter on some of the econometric methods used in the studies, the second 
chapter explores the impact of religion on both individuals’ economic attitudes and outcomes. 
The subsequent chapter examines differences in labor market behavior and outcomes between 
smokers and non-smokers. Thereafter, there is a chapter analyzing the determinants of 
moonlighting, i.e. secondary jobholding, in a comparative context. Besides the comparison of 
moonlighting in Germany and the UK, that chapter further presents an evaluation of a policy 
measure in Germany. In particular, the consequences of imposing social security payments on 
the so-called ‘marginal employment’ on secondary jobholding are studied. 
 
Clearly, the respective issues of the three essays – religious behavior, health behavior and 
atypical employment – belong to rather disjointed areas. However, it is also clear that labor 
supply has many dimensions so that there are common aspects for all three topics. First, from 
a methodological point of view, the questions addressed all are analyzed with the set of 
econometric tools which labor economists typically apply to the data. In particular, most of 
the studies presented are based on longitudinal data, so that it is possible to apply panel 
estimators. This allows to account for the so-called individual heterogeneity and thus allows 
                                                 
1 Pencavel (1999), p. 3. 
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to avoid possible biases in results when using cross-sectional data only. 
 
Furthermore, referring to the more conceptual aspects there is also common ground. Some of 
the following analyses address gender related issues within questions of labor supply. 
Therefore, where relevant, either separate analyses for men and women (Chapter 4 on 
smoking behavior and Chapter 5 on secondary jobholding) or analyses of the impact of males 
on female labor supply are carried out (Chapter 3 on religion, section 2 and section 3). 
Besides that, some of the following analyses explore similar questions and therefore use 
similar dependent variables. In particular, Chapter 3, section 3 and Chapter 5, section 2 
examine reduced form labor participation equations; Mincer-type earnings functions are 
estimated in Chapter 3, section 4 and Chapter 4, section 3. 
 
Finally, another common aspect is that the topics addressed by and large are underresearched. 
This means that the analyses presented add to the literature in several ways, mainly by either 
exploring ‘old questions’ with ‘new data’ or, in the case of the studies of the earnings 
equations by applying a rather unfamiliar, though ‘better’ technique. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: Subsequently, Chapter 2 will briefly present the estimation 
techniques applied in those analyses that are based on panel data. Besides a short discussion 
of the estimators most often used in applied work, the random-effects model and the fixed-
effects model, the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator is outlined. Although this 
estimator seems to be not well known, its application provides an alternative to the most 
severe shortcoming of the standard models, i.e. the ‘all-or-nothing’ assumption on whether 
individual-specific effects are assumed to be correlated with the regressors or not. In 
particular, the estimator suggests that there are subsets of time- invariant and time-varying 
regressors that both are correlated and uncorrelated with the individual-specific effects. 
 
Chapter 3 presents analyses that might be placed within the fields of the ‘Economics of 
Religion’. While this branch of research is a rather young scientific field, a growing number 
of contributions show that the economic approach is able to both explain individuals’ 
religious behavior and, more of importance here, to use religious attitudes and behavior as a 
predictor of economic attitudes and behavior. Therefore, the analyses concentrate on both 
these latter aspects. First, using data from a cross-national survey (ISSP), it is examined in a 
rather explorative manner, whether denominational affiliation or religious belief affect 
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individuals’ attitudes towards female labor supply, specified by individuals’ attitudes towards 
mothers’ employment and attitudes towards the traditional ‘male-breadwinner’ gender-role 
model (Chapter 3, section 2). Consequently, some further analysis is carried out in the same 
study using the male subsample of the data to examine whether the attitudes of husbands 
affect the employment participation of wives (still Chapter 3, section 2). 
While the prior analysis is based on cross-sectional (though cross-national) data, the 
following section additionally uses panel data from the GSOEP. The study draws from both 
sociological and economic theories to explore in more detail the relationship between 
denonimational affiliation, religious belief and religious participation and the labor supply of 
married women in Germany (Chapter 3, section 3). The basic rationale here is that stricter or 
more hierarchical religions quite likely affect individuals’ behavior in favor of the traditional 
gender role model and thus affecting female labor supply negatively. Prior evidence for that 
hypothesis exists for mainly the US. However, as the ‘religious markets’ in the US and 
Germany vary rather strongly, the analysis will explore whether the a priori reasoning will 
hold also for a more secular country like Germany. 
All three indicators on religious behavior are also used in the subsequent section which 
presents an analysis of the impact of religion on the earnings of East and West German male 
workers (Chapter 3, section 4). Findings from the literature suggest for ambiguous effects of 
individuals’ religion. Focusing on Christian religions, there is on the one hand evidence that 
religious believers may be averse to the lifetime accumulation of material wealth. On the 
other hand, the same behavior may, in the spirit of Max Weber’s ‘Protestant Work Ethic’, be 
taken to be pleasing in the sight of God. 
 
The latter section investigates whether membership to certain groups is associated with wage 
differentials. A similar approach is taken to examine whether there is a wage penalty for 
smokers (Chapter 4, section 3), a result that usually is found for the Northern-American labor 
markets. Among the theoretical reasons that are offered, prior studies argue that smokers may 
be individuals with higher time preference rates. Therefore, smokers might be less likely to 
invest in human capital which would consequently result in lower earnings. First, the analysis 
here examines whether there are earnings differentials for German smokers. Furthermore, 
(crude) tests for the theoretical reasoning is also provided. 
However, before examining smokers’ and non-smokers’ labor market outcomes measured 
in earnings or wages, there is an analysis that addresses whether smokers may differ in 
another aspect of labor market behavior, namely absenteeism (Chapter 4, section 2). Again a 
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higher time preference rate may lead individuals to both smoke and show higher absence from 
work rates. The focus is again on the behavior and the outcomes of German workers. 
Therefore, GSOEP data are used in both sections which furthermore explore whether there are 
differences between males and females. 
 
Chapter 5 then presents studies on secondary jobholding. First, a comparative analysis is 
carried out in section 5.2 that examines differences in the determinants of multiple 
jobholding. The countries studied are Germany and the UK, which belong to quite different 
regimes in terms of labor market regulations. One particular labor market restriction, hours-
constraints, is one of the two more promiment arguments as to why workers should want to 
provide labor in more than one job. Given a more flexible labor market, like the British, it 
may therefore be argued that individuals do not face the need of holding a second job. 
However, besides this primary explanation there are further theoretical arguments which 
suggest that workers may not be hours-constrained to moonlight. For example, jobs may be 
complementary or one job may provide financial stability while the other offers non-monetary 
benefits. Both motives, the ‘hours-constraints’ motive and the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive 
are examined with longitudinal data drawn from the BHPS and the GSOEP.  
Finally, the subsequent section is devoted to the analysis of a change in the institutional 
framework in Germany and its consequences for secondary jobholding. That is, the 1999 
reform of imposing social security payments on ‘marginal employment’ is evaluated. 
 
The final chapter, Chapter 6, briefly summarizes the results from the empirical analyses again 
and presents some concluding remarks. 
 
  5 
2. Panel estimation methods 
2.1 Introduction and notation 
In this chapter, techniques for panel or longitudinal data are briefly discussed.1 As some of the 
following essays use the same estimation techniques, this section gives a short and general 
introduction one can later on refer to. Therefore, detailed repetitions of the methods can be 
avoided. However, only the techniques used more than once will be presented. Estimation 
methods that are applied only once will be illustrated in the particular section which allows 
for an undisturbed reading of the studies. Furthermore, extensions of the techniques that are 
necessary due to, for example, a different data structure will also be given only when needed. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Subsequently,  a short background to panel data 
is given and notation is established that is used in the presentation of the models. Thereafter, 
based on extensions to the pooled OLS estimator, the two most frequently used panel 
estimators for continuous dependent variables, the random effects estimator and the fixed 
effects estimator, are outlined. Followingly, the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable (IV) 
estimator is presented which can be considered to be an estimator in between the fixed and 
random effects approach. The presentation of the estimators is followed by the outline of two 
statistical tests that can be used to decide on which estimator is the appropriate one to base the 
findings upon. In particular, both the Breusch-Pagan test tests for random effects and the 
Hausman test are presented, the latter being useful for the choice of either the random effects 
model, the fixed effects model or the Hausman-Taylor IV estimator. The chapter closes with 
the presentation of a model for panel data with binary dependent variables, the fixed effects 
logit estimator. 
 
Panel data are repeated observations on the same set of cross-section units. While these 
methods can be employed for larger entities like, for instance, firms or regions, the units in 
the analyses here are all individuals. Typical sources of panel data are household surveys like 
e.g. the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the United States, the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) or the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP).2 Persons who 
                                                 
1 More details on panel data models and methods are provided by econometrics textbooks like Baltagi (2001), 
Greene (2003), Johnston and DiNardo (1997) or Verbeek (2000). The presentation of the models here draws 
heavily from these textbooks. 
2 For more information on the PSID see http://www.isr.umich.edu/src/psid/, information on the BHPS is given at 
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participate in one of these panel studies are re- interviewed on a yearly basis.3 Therefore, the 
structure of panel data typically is that the number of cross-section units (N) is large and the 
number of time periods (T) over which individuals are observed is rather small. The use of 
time-series methods, i.e. when n = 1 and T is large, may hence be somewhat problematic. 
However, the techniques developed to address these short and wide data sets focus on cross-
sectional variation, or heterogeneity. 
The follow-up approach that is employed in the design of longitudinal data is the base for 
the fundamental advantage of panel data techniques. Using estimation methods for panel data, 
it is possible to control for the so-called unobservable individual heterogeneity. 4 The general 
idea behind this is that there are individual-specific characteristics that, on the one hand, are 
difficult or even impossible to observe or measure. On the other hand, it is assumed that those 
characteristics vary across individuals but are constant over time. One of the more typical 
examples for such an unobservable characteristic is the intelligence or the abilities of 
individuals. It is rather plausible that intelligence/abilities meets both underlying assumptions: 
It varies across individuals and it presumably is (more or less) constant over time. If 
intelligence/abilities or any other unobservable individual-specific characteristic is not taken 
into account in regression equations, results from, for example, OLS might be biased. In this 
latter case, the problem that emerges is simply one of missing or omitted regressors. 
 
The panel estimators that are presented here, however, do control for unobservable individual 
heterogeneity. First, some notation is established: 
=ity  the value of the dependent (continuous) variable
5 for cross-section individual i 
at time t where i = 1, …, n and t = 1, …, T 
=jitX  the value of the jth explanatory variable for individual i at time t.  There are K  
explanatory variables indexed by j = 1, …, K. 
 
The discussion of the models here is restricted to the case of balanced panels. That is, there is 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/index.php. The GSOEP is hosted by the GSOEP-group at the German Institute 
for Economic Research in Berlin (DIW), see http://www.diw.de/english/sop/index.html (all links October 2003). 
3 This refers to the ideal case. Survey non-response and the so-called panel attrition represent methodological 
challenges that are object of a large literature not further discussed here. 
4 The possibility to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity presumably is the most important benefit in 
the use of panel data. Baltagi (2001, 6-9) lists some more advantages as well as limitations. 
5 Regarding limited dependent variables, the presence of individual-specific effects in panel data complicates 
matters significantly. See section 2.8 in this chapter for an outline of the fixed effects logit model that can be used 
when the dependent variable is binary. 
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the same number of observations for each individual. The total number of observations thus is 
Tn × . Typically, the data are organized by decision units. Therefore, 
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where ite  is the error term for individual i at time t. Usually, the data are arranged to form 
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   (2.2) 
where y is 1´nT , X is knT ´ , and e  is 1´nT . The standard linear model can then be 
written as 
eXßy +=    (2.3) 
where  [ ]kbbb  , , , 21 L=¢ß . 
 
All models that are presented subsequently are variants of the model given by (2.3). The 
differences between the models are mainly due to different assumptions about the error term 
e . 
 
 
2.2 The pooled OLS estimator 
The simplest case of using longitudinal data arises from ignoring the panel structure of the 
data. Once the data are organized as given by equation (2.1) the model can be written as  
eXß +=y .   (2.4) 
 
The simplicity of this model comes from the assumption about the error term: It is assumed 
that ),0(~ 2se iidit . That is, for a given X, there is no serial correlation between observations 
and, furthermore, errors are not heteroskedastic. Put differently, one assumes that an 
individual’s observations over time are observations from different individuals. Such 
approach might be reasonable, for example, in cases when the size of cross-sectional samples 
is too small. However, ignoring the panel structure of the data by assuming that the error 
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terms are iid leads to results that are not appropriate in many cases. Still, as the assumptions 
about the disturbance meet those of the classic linear regression model, efficient estimation 
can be achieved using OLS. Let PR be an index corresponding to the pooled regression 
estimation, the least squares estimator can be derived just as in simple multiple linear 
regression models using cross-sectional data: 
yXXXß ¢¢= -1)(ˆ PR    (2.5) 
 
The variance of the estimator is 
12 )()ˆ( -¢= XXß esPRVar    (2.6) 
and 2es  can be estimated by 
ee¢
-
=
KnT
s
12
e    (2.7) 
where   PRßXye ˆ-= . 
 
However, in the presence of unobservable individual heterogeneity, the pooled OLS estimator 
quite likely will be biased. The following example will briefly illustrate the consequences. 
Consider the ‘true’ underlying model 
eßXßXy ++= 2211    (2.8) 
 
Now, let 2X be unobservable. Therefore, the model is estimated taking into account 1X  only. 
The familiar estimator for 1ß  is: 
yXXXß 1
1
111 )(ˆ ¢¢=
-    (2.9) 
 
The expected value of the estimator is given by: 
])()([)ˆ( 1
1
11221
1
1111 eXXXßXXXXßß ¢¢+¢¢+=
--EE  (2.10) 
 
However, assuming that 0)( 1 =XiE e  and given that 02 ¹ß , which will presumably be the 
case, 021 ¹¢XX : 
1221
1
1111 )()ˆ( ßßXXXXßß ¹¢¢+=
-E  (2.11) 
 
The OLS estimator for 1ß  will consequently be biased, although the direction of the bias a 
priori is not clear and has to rely on theoretical reasoning. 
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Nevertheless, and despite its potential biases, pooled OLS estimation is often used as starting 
point in applied analyses. Typically, its results are compared to results from models that are 
better suited for the analysis of panel data. The three models considered here are the random 
effects estimator, the fixed effects estimator as well as the Hausman-Taylor IV estimator. 
These are presented next. First, however, extensions to the simple model have to be 
introduced. 
 
 
2.3 Extensions to the pooled OLS estimator 
The following model is considered:  
ititit ey +¢= ßX  (2.12) 
 
where the structure of the error term is as follows: 
itiite ha += . (2.13) 
 
That is, the disturbance term is decomposed in two parts: The second part, ith , corresponds to 
the common stochastic error term in, for example, classical linear regression models. There 
are two explicit assumptions: First, ith  is assumed to be uncorrelated with itX  and it is 
furthermore assumed to vary unsystematically across individuals and time. In particular: 
0)|,(
0)|(
=
=
X
X
jsit
it
E
E
hh
h
 (2.14) 
for all st ¹  or ji ¹ . 
 
The first part of the decomposed error term, ia , is the so-called individual-specific effect. In 
contrast to the remaining disturbance the common assumption is that ia  varies across 
individuals but is constant over time. The crucial assumption that distinguishes the fixed 
effects model from the random effects model is whether ia  may or may not be correlated with 
the set of explanatory variables, itX : 
· random effects model: ia  is uncorrelated with itX ; 
· fixed effects model: ia  is correlated with itX . 
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That is, in the fixed effects model, the ia  are assumed to be n unknown parameters that are to 
be estimated, while in the random effects case, the ia  are treated as drawings from a 
distribution with mean m  and variance 2as  which are independent from the explanatory 
variables in itX . As will be shown later in this chapter, the Hausman-Taylor instrumental 
variable estimator provides an alternative to this ‘all or nothing’ approach regarding the 
correlation between the itX  and the ia .  
 
 
2.4 No correlation between individiual effects and covariates: The 
random effects model 
Consider the following model:  
ititit ey +¢= ßX  (2.15) 
where   itiite ha += . 
 
It is useful to be more explicit about the two parts of the error term (repeating and extending 
(2.14)): 
[ ] [ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ] .  if 0|
, or   if 0|
,  and , , allfor  0|
, |
, |
, 0||
22
22
jiE
jistE
jtiE
E
E
EE
ji
jsit
iit
i
it
iit
¹=
¹¹=
=
=
=
==
X
X
X
X
X
XX
aa
hh
ah
sa
sh
ah
a
h
 (2.16) 
 
Formulating the model in T observations for each unit i, it follows that, conditional on X, 
)])([(),( isiitiisit EE hahaee ++=  
      ),(),(),()( 2 isitiitisii EEEE hhahhaa +++=  
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ï
ï
î
ïï
í
ì
¹
¹
=+
=
.  if  and  allfor 0
,for  
,for 
2
22
jist
st
st
a
ha
s
ss
 
The error covariance of the disturbance term of each individual cross-section unit i is: 
ú
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
+
+
+
=¢+=¢
2222
2222
2222
22][
haaa
ahaa
aaha
ah
ssss
ssss
ssss
ssee
L
MOMM
K
K
TTTiiE iiI  (2.17) 
where iT is a 1´T  column vector of ones. Let ]|[ XS iiE ee ¢=  be the TT ´  matrix given in 
(2.17), the disturbance covariance matrix for the full nT observations then is 
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
=¢=Ä=
S
S
S
eeSIO
L
MOMM
K
K
00
00
00
][En . (2.18) 
 
For application of either the generalized least squares estimator (GLS) or feasible GLS, one 
needs to know the inverse of W , and, in particular, 2/12/1 -- Ä= SIO n . The block diagonality 
of O  facilitates finding the inverse. One can focus on finding 2/1-S , which is 
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
÷
ø
ö
ç
è
æ ¢--=- TTT iiT
IS
q
sh
112/1 , 
where 
22
2
ha
h
ss
s
q
+
=
T
. (2.19) 
 
Transforming yi and Xi for GLS yields 
ú
ú
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ê
ê
ë
é
-
-
-
=
×
×
×
-
iiT
ii
ii
i
yy
yy
yy
q
q
q
sh M
2
1
2/1 1yO  (2.20) 
and likewise for the rows of Xi, where the ith term ×iy  is 
å
=
× =
T
t
iti yT
y
1
1  
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and ×iX  is defined similarly. 
 
If the variance components 2hs  and 
2
as  are known, GLS estimation can be applied without 
difficulty. However, this typically is not the case and estimates of the unknown variances are 
needed. Consistent estimators can be derived as the appropriately modified sum of squared 
errors from two different estimators, the so-called between estimator and the within estimator, 
which therefore will be presented briefly. 
 
2.4.1 The between estimator 
This estimator is quite intuitive insofar as one performs OLS on a ‘collapsed’ data set where 
all data are converted into individual specific averages ×iy  and ×iX . The resulting between 
estimator is given by 
yPXXPXß DDB ¢¢=
-1)(ˆ  (2.21) 
where DD)DD(P 1 ¢¢= -D  and Tn iID Ä= , i.e. a nnT ´  matrix of n dummy variables 
corresponding to each cross-section unit, that is, each individual. Note that if OLS on the 
pooled sample is consistent, the between estimator Bßˆ  is also consistent, though not efficient. 
 
2.4.2 The within estimator 
This estimator uses information that is not taken into account by the between estimator and is 
called within estimator as it uses only the variation within each cross-section unit. The data is 
premultiplied by a matrix DM , where DD)DD(IM
1 ¢¢-= -nTD  and OLS is computed on the 
transformed data. The following estimator, the within estimator, then is 
[ ]
yMXXMX
yMXMXMXMß
DD
DDDDW
¢¢=
¢¢=
-
-
1
1
)(
)()()()(ˆ
 (2.22) 
 
If the assumptions underlying the random effects model are correct, the within estimator Wßˆ  
is, alike the between estimator, consistent, but not efficient. 
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The unknown variance components 2hs  and 
2
as  can now be computed as follows: 
wwnnknT
uu ˆˆ
12 ¢
--
=hs  
kn
BB
B -
¢
=
uu ˆˆ2s  
TB
2
22 h
a
s
ss -=  
where wuˆ are the residuals from the within regression and Buˆ  are the residuals from the 
between regression. 2hs  and 
2
as  can then be used to compute q  as given by (2.19). After that, 
OLS can be performed on the transformed variables y~  and X~  where 
×× +-= iiitit yyyy qˆ
~  (2.23) 
×× +-= iiitit XXXX qˆ
~
. (2.24) 
 
Note that the random effects estimator reduces to the pooled OLS estimator when there is no 
uncorrelated individual-specific component of variance, i.e. 02 =as and therefore 1=q . 
 
 
2.5 Correlation between individiual effects and covariates: The fixed 
effects model 
The within estimator that was needed in the random effects model to compute the unknown 
variance component 2hs  is of importance again as it is one possible estimator for the fixed 
effects model. In contrast to the random effects case, the crucial assumption in the fixed 
effects model is that 0),cov( ¹iit aX . The model must therefore be estimated conditionally on 
the presence of the fixed effects. Rewriting the model in (2.12) gives 
itiitity ha ++¢= ßX  (2.25) 
where the ia  are unknown parameters to be estimated.
6 
 
                                                 
6 Note that while the remaining parameters can be estimated consistently, there is no consistent estimation for 
ia  (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). 
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The regression that is to be run is 
?DaXßy ++=  (2.26) 
where, as above, D is the matrix that collects n dummy variables corresponding to each 
individual. Premultiplying the data by DM , the resulting within estimator is (repeating (2.22)) 
yMXXMXß DDW ¢¢=
-1)(ˆ . 
 
The particular advantage of the fixed effects model is the removal of the individual-specific 
heterogeneity which can be shown by an ‘deviations-from-means’ approach. Consider 
××× ++¢= iiiiy haßX . (2.27) 
 
As the mean of the individual fixed effect ia  for individual i is ia , Eqs. (2.25) and (2.27) can 
be differenced. This yields 
)()( ××× -+¢-=- iitiitiit yy hhßXX . (2.28) 
 
While unobservable heterogeneity is accounted for, there is a potential drawback insofar that 
the within estimator uses only the variation within an individual’s set of observations. This 
might be problematic when there are time- invariant explaining variables, which is rather often 
the case in micro-econometric analyses. Consider, for example, an individual’s time spent in 
education or vocational training. Once completed, this measure will not vary much over time, 
if at all. It therefore is associated with ia  and cannot be used in the regression. However, as 
will be shown below, the Hausman-Taylor IV estimator provides an opportunity to handle this 
potential problem. 
 
The covariance matrix of the within estimator is  
12 )()ˆvar( -¢= XMXß DW hs  (2.29) 
and can be estimated by computing 
knnT
ww
--
¢
=
uu2ˆhs . (2.30) 
 
To sum up: The two estimators presented, the random effects estimator and the fixed effects 
estimator, both are models to handle the specific structure of longitudinal or panel data. That 
is, unobservable individual heterogeneity is taken into account by both models. The 
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distinction between the two models is whether the individual-specific time- invariant effects 
are correlated with the regressors or not. Furthermore, given that the random effects model is 
valid, the fixed effects estimator still produces consistent estimates of the identifiable 
parameters. As it often might be unlikely to believe that the individual-specific effects are 
uncorrelated with the relevant covariates, it is appealing to prefer the fixed effects estimator 
over the random effects estimator. 
 
However, it has to be noted that there are also perils relying on the fixed effects model only. 
First, as pointed out, time- invariant variables cannot be used. This might be a limitation to a 
range of micro-econometric topics of interest like, for example, analyses on the returns of 
education. Furthermore, measurement error in X and endogenous changes in X might lead to 
biased results also with the fixed effects estimator.7 
 
As a consequence, neither random effects nor fixed effects estimation might be appropriate 
and other, more sophisticated models, like IV estimation or GMM should be applied. 
Therefore, in addition to both random effects and fixed effects model which are standard in 
applied work and which are also used in some of the following studies, one of these more 
advanced methods, the Hausman-Taylor IV estimator presented followingly is also used. 
 
 
2.6 Endogenous effects: The Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable 
(IV) estimator 
As outlined, the crucial difference between the random effects model and the fixed effects 
model is based on assumptions about the correlation between the individual-specific effects 
and the set of regressors. There are two major shortcomings: First, the user is left to make an 
‘all or nothing’ decision based on whether she assumes that there is correlation or not. 
Second, in cases where it is more reasonable to assume that the individual effects are related 
to the regressors, estimation of time- invariant explanatory variables is not possible. To 
overcome these shortcomings, Hausman and Taylor (1981) introduced a model where some 
of the explanatory variables are related to the ia , while others are not. In particular, they 
                                                 
7 For more details and consequences see Johnston and DiNardo (1997, pp. 399). 
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consider a model of the form: 
itiiitity nm +++= ?ZßX  (2.31) 
where the iZ are time-invariant covariates. In this formulation, all individual effects that are 
denoted as iZ are observed. As in the panel models above, unobservable individual effects are 
contained in the person-specific random term, im . Hausman and Taylor suggested to split X 
and Z into two sets of variables:  X = [X1;X2] and Z = [Z1;Z2]. X1 is 1kn ´ , X2 is 2kn ´ , Z1 is 
1gn ´ , Z2 is 2gn ´  and NTn = . 
 
The model then is 
itiiiititity nm +++++= 22112211 ?Z?ZßXßX  (2.32) 
 
The distinguishing feature of this model is found in the assumptions on the correlation 
between the individual-specific effect, im , and the sets of time-varying and time- invariant 
regressors. In particular, four sets of observed variables are defined in this model: 
it1X  is 1k  variables that are time-varying and uncorrelated with im , 
i1Z  is 1g  variables that are time- invariant and uncorrelated with im , 
it2X  is 2k  variables that are time-varying and correlated with im , 
i2Z  is 2g  variables that are time- invariant and correlated with im . 
 
There are the following assumptions about the random terms in the model: 
. /],,,|,[
, ],,,|[
, 0],,,|,[
, ],,,|[
, 0],|[  :however  ;0],|[][
222
2211
222
2211
2211
2
2211
2211
mnm
mn
m
sssrmnmn
sssmn
mn
sm
mmm
+==++
+==+
=
=
¹==
iitiitiisiit
iitiitiit
iitiitiit
iitiiti
iitiiitii
Corr
Var
Cov
Var
EEE
ZXZX
ZXZX
ZXZX
ZXZX
ZXZX
 (2.33) 
 
Under these assumptions, the fixed effects estimator will still result in consistent estimates for 
),( 21 ¢¢¢= ßßß . However, the within transformation used in the fixed effects model will also 
sweep away both the individual effects, im , and, more vital here, the time- invariant 
covariates, iZ . Therefore, estimates of ?  cannot be calculated using the fixed effects 
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estimator. Furthermore, it may not be efficient because it1X  is needlessly instrumented. 
Hausman and Taylor propose an instrumental variable approach where the following 
variables are used as instruments: iit 11  , ZX  and ××- iiit 122  , XXX . That is, the exogenous 
variables, i.e. the variables that are uncorrelated with im , serve as their own instruments. The 
time-varying endogenous variables, it2X , are instrumented by the deviation from individual 
means ( ×- iit 22 XX ), the time-invariant endogenous variables, i2Z , are instrumented by the 
individual average of it1X  ( ×i1X ). 
 
Given the minor role in the current empirical literature, the estimator seems not to be well 
known. Therefore, the strategy of the estimation is outlined in some more detail here. First, 
the familiar within transformation is applied to the data. The model (2.31) therefore reduces to  
itititity n
~~~~
2211 ++= ßXßX  (2.34) 
where ×-= iitit yyy
~  and å
=
× =
T
t
iti yn
y
1
1
; an analogous transformation is applied to itX  and itn . 
 
The resulting within estimators, w1ßˆ  and w2ßˆ , are consistent, but may not be efficient. 
Furthermore, note again that since 0
~
=-= ×iii ZZZ  and 0
~ =-= ×iii mmm , both iZ  and im  
are removed from the model. The ?  therefore are not estimable. 
 
Next, the within residuals are obtained from the within estimator: 
witwititit yd 2211
~~~~ ßXßX --=  (2.35) 
 
It is then possible to estimate the variance of the idiosyncratic error component, 2ns , as 
nN
RSS
-
=2ˆns  (2.36) 
where N is the total number of observations and RSS is the residual sum of squares from the 
within regression. 
 
To access intermediate, consistent estimates 1?  and 2? , the group means of the residuals, itd
~
, 
are then used as the dependent variable in an instrumental variable regression on 1Z  and 2Z , 
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where 1Z  and 1X  are the instruments. These estimates, IV1?ˆ  and IV2?ˆ , are needed to obtain 
an estimate of the variance of the random effect, 2ms . Define 
2
1 1 1
2 ˆ11 å å å
= = =
÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
=
n
i
T
t
T
t
i
i
i i
e
TN
s  (2.37) 
with )ˆˆˆˆ(ˆ 22112211 IVitIVitwitwititit ye gg ZZßXßX ----= . 
 
In the case of balanced panels, Hausman and Taylor show that 
222plim nm ss +=¥® Tsn . (2.38) 
 
Given that the panel is unbalanced, it follows that 
222plim nm ss +=¥® Tsn . (2.39) 
where 
å =
= n
i i
T
n
T
1
/1
. 
 
From this estimator and the estimator of 2ns  in (2.36), it is possible to deduce 
T
s )ˆ(
ˆ
22
2 n
m
s
s
-
= . (2.40) 
 
In order to run feasible GLS, a weight is needed. Therefore, define 
÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ
+
-=
22
2
ˆˆ
ˆ
1ˆ
mn
n
ss
s
q
i
i T
. (2.41) 
 
The next and final step is to perform the standard random effects GLS transformation on each 
of the variables. As the full set of the variables in the model can be written as 
),,,( 2121 iiititit ZZXXw ¢¢¢¢=¢ , the transformed variables for GLS are 
×-¢= iiitit www qˆ
*'  and ×-= iiitit yyy qˆ
* . (2.42) 
 
Consider then a )( 1121 kgkknT +++´  matrix V, where the rows consist of the instrumental 
variables ],,)(,)[( 112211 ××× ¢¢-¢-=¢ iiiitiitit XZXXXXv . The instrumental variable estimator then 
is 
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( ) )]))('()]())('[(, 111' *-*-*-* ¢¢¢¢=¢¢ yVVVVWWVVVVW?ß IV  (2.43) 
 
This Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator is consistent and efficient. Furthermore, 
a strong advantage of this approach is that no external instruments have to be used. While the 
subsequently proposed estimators of Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon and 
Schmidt (1989) try to improve upon the efficieny of the HT-IV estimator, only this latter is 
used here as the underlying exogeneity assumptions are weaker.8 
 
 
2.7 Two statistical tests for panel models 
The preceding sections presented four estimators that can be applied to panel data. Clearly, 
the pooled OLS estimator is presented mainly because of its ease of use and because of its 
benchmark character in the empirical literature. However, as it does not account for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity, the more relevant models are the random effects and 
the fixed effects model, which are the two most prevalent estimators that are applied to 
longitudinal micro-data. Furthermore, improving on some of the shortcomings of these two 
models, the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable estimator might also be applied. 
However, this variety of methods leaves the question about which model to use. That 
question is answered in the next two subsections that present simple statistical tests. First, the 
Breusch-Pagan test for random effects is presented. This Lagrange-Multiplier test is a test on 
whether there are individual-specific effects. It can therefore be used to decide on whether to 
rely on the results from the pooled OLS estimator or, somewhat more likely when using panel 
data, whether random effects exist. Next, the Hausman test is shortly discussed. This test is a 
tool when having to decide on whether it is the fixed effects or the random effects model that 
is the more reliable one. Furthermore, although not presented here, the Hausman test can also 
be used for the decision on whether the HT-IV estimator is the more appropriate one to apply 
to the data. 
 
                                                 
8 See Baltagi (2001) for a comparison of these three methods and the particular differences between the 
estimators. 
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2.7.1 The Breusch-Pagan test 
This Lagrange-Multiplier test tests for the existence of individual heterogeneity, i.e. whether 
the pooled OLS is an appropriate model or not. It was developed by Breusch and Pagan 
(1980) and is based on the following statistical hypotheses: 
0: 20 =asH , 
0: 21 ¹asH . 
Therefore, the null hypothesis, 0H , is the same as 0),( =isitCor ee  for st ¹ . 
 
It is instructive to explore the following equation: 
å å+å å=å úû
ù
êë
éå
= ¹= == =
n
i ts
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n
i
T
t
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i
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t
it
11 1
2
1
2
1
eeee . (2.44) 
 
Assuming that the pooled OLS model is valid, the second term on the right hand side equals 
zero. The sum on the left hand side and the first term on the right hand side can easily be 
determined. Given that both terms are roughly equal, unobservable individual heterogeneity is 
not relevant.  
 
The estimation of a pooled OLS regression is sufficient to compute the test-statistic. Let the 
estimated residuals ite  be an estimator for ite ,  the test-statistic for the Breusch-Pagan test 
then is 
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 (2.45) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, LMBP is distributed as chi-squared with one degree of freedom. 
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2.7.2 The Hausman test 
As outlined, the salient distinction between the random effects model and fixed effects model 
is whether there is correlation between the ia  and the set of regressors. This distinction is 
sufficient to put up the Hausman test which is based on the following (verbal) hypotheses: 
iH a:0  is uncorrelated with X , 
iH a:1  ist correlated with X . 
 
There now is a simple motivation for the development of an appropriate test-statistic: 
· Under the null hypothesis, 0H , i.e. if the ia  are uncorrelated with the covariates 
itX , the random effects (GLS-)estimator ( REßˆ ) is consistent and efficient; the 
fixed effects (within-)estimator ( FEßˆ ) is consistent, though not efficient. 
· Under the alternative hypothesis, 1H , i.e. if the ia  are correlated with the 
explanatory variables itX , the fixed effects estimator is consistent and efficient but 
the random effects estimator is now inconsistent. 
Therefore, under the null hypothesis, there should be no systematic differences between FEßˆ  
und REßˆ . The hypotheses can then be modified as follows: 
0)ˆˆ(:0 =- REFEH ßß , 
 0)ˆˆ(:1 ¹- REFEH ßß . 
 
The variance of both estimators is needed to compute the test-statistic. In general, the variance 
of the differences is: 
)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ,ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ( ¢--+=- REFEREFEREFEREFE CovCovVarVarVar ßßßßßßßß . (2.46) 
 
The first two components on the right hand side are known from the estimations. The 
covariances, however, are unknown. Hausman (1978) showed that the covariance of an 
efficient estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero, which implies that 
0)ˆ()ˆ,ˆ(]ˆ),ˆˆ[( =-=- REREFEREREFE VarCovCov ßßßßßß . (2.47) 
 
Therefore, 
)ˆ()ˆ,ˆ( REREFE VarCov ßßß = . 
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Using this result yields the required covariance matrix for the test: 
Sßßßß =-=- )ˆ()ˆ()ˆˆ( REFEREFE VarVarVar . (2.48) 
 
S  can be computed using the estimated covariance matrices from the within- and the GLS-
estimation. The Hausman test-statistic then is: 
21 ~)ˆˆ(ˆ)ˆˆ( KREFEREFEHT cßßSßß -¢-=
- . (2.49) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, HT is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with K degrees of 
freedom. 
 
 
2.8 A method for binary dependent variables: the fixed effects logit 
model 
While all the above presented models for panel data deal with continuous dependent 
variables, the estimation of models for limited dependent variables complicates matters 
significantly. The reason is that correlations between different error terms typically 
complicate the likelihood functions of such models. 
 
Similar to the cross-sectional case, panel models with limited dependent variables are 
formulated as follows: 
itiitity ha ++¢= ßX
*  (2.50) 
where *ity  is a underlying latent variable representing, for example, tastes to work. However, 
such variables in general are not observable. In the case of a binary variable, one typically 
observes 
ïî
ï
í
ì >
=
otherwise.0
0 if1 *it
it
y
y  
 
Initially assuming that the error term ith  has a symmetric distribution function F(.) and is iid 
across individuals and time and independent of all itX , maximizing the resulting log-
likelihood function suffers from the so-called ‘incidental parameters problem’ as the number 
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of parameters increases with the number of observations resulting in inconsistent estimators 
(Verbeek, 2000).9  
 
An alternative strategy has been proposed by Chamberlain (1980) by using the conditional 
maximum likelihood. Accordingly, the likelihood function is considered conditional upon a 
set of statistics ti that are ‘minimal sufficient’ for ia . That is, conditional upon ti, an 
individual’s likelihood contribution does not depend upon ia  but still depends upon the other 
characteristics ß . Assuming that the dependent variable in question is a binary choice 
variable, the existence of a minimal sufficient statistic depends upon the functional form of F, 
i.e. the distribution of ith . Let ),,,,( 1 ba iiTi yyf K  be the joint density function of iTi yy ,,1 K . 
The function hence depends upon ia  and ß . Given that there exists a sufficient statistic ti, the 
joint density funtion no longer depends upon ia : ),|,,(),,|,,( 11 ßß iiTiiiiTi tyyftyyf KK =a . 
Based upon the latter term, the conditional maximum likelihood function can be maximized to 
get a consistent estimator of ß . 
 
For nonlinear models, it has been shown that there exists no sufficient statistic for ia  for the 
probit model, i.e. there is no consistent estimator for a fixed effects probit model for fixed T. 
However, for the fixed effects logit model, i.e. assuming that the ith  are distributed 
independently logistic, ii yt =  is such a minimal sufficient statistic for ia . Consistent 
estimation is therefore possible by conditional maximum likelihood. In particular, the 
following probability model is considered: 
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As noted, this fixed effects model can be estimated by conditional maximum likelihood. 
Particularly, the probability of a sequence of outcomes (yi1, …, yiT), conditional to å
=
=
T
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9 This is, because the estimator relies on Ti increasing for the constant terms to be consistent. However, Ti is 
fixed and, furthermore, usually quite small. The estimators of the constant terms, ia , therefore do not converge 
(Greene, 2003). 
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where Si is the set of all possible combinations of yi ones and T – yi zeros, is free of the 
incidental parameters, i.e. independent of ia . 
 
Similar to the perils of the fixed effects estimation in the case of continuous dependent 
variables, it should be noted that the fixed effects logit model also has its shortcomings. In 
particular, the conditional distribution of iTi yy ,,1 K  is degenerate if ti (i.e. iy ) = 0 or ti = 1. 
Such individuals do not contribute to the conditional likelihood and should therefore be 
discarded from the estimation. 10 In other words, only those individuals that change status at 
least once are relevant for estimating ß  as their behavior would be captured by their 
individual effect ia  otherwise. 
 
Like the standard random and fixed effects models, it is of relevance to test whether there is 
individual heterogeneity. If there would be no heterogeneity, the model could be estimated 
using the familiar logit estimator, i.e. by unconditional maximum likelihood. Testing for 
heterogeneity can again be done by a Hausman-specification test. The null hypothesis here is 
that there is homogeneity. That is 
aa =iH :0 , 
aa ¹iH :1 . 
 
Under the null hypothesis, 0H , both Chamberlain’s conditional maximum likelihood 
estimator (CMLE) and the usual maximum likelihood (ML) estimator are consistent, but the 
CMLE is inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, 1H , the CMLE is consistent and 
efficient, but the unconditional ML estimator is inconsistent. The appropriate Hausman test 
can therefore be based on the following chi-squared statistic 
[ ] [ ] 21 ~)ˆˆ()()ˆˆ( KMLCMLMLCML MLVarCMLVarH cßßßß --¢-= - . (2.53) 
 
 
                                                 
10 In fact, this is often done automatically by appropriate statistical software packages like, in this case, STATA. 
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Under the null hypothesis, H is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with K degrees of 
freedom. A large value will cast doubt on the null hypothesis, i.e. the existence of 
homogeneity. 
  26 
3. Religion and economic outcomes 
3.1 Introduction: The economists’ view of religion 
In this chapter, a variety of questions is analyzed that are associated with the field of the so-
called ‘Economics of Religion’. Several non-market situations have been addressed 
increasingly by economists in the last decades – sometimes entailing the accuse of the 
‘imperialism of economics’. However, individuals’ religious behavior as subject of scientific 
research has long been neglected. Typically, this area of research is considered as rather 
esoteric by mainstream economists. This rather declining attitude is based on the perceivingly 
widespread assumption that faith in a superior order rests upon irrationality. According to this 
opinion, scientific research should be left to more traditional scholars like sociologists, 
psychologists if not theologians in the first place.  
Nevertheless, Iannaccone (1998) shows in his extensive survey of work done in this field 
that the economic analysis of religion can offer valuable contributions when tackling to 
understand human behavior. Not only has previous research shown that religious behavior 
does not rest on ‘primitive’ thought, neurotic impulses and social conditioning (Iannaccone et 
al., 1998) but that religious involvement furthermore influences a range of social and 
economic phenomena. Among the aspects explored, religious participation and its 
determinants is addressed more often. The seminal contribution here was made by Azzi and 
Ehrenberg (1975) who analyze church attendance in the US in a Becker-style allocation-of-
time framework.1 
While the origin of the ‘Economics of Religion’ might be attributed to the writings of 
Adam Smith, the study of Azzi and Ehrenberg has to be considered as the modern revival of 
economists’ work on religion and individuals’ religious behavior. However, the demand for 
religious products is only one of the strands of research that are subsumed to the ‘Economics 
of Religion’. Besides religious participation, the economic analysis also covers the 
functioning of religious markets and religious bodies.2 Overall, the basic message from this 
body of research is that ‘home oeconomicus’ and ‘homo religiosus’ are not mutually 
                                                 
1 Among recent analyses are, e.g., Cameron (1999), Sawkins et al. (1997), Smith et al. (1998) or Heineck (2001). 
2 In particular, this strand addresses churches and other religious bodies and analyzes these institutions the way 
consultants analyzes firms and the potential to improve on efficiency or to stimulate growth. Still another strand 
is the so-called ‘Religious Economics’, a field of research that analyzes the structure of economies and economic 
policies from a religious perspective. There exists, for example, an established literature from the Islamic point 
of view on, amongst others, banking and accounting. For a general introduction to the ‘Economics of Religion’ 
see Iannaccone (1998) or, in Germany only, Schmidtchen (1999). 
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exclusive. 
While a good deal of work has furthermore been done to explore Max Weber’s famous 
hypothesis of the ‘Protestant Work Ethic’ (see, e.g., Blum and Dudley, 2001, Barro and 
McCleary, 2002 or Ekelund et al., 2002), the questions addressed in this chapter focus on the 
micro- level approach on the economic consequences of religion and religious behavior of 
individuals. Here, most of the research done so far examines more socio-economic or 
sociological issues like marital stability (Heaton and Pratt, 1990; Lehrer and Chiswick, 1993, 
Booth et al., 1995, Chinitz and Brown, 2001) or fertility (Lehrer, 1996). 
Literature on economic outcomes, however, is scarce. Among the few analyses that exist, 
Berggren (1997) shows, using data for Sweden, that the higher the rate of Christians in a city, 
the lower the rate of non-payments of debts. Earnings and wage premiums respectively are 
found by Chiswick (1983) for American Jews, by Tomes (1985) for Canadian Jews and by 
Ewing (2000) for American Catholics. Steen (1996) concludes that both Jewish and Catholic 
men have significantly higher wages than men who are raised in other religious traditions. 
Lipford and Tollison (2002), using US state data on per capita income, apply simultaneous 
estimation techniques to examine the effects of religious participation on income and, vice 
versa, income on religious participation. Their findings support hypotheses that, on the one 
hand, religious participation reduces participants’ incomes. High incomes, on the other hand, 
discourage religious participation. 
Lehrer (1995) analyzes the labor supply of married women using US data. She draws from 
both economic and sociological theories to examine the impact of religion on women’s 
decisions regarding the allocation of time between home and labor market. Her findings 
support the hypothesis that religion affects female time allocation decisions. 
 
The following analyses add to the existing literature on the effects of religion on individuals’ 
economic outcomes in several ways. First, two of the three following studies use survey data 
from Germany. As most of the existing literature explores North-American data, this opens 
the possibility of transnational and -continental comparisons. Such is of interest as there are 
huge differences in the structure of religious markets between, for example, the US and 
Germany. On the one hand, in the US, there is a variety of strongly competing religious 
bodies (Lindner, 2003). The German religious market, on the other hand, is dominated by the 
Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany, i.e. mainline Protestants. 
Adherents of these two religious bodies together account for almost two thirds of the German 
population. Furthermore, and additional to the overall secular trends in the last decades, the 
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eastern and western parts of Germany have experienced different developments concerning 
the societal role of religion prior to the reunification in 1990. While there is evidence of a 
recovery of religiosity in most post-communist countries (Barro and McCleary, 2002), East 
Germany is exceptional insofar that the majority of the population neither has a 
denominational affiliation nor believes in God (Pollack and Pickel, 1999). 
Besides the re-examinations of existing work with different data there furthermore are 
methodological advantages of some of the following studies. In contrast to the mostly cross-
secional analyses done yet, longitudinal data are used as well so that panel analyses can be 
carried out. As pointed out in the chapter on econometric methods for panel data, results from 
cross-sectional analyses might be biased in the presence of unobservable individual 
heterogeneity. Therefore, applying panel estimators might help to remove such potential bias 
and to make statistical inferences more reliable. 
Three studies are carried out followingly: The next section, 3.2, presents a cross-national 
study on the impact of religion on individuals’ attitudes towards female or mothers’ labor 
market participation and, using a sub-sample of employed married males, whether those 
attitudes affect wives’ employment. This latter aspect is explored in more detail by 
additionally using panel data in section 3.3, presenting analyses on the impact of religion on 
the labor supply of married women in Germany. This is followed by the analysis of the 
relationship between religion and male earnings in Germany in section 3.4. Concluding 
remarks on the economic outcomes of religion are given in section 3.5. 
 
 
3.2 Religion, attitudes towards mothers’ labor participation and 
wives’ employment 
In the economic and sociological literature, there is considerable concern about the rise in 
women’s participation in paid employment in the last decades. There exists extensive research 
both theoretically and empirically. However, there are only a few studies tackling the 
substantial variation in female employment across countries. This, among other reasons, is 
certainly due to the lack of comparable data in early years. In the last ten to twenty years, 
however, a few databases have been established and successfully implemented that ease inter-
country analyses. It is since possib le to examine factors that influence the labor participation 
decision of women controlling for differences in welfare state regimes across countries. These 
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regimes include, for example, institutional settings like family taxation, child allowances or 
the availability of state provided child care services. 
Culture, however, as a constituting part of human nature has not been that prominent in 
economic analyses that examine female employment across countries. This might partially be 
attributed to the complexity of the term. It consists of explicit and implicit patterns of and for 
behavior. Traditional ideas, i.e. ideas that are historically derived and selected and especially 
their attached values are of particular importance. Culture may thus, on the one hand, be 
considered as products of action. On the other hand, it may also be considered as conditioning 
elements of further action (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1967). Consequently, culture plays an 
essential role in the formation of individuals’ habits and attitudes on any imaginable aspect of 
life, also including factors that influence economic outcomes. Aspects like, for example, 
diligence or honesty shown by employees might be rewarded by employers. Still, while it is 
plausible to assume that individuals structure and organize daily life on behavioral norms and 
virtues, attitudes and norms differ across individuals depending on their particular cultural 
background. 
There are several factors that influence this background. The country-specific historical 
experience is one of these factors as certainly also is the membership to a particular ethnic 
group. Furthermore, there always are interdependencies between these aspects and the 
religion that is dominant in the country, region, and/or ethnic group. Therefore, religious 
affiliation and religious belief quite likely influence individual attitudes and behavior. The 
references given in the introduction to this chapter show that there is empirical evidence that 
religion affects a variety of sociological and economic aspects.  
However, pertaining to mothers’ employment there are only a few studies that address the 
formation of attitudes at the basic individual level and the observable cross-country variation 
in patterns. This is somewhat surprising as the strong increase in female labor participation 
and its impact on family as an institution has attracted the attention of the public as well as of 
policy makers. Furthermore, while culture in general and institutional settings have been 
explored by some authors (Knudsen and Waerness, 2001; Antecol, 2003), religion as a 
potential factor has largely been ignored. 
This section therefore adds to the existing research in multiple ways. First, three waves of 
a cross-national comparable dataset are used spanning time from 1991 to 1998. It is thus 
possible to get an insight in the recent development of attitudes towards working mothers. 
This, however, is not the focus of the section and hence remains somewhat crude. Yet, 
religion and its impact on attitude formation is explored in more detail. Furthermore, building 
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up on the analysis of attitudes, the data on males are used to examine the effect of religion on 
wives’ employment participation. This latter has, as far as apparent, hitherto not been object 
of investigation. 
 
3.2.1 Attitudes towards mothers’ employment: previous findings and 
expectations 
In many Western industrialized countries, women’s participation in paid employment 
increased rapidly in the last decades. This phenomenon has attracted much attention in social 
sciences, particularly in economics and sociology. Analyses on both the macro- and the 
micro- level have been conducted exploring possible factors that led to this development. On 
the macro-level, three prominent hypotheses from the sociological literature are the 
emancipation hypothesis, the U-hypothesis, and the constancy hypothesis each offering a 
different explanation as to why female labor participation has grown and hence also 
suggesting different prospects of future development (for a detailed discussion see Rau and 
Wazienski, 1999). 
However, more of interest here are studies on the micro- level that focus on the formation 
of attitudes towards female and particularly mothers’ labor participation and analyses that use 
such attitudes as predictors of women’s employment. Often, micro-level studies also link their 
analyses to the cross-country variation in female labor participation. Such comparative studies 
are regularly based on differences in welfare states and social policies. The cross-country 
variation in female employment can consequently be attributed to differences in, e.g., the 
taxation of the family or state-provided services of both child care and care of the elderly. 
Such policy dimensions, however, are subject to support of the society in general and 
therefore, in particular, are subject to individual behavior and attitudes towards gender roles 
and women working outside the home. 
Now, as Knudsen and Waerness (1999) point out, there are only few theoretical 
underpinnings about cross-country differences in attitude formation. These, in general, focus 
on the differences in institutional patterns. However, they furthermore state that there are two 
general social processes that lead to different attitudes and behavior in Western industrialized 
countries. These are (1) the struggle toward gender equality and (2) the individualization 
process, both being consequences of the secularization process. On the one hand, there is a 
certain amount of studies in the spirit of Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’ addressing secularization 
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or individualization and its relationship to economic well-being and prosperity. However, on 
the other hand, there surprisingly is only scarce literature that addresses the formation of basic 
attitudes at the level of the individual and the potential role religion might play within this 
process. Only recently has scholarly interest in such questions been rediscovered. 
For instance, Knudsen and Waerness (1999) acknowledge that, where dominant, religions 
might influence both a nation’s institutional settings like the design of the welfare state and 
the individuals’ interpretations of it. However, while noting that Catholic nations might be 
expected to be less favorable towards female or mothers’ employment, they do not include 
indicators of religion in their empirical analysis. 
In another study, Knudsen and Waerness (2001) combine attitudinal indicators from the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) into a single index to examine attitudes towards 
gender roles and mothers’ employment comparing the UK, Norway and Sweden. Here, they 
use frequency of religious participation as explanatory variable. They hypothesize that 
religiously devoted individuals are more negative towards modern gender roles than the not 
religiously engaged. Their findings show that a higher level of religious participation has a 
negative impact on liberal attitudes. While there are no statistical differences between the 
Swedish and the Norwegians they furthermore find that religiously active individuals in 
Britain are more in favor of modern gender roles and working mothers than the Norwegian 
counterparts. 
Siaroff (1994) pursues a comparative analysis on the aggregate level and finds that 
Protestantism is a crucial factor explaining female work desirability. On the one hand, he 
attributes this result to the greater importance, Protestantism attaches to individual rights. On 
the other hand, traditional religions including foremost Catholicism usually have stricter 
views towards working mothers. Schmidt’s (1993) analysis is along this line of arguments and 
his findings corroborate the Protestantism-Catholicism split. Gomilschak et al. (2000), using 
ISSP-data, also find that the higher the share of Protestants in nations the less likely is the 
accordance with the traditional ‘male-breadwinner’ model.  
Sainsbury (1999), on the other hand, concludes that it is not the Protestantism- 
Catholicism split only that is responsible for the cross-country variation in the development of 
female labor participation. While she acknowledges that Protestantism and Catholicism may 
play a part on its own, she refers to the Norwegian and the US case to indicate that it rather is 
the political institutionalization of religious and traditional beliefs in the party system also of 
Protestant nations that maintains societal attitudes in favor of the traditional ‘male 
breadwinner’ regime. 
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Similar results are shown by Guiso et al. (2002) in their quite comprising study that 
analyzes the impact of religion on people’s economic attitudes. Using data from the World 
Value Surveys (WVS) they, among a variety of economic aspects, also examine attitudes 
towards working women. They find that it is the religiously engaged who are less favorable 
with respect to female labor participation. However, this finding is not only attributed to more 
hierarchical denominations such as Catholicism or the Islam, but across most denominations, 
with Buddhism being somewhat exceptionally. Following their analysis, Protestantism is 
therefore not the religion in support of particularly liberal attitudes. 
 
There are some lessons and implications from the findings of all above noted studies. First, 
despite the complexity of institutional differences across countries with its differences in 
incentives for women to participate in paid employment, religiosity, in general, seems to have 
an impact on the behavior of individuals also including economic attitudes and outcomes. 
This, second, seems to be more or less independent from the particular denomination people 
are affiliated with but is rather attributed to the intensity of involvement, i.e. the frequency of 
religious participation. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that this picture should not 
show in the following analyses.  
However, none of the aforementioned studies shed light on intra-household or intra- family 
processes. According to New Home Economics (Becker, 1991), it can however be expected 
that both partners bargain over joint labor participation decisions, mostly implying that a 
husband’s career has a negative effect on his wife’s employment participation and outcomes. 
Empirical evidence in this area shows that the husband indeed matters. Bernardi (1999), using 
Italian data, conludes that a wife’s participation in the labor market is negatively affected if 
the husband has comparative advantages in market work. Antecol (2003) presents a cross-
country comparison based on the 1994 wave of the ISSP and ILO labor statistics. She 
analyzes the impact of male attitudes on the female decision to participate in the labor market 
and concludes that labor force participation rates of women are higher in countries where 
there are more liberal male attitudes towards working women. 
However, these studies again ignore religion and individual religious behavior as a 
potential source of variation in attitudes. This section therefore combines elements of previous 
analyses and examines possible influences on both attitudes towards mothers’ employment 
and actual labor market participation of wives. 
 
To sum up: Due to missing theoretical underpinnings, no particular expectations can be 
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derived deductively. However, based on the existing results from the previous literature, 
religiosity is assumed to affect individual attitudes towards gender roles and towards working 
mothers negatively. This assumption holds across the variety of denominations that are 
present in the (predominantly Christian) countries examined here. In particular, taken that 
individuals are religiously active or engaged, there should be no substantial differences in 
attitudes between Catholics and Protestants. Moreover, male and in particular husbands’ 
attitudes in favor of the traditional gender and family models are expected to affect the labor 
participation of wives negatively. 
The choice of the countries examined is based on Esping-Andersen’s follow-up on his 
classification on welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Particularly, West-Germany 
and Italy, having more familialistic welfare regimes, are considered to follow the ‘labor 
reduction route’ so that Germans and Italians are expected to show more traditional attitudes. 
Britain and New Zealand are representing the ‘neoliberal route’ and having more 
individualistic regimes that are based on less generous and means tested welfare benefits. 
More liberal attitudes should show for these two countries. 
East Germany is exceptional: Similar to other post-communist nations, it also was 
ideological reasoning prior to German reunification that lead to higher female labor 
participation rates. However, it might be argued that this was only state decreed behavior that 
was not reflecting true underlying individuals’ attitudes. In fact, there is evidence that 
individuals in the Eastern European countries are as traditionalistic as in the Western 
industrialized countries. Gomilschak et al. (2000) show that agreement to the traditional role 
of women ranges from 60% to 73% of the respective population. East Germany is different: 
following Canadians, where only 17% are in favor of the traditional gender role of women, 
East Germans (20% agreement) are even more liberal than the British or the Scandinavian. 
However, Braun et al. (1994) argue that the prevalent more egalitarian gender-role attitudes 
might be undermined once the economic necessity is reduced. Nevertheless, it can be 
expected that East German ind ividuals are more liberal than West Germans or Italians. 
 
3.2.2 Data and econometric methods 
The data used are drawn from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP).3 This is a 
continuing, annual program of cross-national collaboration with a focus on social values and 
                                                 
3 For more detailed information, see http://www.issp.org (URL: October 2003). 
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attitudes. Adding to the countries’ regular surveys a module is administered each year to 
collect comparable data. It started with a bilateral cooperation between the German ZUMA 
und the US-American NORC in the beginning of the 1980’s. It ever since has grown to 38 
participating countries. Three modules from the 1990’s are the source for the data used here. 
In particular, these are the two available modules on ‘Religion’ issued in 1991 and 1998 and 
the second module on ‘Family and Gender Roles’ issued in 1994. 
The latter provides a rich data source on attitudes towards female and mothers’ labor 
participation. It provides five questions of variables pertaining to family and six questions on 
sex roles. However, only two indicators drawn from this module are used. In particular, it is 
one question from the first set of variables on gender roles and one question from the 
variables on the impact of working mothers respectively: Do you agree or disagree with (1) a 
man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family and (2) all in 
all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job. Answers to both questions are to 
be given on a five-point scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. 
There are mainly two reasons why only these questions are used in the analyses. First, as 
is obvious from the above cited studies, the 1994 module has been widely explored by both 
sociologists and economists. Second, and more important, there are almost the same questions  
in the ‘Religion’ modules in 1991 and 1998. It is thus possible to explore an admittedly rather 
crude and descriptive time trend in individual attitudes towards mothers’ employment across 
sexes, countries and religions. However, the ISSP is not a panel study, i.e. a survey that 
consists of repeated observations on the same set of cross-section units. Therefore, panel 
estimators that control for unobservable individual heterogeneity cannot be applied. 
Furthermore, as the cross-sectional samples used are not extensive, pseudo-panel estimation 
as outlined by Baltagi (2001) cannot be used either. The advantage of using three waves of the 
ISSP therefore basically is the increase of the sample size, making statistical inference more 
reliable. 
Two necessary comments have to be made: First, whereas the family question is identical 
in all three waves, there is a little change in wording in the gender role question. Instead of 
‘man’ and ‘woman’, that is used only in 1994, ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ are used in 1991 and 
1998: Do you agree or disagree … A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look 
after the home and family. Secondly, attention should also be paid to the differences in the 
modules: It might be that the response behavior to the questions on attitudes is not 
independent from the general focus of all other questions. Therefore, a possible bias in 
answers cannot be ruled out a priori. 
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The Likert-scale answers on the two indicators on gender roles and family are used both 
as dependent and independent variables in the analyses here. To ease estimation and 
interpretation of the results, binary indicators are generated from the original data that equal 
one if the individual agrees or strongly agrees with the respective issue and zero else. A 
similar approach is followed in the analysis of wives’ employment: It would in general be 
possible to differentiate the amount of labor supplied in, say, full-time, part-time and not 
being employed. This would allow to use models for categorical or nominal outcomes. 
However, because of sample size restrictions, the original data are used to generate a binary 
outcome variable, ‘employed-not employed’, and appropriate estimators are applied. 
The underlying hypothesis in this analysis is that religion and, in particular, religious 
involvement plays an important role in the formation of attitudes. It is further assumed that 
religion affects wives’ employment. Therefore, a range of variables covering religious 
affiliation and participation is included. Detailed information on denominational affiliation is 
given in all three waves of the ISSP used. However, due to the focus on Western 
industrialized countries, the bulk of denominations included is of Christian nature. These 
denominations are in particular: Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Anglican, Protestant and other Christian affiliation. Further non-Christian religions included 
are Muslim and a variable capturing all other denominations as well as a variable for 
individuals who are not affiliated with a religion or denomination. 4 Being aware that there are 
differences between Protestant groups across the countries examined here, affiliation to one of 
these churches or groups is stacked together in one indicator to ease clarity of the models 
estimated in order to track the possible Protestant-Catholicism split.5 
As argued, denominational affiliation is only one possible factor influencing individual 
attitudes. It rather is religiosity, i.e. the intensity of religious belief and the level of religious 
involvement that might play another, if the not the dominant part determining attitudes and 
behavior. Therefore, indicators of the frequency of religious participation are included in the 
analyses as well. As Iannaccone (1998) points out, religious participation might be used as a 
measure for the individual’s so-called ‘religious human capital’, i.e. the stock of knowledge 
and familiarity with one’s own religion, its rituals and doctrines. While this idea might be 
considered as extention to the familiar ‘human capital theory’, the level of religious 
                                                 
4 Due to sample size restrictions, observations on the following Christian and Non-Christian denominations have 
been excluded from the analyses: Congregational, Orthodox, Free Presbyterian; Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, and 
Jewish. 
5 Further analyses that include separate indicators for the Protestant denominations noted did not yield in 
findings that differ substantially from those shown in this section and are thus not presented. 
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participation is used here as proxy for the religiosity of  individuals.6 
It might plausibly be expected that a high level of participation in religious services is 
accompanied by familiarity with church doctrines. As shown by previous research, this quite 
likely affects attitudes towards female or mothers’ employment in case the particular church 
upholds the traditional family role model. Therefore, four dummy-variables are used that are 
generated from the original data and capture whether the individual attends religious services 
‘once a week or more’, ‘once a month or more’, ‘less frequently’ and ‘never’, the latter being 
the omitted reference category. 
Moreover, there is a variety of socio-economic characteristics that are also included in the 
multivariate regressions as control-variables. These are in particular: two age-dummies 
(individuals older than 50 years being the reference group), a male-dummy, affiliation to 
lower social class, a binary indicator for married and other than married, dummies on part-
time and full- time occupation, another indicator on occupation in public services, a dummy 
indicating whether the individual has a higher education, two dummy variables representing 
left or right wing political attitudes (liberal being the reference group), an indicator on 
household-size and another dummy capturing whether the individual’s residence is in a rural 
area. The final sample used consists of 11,570 individuals aged 20 to 64 years.7 At first glance 
this age restriction might seem to be rather arbitrarily when examining attitudes towards 
mothers’ employment. However, it makes sense in the ensuing analysis of married men and 
the impact of religion on wives’ employment. 
 
As noted above, the dependent variables are binary. Therefore, probit estimation is an 
appropriate method to apply. However, instead of presenting coefficients resulting from the 
probit model, discrete changes in the predicted probabilities are shown. Similar to marginal 
effects, discrete changes capture the effects of single covariates on the dependent variable.8  
They are calculated as follows (Long, 1997): 
                                                 
6 In general, attention has to be paid when applying this concept empirically as frequency of participation and 
religious human capital are endogenous: Frequent religious participation adds to the stock of religious capital 
and in turn increases participation as the level of satis faction that arises from the consumption of religious 
products like church attendance or reading religious scripts increases the higher an individual’s religious human 
capital. However, this potential endogeneity is no problem here as there is no indicator for religious human 
capital, like, for example, a question on the importance of religious belief. 
7 Experiments with different age restrictions like the common labor supply related span from age 25 to 55 did not 
result in substantially different findings from the estimations. 
8 The advantage of using discrete changes rather than the popular marginal effects is that interpretation of 
changes in the predicted probabilities is more straightforward given discrete changes in xk. Furthermore, 
marginal effects are inappropriate for binary independent variables. For a detailed discussion, see Long (1997, 
pp. 71). 
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Let Pr(y=1 | x, xk) be the probability of an event, i.e. the agreement to gender roles or 
mothers’ labor participation, given a set of explaining characteristics, x, and noting the value 
of xk. Pr(y=1 | x, xk + d) then is the probability with xk increased by d, with all other variables 
unchanged. The discrete change in the probability for a change of d in xk then equals 
),|1Pr(),|1Pr(
)|1Pr(
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d .   (3.1) 
For dummy variables, discrete changes are the change as xk goes from 0 to 1, holding all other 
variables at their mean: 
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3.2.3 Empirical results 
3.2.3.1 Attitudes towards gender roles and female full-time employment 
First, note that the results from the control variables meet prior expectations so that they need 
not be discussed.9 As noted above, the three waves drawn from the ISSP allow to crudely 
picture the trend of attitudes towards gender roles and mothers’ employment in the 1990’s. 
Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.4 show the cumulated shares of agreement and strong agreement 
towards both questions over the time period examined here. While Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 
show the time trend separately for women and men across the five countries, Figure 3.3 and 
Figure 3.4 depict agreement to the gender role model subject to denominational affiliation and 
frequency of religious participation. 
A distinctive feature of these descriptive results is that, when looking at the four  figures, 
one has to be cautious interpreting the findings. This is because response behavior seems to be 
dependent on the focus of the respective module. In particular, responses in 1994 to some 
extent cause a non-monotonic development between 1991 and 1998. Unless one is willing to 
believe that there have been real up and down changes in attitudes interpretation demands 
care.10 
                                                 
9 Corroborating existing evidence it is found that, on average, it is the higher educated young woman living in 
small urban households and in favor of left wing political positions who disagrees with the traditional ‘male 
breadwinner model’. Full estimation results are shown in the Appendix. 
10 It is, however, interesting to notice that except for the attitudes on the ‘male-breadwinner’ gender role, the 
1994 questioning presumably led to stricter views on female labor participation. Therefore, evidence from the 
literature might even be slightly ‘biased’. 
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A man's job is to earn money, a woman's job is to look for 
home and family
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Figure 3.1: Attitudes towards the traditional gender role model, by country and gender 
Source: ISSP, own calculations; cumulative shares of agreement and strong agreement, weighted. 
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show that, as expected, males are more in favor of the traditional 
allocation of labor between spouses or partners than females. While this is observable across 
all countries examined, there are large differences between the countries. Not surprisingly, the 
two proponents of Esping-Andersen’s (1996) labor-reduction route, West Germany and Italy, 
are the most restrictive nations regarding the traditional gender role (Figure 3.1) and, even 
more clearly, pertaining to mothers’ employment (Figure 3.2). While agreement of Italians to 
the ‘male breadwinner model’ is rather stable over the time period (between 30-35%), 
individuals in West Germany even show an increase in favor of the traditional role model 
(Figure 3.1). Agreement increases from about 30% in 1991 to 45% in 1998. A similar picture 
can be seen for the attitude towards working mothers. Clearly, Italy is the most traditional 
country in the sample of countries here: Only about 30-35% of the population do not think 
that the family suffers when the woman/mother works full- time (Figure 3.2). Note, however, 
that there is a small decrease from 1991 to 1998, having a peak in 1994. 
 
As could be expected, liberal attitudes are found for the UK and New Zealand. Agreement in 
New Zealand is quite stable towards both attitudinal issues: About 17% are in favor of male’s 
responsibility to financially take care of the family and only about 30% think that the family 
suffers when the mother works full- time (again having a peak in 1994 at about 40%). 
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Attitudes in Britain have even become more liberal between 1991 and 1998. While agreement 
to the ‘male-breadwinner’ model is at 25% in 1991, it decreases to less than 15% in 1998 
(Figure 3.1). Mothers’ full-time employment, however, is seen sceptical by about 30% of the 
British in 1991 with only a slight decrease to 25% in 1998 (Figure 3.2). 
 
Family suffers when the woman has a full-time job
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Figure 3.2: Attitudes towards mothers’ full-time employment, by country and gender 
Source: ISSP, own calculations; cumulative shares of agreement and strong agreement, weighted. 
 
Unsurpringly, East Germany is different. Attitudes towards mothers’ emplyoment are as 
liberal as the British and the New Zealand case which might, somewhat speculative though, 
be due to the extensive full- time child care institutions that were supplied by the state prior to 
German reunification. However, the model on the traditional allocation of labor has regained 
popularity: While about 20% support the ‘male-breadwinner’ model in 1991, there is a 
considerable increase to about 30% of agreement in 1998 (Figure 3.1). To some extent, this 
might hint towards the hypothesis of Braun et al. (1994) that tradititional gender-role attitudes 
might regain importance once economic hardship has eased up. 
 
Regarding religious affiliation and participation, the descriptive findings shown in the figures 
(Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4) are mainly as expected. First, as in the figures shown above, 
mothers’ full-time employment is less accepted. While agreement towards the traditional 
male-female allocation of labor ranges from 15% to at maximum 45%, full- time working 
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mothers are refused by 25% up to even 65% of the interviewed individuals. 
 
Denominational affiliation and attitudes towards 
gender roles (---) and female full-time employment (—)
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Figure 3.3: Denominational affiliation and attitudes towards the traditional gender role model and 
mothers’ full-time employment 
Source: ISSP, own calculations; cumulative shares of (strong) agreement to the ‘male -breadwinner’ 
gender role model and that the family suffers when women/wives work full-time, weighted. 
 
Pertaining to denominational affiliation, belonging to the Roman Catholic Church or any 
other religious group than those listed is attributed with more conservative attitudes (Figure 
3.3). Again, having peaks in 1994, disagreement with full-time employed mothers among 
Caholics is rather stable at about 55-50% from 1991 to 1998. Subsequently, some 45% of 
members of other religious groups in 1998 agree that families suffer when mothers work full-
time. They are followed by Protestants with 40% of agreement. As might be expected, the 
least conservative are individiuals with no denominational affiliation: Only some 25% believe 
that mothers’ full- time employment is harmful for the family. 
 
Mainly the same picture shows for attitudes towards the ‘male-breadwinner’ gender role 
(Figure 3.3): While the level of agreement is somewhat lower then the attitude on mother’ 
employment, it is again membership to the Roman Catholic Church or any other religious 
group that is in favor for the traditional allocation of labor. Here, the latter are the least liberal, 
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followed by Catholics and Protestants where agreement is only slightly lower. The range 
across denominations is from about 25% (Protestants) to almost 35% (others).11  
More clearly distanced, only some 15% in 1991 to about 18% in 1998 of individuals 
without religious affiliation agree towards the traditional male-female of labor. 
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Figure 3.4: Religious participation and attitudes towards the traditional gender role model and 
mothers’ full-time employment 
Source: ISSP, own calculations; cumulative shares of (strong) agreement to the ‘male -breadwinner’ 
gender role model and that the family suffers when women/wives work full-time, weighted. 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the differences for both attitudes in question across different levels of 
religious participation. Interestingly, the quasi-cardinal order in the frequency of church 
attendance finds its equivalents in the ordinally scaled agreement towards both attitudes on 
gender role and mothers’employment. In particular, indiviudals who attend church once a 
week or more mainly think that families suffer when mothers work full- time. Agreement here 
is at more than 55%. While the level of agreement is lower (about 35%), it is again the most 
religiously active who support the ‘male-breadwinner’ gender role model. Subsequently, 
individuals who attend church once a month ore less regular follow in agreement towards 
                                                 
11 Again, some peculiar peaks are found for 1994, but are not discussed further. 
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both indicators. Clearly again, individuals who never participate in religious activities are the 
most liberal: About 30-35% only agree with the idea of a suffering family when mothers work 
full-time and only 15% to about 20% are in favor for the traditional allocation of labor 
between men and women. 
 
However, these findings are preliminary as they might be caused by factors that are not 
accounted for in these simple graphics. Therefore, probit regressions are run where the range 
of socio-economic control variables outlined above are included. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 
show the discrete changes in the predicted probabilities of agreement to either the traditional 
male-female allocation of labor or the notion of the suffering family.  
 
In Table 3.1, results from regressions are shown tha t use variables interacting denominational 
affiliation and religious participation with additional country-controls, while results from the 
interaction of attendance and nationality are shown in Table 3.2.12 Besides, further control 
variables on denominational affiliation are included in the estimations. These latter regressors 
are either included in the regressions (model specifiation 2) or not (model specification 1). 
Meeting prior expectations, Table 3.1 shows that, compared to Catholics who do not 
attend church regularly, it is regular religious participation among Catholics, Muslims and 
members of other denominational affiliations that lead to higher predicted probabilities in the 
agreement on the ‘male-breadwinner’ model. While the discrete changes in the predicted 
probabilities for Catholics are rather small, ranging from 0.02 to almost 0.04, there are larger 
discrete changes for Muslims (about 0.4).  
 
Moreover, individuals who consider themselves not to be affiliated with a specific church or 
religious group, but regularly participate in religious activities are also more traditional 
regarding the allocation of labor between men and women. While church attending 
Protestants are not found to be statistically different from the reference group, this latter 
finding supports the hypothesis that it rather might be religious participation than 
denominational affiliation that affects underlying attitudes. However, findings that again point 
                                                 
12 Regressions were estimated that include attendance, denominational affiliation and citizenship separately.  
While the results are not, the findings are in line with expectations, i.e. the higher the frequency of religious 
participation, the higher is the discrete change in the predicted probability of the particular outcome. Similar 
results are found for individuals which are denominationally affiliated. Individuals from nations other than West 
Germany are more liberal than their counterparts except for the case of Italians who are more likely to think that 
the family suffers when the woman is working full-time. 
CHAPTER 3: RELIGION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 43 
to differences in attitudes across religious bodies show for those individuals who do not attend 
church regularly: Protestants and persons without denominational affiliation are more liberal 
than Catholics. Predicted probabilities for Protestants decrease by 0.2 to 0.3 and by 0.1 to 
about 0.15 for individuals without religion. 
 
Table 3.1: Denominational affiliation, religious participation and attitudes towards gender role 
and female full- time employment; including control variables 
 Man’s job: earn money; 
woman’s job: home and 
family 
Family suffers when 
woman/wife has a full-
time job 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Catholic and regular attendance 0.0393*** 0.0230* 0.1003*** 0.0353** 
 (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0169) 
Protestant and regular attendance -0.0033 0.0083 -0.0199 0.0661*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.0225) (0.0242) 
Muslim and regular attendance 0.4343*** 0.4424*** 0.1932 0.3059** 
 (0.1673) (0.1663) (0.1637) (0.1431) 
Other denomination and regular attendance 0.1926*** 0.1953*** 0.1092** 0.1499*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0502) (0.0507) (0.0512) 
No denomination and regular attendance 0.1851** 0.1908** 0.0810 0.2012** 
 (0.0815) (0.0824) (0.0805) (0.0783) 
Catholic and no regular attendance (omitted reference category) 
Protestant and no regular attendance -0.0318*** -0.0252** -0.0666*** -0.0045 
 (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0143) 
Muslim and no regular attendance 0.0634 0.0744 -0.1467 -0.0665 
 (0.1457) (0.1498) (0.1415) (0.1619) 
Other denomination, no regular attendance 0.0211 0.0238 -0.0218 0.0126 
 (0.0313) (0.0320) (0.0367) (0.0382) 
No denomination and no regular attendance -0.1478*** -0.1164*** -0.1900*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0145) 
Nationality: West German (omitted reference category) 
Nationality: East German — -0.1177*** — -0.1848*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0138) 
Nationality: Italian — -0.0400*** — 0.0803*** 
  (0.0125)  (0.0175) 
Nationality: New Zealander — -0.1000*** — -0.1618*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0155) 
Nationality: British — -0.0445*** — -0.1707*** 
  (0.0122)  (0.0144) 
Chi2 1,466.61 1,589.89 1,216.56 1,565.65 
Log likelihood -5,676.14 -5,614.50 -7,271.47 -7,096.92 
Notes: Discrete changes following probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 11,570 observations. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
Similar results are found regarding the attitudes towards full- time working women (columns 3 
and 4). Again, Catholics and individuals with other religious affiliation who regularly 
participate in religious activities are more likely to think that the family suffers when women 
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work full-time. Individuals without denominational affiliation and Protestants who do not 
attend church regularly are also less likely to agree on this particular attitude. 
 
However, the results for Protestants are not robust when additionally controlling for 
nationality (Table 3.1, last column). While regular attendance now affects the predicted 
probability, Protestants who do not participate in religious acitivities are not different to their 
Catholic counterparts. Furthermore, and likewise interestingly, the discrete changes for 
Muslims and individuals without denominational affiliation are found statistically signficant 
pointing to less liberal attitudes. Regarding nationality itself, the results corroborate the 
descriptive findings shown above. That is, West German individuals are the least liberal 
among the countries analyzed here regarding agreement on the ‘male-breadwinner’ gender 
role model and only surpassed by Italians who are even more restrictive in the attitudes 
towards full- time working women. 
 
Controlling for interaction between nationality and regular religious participation, Table 3.2 
first shows that denominational affiliation is associated with rather traditional attitudes 
towards both gender roles and female full-time employment (columns 2 and 4). 
 
Furthermore, West Germans who attend church are more in support of traditional gender roles 
compared to their counterparts from the reference group, i.e. West Germans who do not attend 
church regularly. Regardless of the frequency of church attendance, East Germans are less 
restrictive. In particular, predicted probabilities decrease by about 0.6 to 0.7 for church 
attending East Germans and by about 0.13 to 0.15 for those who do not go to church. While 
the discrete changes are lower, British and New Zealanders who do not attend church are 
likewise liberal. 
 
Again corroborating the descriptive findings shown above, full-time employment of women is 
disagreed with by West Germans who regularly attend church and Italians regardless on 
whether they are attending church or not. The predicted probabilities increase by 0.09 to 
almost 0.13 for West Germans and by about 0.10 to 0.18 for Italians. Less traditional attitudes 
are found for British, also regardless of the frequency of religious participation, as well as 
East Germans and New Zealand citizens who do not attend church regularly.  
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Table 3.2: Nationality, religious involvement and attitudes towards gender role and female 
full-time employment; including control variables 
 Man: job; woman: family Family suffers 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
West German and regular attendance  0.0759*** 0.0468** 0.1268*** 0.0951*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0236) (0.0245) 
East German and regular attendance -0.0583** -0.0722*** -0.0226 -0.0458 
 (0.0293) (0.0273) (0.0424) (0.0416) 
Italian and regular attendance  0.0224 -0.0061 0.1838*** 0.1448*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0202) (0.0229) 
New Zealander and regular attendance  0.0484** 0.0281 -0.0141 -0.0353 
 (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
British and regular attendance  0.0381 0.0185 -0.0651** -0.0862*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0249) (0.0280) (0.0276) 
West German and no regular attendance (omitted reference category) 
East German and no regular attendance -0.1547*** -0.1334*** -0.1864*** -0.1479*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0141) (0.0155) 
Italian and no regular attendance  0.0025 -0.0215 0.1395*** 0.1081*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0213) 
New Zealander and no regular attendance -0.1210*** -0.1179*** -0.1354*** -0.1301*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0159) (0.0161) 
British and no regular attendance -0.0470*** -0.0339** -0.1371*** -0.1202*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0161) 
Denomination: Catholic  — 0.0887*** — 0.1130*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0156) 
Denomination: Muslim — 0.3655*** — 0.2158** 
  (0.1168)  (0.1084) 
Denomination: Protestant — 0.0758*** — 0.1017*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0126) 
Denomination: Other denomination — 0.1629*** — 0.1367*** 
  (0.0311)  (0.0309) 
Denomination: No denomination (omitted reference category) 
Chi2 1,495.67 1,579.20 1,431.45 1,519.39 
Log likelihood -5,661.61 -5,619.85 -7,164.02 -7,120.05 
Notes: Discrete changes following probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 11,570 observations. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
To sum up, evidence is found that denominational affiliation as well as religious participation 
and nationality affect attitudes towards gender roles and female full- time employment. 
Meeting prior expectations, West Germany and Italy are the most traditional countries among 
the nations in the sample here. This finding furthermore holds when controlling for the level 
of religious participation. While the results for denominational affiliation itself also hint 
towards more traditional attitudes, there is some evidence that only those individuals who 
regularly attend church are less liberal in their attitudes. 
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3.2.3.2 Husbands attitudes and wives’ employment 
Before discussing the findings from the probit regressions, descriptive results are presented in 
the following two tables, showing the shares of women in paid employment (Table 3.3) and, 
conditional on the subsample of married males, the shares of wives in paid employment 
(Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.3: Religious participation, denominational affiliation and female employment 
 Women in paid employment (respective shares) 
 West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
 
Italy 
New 
Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
Mean 50.0 60.4 40.1 66.3 61.5 
Denomination:      
  Roman Catholic 48.9 59.4 39.6 70.6 61.4 
  Protestant 49.0 52.3 — 64.7 60.6 
  Other (39.7) (50.0) (44.1) 56.9 (61.1) 
  None 66.4 65.4 (50.9) 70.5 62.7 
Church attendance:      
  Once a week 32.1 (57.9) 35.1 59.1 52.7 
  Once a month 46.3 (44.4) 35.2 71.3 68.2 
  Less regularly 51.5 64.9 46.0 68.5 60.8 
  Never 57.7 59.1 47.9 64.9 60.3 
N 707 626 440 810 597 
Notes: ( ) Cell includes less than 30 observations. 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
Table 3.3 shows several aspects. First, there is considerable variation in labor participation 
rates across countries in line with Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regimes: While only 40% 
of Italian women participate in paid employment, almost two thirds of women from New 
Zealand offer labor outside the home. Regarding denominational affiliation, female labor 
participation by and large does not differ much from the respective overall country-shares. 
However, with the exception of British women, women who are not affiliated with a church 
or religious group are more often employed.  
 
Even more clearly, labor participation differs across women depending on their level of 
religious participation. For West Germany and Italy, there is even an ascending order of 
female employment with descending church attendance. Furthermore, only 32% of West 
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German women who attend church at least once a week are in paid employment which is a 
difference from the average female labor participation of about 36%. While differences for 
the neoliberal proponents, New Zealand and the UK, are not that large and furthermore 
neither clearly de- or increasing, women who attend church once a week or more are less 
often in paid employment.  
 
Table 3.4: Religious participation and denominational affiliation of males and wives’ 
employment 
 Wives in paid employment (respective shares) 
 West 
Germany 
East 
Germany 
 
Italy 
New 
Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
Mean 44.7 66.2 44.9 68.4 64.8 
Denomination:      
  Roman Catholic 43.1 (61.9) 43.8 69.0 61.8 
  Protestant 48.2 54.8 — 64.4 58.6 
  Other (28.6) (41.7) (49.5) 76.6 (53.9) 
  None 47.7 70.4 (58.1) 71.5 72.3 
Church attendance:      
  Once a week 32.2 (75.0) 39.2 62.1 (53.1) 
  Once a month 38.3 (54.2) 35.9 (64.9) (72.2) 
  Less regularly 48.5 63.0 49.1 68.8 61.7 
  Never 45.1 67.8 53.1 70.7 67.3 
N 417 468 306 489 357 
Notes: ( ) Cell includes less than 30 observations. 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
Pertaining to the possible effect of religiosity of husbands on the labor participation of their 
wives, Table 3.4 corroborates the findings from Table 3.3. By and large, given that men are 
not member of a church or a religious group, wives are more often employed than average. 
While this is also true for wives of Protestant men in West Germany and wives of men of 
other religious affiliation in New Zealand, Protestants’ wives in East Germany and the UK are 
less often in paid employment. A picture similar to the above also shows for church 
attendance rates of males and wives labor participation. Again, for West Germany, the 
relationship is reversely related: the more often the husband attands church the less often is 
the wive offering labor. The relationships in all other countries analyzed are more ambiguous. 
However, labor participation of wives whose men are never attending church is again higher 
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than the average female employment rate across all nations. 
 
Again, as further variables are not controlled for in these descriptive findings, the results 
presented may reflect influences other than those indicated. Therefore, probit regressions are  
run and discrete changes in the predicted probabilities are calculated. Results from these 
operations are shown in Table 3.5. As can be seen, once controlling for a range of socie-
demographic and –economic variables, the relationship between male denominational 
affiliation and its effect on wives’ employment is not overwhelming. Compared to wives of 
men without religious affiliation, all discrete changes hint towards a lower labor participation 
of women whose husbands are denominationally affiliated. However, all but the Protestants’ 
coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 3.5: Husbands’ attitudes, religious involvement and labor participation of wives 
 Wife is participating in paid employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
“A man’s job is …” -0.1715*** — — — 
 (0.0196)    
“Family suffers …” — -0.1683*** — — 
  (0.0177)   
“A man’s job is …” * regular church attendance — — -0.1833*** — 
   (0.0318)  
“Family suffers …”  * regular church attendance — — — -0.1511*** 
    (0.0278) 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0388 -0.0368 -0.0319 -0.0283 
 (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0287) 
Denomination: Muslim -0.1929 -0.2164 -0.2267 -0.2295 
 (0.1662) (0.1633) (0.1607) (0.1598) 
Denomination: Protestant -0.0508** -0.0561** -0.0623*** -0.0581** 
 (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
Denomination: Other denomination -0.0281 -0.0386 -0.0284 -0.0282 
 (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0561) (0.0561) 
Nationality: East German 0.1826*** 0.1816*** 0.2013*** 0.2036*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0263) (0.0262) 
Nationality: Italian 0.0155 0.0292 0.0183 0.0249 
 (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0301) 
Nationality: New Zealander 0.2149*** 0.2136*** 0.2350*** 0.2319*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
Nationality: British 0.1655*** 0.1513*** 0.1758*** 0.1735*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0273) 
Chi2 677.81 689.84 634.50 631.38 
Log likelihood -2,262.74 -2,256.73 -2,284.40 -2,285.96 
Notes: Discrete changes following probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,806 observations. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
Regarding nationality, evidence is found that supports both prior expectations as well as 
results from descriptive findings: wives from East Germany, New Zealand and the UK are 
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more likely employed than their West German counterparts. Italian wives do not statistically 
differ from the reference group. 
Unsurprisingly, there is further evidence that wives are less likely in paid employment 
given that the husband has traditional attitudes towards female labor participation. This holds 
also when controlling for male religious participation. However, the differences in the discrete 
changes are not large and, furthermore, not consistent. On the one hand, the predicted 
probabilities of wives’ employment further decrease when the male’s attitude on the ‘male-
breadwinner’ gender role model is interacted with regular church attendance (Table 3.5, 
column 1 and 3). The predicted probabilities change from –0.17 to –0.18. Column 2 and 4 
then show that, on the other hand, predicted probabilities in wives’ employment slightly 
increase from almost –0.17 to –0.15 for men who think that the family suffers when the 
woman works full-time and who regularly attend church. 
 
 
3.3. The effect of religion on the labor supply of married women in 
Germany 
Apart from the sociological interest in female labor participation outlined above, female labor 
supply and particularly the labor supply of married women is object of frequent analysis in the 
labor economics literature. This is not too surprising given the strong increase in female 
participation in paid employment in the last 30 to 40 years. Consequently, as mentioned 
before, researchers spent remarkable efforts to examine the underlying reasons for this 
development. Questions of interest mainly are institutional patterns and their effect on the 
incentives of individuals to offer labor. In the context of female labor supply, patterns of 
relevance, for example, are a) the taxation of families and b) child care support provided by 
either public or private institutions. 
As pointed out, neither culture in general nor religion in particular is on the top of the 
agenda of economists. It should therefore not surprise that there is only scare literature on the 
potential influence of religion on labor supply of individuals themselves or individuals within 
households. In fact, to the best knowledge, there is only one study by Lehrer (1995) that 
addresses the impact of religion on the labor supply of married women using US data. She 
draws from both economic and sociological theories to examine the impact of religion on 
women’s decisions regarding the allocation of time between home and market. The 
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subsequent analysis follows a similar approach using German data. In combination with the 
analysis of the preceding section, it adds to the understanding of the effects of religious 
attitudes on female labor supply. Furthermore, given the differences between the religious 
markets in Germany and, above all, the US, this study opens the possibility of transatlantic 
comparisons. On the one hand, the US situation is identified by a broad range of 
denominations which are also acting in a competitive way. On the contrary, the German 
religious market is dominated by two large Christian churches: The adherents of the Roman 
Catholic Church and the Evangelical Church in Germany together account for almost two 
thirds of the German population. As about a fourth of Germans are not denominationally 
affiliated, other denominations and religious groups play a minor or even negligible role. 
Furthermore, as is shown in the preceding section, religion plays different societal roles in the 
eastern  and western parts of Germany. 
 
In general, the cross-sectional analysis performed here replicates results found for the US, 
thus supporting the hypothesis that religion affects female time allocation decisions. 
Furthermore, and extending previous research, the findings from the longitudinal analysis 
carried out reinforces preceding results: There is evidence that the labor participation decision 
of married women is affected by their husbands’ religious belief. This, to some extent, may be 
interpreted in line with the ‘male-chauvinist’ model (Killingsworth, 1983), i.e. that the male 
usually decides on his supply of labor independently from the female. The female then treats 
the male income as property income when deciding about how much labor to supply. 
Furthermore, the results support bargaining models that consider joint household decisions to 
be dominated by male attitudes and behavior due to, for example, asymmetric bargaining 
power between spouses (Ott, 1992). 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Theoretical considerations and 
testable hypotheses are presented subsequently; the data and methods used are discussed in 
subsection 3.3.2, followed by the empirical results in subsection 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.1. Theoretical considerations 
Based on both sociological and economic theories, there are mainly two mechanisms through 
which religion might affect women’s decisions whether to supply labor or not. Sociological 
literature suggests that attitudes toward gender roles and the appropriate division of labor 
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differ across religious groups. Attitudes then are supposed to range from most egalitarian to 
rather strict positions,13 individuals with no religion on the one side and, relevant for the US, 
so-called ‘exclusivist Protestants’ on the other side of the spectrum. Lehrer (1995), for 
example, finds that almost 25% of exclusivist Protestants strongly agree that it falls into the 
man’s responsibility to earn the main living while the woman takes care of the home and 
family. In contrast, only about 8% of persons without religion share this view. Exclusivist 
Protestants also tend to disapprove stronger that mothers work full time when their youngest 
child is under age 5.  
The findings from the preceding section show that differences in attitudes across 
denominations might also be of concern for Germany. Furthermore, while not controlling for 
religious affiliation, Albrecht et al. (2000) show that 48% of West German men expect their 
wives to stay home, even if the children are in school age, compared to only 22% of Italian 
men or to even only 12% of British men. 
 
Taking into account that the employment behavior of married women might differ due to 
different family backgrounds, information on the husband’s religion and belief has to be 
included in the analysis as well. If spouses have the same religious affiliation, women’s labor 
participation then only depends on the religious group’s position in the ‘egalitarian-strict-
continuum’. However, if spouses do not share the same faith and instead belong to religious 
groups with strong different attitudes toward gender roles marital conflicts may arise. The 
mechanism that resolves these conflicts is the so-called ‘bargaining effect’ (Lehrer, 1995).14 
This effect suggests for either less or more female labor supply, depending on whether the 
husband belongs to a more liberal religion or not. That is, if the wife’s faith is placed on the 
egalitarian end of the spectrum, her husband however belonging to a less tolerant religion, one 
would then expect the woman to supply less labor compared to the case where the husband 
shares his wife’s liberal attitude toward female labor participation. 
Analogously, a higher labor supply should be expected among women who belong to a 
strict religious group but have a husband who does not. This is because strict religious groups 
often have clear membership criteria and sometimes even proscriptions against ‘outer-
                                                 
13 Strictness in this respect is a phenomenon that has to be seen in comparison to more liberal or egalitarian 
religious groups, i.e. something to be found rather between than within denominations (Olson and Perl, 2001). It 
implies the obedience to rules not only affecting the issue of labor participation but furthermore aspects like 
dietary (e.g. no drinking or smoking) or questions of morality (e.g. the acceptance of divorce and cohabitation). 
14 The name of the effect goes back to its origin in the framework of game-theoretic bargaining models. For 
models regarding household decisions see Ott (1992). 
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marriages’. An outer- faith marital union might then be seen as indicator that the wife 
overcomes less tolerant attitudes and doctrines by their religion, hence including the 
disaffirmation of women who engage in paid employment. 
It can furthermore be argued that it is not simply denominational affiliation itself that 
influences individual behavior but that it rather is a person’s intensity of religious belief that 
affects various aspects of human behavior.15 That is, even if someone is a church member, but 
otherwise does not care about religious belief, this individual will ceteris paribus not show a 
much different labor behavior than an individual without religion. Such is easily conceivable 
in cases when membership to a church or religious group is simply inherited from the parents 
or because of the regional predominance of a particular denomination. 
 
Both the individual’s belief and the denominational household composition are also relevant 
for the second line of explaining the impact of religion on the labor supply of married women. 
Economic literature suggests that it is religious inter-marriage that affects female incentives to 
invest in various forms of human capital. Both Becker et al. (1977) and Lehrer (1996) find 
that marital differences in religious beliefs are associated with smaller family size. This 
supports the argument that inter-faith couples recognize the relative instability of their unions 
and that subsequently partners have lower incentives to invest in spouse-specific capital, 
primarily children. 
Put differently, women in such unions recognize the supposedly less stable union they 
have. Therefore, they face incentives to invest more in labor related human capital such as 
vocational training and other labor market experience that becomes useful in the case of a 
divorce. Hence, due to this ‘marital-stability-effect’ (Lehrer, 1996), a higher level of labor 
supply would be expected for women whose husbands do not belong to the same church or 
religious group compared to women in inner- faith marriages. 
 
3.3.2. Data and econometric methods 
The structure of religious bodies in Germany is quite different to, for example, the US case: 
First, almost two thirds of the population are adherents of the Roman Catholic Church 
(32,3%) or the Evangelical Church in Germany (31,9%), which is the institutional form 
                                                 
15 Recall the findings from the preceding section that are in line with this  hypothesis: Individuals without 
denominational affiliation who regularly attend church are more in favor of traditional attitudes than their 
counterparts who do not attend church (Table 3.1). 
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chosen by a community of 24 Lutheran, Reformed and United regional churches. Besides 
these two Christian churches, there is a variety of other denominations and religious bodies. 
Muslims account for almost 4% of the population. Other Christian denominations range from 
Orthodox churches to other Protestant groups like Baptists or Methodists to denominations 
that are rather exclusivist- like. However, as the adherents of all other Christian bodies sum up 
to about 2,5% of the German population, they play a minor role. Furthermore, about 29% of 
the population is not affiliated with a church or religious group.16 Second, concerning the 
regional distribution of denominations, there is in general a historically grown Protestant-
North Catholic-South divide in the former western federal states. More important, the eastern 
part of Germany is different inasmuch as 70% of its population does not belong to a church 
because of East Germany’s former communist history. 
 
The data used are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a wide-ranging 
representative longitudinal study of private households (SOEP Group, 2001). It provides 
information on all household members, consisting of Germans living in the old and new 
German states, foreigners and recent immigrants to Germany. The Panel was started in 1984. 
In 2000, there were more than 12,000 households, and more than 20,000 persons sampled. 
Information on religious behavior and attitudes is available in different ways and waves. 
As outlined above, different religious groups are considered to show varying ‘denominational 
strictness’ (Iannaccone, 1992).17 Therefore, information on denominational affiliation is 
initially included. This was asked for in 1990 and 1997 and has shown to be rather stable 
except for Protestants, i.e. adherents of the Evangelical Church in Germany, where 
membership decreased about 13% (Heineck, 2001).  
‘Faith intensity’, i.e. the question on the importance of belief/faith in one’s life, was asked 
for in 1994, 1998 and 1999.18 Answers to this question were to be given on a scale ranging 
from 1 ‘very important’ to 4 ‘not important’. The strength of belief is assumed to be a 
stronger indicator of labor related behavior than mere denominational affiliation. The 1998 
information on the intensity of faith is thus matched to individual data from 1997 for a cross-
                                                 
16 All numbers noted are drawn from a scientific online information service on religion in Germany, see 
www.remid.de (mainly in German). 
17 Iannaccone´s interest (1992) is on the examination of the impact of ‘sect-like’ religious groups and sects in 
comparison to church-like groups. Nevertheless, it might be suggested that even in a rather secular country like 
Germany, expectations, for example, to attend services may be higher among Roman Catholics and Muslims 
compared to Protestants. 
18 Cameron (1999), in his analysis of the frequency of religious participation in the UK, adapts the Azzi-
Ehrenberg allocation-of-time framework by including ‘strength of faith’ as ‘God Appreciation Capital’. Here, 
‘strength of faith’ and ‘religious belief’ are used interchangeably for the implied religious conviction. 
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sectional analysis, willing to accept this potential source of, presumably only small, bias.  
Furthermore, information on church attendance is available from 1990, 1992 and 
continuously from 1994 to 2001. The frequency of participation mainly is given on a scale 
ranging from 1 ‘at least once a week’ to 4 ‘never’. In 1995 and 1998, however, answers were 
extended to a fifth category ‘daily’. Answers to this item have been recoded to fit the ‘at least 
once a week’ category. Note again that using participation information may raise potential 
endogeneity problems with the intensity of faith: Among other religious ‘inputs’, a high level 
of church attendance contributes to form the so-called ‘religious human capital’ (Iannaccone, 
1998), i.e. a stock of religious knowledge and the familiarity with church ritual and doctrines 
etc. This type of human capital in turn increases the level of attendance because the 
satisfaction an individual receives from participation will increase with increasing religious 
capital. Church attendance and strength of belief will thus be determined simultaneously and 
might lead to biased estimations if included both as exogenous variable. Therefore, the 
indicators are used in separate equation specifications. 
 
A first impression is given by some descriptive data in Table 3.6, already grasping some of 
the theoretical implications. That is, there is preliminary evidence that married women who 
belong to presumably stricter religious groups are less often employed than their respective 
counterparts. Women, for example, who belong to other religious groups – under it mainly 
Muslims19 – are prevailingly not employed (about 72%). They are followed by women who 
are members of other Christian churches or groups, i.e. Baptists, Methodists and others 
(almost 59%). On the contrary, women without religion are much more often full-time 
employed than those with denominational affiliation. A similar structure is found for women 
who rather attach importance to religion in their lives. 64% of those women, who say that 
belief is very important, are not employed, compared to only about 43% of those women to 
whom religion is of no importance. Furthermore, only some 12% of the believers work full-
time, whereas almost 40% of the non-religious women have a full- time job. 
A likewise picture shows for religious participation: 33% of women, who never attend 
church, hold full-time positions, whereas only about 13% of women attending church at least 
once a week are full-time employed. While the findings for part-time occupation are less clear 
cut, it is again for non-employed women. Here, about 60% are regularly participating in 
religious activities while some 45% are never attending church.  
                                                 
19 Although Muslims are not identifiable in the 1997 sub-sample, they were so in 1990 and then accounted for 
95% of those individuals stating to belong to any other religious church or group. 
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With regard to both the ‘bargaining-effect’ and the ‘marital-stability-effect’ outlined 
above, only some of the theoretical implications are testable directly in this analysis due to 
sample size limitations. Couples, in which spouses do not share the same denominational 
affiliation, sum up to about 20 percent in the sample. Allocating these cases into separate 
dummy variables indicating the husbands’ respective religion to test for either more or less 
labor participation of the wives would make estimation questionable due to the subsequent 
too small number of cases. 
 
Table 3.6: Employment status by denominational affiliation, strength of belief and frequency 
of church attendance; Married women in Germany 
Employment status in 1997 (row %)  
Full- time Part-time Not employed 
Denominational affiliation    
Catholic 18.7 29.1 52.2 
Protestant 19.7 31.4 48.9 
Other Christian 18.2 (23.1) 58.7 
Other religious group (11.4) (16.7) 71.9 
No denomination 44.0 16.4 39.6 
Importance of religion/belief    
Very important 12.4 23.6 64.0 
Important 21.0 27.8 51.2 
Less important 22.8 30.9 46.3 
Not important at all 39.3 18.2 42.5 
Frequency of church attendance    
At least once a week 12.7 28.1 59.2 
At least once a month 15.2 21.1 63.7 
Infrequently 19.1 33.2 47.7 
Never 33.0 22.1 44.9 
Total 23.4 26.7 49.9 
Notes: ( ) sample includes less than 30 cases. 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998; own calculations, weighted. 
 
That is, testing for both ‘bargaining-effect’ and ‘stability-effect’, this analysis has to rely on 
the information about inner- faith unions and can thus only indirectly derive implications of 
outer-marriages regarding the labor market outcomes of women. The cross-sectional analysis 
then is based on a sample of 1,763 observations of married women aged 25 to 55 years old.  
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This age is chosen to focus on women who have completed their formal education but are still 
young enough to rule out substantial outflows from the labor force into early or regular 
retirement. There are two samples used for the panel analyses: The first sample uses 1,245 
person-year observations and is based on data from the three waves that supply information 
about the strength of religious belief (1994, 1998 and 1999). The second sample uses data 
from 1992 and 1994 to 2001 summing up to 8,773 person-year observations to explore the 
effect of church attendance on labor supply. 20  
 
3.3.2.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
A familiar way to examine labor participation would be to model the binary choice decision 
whether or not to supply labor. This could then be estimated by, for example, the probit 
model. Here, information is used that is available on the extent of labor supplied by married 
women. This is done because religious attitudes, given a pro-labor decision, may furthermore 
influence the question on how many hours should be supplied. This might, for example, be of 
relevance when children are to be cared for. Thus, a multinomial logit model is applied to the 
cross-sectional data as the decision whether or not and if yes, whether to supply labor either as 
full- or part-time occupation can appropriately be estimated by this model. 
 
Let y be the employment status of individual i, it can be observed as 
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xi is the vector of explanatory variables that are assumed to affect women’s decision on labor 
participation. It hence also includes the variables that are related to denominational affiliation, 
strength of belief or church attendance. Similar to the binary model used out in the preceding 
                                                 
20 Note that data from 1990 are not used in this analysis. This is because indicators for self-reported health status 
and registered disability status, which are assumend to be important control variables, are not available. 
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section, the magnitudes of the effects in the model can be assessed by measuring the discrete 
change in probabilities when xk changes from the starting value xS to the ending value xE: 
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where ),  (Pr kxmy x= is the probability that y = m given x, noting the specific value for 
xk. 
 
This approach, however, is limited in two ways. First, the amount of change in the probability 
depends on the amount of change in xk, the starting value of xk and the values of all other 
variables. Consequently, at different levels of these variables, the changes will be different. 
Second, the dynamics among the dependent outcomes are not indicated by measures of 
discrete change. This latter can be addressed using the odds formulation of the multinomial 
logit model. The odds of outcome m versus outcome n given x are indicated by 
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Expanding )exp( |nmxß and changing xk by d  leads to 
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The effect of xk can then be measured by the ratio of the odds before and after the change in 
xk: 
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Therefore, the change in the odds for a change in xk does not depend on the level of xk or on 
the level of any other variable. 
However, the calculation of changes in the odds results in a large number of coefficients 
that makes it difficult to see patterns in the results. Therefore, to ease the understanding of the 
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findings, a graphical tool is employed and enhanced odds ratio plots of the results are 
presented (Long, 1997). These plots then include both the discrete change in the base 
probabilities and the factor changes in the odds. 
 
3.3.2.2 Panel analysis 
Exploring the longitudinal structure of the data offers the possibility to account for 
unobservable individual-specific heterogeneity. As outlined in Chapter 2 (equations 2.8 to 
2.11), results from the cross-sectional analysis might be biased in the presence of 
unobservable characteristics. Among other unobservable influences it can, for example, be 
assumed that tastes towards work vary across the women examined here. Such tastes, 
however, are difficult to measure. It may then be possible that the variables used to capture 
the effects of religion reflect these propensities to paid employment instead of the effects of 
denominational affiliation or strength of belief. The major advantage of the panel estimation 
methods employed is that they account for individual-specific characteristics that are not 
observable. Put simply, as shown in detail above, these techniques allow for the inclusion of 
as many individual specific effects in the regression as there are individuals in the sample.21 It 
is then possible to estimate each individual specific coefficient. This results in a large set of 
coefficients indicating each individual’s specific effect that is constant over time. It is best 
imagined as the particular individual’s effect shifting the overall regression constant. 
Interpretation would therefore turn out to be cumbersome when N is large. However, 
interpretation is unnecessary in most of the cases. In general, the panel estimators used 
‘differentiate out’ individual-specific heterogeneity while still accounting for it. Therefore, the 
bias that can possibly exist in cross-sectional estimations is removed.  
As the number of hours supplied as labor is inherently ordered, either ordered probit or 
logit models or, at least, models for multinomial outcomes would be the appropriate 
econometric techniques to apply also to the longitudinal data. Furthermore, as it is plausible to 
assume that the individual-specific effect is correlated with the set of regressors, the fixed-
effect estimator should be preferred. However, at present there is a ready formulation of the 
ordered model for the random effects case only22 but not for the fixed effects case. The 
employment information therefore is collapsed into the employed/not employed dichotomy 
and the fixed effects logit model as out lined in the chapter on methodology is applied. The 
following underlying latent model is considered (see also Greene, 2003): 
                                                 
21 For technical details, see Chapter 2 and the literature referred to there. 
22 See Butler and Moffitt (1982). For an application on church attendance rates see Heineck (2001). 
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where *ity  is the continuous but unobserved taste to work of individual i in period t, xit is a 
vector of explanatory variables and ia  is the constant over time fixed effect that accounts for 
the intrinsic differences in tastes to work and unobserved explanatory variables. itn  is the 
stochastic error term that is assumed to be iid. 
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Assuming that itn  is distributed independently logistic, it follows that 
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As shown in Chapter 2, this fixed effects model can then be estimated by conditional 
maximum likelihood (Chamberlain, 1980).  
 
Explanatory variables used in the cross-sectional analysis 
Both denominational affiliation and strength of religious belief of both partners are expected 
to affect the employment decision of married women. Furthermore, similar to religious belief 
itself, frequency of church attendance is used as proxy for religious human capital. Therefore, 
three model specifications are estimated: First, in specification 1 (M1), the denominational 
composition of the partnership is used to test for both the ‘bargaining effect’ and the ‘marital 
stability effect’. Therefore, dummy variables are employed that represent the different 
religious affiliations and furthermore show whether both partners belong to the respective 
religious group. The reference category is the homogamous Catholic union where the 
traditional inner-household allocation of labor is assumed to play an important role.  
Depending on the other groups’ strictness, different effects are expected for homogamous 
partnerships. Traditional attitudes toward female labor participation should also show for 
Muslims, a negative effect on labor participation is therefore expected. Other Christian groups 
are not distinguished in particular. It is hence impossible to differ between, for example, 
Orthodox affiliation and other maybe more exclusivist- like affiliations. No prior statements 
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can thus be made. As for Protestant partnerships, one might be tempted to connect 
expectations to the famous Protestant Ethic of Max Weber. However, and despite its 
popularity, empirical evidence in the literature is far from clear cut (Iannaccone, 1998). 
Therefore, the positive effect that would usually be anticipated is restricted here: At least, no 
negative effects should show. In turn, results for partners that both have no religious 
affiliation are expected to have a positive effect.  
As the sample size does not allow to control for the particular affiliation of the husband, 
expectations on partnerships where wife and husband have different religions are more 
difficult to grasp. One exception might be unions of Muslim women with men of any other 
affiliation. As pointed out above, overcoming proscriptions against ‘outer-marriages’ and 
hence overcoming negative attitudes towards women in paid employment should be 
accompanied with positive effects on female labor participation. 
Model specification 2 (M2) employs the indicator on religious belief. This is because it is 
assumed that in a more secular country like Germany it is not denominational affiliation itself 
that affects tastes to work. It rather is the individual’s religious conviction that plays an 
important role in its life. That is, assuming that the religious dogma taught in the respective 
church or group is rooted in the person’s everyday life, effects on individual behavior are 
expected to be observable. Therefore, dummy variables that interact affiliation with belief and 
non-belief are used. Two mainline results should be observed. First, as above, there might be 
different effects due to differences of the groups’ strictness. Furthermore, non-believers are 
assumed to have a higher propensity to work compared to believers. 
The findings for church attendance in Model specification 3 (M3) should not substantially 
differ from that of specification 2, as the frequency of religious participation can be used as 
proxy for revealed preferences and is henceforth included in the analysis to test for robustness 
of the expected results. 
 
A variety of control variables are used in both cross-sectional and panel analyses. To 
economize on space, both expectations on results and findings from the estimations are not 
discussed in further detail. In particular, common labor related variables included are: age, 
age squared, duration of education as proxy for accumulated human capital, and non- labor 
income. Furthermore, the number of both small children up to age 6 and children between age 
7 and 16 are included.23 Health is controlled for by using self reported health status and a 
                                                 
23 Lehrer (1995) examines the effect of religion on female labor participation dividing the sample in three stages 
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dummy capturing whether the individual is registered disabled. Furthermore, dummies for 
municipal size are included to control for possible social ties, also including religious attitudes 
toward female labor participation. In addition, another dummy variable is included controlling 
whether the individual is a West-German or East-German citizen. This is done, because labor 
markets in both parts of Germany still are quite different. As shown in the preceding section, 
female labor participation in East Germany in general and full-time employment in particular 
is higher compared to West Germany, despite East Germany’s structural problems and its 
high unemployment.24 
 
Explanatory variables used in the longitudinal analysis 
The control variables just illustrated for the cross-sectional analyses are also employed in the 
panel estimations. Denominational affiliation is omitted in the longitudinal analyses. This is 
done for two reasons. First, it is asked for in the GSOEP in 1990 and 1997 only. Employing 
the fixed effects estimator on data from two waves might result in undesirable findings. As 
the estimator then is based on the intrapersona l change over time, using two points in time 
would measure the effects of this change. This, however, is not the intention here. 
Information on the strength of religious belief is available for three waves; data on the 
frequency of church attendance are drawn from eight waves. Therefore, two sets of models 
are estimated: The first part of the equations analyzes the effects of religious belief on female 
labor participation. Therefore, dummy variables indicating the importance of religion in both 
the wife’s and the husband’s lives are used. Several model specifications are applied. First, 
estimations that separately include the wife’s belief (M1) and the husband’s belief 
respectively (M2) are run. The belief variables of both wife and husband are included in M3. 
Collapsing the information on religious belief, interaction-terms are generated to further 
analyze the effects of the partners composition regarding to religious belief. Controlling for 
the wife’s faith, variables are used that simultaneously account fo r the husband’s religious 
belief (M4). Somewhat more crude is the second set of variables which indicate whether both 
partners have a (strong) religious belief, whether it only is the wife to whom religion is of 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the life cycle: period 1, when no children yet are in the household, period 2, in which small children are 
present in the household and the youngest is under age 6 and period 3, when all the children have left the 
household. This separation is based on the assumption that some religions emphasize the domestic role for 
women especially in connection to the presence of children and young children particularly. With no children 
present in the household, religious composition of unions should result in a relatively weak influence on the 
wife’s labor supply. However, effects emerge or get stronger when young children arrive. In this analysis, 
though, limitations of sample size impede a further exploration of this additional theoretical strand. 
24 Further experiments with control variables for a possible North-South or Protestant-Catholic divide mainly did 
not yield other than trivial results and thus are not presented. 
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importance or whether it is the husband (M5). In both case, the reference categoy is the 
couple where both partners do not think that religious belief is important. 
Analogously, several equations are estimated assessing the effect of religious participation 
on the wife’s labor supply. A first part includes dummy variables that indicate the frequency 
of male and female church attendance. Again, effects of male and female participation are 
calculated separately (M1 and M2) and together (M3). A second part of equations collapses 
the data into variables that simultaneously represent the wife’s and the husband’s attendance 
rates. Again, specification M4 is somewhat more detailed than specification M5. 
 
3.3.3. Empirical results 
First, note that the results for the control variables from both the cross-sectional and the panel 
analyses are all well behaving and will hence not be discussed. Full results from the 
multinomial logit models are shown in the Appendix. The findings for the effects in the cross-
sectional analysis are presented graphically, using an enhanced odds-ratio plot (Long, 1997). 
In the case of the multinomial logit model estimated, this allows for the presentation of two 
aspects of interest: First, the dynamics among the dependent outcomes can be shown by 
plotting the factor changes in the odds ratios. That is, the effect of a covariate on the possible 
outcomes of the dependent variable is visualized by the horizontal distance between letters 
representing the different outcomes. If a regressor increases the odds of, for example, 
outcome A over outcome B, then A is plotted to the right of B and vice versa. A dotted line is 
included if the variable does not differentiate the outcomes, i.e. if the coefficient is not 
statistically significant. 
However, a substantive impact of a variable would be small if, for example, the odds 
would increase by a factor of 10 but if the current odds would be 1 in 10,000. Therefore, 
second, the baseline probabilities have to be taken into account as well. Therefore, the discrete 
change in the probabilities of the outcomes is represented by the size of the letters that depict 
the particular outcome. That is, the heights of the letters are made proportional to the square 
root of the discrete change in the odds.25 However, it has to be kept in mind that the discrete 
change depends on the values of the data at hand. 
 
                                                 
25 The square root is used since letters are approximately square, and thus the area of the letters is proportional to 
the magnitude of the dis crete change. 
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Figure 3.5: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of homogenous unions and intermarriages 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998; own calculations. 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the effect of homogenous unions and intermarriages on female labor supply. 
In particular, the outcomes analyzed are full- time employment (F), part-time employment (P), 
and being not employed (N). The omitted reference group is the homogamous Catholic union. 
Consider first the cases where partners have the same affiliation. The odds of having a part-
time job relative to either being employed full-time or even being not employed increase by a 
factor of about 1.5 if both spouses are Protestant.26 When both partners have any other 
Christian affiliation a reverse finding exists. That is, the odds of being in part-time occupation 
decrease by a factor of about 0.5 relative to the other outcomes. For other Christian women 
there is also a decrease in the predicted probability of part-time employment of -0.15.27 In 
both cases, i.e. being Protestant or other Christian, the odds of N over F, however, are not 
                                                 
26 Factor changes in the odds are printed at the top of the figure. The values on this scale equal to the exponential 
of the values of the logit coefficients that are plotted at the bottom scale. 
27 To further economize on space, results for the changes in predicted probabilities are not shown. 
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influenced. 
 
Being a woman in unions in which both partners are not affiliated with any religion increases 
the odds of having a full- time job relative to both being not employed or working part-time 
with a factor change of 1.7. Another result that supports prior expectations is the finding for 
women who have any other religious affiliation, i.e. who are Muslim, and whose spouses are 
also Muslim. The odds of both full- and part-time employment over being not employed 
clearly decrease by a factor of about 0.4. 
 
Furthermore, the probability of being not employed increases more than the probability of 
part-time employment and particularly full- time employment, with all other variables held at 
their means: The predicted probability increases by 0.22. However, one has to remember that 
this change depends on the given set of variables and might therefore be different for any 
other set of data. A similar result is found for Muslim women whose husbands have a 
different religious affiliation. The probability of working full-time increases by 0.33 and is 
thus in line with expectations. Women in such ‘outer-marriages’ counteract against cultural 
customs and habits that also include traditional attitudes towards female labor participation. 
However, the odds of all three outcomes are not differentiated statistically. 
The somewhat vague expectations on the other ‘outer-marriages’ show through also in the 
findings. No particular outcome is found to be differentiated statistically for both women 
without religious affiliation and other Christian women whose spouses belong to other 
religious groups. The odds of having a part-time occupation relative to full- time employment, 
however, increase for both Catholic and Protestant women whose partners have a different 
affiliation. 
 
As argued above, denominational affiliation may only be a weak indicator of the possible 
influence of religion in a person’s life. In order to tackle the different attitudes towards female 
labor participation across religious groups, model specification M2 uses variables that interact 
religious affiliation with the strength of belief. The estimation therefore includes believers and 
non-believers. Analogously to specification M1, the group of Catholic women who have a 
very strong or strong belief is the omitted reference category. Note furthermore that there are 
too few observations on ‘no affiliation and believer’ in the sample. A corresponding indicator 
could hence not be used in the estimation. 
Comparing M1 and M2, there are some similarities in the findings: Compared to their 
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Catholic counterparts, female Protestant believers are more likely to be part-time employed 
relative to full- time employment or not being employed (Figure 3.6).28 The odds increase by a 
factor change of about 1.7. On the other hand, the odds of being employed over not being 
employed decrease for Muslim women with strong belief by a factor change of about 0.4 to 
0.5. Again, there is no differentiation between full-time and part-time occupation for Muslim 
women and there is also an increase by 0.19 in the probability of being not employed. 
Different to the above findings, being a believing woman with other Christian affiliation does 
not influence the odds of any outcome over the other. 
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Figure 3.6: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of denominational affiliation and religious belief 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998; own calculations. 
 
Regarding women without religious belief, the differentiation between the employment 
outcomes and the base category N is more distinct at first glance. The odds of having a part-
time job relative to being not employed seem to increase for all but Muslim women by factor 
changes of 1.4 to 1.5. These effects, however, are statistically significant only for Catholic 
                                                 
28 Note that due to the different scales in Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.7 the distances only appear to be greater. 
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and Protestant women who do not believe. There is furthermore no significant effect for 
Muslim women and other Christian women. However, women who have no affiliation and do 
not attach importance to religion in their life are much more likely to work full-time relative 
to not working at all. The factor increases by 1.8. 
 
Figure 3.7 plots the results for specification M3 including indicators for the frequency of 
religious participation that again is interacted with denominational affiliation. Churchgoers 
and non-churchgoers are referred to the omitted category: the churchgoing Catholic woman. 
As religious participation might be interpreted as revealed preferences, it is not too surprising 
that the findings are not much different compared to those of specification M2. 
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Figure 3.7: Enhanced odds ratio plot of the effect of church attendance and non-attendance 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998; own calculations. 
 
Again, the odds of having a part-time occupation relative to not working are increasing for 
Protestant women who regularly attend church by a factor change of 2.4. Furthermore, there is 
an increase in predicted probability of part-time employment by 0.16 and a decrease of being 
not employed by -0.17. No statistical differentiation between the three outcomes is found for 
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other Christian women who regularly attend church and, holding all other variables at their 
mean, the discrete changes in the predicted probabilities are rather small. In accordance with 
the above findings, the odds of having a part-time job relative to being not employed 
decreases for Muslim women who are frequently participating in religious activities. While 
the odds decrease by a factor change of 0.3 there is also a decrease in predicted probability of 
part-time occupation by -0.2. On the other hand, the probability of being out of labor force 
increases by 0.18. However, unlike the results from M1 and M2, full-time employment is 
neither differentiated from being not employed nor part-time employment. 
 
Referring to women who are not regularly attending church, the patterns shown in Figure 3.6 
are reinforced. First, like above, the outcomes are not statistically differentiated for Muslim 
women. However, the odds of having a part-time job relative to N increase for Protestant 
women by a factor change of 1.7. Furthermore, and in contrast to the statistically insignificant 
effect in M2, the odds of being full-time employed relative to not working are clearly 
increasing for other Christian females and women without religious affiliation. The factor 
changes here are 2.3 and 2.5 respectively. The odds of being employed either full- or part-
time relative to not being employed increase also for Catholic women who do not go to 
church by factor changes of 1.9 and 1.7 respectively.  
Summing up, there is at least some evidence for possible effects of religion on female 
labor supply decisions. However, the results from the cross-sectional analyses just presented 
might be biased as unobservable individual heterogeneity that differs across individuals but 
does not vary over time is not controlled for. In contrast, the following results from the 
longitudinal estimations account for these individual specific effects. 
 
Examining the results from the panel analyses in Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 one has to keep in 
mind that only those observations could be used for the fixed effects estimation where there is 
variation in the data over time. That is, information on women who were either employed or 
not employed in all of the waves used is dropped out of the conditional likelihood function. 
This also explains the substantial decrease in the number of observations. The models that 
analyze the effects of religious belief on labor participation use 1,245 observations out of 
7,543 observations that are available for the three waves used. Analyzing the effect of 
religious participation on the labor decision of women, there are 8,773 observations out of 
21,578 observations from eight waves.  
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Table 3.7: Strength of religious belief and employment participation, fixed effects logit 
estimation including control variables 
 M1 M2 M3 
W: Faith is very important -0.3361 — -0.0533 
 (0.5191)  (0.5468) 
W: Faith is important -0.0452 —  0.0185 
 (0.3727)  (0.3853) 
W: Faith is less important  0.1353 —  0.1396 
 (0.2825)  (0.2875) 
W: Faith is not important (omitted reference category) 
  
H: Faith is very important — -1.1696** -1.1324* 
  (0.5620) (0.5875) 
H: Faith is important — -0.3141 -0.3042 
  (0.3512) (0.3620) 
H: Faith is less important —  0.0494  0.0409 
  (0.2435) (0.2481) 
H: Faith is not important (omitted reference category) 
Log likelihood -305.47 -303.27 -303.04 
Chi2 283.47  287.87  288.34 
 M4 M5 
W: F. is very important*H: F. is (very) important -0.8535 — 
 (0.5941)  
W: F. is very important*H: F. is less/not important  0.8502 — 
 (0.9715)  
W: F. is important*H: F. is (very) important -0.3445 — 
 (0.4533)  
W: F. is important*H: F. is less/not important  0.0375 — 
 (0.4017)  
W: F. is less important*H: F. is (very) important -0.0997 — 
 (0.4713)  
W: F. is less important*H: F. is less/not important  0.1231 — 
 (0.2866)  
W: F. is less/not important*H: F. is (very) important -1.0497 — 
 (1.0942)  
W: F. is less/not important*H: F. is less/not important (omitted reference category) 
  
W: F. is (very) important*H: F. is (very) important — -0.5491 
  (0.3658) 
W: F. is (very) important*H: F. is less/not important — -0.0757 
  (0.3032) 
W: F. is less/not important* H: F. is (very) important — -0.3172 
  (0.3831) 
W: F. is less/not important*H: F. is less/not important (omitted reference category) 
Log likelihood -303.32 -304.85 
Chi2  287.78  284.70 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 and 1999. Own calculations. 
 
Table 3.7 shows the findings for the effects of religious belief on female labor participation; 
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Table 3.8 presents the results for the effects of church attendance. Furthermore, the husband’s 
strength of belief and his frequency of religious participation as well as the interaction-terms 
are included to indirectly test for the ‘bargaining effect’ and the ‘marital-stability’ effect. 
 
Compared to the results obtained from the cross-sectional analysis the findings for the 
longitudinal estimations tell a somewhat different story. 29 In Table 3.7, the influence of the 
women’s belief seems to be eliminated: Although the coefficients for strong believing and 
believing women are mainly negative, the effects are not statistically different from zero. 
However, this might be explained by the fact that women’s faith is more stable over time. 
There may hence be too little variation in the data that would be needed to get substantial 
results from the fixed effects estimator. Furthermore, using 1,245 observations for three 
waves, it is obvious that the sample size is far from extensive. 
 
Regarding the effect of the husbands’ belief there is evidence in support of prior expectations. 
In particular, in both model specification 2 and specification 3, the presence of a husband with 
a strong belief affects the wife’s employment decision significantly negative. It furthermore 
makes no big difference whether the indicators on male belief are used separately or together 
with the female’s indicators. The logit changes by about -1.17 and -1.13 respectively which 
corresponds to a decrease in the odds ratios by a factor of about 0.3. However, when inc luding 
the belief dummies for both men and women, the statistical significance level decreases from 
5% to 10%. Furthermore, negative coefficients are found for husbands to whom faith is 
important. These coefficients are not statistically significant though. 
Examining the results from the interaction-terms in the lower half of Table 3.7 the picture 
again slightly changes a little. Independently from the wife’s strength of faith, all interaction-
variables that represent a (strong) religious belief of the husband show the expected negative 
sign. However, none of those coefficients is statistcally different from zero. Still, it should be 
noted that in the case of both partners having a strong religious belief, the z-values are 
somewhat ‘close’ to statistical significance (-1.44 in specification M4 and -1.50 in M5). 
Given a larger sample size, findings might then turn non-trivial. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Again, the coefficients for the control variables all behave as one would expect and are not discussed, but are 
given in the Appendix. 
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Table 3.8: Church attendance and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation 
including control variables 
 M1 M2 M3 
W: attends church at least once a week -0.4115** — -0.3613* 
 (0.1794)  (0.1963) 
W: attends church once a month -0.0650 — -0.1021 
 (0.1377)  (0.1493) 
W: attends church less regular  0.0836 —  0.0404 
 (0.0939)  (0.1006) 
W: never attends church (omitted reference category) 
    
H: attends church once a week — -0.3270* -0.1674 
  (0.1964) (0.2146) 
H: attends church once a month —  0.0558  0.1208 
  (0.1511) (0.1641) 
H: attends church less regular —  0.1436  0.1343 
  (0.0959) (0.1027) 
H: never attends church (omitted reference category) 
    
Log likelihood -2,674.07 -2,674.39 -2,671.98 
Chi2  1,196.82  1,196.18  1,201.00 
 M4 M5 
W: once a week*H: once a week/month -0.3691* — 
 (0.2070)  
W: once a week*H: less often/never -0.5923** — 
 (0.2924)  
W: once a month*H: once a week/month -0.1266 — 
 (0.1737)  
W: once a month*H: less often/never  0.0063 — 
 (0.1726)  
W: less often*H: once a week/month  0.0205 — 
 (0.2124)  
W: less often*H: less often/never  0.0930 — 
 (0.0969)  
W: never*H: once a week/month  0.0597 — 
 (0.3142)  
W: never*H: less often/never (omitted reference category) 
  
W: once a week/month*H: once a week/month — -0.2525* 
  (0.1469) 
W: once a week/month*H: less often/never — -0.1692 
  (0.1468) 
W: less often/never*H: once a week/month — -0.0138 
  (0.1846) 
W: less often/never*H: less often/never (omitted reference category) 
Log likelihood -2,673.41 -2,676.48 
Chi2  1,198.15  1,192.00 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1992, 1994, 1998 to 2001. Own calculations. 
 
Including the frequency of religious participation as a proxy for religious belief, the results 
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corroborate the above findings (Table 3.8). First, when us ing the indicators of church 
attendance separately in the regressions, the findings show that frequent attendance of both 
wife and husband affects the likelihood of the wife’s employment participation negatively 
(M1 and M2).  
 
As the husband’s effect is weak, it is not surprising that his level of church attendance does 
not affect the wife’s decision on labor participation anymore when using the indicators 
together in one regression equation. 
The result for the wife, however, is quite robust: While the statistical significance 
decreases from 10%-level to the 5%-level, the finding still indicates that wives who attend 
church at least once a week are less likely to be in paid employment. The logit changes about 
-0.4 each corresponding to an odds ratio decrease by a factor of about 0.6. While monthly 
participation in religious activities does not affect women’s labor participation statistically, 
the coefficients have negative signs, as would be expected.  
 
Furthermore, the findings for the interaction-terms also point towards a negative influence of 
a high level of religious participation on the likelihood of wives’ employment. Again, women 
who attend church once a week or once a month are less likely to be employed compared to 
couples which do not participate in religious activities. This result is rather independent from 
the level of the husband’s church attendance. The exception is found for specification M5, 
where the result for a female who regularly attends church but whose husband does not is not 
statistically significant: As expected, the sign is negative, the z-value, however, is only -1.15. 
Nevertheless, it may altogether be argued that regular church attendance by married women 
embeds attitudes towards female labor participation that affect their decision on labor supply 
negatively. 
 
 
3.4. The impact of religion on male earnings in Germany 
As shown in the preceding two sections, religion quite likely influences underlying economic 
attitudes towards female labor supply as well as the labor participation of women itself. As 
could be seen further, it is men and adherents to more hierarchical religious groups who are, 
on average, more traditional pertaining to the inner-household allocation of labor. As male 
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labor participation is more homogenous than female employment, the focus in this chapter is 
on men’s earnings rather than women’s. The general idea behind this is the assumption that 
male attitudes and mechanisms towards female participation in paid employment might well 
result in differences in labor market behavior and therefore also in differences in earnings. 
However, it is a priori not possible to predict whether religiously involved individuals have 
higher or lower earnings than others. 
It might be that men with a strong religious belief are even more in favor of the ‘male-
breadwinner’ gender role model than the average male. Those males might therefore be more 
likely to take on the responsibility to financially care for the family. This might subsequently 
be associated with higher efforts on the labor market which, ceteris paribus, may then result 
in differences in earnings for religiously active males.  
Furthermore, education might also be a channel through which religion might affect 
individuals’ earnings. Schools that are run by churches might differ in, for example, the set of 
ethical or moral norms and values that might transmit in differences in individuals’ behavior 
also on the labor market. On the other hand, it might as well be argued that individuals who 
uphold religious, and in particular Christian traditions, do not emphasize the accumulation of 
material wealth. Lower earnings might therefore be observable. 
However, despite the range of possible theoretical explanations that are further presented 
in the next subsection, there is only little research on the relationship between religion and 
individuals’ earnings or religion and aggregate income. 
 
This section adds threefold to the existing literature. First, data from Germany are used for the 
first time, allowing for transatlantic comparisons, as previous research examines datasets from 
the US or Canada only. Second, and more importantly, the longitudinal structure of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is again used. This allows to apply panel estimation 
techniques that account for individua l heterogenity, something that has hitherto not been 
accounted for in the existing literature. Third, it is not alone denominational affiliation or 
church membership and its impact, that is analyzed in this section. Adding to previous work, 
two more indicators of individuals’ religious behavior are included for the first time in 
analyses of the effects of religion on earnings. These proxies are the individuals ’ strength of 
religious belief as well as the individuals ’ church attendance rate.  
 
Following these introductory remarks, subsection 3.4.1 discusses some theorectical arguments 
for the link between religion or religious commitment and individuals´ earnings and 
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introduces shortly the findings from previous studies. Subsection 3.4.2 presents very briefly 
the data and the estimation techniques used followed by the results in subsection 3.4.3. 
Concluding remarks are given in subsection 3.4.4. 
 
3.4.1. Theoretical background and previous findings 
As is well known in the economic literature, family background can influence individuals´ 
socio- economic outcomes substantially. The relationship between family background and, for 
example, educational attainment of children is just one issue that is addressed more often (see 
e.g. Painter and Levine, 2000; Plug and Vijverberg, 2001; Keane and Wolpin, 2001 or 
Maurin, 2002).  
Religious tradition and the religious upbringing of children might be seen as one 
important aspect of family background that affects individual behaviour. As indicated above, 
there are several stud ies that find evidence for an effect of religion on e.g. marital stability or 
criminal activity.30 Lipford and Tollison (2002) argue that it is hence suggesting that religious 
teachings might also affect individuals´ attitudes and behavior regarding the acquisition of 
material wealth. Referring to the emphasis of Christian faith on ‘treasures in heaven’ as 
opposed to ‘treasures on earth’,31 they pick up an argument by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), 
arguing that there might be a trade-off between the present and the so-called ‘afterlife’ 
consumption. They consequently hypothesize that religious participants place lower valuation 
on market earnings because of their differing preference sets. Therefore, males who are 
religiously active may earn less compared to those males who are not religiously involved. 
Religious upbringing and religious commitment might have an effect on earnings through 
another possible mechanism. Values and virtues like honesty, discipline or diligence that are 
possibly transmitted through the religious upbringing of the individual either by parents or by 
schools run by churches might be rewarded by an employer. It is, however, plausible to 
assume that this signalling effect is more important on labor markets if religious markets are 
comparable to the US structure, i.e. having a wide range of churches and denominations that 
                                                 
30 Family background is of course only one aspect affecting the behavior of individuals. School environment 
may also play an important role. Mocan et al. (2002), for example, examine the impact of Catholic schools on 
deviance among teens. They, however, do not find empirical support that Catholic schooling leads to a lower 
incidence of risky or deviant behavior. 
31 There are several passages in the Bible that point to the inverse relationship between material wealth and 
redemption. A presumably well known passage is the example that it might be easier for a camel to go through 
the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. See Marc, 10, 23-25 or Luke, 18, 24-25 
or Matthew, 19, 23-24. 
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compete for both members and financial support.  
On the other hand, recall that European religious markets, and the German religious 
market in particular, are quite different to the US structure. In contrast to the US, the German 
religious market is a highly concentrated one. In 1997, membership to the Roman Catholic 
Church and the Protestant Church amount for over 90% of denominationally affiliated men, 
who are examined here.32 A signalling effect that may be based only on the membership to a 
particular church or denomination is therefore expected to play no significant role in the 
German situation. 
This might, however, be different if denominational affiliation is associated with the 
embedding of religious doctrines and attitudes in an individual´s life. Regarding the 
predominance of Christian faith in Germany, the above noted hypothesis is relevant again: It 
might be expected that strong believers are less inclined towards the acquisition and 
accumulation of material wealth. Therefore, the earnings of strong believers should, ceteris 
paribus, be lower compared to individuals who attach no importance to faith in their lives. 
Regarding Protestants, this argument might be seen in contrast to Max Weber´s thesis of 
greater wealth and prosperity due to the Protestant Work Ethic. However, as pointed out, there 
is a number of studies challenging or even refuting the popular thesis empirically.33  
 
There is only scarce literature on the relationship between religion and income or earnings. 
Most of the relevant studies use cross-sectional US or Northern American data. As the 
structure of the religious bodies is rather heterogenous, it is not surprising that findings are 
somewhat ambiguous. 
Using US state level data, Heath et al. (1995) examine the impact of religion on per capita 
income. They argue that the prevalence of more strict churches or denominations might, on 
the one hand, discourage the settlement and development of specific industries in 
‘unprogressive’ areas. It, however, might on the other hand also discourage individual 
behavior that inhibits economic progress, such as criminal activities, and furthermore 
encourage and uphold values and virtues such as honesty and discipline that might improve 
economic performance. Regressing per capita state income against the shares of population 
groups that are denominationally attached, they find that Jewish membership is positively 
correlated with per capita income. In contrast, Catholicism and the so-called fundamentalist 
                                                 
32 Furthermore, apart from additional donations, there is no competition for the financing of the churches in 
Germany. Being a member of an established church, a church tax is directly deducted from earnings. 
33 See Iannaccone (1998, 1474-75). 
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Protestantism are negatively correlated with state per capita income. 
Lipford and Tollison (2002), also using US state per capita income, estimate 
simultaneous-equation regressions to analyze the effect of religious participation on income 
and the impact of income on religious participation. They find that membership in religious 
bodies is negatively correlated with per capita income, reflecting the effect of religion on 
preferences and net earnings potential. Furthermore, they find evidence that income deters 
religious participation by inducing a substitution between market-earnings and religious 
activities. 
There is furthermore some research on the relationship between religion and individuals’ 
earnings or wages, most of which has been done in the beginning and the middle of the 1980s. 
Chiswick (1983) presumably was the first explicitly using the human capital framework in his 
study of Jewish men, finding that Jews have both higher earnings and a higher rate of return 
to schooling. Higher earnings for Jews are also reported by Meng and I (1984) and Tomes 
(1983, 1984 and 1985), whereas there is no unambiguous evidence for an earnings differential 
for Catholics or Protestants.  
Similar results are found by Steen (1996) and Ewing (2000) who both use data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey Youth Cohort (NLSY). Whereas both find higher earnings for 
Catholics, Ewing (2000) is the only author not finding wage premiums for Jews. He, however 
and unlike the others, does not restrict his analysis to men. 
 
Given the different structure of the religious market in Germany, the findings of the existing 
literature do not directly carry over in prior expectations here. First, and in contrast to 
previous results, denominational affiliation itself is not expected to be associated with higher 
earnings. It might even be argued, that retaining to a religious affiliation in times of the 
continuing secularization and individualization indicates that aspects other than material well 
being are of more importance. Therefore, lower earnings of religiously affiliated men might as 
well be observed. This arguing should also apply to the indicators of an males’ religious 
involvement given by the importance that is attached to religious belief and by the frequency 
of religious participation. That is, given that the male has a strong religious belief or given 
that he attends church regularly and often, lower earnings could be expected. 
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3.4.2. Data and econometric methodology 
The data used are again drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). As the 
variables that are related to religious affiliation and religious participation are outlined in 
section 3.3.2, another detailed discussion of the sample and the derived indicators is omitted. 
A first impression of the data at hand is given by the descriptive findings in Table 3.9 and 
Table 3.10. The first table shows that strong belief is no widespread phenomenon among the 
German men examined. Only about 6% of men in the western federal states state that faith or 
religion is very important to them.34 Even aggregating the two categories ‘faith is very 
important’ and ‘faith is important’, its share amounts to less than a third of the respondents. 
Among married men, there are sligthly more strong believers than among single men. Men, 
however, who are 35 to 45 years of age are less believing than their younger and older 
counterparts. 
 
Table 3.9: Structure of denominational affiliation and importance of faith among German men  
 West-Germany East-Germany 
Denominational affiliation in 
1997 
Non-
married 
Married All Non-
married 
Married All 
Catholic  34.9 39.4 37.7 (10.1) (5.6) 7.2 
Protestant 30.8 30.3 30.5 (9.8) 16.8 14.3 
Other Christian (1.0) 2.8 2.1 –  (2.3) (1.5) 
Other Faith (1.9) 6.8 5.0 –  –  –  
No Denomination 31.4 20.7 24.7 80.1 75.3 77.0 
 West-Germany East-Germany 
Religious belief is …  
very important 
important or 
very important 
 
very important 
important or 
very important 
All 6.4 31.0 2.6 9.7 
Aged .. to .. years     
25 – 35 7.7 28.4 (1.9) (6.7) 
35 – 45 4.8 29.1 (3.1) 9.5 
45 – 55 7.0 36.3 (2.6) 15.0 
Married 7.1 33.2 3.6 12.7 
Non-married 5.0 26.5 (0.3) (2.9) 
Notes: ( ) Cell includes less than 30 cases. 
Source: GSOEP, different waves. Own calculations, weighted. 
 
Looking at east German men, it is obvious that both parts of Germany have experienced a 
fundamentally different development in the decades before reunification also regarding 
religion. Whereas about 25% of men in the western federal states are not denominationally 
                                                 
34 Recall that the original question is ‘How important is faith/religion for your well-being and your 
satisfaction?’. The answer are given on a four-point-ordinal scale from ‘very important’ to ‘not important at all’. 
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affiliated, there are only 23% East German men, who are member of a Christian Church. It is 
easily conceivable that the predominance of men who are not denominationally affiliated can 
be attributed to the formerly atheistic public life. An analogous picture also shows in the 
lower part of Table 3.9, regarding the importance of faith. Only 2.6% of East German men in 
the sample think that religion or faith is very important and adding those who attach some 
importance to faith the share amounts to less than 10%.35 Again, married men are slightly 
more likely to have a religious belief. 
 
Table 3.10: Completed years of education and monthly gross earnings by religious invol-
vement 
West-Germany East-Germany  
Years of 
edu-
cation 
 
t-value 
Log of 
monthly 
gross  
earnings 
 
t-value 
Years of 
edu-
cation 
 
t-value 
Log of 
monthly 
gross  
earnings 
 
t-value 
Religious affiliation         
Catholic 11.1***  4.19 8.36***  3.46 11.6***  2.28 7.46**  2.00 
Protestant 12.0*** -6.34 8.43** -2.47 12.5 -0.68 7.59  1.33 
Other Christian 10.5***  3.75 8.31**  2.26 — — — — 
Other Faith 9.7***  8.22 8.22***  5.95 — — — — 
No affiliation 12.2*** -5.96 8.54*** -7.29 12.4 -0.50 7.67 -2.23 
Importance of faith         
Very important 11.0***  4.29 8.37***  5.78 11.9  1.51 8.05*  1.67 
Important 11.4***  2.76 8.49  0.09 12.2  1.47 8.15  0.15 
Less important 11.7** -2.07 8.51** -2.41 12.5  0.57 8.15 -0.16 
Not important at all 12.0*** -3.53 8.51 -1.13 12.6* -1.89 8.15 -0.53 
Attendance rates          
Once a week 11.4***  3.92 8.36***  7.33 12.6* -1.68 7.95 -1.33 
Once a month 11.4***  3.91 8.42  1.12 12.7* -1.83 7.96 -1.60 
Less regular 11.6  0.51 8.45*** -5.70 12.5** -2.43 7.96*** -3.33 
Never 11.7*** -5.16 8.43  0.43 12.3***  3.61 7.90***  4.16 
Notes: two-sided t-tests, H0:particular mean=respective average mean 
* Significant at the 10%-level; ** the 5% -level; *** the 1%-level. 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Plotting both earnings and years spent in education against either denominational affiliation, 
importance of faith or frequency of church attendance (Table 3.10), there is, for both East and 
                                                 
35 Using a different survey, Pollack (1994) finds that the majority of East Germans do not belief in God or deny 
the existence of a higher order. 
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West Germans, some first evidence in support for the hypothesis that the religiously involved 
are less educated and earn less than non-believers. In particular, having no denominational 
affiliation is associated with more time spent in education and higher earnings for West 
German men. Compared to men of any other Christian faith, males withouth religion have 1.7 
years more of formal education and even 2.5 years compared to males of any other religious 
affiliation. In East Germany, however, only Catholics show to have less education and lower 
earnings. 
 
West German men who are religious believers or attend church regularly have less education 
and earn less too. While strong believers on average have one year less of education than men 
do not care about faith, the difference decreases to 0.3 years for churchgoers compared to 
non-churchgoers. The relationship is even weaker in East Germany: Men who do not attach 
importance to faith in their lives spend slightly more time in education and the earnings of 
strong believers are lower by 0.1 points in the logarithm of monthly gross earnings. 
However, looking at religious participation, that first picture is different: Although the 
difference is rather small, it is those men who regularly attend church who are better educated. 
Furthermore, men who never attend church earn slightly less than all other men. 
 
As argued above, individuals’ religious involvment quite likely is a stronger indicator or 
predictor of individual behavior than mere denominational affiliation. To control for possible 
interactions between religious belief, religious participation and membership in a religious 
group or church, the 1998 information on the intensity of belief is matched to individual data 
from 1997 for a first cross-sectional analysis, accepting the potential source of a presumably 
only small bias. Recall that church attendance and strength of religious belief are 
simultaneously determined. Therefore, to again avoid potential endogeneity problems that 
may consequently rise if included both as exogenous variable, both indicators are used 
separately in the analyses. 
To further avoid problems that might be related to education or early retirement, the 
sample drawn from the data is restricted to male employees aged 25-55. The earnings 
regressions that are run separately for East and West German men include standard human 
capital variables and related background characteristics. These are in particular: length and 
type of education, experience and experience squared, a dummy capturing whether overtime 
work is done or not, a part-time dummy, a ‘blue-collar’ and a public servant dummy, three 
firm-size bands, regional dummies for the western federal states that equals unity if the 
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individual lives in the northern or the middle-western. Furthermore, dummies for nine 
occupations and eleven branches are included.  
Model specification and robustness is controlled for by estimating a series of different 
earnings equations, using a variety of subsamples. First, as indicated, cross-sectional 
regressions are run using a dataset with matched information from 1997 and 1998 to be able 
to control for denominational affiliation, frequency of religious participation and strength of 
religious belief. That dataset comprises 2,012 observations. 
Longitudinal regressions are estimated using three panel-datasets. First, the change in 
denominational affiliation and its effect on earnings can be captured using data from 1990 and 
1997, with 2,524 person-year-observations. The effect of religious belief on earnings is 
examined with data from the years 1994, 1998 and 1999 and covers 4,077 person-year-
observations. The subsample comprises nine waves from 1990, 1992 and 1994 to 1999 and 
2001 to analyze the impact of church attendance on earnings. 24,522 person-year observations 
are available in this unbalanced panel. 36 
 
The dependent variable used in all regressions is monthly gross earnings. As Anger and 
Schwarze (2002) point out, monthly labor income might overstate the remuneration of 
workers whose weekly hours of work exceed 40. Using hourly wages, that can be generated 
by dividing earnings by working hours, might however understate the earnings of those who 
work long hours. Thus, to prevent differences in working hours from distorting the estimates, 
working time is used as a control variable. 
 
Starting from a Mincer-type standard earnings-regression function, the cross-sectional 
relationship between earnings and religion is specified by 
iiii eRXW +¢+¢= 21ln bb  (3.12) 
where Wi represents monthly gross earnings for individual i, Xi is a vector of exogenous 
standard human capital variables with its associated parameters 1b . Ri is the vector of binary 
indicators capturing the individual’s religious belief, her denominational affiliation or her 
religious participation. Rather than including the indicators themselves, variables are used that 
                                                 
36 Using the unbalanced data in the latter case is due to the attrition of the panel over 1990 to 2001. Balancing the 
data reduces the sample size to 212 West German and 148 East German men. Furthermore, running the 
regressions using the balanced data, the very implausible results suggest for selectivity problems in response 
behavior. From the technical point of view, note that there are some modifications in the computation of the 
estimators and their components when using the unbalanced panel rather than the balanced dataset. For details 
see Greene (2000) pp. 567 for the fixed effects model and pp. 577 for the random effects case. 
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interact denominational affiliation with religious belief or religious participation respectively. 
In the semi- logarithmic specification, the coefficient, 2b , can then approximately be 
interpreted as the percental earnings gains or losses of the particular denominational 
affiliation or strength of belief. The variable ei is the common disturbance term that is 
assumed to be iid. 
 
Furthermore, to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity that might lead to biased 
cross-sectional estimates, the longitudinal structure of the GSOEP is used and panel 
estimators are applied. The earnings function of individual i at time t can be formulated as 
itiititit eRXW ++¢+¢= gbb 21ln , i=1, …, N; t=1, …, T,  (3.13) 
where notation follows equation (3.12). ig  denotes the unobservable factor that varies across 
individuals but is constant over time, hence called the “individual fixed effect”. The error 
term is represented by eit and is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors, Xit and Rit, 
and the individual time- invariant factor ig . 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, such model can be estimated by the fixed-effects or the random-
effects estimator which differ in the assumption on whether ig  is correlated with the vector of 
regressors (fixed-effects) or not (random-effects). Furthermore, assuming that a subset of the 
regressors is correlated with the individual-specific effect while the remaining subset of 
covariates is not correlated, the model can also be estimated using the Hausman-Taylor 
instrumental variable estimator. Note also that there is one peculiarity regarding the fixed-
effects estimator: When using only two waves, as is the case here examining the effects of 
denominational affiliation on earnings, it is the change in the covariates and the dependent 
variable that enters the estimation. 
 
In particular, OLS estimation is performed on data tha t are transformed as 
eRXW D+D+¢D=D 21ln bb   (3.14) 
where D is the difference operator. It thus is not the denominational affiliation itself that 
affects earnings but exit from or entry into a religious group or church. 37 The individual fixed-
                                                 
37 In the GSOEP, there is a decreasing number of members between 1990 and 1997 both for the Roman Catholic 
Church (-3.6%) and the Protestant Church (-12.9%), whereas other Christian denominations and other religious 
groups increase in membership. Note, however, that official statistics report a decrease in membership of about 
3% for Roman Catholics, while the Protestant Church loses about 7% of its members (Federal Statistical Office 
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effect, however, is still accounted for as the time- invariant individual specific effect, ig , is 
differenced out of the equation. 
 
3.4.3. Empirical results 
First, note that the results of both the cross-sectional estimation and the pooled OLS 
estimation that are presented in the following might serve as a means of comparison to 
previous findings in the literature. However, as will be shown below, one important result is 
that unobservable individual heterogenity has to be accounted for when analyzing the effects 
of religion or faith on individuals´ earnings.  
 
The results from cross-sectional estimations (Table 3.11 and Table 3.12) corroborate the 
descriptive findings and furthermore show evidence of two aspects.38 One the one hand – not 
surprisingly though – the results from the separate East-West regressions confirm that due to 
the different historical development religion exert different effects in the two parts of 
Germany. Whereas for the West German sample denominational affiliation accounts for some 
of the variation in the data, membership in a church does not affect earnings in East Germany.  
 
However, and in contrast to most of prior findings for the US, membership in a religious 
group or church correlates negatively with the earnings of West German men. That is, initially 
including only denominational affiliation in the regressions (Table 3.11, upper part), being a 
Catholic or a Protestant is accompanied with an earnings penalty of about 6%, compared to 
their undenominational counterparts. Having any other faith, i.e. mainly being a Muslim, even 
seems to lead to an earnings loss of almost 8%. A second model specification in the middle of 
Table 3.11 then includes the ‘strength of faith’ indicators as regressors and it shows that 
strong believers suffer a wage penalty of about 7% in West Germany and even more than 
15% in East Germany. While the earnings of East German men are unaffected by religious 
participation, a high level of church attendance is associated with an earnings loss of almost 
6% for West German men (Table 3.11, lower part). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Germany, 1993 and 1999). 
38 To economize upon space, only the covariates relevant to the hypotheses are discussed. The control variables 
that are included in all regressions, however, behave as expected. For full details see the Appendix.  
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Table 3.11: Denominational affiliation, religious belief, religious participation and earnings; 
cross-sectional regressions including control variables 
 West Germany East Germany 
Denomination: Catholic  -0.0623*** -0.0001 
 (0.0195) (0.0557) 
Denomination: Protestant -0.0656*** -0.0077 
 (0.0198) (0.0294) 
Denomination: Other Christian -0.0446 — 
 (0.0351)  
Denomination: Other religious affiliation -0.0783** — 
 (0.0321)  
R2 0.5867 0.4869 
F 43.15 11.84 
Religious belief is very important -0.0651** -0.1538** 
 (0.0278) (0.0669) 
Religious belief is important -0.0204 0.0116 
 (0.0199) (0.0394) 
Religious belief is less important -0.0233 -0.0051 
 (0.0178) (0.0239) 
R2 0.5842 0.4922 
F 43.68 11.79 
Religious participation: At least once a week -0.0589** -0.0639 
 (0.0243) (0.0604) 
Religious participation: At least once a month -0.0065 -0.0293 
 (0.0238) (0.0654) 
Religious participation: Less regular -0.0151 0.0375 
 (0.0152) (0.0296) 
R2 0.5844 0.4901 
F 43.71 11.69 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
Table 3.12 presents results of regressions that include interaction-terms on denominational 
affiliation and either the strength of religious belief or the frequency of church attendance. In 
contrast to the above finding, religious belief now does not seem to affect earnings of East 
German men anymore. The findings for West German men indicate that denominational 
affiliation statistically dominates the effects. That is, irrespective of the intensity of religious 
belief or the level of religious participation, Catholic and Protestant as well as Muslim males 
earn less than men without denominational affiliation who do not have a religious belief or 
who never attend church. The coefficients in general hint towards earnings losses of about 6-
7%, although Muslims without religious belief as well as Protestants or again Muslims who 
participate in religious activities seem to earn about 11% less than the respective counterpart. 
However, it has to be kept in mind that these findings all come from cross-sectional 
estimations. Individual heterogeneity is thus not accounted for. 
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Table 3.12: Denominational affiliation, religious belief and religious participation interacted; 
cross-sectional regressions including control variables 
 West Germany East Germany 
Catholic and religious belief -0.0721*** -0.0625 
 (0.0235) (0.0703) 
Catholic and no religious belief -0.0663*** 0.1007 
 (0.0220) (0.0880) 
Protestant and religious belief -0.0592** -0.0062 
 (0.0294) (0.0475) 
Protestant and no religious belief -0.0767*** -0.0078 
 (0.0216) (0.0345) 
Other Christian and relig ious belief -0.0562 — 
 (0.0403)  
Other Christian and no religious belief -0.0391 — 
 (0.0561)  
Other religion and religious belief -0.0769** — 
 (0.0353)  
Other religion and no religious belief -0.1129** — 
 (0.0494)  
No religion and religious belief -0.0792 0.0206 
 (0.0526) (0.0721) 
R2 0.5877 0.4891 
F 38.93 11.08 
Catholic and religious participation -0.0611** -0.0480 
 (0.0258) (0.0740) 
Catholic and no religious participation -0.0650*** 0.0562 
 (0.0207) (0.0818) 
Protestant and religious participation -0.1157** -0.0205 
 (0.0478) (0.0657) 
Protestant and no religious participation -0.0628*** -0.0062 
 (0.0201) (0.0316) 
Other Christian and religious participation -0.0317 — 
 (0.0500)  
Other Christian and no religious participation -0.0556 — 
 (0.0434)  
Other religion and religious participation -0.1063*** — 
 (0.0411)  
Other religion and no participation -0.0636* — 
 (0.0372)  
No religion and religious participation -0.1722 -0.1380 
 (0.1135) (0.1488) 
R2 0.5879 0.4887 
F 38.96 11.07 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
 
The relevant findings from the panel regressions are shown in Table 3.13 through Table 3.15. 
Although results from the pooled OLS estimator do no account for unobservable individual 
effects, they are included for means of comparison. The effects of denominational affiliation 
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on earnings (Table 3.13) again indicate earnings losses of about 6% to 7% in the pooled 
regression and of about 5% in the random effects model for Protestant and Catholic males in 
West Germany only. The earnings of other Christian men as well as of those without religious 
affiliation are not affected. Furthermore, while the random effects model accounts for 
individual-specific effects, the Hausman-test statistics reject the latter in favor of both the 
fixed effects model ( 2c -value of 160.76) and in particular the Hausman-Taylor model ( 2c -
value of 19.76). While both these models suggest for earnings losses of about 4% for 
Catholics and Protestants, the coefficients do not statistically differ from zero.39 Again, other 
Christian and Muslim males have earnings that do not differ from the earnings of males 
witout religion. 
 
Table 3.13: Denominational affiliation and earnings; longitudinal regressions including 
control variables 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
West Germany     
Catholic  -0.0617*** -0.0531*** -0.0427 -0.0409 
 (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0340) (0.0261) 
Protestant -0.0701*** -0.0577*** -0.0191 -0.0194 
 (0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0355) (0.0273) 
Other Christian -0.0379 -0.0304 -0.0078 -0.0019 
 (0.0299) (0.0319) (0.0529) (0.0409) 
Other religious affiliation -0.0241 -0.0169 0.0153 0.0127 
 (0.0285) (0.0310) (0.0570) (0.0439) 
Chi2 174.16   
Hausman  160.76 19.76 
East Germany     
Catholic  -0.0217 -0.0199 0.0292 0.0093 
 (0.0422) (0.0456) (0.1206) (0.0894) 
Protestant -0.0031 -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0096 
 (0.0222) (0.0235) (0.0483) (0.0363) 
Chi2 19.59   
Hausman  67.05 11.16 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP, 1990 and 1997. Own calculations. 
 
Using the strength of faith as indicator for possible effects of religion on individual behavior 
the results from the pooled OLS are in line with the first cross-sectional regressions above. 
                                                 
39 Note again that the fixed effects model is based on data from two waves only and therefore quite likely 
captures the effects of either exit from or entry into a religious group. Furthermore, note that the fixed-effects 
estimator might then also be susceptible to problems of endogenous selection. See Johnston and DiNardo (1997, 
402) for a nice illustration of such a problem. 
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Table 3.14 shows that strong believers in West Germany earn about 5% less than their non-
believing counterparts. Men in East Germany seem to have an earnings loss of about 10%. 
However, the LM-tests clearly reject the absence of unobservable effects ( 2c -value of 
1,025.86 for the West German sample and 447.56 for the East German part). While the 
random effects estimation also suggests for earnings penalties of about 5% to 8% for believers 
and strong believers in East Germany, 40 the Hausman-test statistics point towards the 
relevance of the Hausman-Taylor model for West German males ( 2c -value of 9.40) and the 
fixed effects model for East German males ( 2c -value of 4.12).  
 
Table 3.14: Religious belief and earnings; longitudinal regressions including control variables 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
West Germany     
Religious belief is very important -0.0469*** -0.0282 -0.0106 -0.0089 
 (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0205) (0.0169) 
Religious belief is important 0.0023 -0.0089 -0.0108 -0.0109 
 (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0115) 
Religious belief is less important -0.0048 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0066 
 (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0093) 
LM-Chi2 1,025.86   
Hausman  374.05 9.40 
East Germany     
Religious belief is very important -0.1010** -0.0786* -0.0656 -0.0682 
 (0.0437) (0.0471) (0.0617) (0.0502) 
Religious belief is important -0.0340 -0.0451* -0.0495 -0.0522* 
 (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0329) (0.0267) 
Religious belief is less important -0.0022 0.0094 0.0134 0.0152 
 (0.0166) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0131) 
LM-Chi2 447.56   
Hausman  50.41 4.12 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 and 1999. Own calculations. 
 
Neither of these models, however, suggest for earnings losses that are associated with 
religious belief. Although the findings indicate for earnings differences of about 5% to 7% 
less in the eastern federal states and less than 1% less in the western federal states, none of the 
relevant coefficients is statistically signifcant. Note, however, that the East German sample is 
not extensive (n=388) and that for East German believers, the t-statistic is 1.51 and thus 
                                                 
40 The results presented are based on the balanced panel. Using the unbalanced data yields no substantial 
differences in the findings except for the random effects model that implies an earnings loss of about 3% for 
strong believers in West Germany. 
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‘close’ to statistical significance. 
The findings shown in Table 3.15 are based on the largest sample covering nine waves 
between 1990 and 2001 and using religious participation as indicator for individual attitudes 
and behavior.41 The results from the pooled regressions are slightly different from the cross-
sectional estimations. First, while the findings above do not show an effect for East German 
males, the results imply an earnings loss of 4% for males who attend church at least once a 
week. Furthermore, and in contrast to the prior findings, men who participate in religious 
activities from time to time seem to earn about 1.5% more than those who never attend 
church. A similar pattern shows for West German men: While a high level of church 
attendance is accompanied with an earnings loss of 1.6%, less frequent participation is 
associated with an earnings benefit of nearly 2%.  
However, but rather unsurprisingly though, the hypothesis of the absence of unobservable 
individual heterogeneity is again clearly rejected for both samples ( 2c -value of 4,007.50 for 
the East German part and 7,925.08 for the West German part). The subsequently estimated 
random effects model implies no effects of religion on the earnings of East German males, 
although the coefficients associated to regular church attendance still point towards earnings 
losses. For West German males, the random effects model suggest for a reversed U-curved 
effect of religious participation on earnings: The result for a high level of church attendance 
rate is not statistically different from zero and therefore is not different from the earnings of 
males who never go to church. However, irregular and regular but unfrequent participation 
seems to result in earnings gains of about 1%. 
 
Following the pattern of the results for the impact of religious belief above, results from 
Hausman-tests reject the assumption that unobservable individual effects and regressors are 
not correlated. Morever, the 2c -values of further Hausman-tests that test the fixed effects 
model against the HT-IV estimation suggest for the relevance of the latter model for West 
German males ( 2c -value of 248.61) and the fixed effects model for East German men ( 2c -
value of 5.77). 
 
                                                 
41 Note again that the data are unbalanced. As mentioned above, using the balanced dataset results in quite 
implausible findings for East German men. In particular, PR results indicate an earnings gain for strong believers 
of 5% and FE and HT-IV imply a premium of 13% and even 15%. However, tests suggest for the relevance of 
the RE model that is associated to higher earnings of about 10% for males to whom faith is very important. As 
these findings are based on 148 male observations only, further investigation should be carried out to analyze 
whether there is selectivity in survey participation. 
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Table 3.15: Religious participation and earnings; longitudinal regressions including control 
variables 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
West Germany     
Religious participation: once a week -0.0162** -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0012 
 (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0077) 
Religious participation: once a month 0.0044 0.0124** 0.0070 0.0091 
 (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0060) 
Religious participation: less regular 0.0193*** 0.0119*** 0.0032 0.0050 
 (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0039) 
LM-Chi2 7,925.08   
Hausman  1,911.58 248.61 
East Germany     
Religious participation: once a week -0.0409** -0.0242 0.0329 0.0338 
 (0.0187) (0.0259) (0.0390) (0.0345) 
Religious participation: once a month -0.0247 -0.0132 0.0126 0.0142 
 (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0250) (0.0221) 
Religious participation: less regular 0.0158* 0.0112 0.0156 0.0164* 
 (0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0098) 
LM-Chi2 4,007.50   
Hausman  429.93 5.77 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP, 1990, 1992, 1994 to 2001. Own calculations. 
 
Followingly, earnings of West German males are unaffected by religious participation: 
Neither is any of the coefficients statistically significant nor would these suggest for effects 
that are much different from zero. For East German men, both fixed effects model and 
Hausman-Taylor estimation would suggest fo r earnings gains of about 1.5% for less frequent 
religious participation and some 3% for weekly churchgoers. However, while the HT-IV 
suggests for weak statistical significance for irregular religious participants, the coefficients 
from the relevant fixed effects model do not statistically differ from zero. That is, the earnings 
of East German males are also unaffected by religious participation. 
 
Summing up briefly, the results presented stress the need to control for unobservable 
individual heterogeneity: On the one hand, the findings from cross-sectional estimations or 
pooled OLS regressions suggest for negative effects of religious affiliation and religious 
belief or participation on male earnings in West Germany and partially also in East Germany. 
On the other hand, once individual-specific effects are controlled for, these results vanish: 
Neither do denominational affiliation nor a strong faith or a frequent church attendance affect 
male earnings in both West and East Germany. 
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As the theoretical background outlined suggests for either higher or lower earnings of 
religiously involved individuals, establishing testable hypotheses is difficult. Furthermore, the 
analyses presented suggest for only a weak if not neglectable effect of religion on male 
earnings in Germany. Nevertheless, alternative regressions were run to carry out (rather 
crude) tests. In particular, interaction-terms between religious belief and completed years of 
education or potential work experience and interaction-terms between regular church 
attendance and education or experience are included in the estimations.  
The idea behind this is that religiously involved males may, on the one hand, be expected 
to invest less in human capital because of the irrelevance of material wealth which might then 
result in lower returns to either schooling or experience. On the other hand, in line with the 
Protestant Work Ethic, religiously active individuals might as well invest relatively more in 
human capital than individua ls without religious belief. This would then suggest for higher 
earnings. 
 
Table 3.16: Alternative specifications testing for hypotheses (1); longitudinal regressions 
including control variables 
 West Germany East Germany 
 RE FE HT-IV RE FE HT-IV 
Believer 0.0438 0.1074** 0.1120*** -0.1461 -0.1425 -0.1202 
 (0.0379) (0.0434) (0.0360) (0.1481) (0.1789) (0.1455) 
Belief*Education -0.0043 -0.0099*** -0.0103*** 0.0072 0.0065 0.0044 
 (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0117) (0.0140) (0.0113) 
Believer 0.1094** 0.1130* 0.1070** -0.0729 -0.0100 -0.0739 
 (0.0553) (0.0596) (0.0493) (0.1390) (0.1499) (0.1195) 
Belief*Experience -0.0138*** -0.0136** -0.0130*** -0.0021 -0.0076 -0.0021 
 (0.0051) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0118) 
Belief*Experience2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Churchgoer -0.0268 0.0191 -0.0030 -0.0181 -0.1307 -0.1385 
 (0.0223) (0.0245) (0.0222) (0.0862) (0.1127) (0.0993) 
Churchgoer*Education 0.0024 -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0104 0.0111 
 (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0076) 
Churchgoer 0.0405 0.0195 0.0251 0.0476 0.0208 0.0215 
 (0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0250) (0.0785) (0.0858) (0.0758) 
Churchgoer*Experience -0.0042* -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0083 -0.0037 -0.0034 
 (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0075) 
Churchgoer*Experience2 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Table 3.16 shows the relevant findings from these alternative regressions.42 Again, the 
                                                 
42 Results from PR estimations are omitted as statistical tests suggests for either one of the three panel estimators. 
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earnings of East German males are unaffected in all additional specifications. However, the 
results shown in the upper part suggest for lower returns to schooling for West German males 
who have a (strong) religious belief. The findings from the second specification further point 
towards lower returns to work experience for West German believers. Taken together, those 
two findings might therefore weakly support the hypothesis that religiously involved men in 
West Germany are less inclined towards the accumulation of material wealth. However, with 
a difference of up to 1.5%-points in the return to either schooling or experience, the economic 
impact is rather small. Furthermore, the evidence from a second set of alternative 
specifications using church attendance in the interaction-terms again implies no effects of 
religious behavior on both the returns to schooling and experience.  
 
Table 3.17: Alternative specifications testing for hypotheses (2); longitudinal regressions 
including control variables 
 West Germany East Germany 
 RE FE HT-IV RE FE HT-IV 
Belief*Income important -0.0072 -0.0044 -0.0043 -0.0704*** -0.0860*** -0.0903*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0094) (0.0078) (0.0249) (0.0307) (0.0249) 
Belief*Income unimportant 0.0175 0.0151 0.0162 -0.0971 -0.0787 -0.0851 
 (0.0609) (0.0606) (0.0503) (0.0981) (0.1048) (0.0853) 
No Belief*Income unimp. -0.0430* -0.0218 -0.0232 0.0162 0.0114 0.0123 
 (0.0230) (0.0237) (0.0196) (0.0412) (0.0418) (0.0341) 
Belief*Success important -0.0083 -0.0085 -0.0083 -0.0492** -0.0562** -0.0601*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0096) (0.0079) (0.0242) (0.0286) (0.0232) 
Belief* Success unimp. -0.0398 -0.0378 -0.0317 0.0658 0.0745 0.0704 
 (0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0295) (0.0782) (0.0808) (0.0658) 
No Belief* Success unimp. -0.0318*** -0.0295** -0.0291*** -0.0031 -0.0017 -0.0025 
 (0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0107) (0.0210) (0.0224) (0.0182) 
Belief*Family important -0.0086 -0.0073 -0.0072 -0.0562** -0.0609** -0.0651*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0095) (0.0079) (0.0244) (0.0301) (0.0245) 
Belief*Family unimp. 0.0554 0.0419 0.0350 — — — 
 (0.1211) (0.1232) (0.1018)    
No Belief*Family unimp. -0.0877*** -0.0949*** -0.0953*** -0.0505 -0.0459 -0.0476 
 (0.0266) (0.0278) (0.0230) (0.0540) (0.0586) (0.0477) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%-level, ** at the 5%-level, * at the 10%-level. 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Further specifications are estimated that include interaction-terms between religious belief 
and whether the individual thinks that family or income or occupational success are 
important. Indicators for those latter items are available in the GSOEP for 1994, 1998 and 
1999 Again, a priori expectations are ambiguous: Religiously involved males may, for 
example, believe that income is of no importance because of an underlying dissafirmation of 
material wealth. They may, on the other hand, follow the spirit of the Protestant Work Ethic 
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and believe that income is important.  
 
The results from the regressions presented in Table 3.17 do not suggest for any relevance of 
religion for the earnings of West German males. Furthermore, the earnings of East German 
males who are believers and state that either family or income or occupational success is 
important seem to be affected negatively. The earnings penalties are at about 5% to 8% which 
therefore reinforces the tendencies shown above in Table 3.14. The statistical effect in the 
additional regressions quite likely shows as observations on ‘belief’ and ‘strong belief’ are 
pooled. 
 
While the finding for believers who are in favor of the family is consistent with prior 
expectations, the results for believers who are in favor of income or success, however, are 
both surprising and, to some extent, unsatisfactory. This is because it might have been 
expected that those individuals should show higher earnings, if at all significant. It therefore 
may be concluded that religious belief itself still affects male earnings in East Germany 
negatively. 
 
 
3.5. Religion and economic outcomes: concluding remarks 
This chapter presented analyses on the relationship between religion and economic outcomes. 
Adding to previous research, the three studies offer several novelties. First, except for the first 
study, German data are used. As most of the relevant literature explores Northern American 
data, this allows for transnational comparisons. Such is of interest as the structures of 
religious markets and religious bodies in Germany and, above all, the US are quite different. 
Furthermore, the studies also provide results that are based on longitudinal data. The use of 
appropriate panel estimation techniques is an advantage to prior findings which were mainly 
based on cross-sectional data as that approach in general does not account for unobservable 
individual heterogeneity.  
 
The analysis in the first section provides a cross-national examination of the impact of 
religion on the attitudes towards female labor participation. Furthermore, some first evidence 
on whether husbands’ attitudes and religiosity influence wives’ employment participation is 
CHAPTER 3: RELIGION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 91 
presented as well. Using data from three waves of the ISSP from the 1990’s, the cross-country 
variation in attitudes corroborates previous research and shows that males are less favorable 
towards female labor participation and female full-time employment. While this finding holds 
across all the countries analyzed, there are (large) differences between the countries. Among 
the nations included in the analysis, West Germany and Italy are the most traditional in 
attitudes towards gender roles and female full-time emplyoment. Furthermore, with regard to 
religious involvement, results show that both denominational affiliation and religious 
participation influence attitudes. In particular, Catholics and Muslims tend to be more 
traditional in gender roles and less liberal towards female full-time employment. Moreover, 
this also holds for individuals who are not denominationally affiliated but attend church 
regularly.  
Results for indicators on denominational affiliation combined with religious participation 
are also in line with expectations. That is, support is found for the hypothesis that it is a high 
level of church attendance that affects individual behavior. However, the picture is somewhat 
more heterogeneous when controlling for nationality in combination with religious 
participation. Here, the country-specific background to some extent counteracts the effects 
that typically are observable for higher levels of religious activities. 
Somewhat less conclusive results are found for the possible effect of husbands’ religiosity 
on wives’ employment. On the one hand, as could be expected, more traditional attitudes of 
husbands are negatively correlated with wives’ labor participation. On the other hand, neither 
denominational affiliation nor regular church attendance of males seems to have a negative 
effect. The exception is found for Protestants husbands whose wives are less likely to be in 
paid employment. While this might be somewhat surprising considering that Protestants 
typically are expected to be in favor of more liberal attitudes, it has to be noted again, that the 
indicator captures a variety of Protestant churches which quite likely are not quite 
homogenous. Furthermore, due to the given data structure, the findings rely on a cross-
sectional and thus on a somewhat preliminary analysis.  
 
Using longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, the second section therefore 
presents a more detailed examination of the possible effect religion might have on the labor 
supply of married women. Sociological and economic theory suggests that, on the one hand, 
membership to strict churches or religious groups might affect women’s participation in paid 
employment negatively. Marital composition, on the other hand, might add to or counteract 
these effects. Having an inner- faith marriage, i.e. both partners having the same 
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denominational affiliation, should influence female labor supply negatively only when the 
spouses belong to a strict religious group. Depending on the attitudes of either wife or 
husband, inter- faith marriages, however, might both positively and negatively affect the labor 
supply decision of women. 
Using cross-sectional as well as longitudinal econometric techniques, there is weak and 
indirect empirical evidence of the hypotheses suggested. First, marital composition influences 
female labor participation insofar that among homogeneous unions, Christian women other 
than Catholic and Protestant are less likely to be part-time employed. Furthermore, Muslim 
women are even less probable to be employed at all. Inter- faith marriages in general do not 
affect the labor supply of women. Second, arguing that it is not denominational affiliation 
alone that influences behavior, both the strength of religious belief and the frequency of 
religious participation along with denominational affiliation are included in the analyses. 
Results suggest that the labor participation decision is affected by both strong religious belief 
and regular participation. These latter findings from cross-sectional analyses are also 
supported by the results from the panel estimations that control for unobservable individual 
heterogeneity. It is found that women who attend church regular and often are less likely 
employed. Furthermore, while women’s strength of religious belief does not affect female 
labor supply, it is the presence of a husband with a strong religious belief that influences 
female labor participation negatively.  
 
In the last section of this chapter, GSOEP data are again used to analyze whether religion 
influences male earnings. Separate earnings regressions are run for East and West German 
men due to the quite different religious traditions in the last decades before reunification. As a 
result, the findings differ in various ways. First, cross-sectional estimations suggest that 
denominational affiliation is negatively correlated with earnings only in West Germany: Both 
Catholics and Protestants earn about 6% less than men who are not denominationally 
affiliated, men of any other faith receive monthly gross earnings that are about 8% lower. 
Using interaction-term between denominational affiliation and either religious belief or 
religious participation, the results are corroborated with the earnings losses being slightly 
larger. 
Up to this point, the results confirm prior results from the literature inasmuch cross-
sectional estimations suggest for an effect of religion on individuals´ earnings. Findings from 
OLS estimation might, however, be biased if there are individual specific effects that cannot 
be observed. Therefore, using the longitudinal structure of the GSOEP, panel estimators are 
CHAPTER 3: RELIGION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 93 
applied that control for unobservable individual heterogene ity. The results stress the need to 
do this: The negative effects mainly vanish. While random-effects regressions still point to a 
negative effect of denominational affiliation on earnings for West German males and also to a 
negative effect of religious belief in East Germany, it is mainly the fixed effects specification 
or the Hausman-Taylor model that is relevant. Results from these models  imply that male 
earnings in West Germany are not effected by religious affiliation, belief or participation. 
However, there is some evidence that religious belief affects earnings of East German males 
negatively. 
Crude empirical tests did not reveal further insights other than the weak evidence for 
strong believers in West Germany to be less inclined to invest in human capital. Moreover, 
East German believers earn less even if they are in favor of income or occupational success. 
 
Two mainline results arise from the analyses: First, from a technical point of view, it is 
important to account for unobservable individual effects when analyzing the effects of 
religion. Second, religious affiliation as well as religious belief and participation to some 
extent influence labor related issues also in a supposedly secularized country like Germany. 
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4. Smoking behavior and economic outcomes 
4.1 Introduction: Some remarks on health, smoking and economics 
In the preceding chapter, evidence is presented on the relationship between issues of religion 
or religious behavior and economic outcomes. As pointed out, there is only limited empirical 
research in this area yet. In contrast, far more attention is typically attracted by topics that are 
related to health and its effects on economic behavior or outcomes. There are analyses both on 
the individual and the  aggregate, public health level. The latter is a major policy concern as 
health expenditures in Western industrialized countries, with only a few exceptions, have 
constantly increased in the last 30 to 40 years (Figure 4.1).1  
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Figure 4.1: Health expenditures (% GDP) in selected OECD countries 
Source: OECD Health Data, 2001. 
 
However, while the determinants for this development are of ongoing socio-political interest, 
this chapter will concentrate on the micro- level and focus on one particular aspect of 
individual health behavior, tobacco consumption, and its relationship to economic outcomes. 
There are several reasons why this is done. For example, subject to the genetical condition, an 
individual’s health by and large is determined by her behavior. A balanced diet, regular non-
                                                 
1 To ease legibility, only a few OECD countries are shown. However, increasing health exp enditures is a 
phenonemon found in almost all of the OECD countries. 
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excessive physical training and a moderate use of stimulants are prerequisites for a good 
health condition both mentally and physically. Furthermore, essential for the following 
analysis, a good health forms the basis of a good performance in the labor market. 
Productivity losses that might occur due to bad health can clearly influence individuals’ labor 
outcomes. In the empirical labor economics literature, indicators on self-rated health are 
regularly used as explanatory variable in, for example, earnings regressions or labor 
participation equations. Furthermore, chronic conditions or disability as well as the effects of 
accidents on labor related outcomes are also addressed by a vast literature. 
The focus here is on tobacco use as an indicator of individuals’ health behavior. The 
crucial point is that people decide on whether to smoke or not, although they quite likely 
know about the adverse health effects that are attributed to smoking: While there also is a 
variety of (expected) subjective benefits of smoking like stimulation, stress or tension 
reduction, positive social effects and weight control (Rohsenow et al., 2002), it is nowadays a 
well known fact that smoking causes heart disease, stroke, different forms of cancer and other 
serious diseases. Subsequently, smoking reduces the life expectancy and is found to be the 
largest single cause of premature death in developed countries (Peto et al., 1994). Projections 
by the WHO (1997) support this finding and, by 2020, also expect smoking to be responsible 
for more deaths than any other single disease.  
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Figure 4.2: Smoking prevalence (% of population) in selected OECD countries 
Source: OECD Health Data, 2001. 
 
However, and despite the more or less ubiquitous knowledge of tobacco use and its negative 
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consequences on individuals´ health, smoking is still a prevalent phenomenon in Western 
industrialized countries. While there is variation across countries, Figure 4.2 shows for a 
small sample of OECD countries that after declining smoking rates in the 1970’s and 1980’s, 
the incidence of tobacco consumption has pivoted to a somewhat stable level in the 1990’s.2 
For Germany, smoking rates were also stable at about 26% to 28% in the 1990’s 
(Federal Statistical Office, 2001a and 2001b). While further analysis on the determinants of 
both starting and quitting smoking might be worthwile, it is not of primar relevance here. It 
rather are consequences observable on the labor market that will be studied.3 In contrast to the 
German case, substance use, i.e. the use of illicit drugs, alcohol and tobacco has been 
addressed by a variety of analyses mainly using US data. Among the different socio-economic 
outcomes examined, labor related issues that are analysed e.g. are labor supply, absenteeism 
and wages. As will be pointed out by the brief discussions of the existing literature in the 
respective sections, smokers differ from non-smokers in both labor market behavior and 
outcomes. 
The two following studies add to analyses that have been done for the US and other 
Western industrialized countries. In Section 4.2, an analysis of the relationship between 
smoking behavior and absence from work using GSOEP data for Germany is presented. 
Subsequently, labor earnings in Germany are examined for smokers and non-smokers in 
Section 4.3 to account for possible wage differentials that are typically found in the literature. 
Some concluding remarks are given in Section 4.4. 
 
 
4.2 Smoking and absence from work 
Smoking behavior is associated with a range of effects that are deleterious to individuals’ 
health. Therefore, smokers’ productivity might well be limited once these health impairments 
emerge due to increasing sickness incidence. On the one hand, it might well be argued that 
major negative health effects of tobacco consumption will first appear in a later stage of life. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that smoking is associated with poor physical fitness 
                                                 
2 Again, only few OECD countries are shown to ease clarity. Data availability over the period shown has been 
the selection criterion. 
3 For Germany, there is evidence that the decision to start smoking tends to be influenced by a complex 
intergenerational transmission (Bantle and Haisken-DeNew, 2002). That is, youths living in households where 
one parent or even both parents smoke are more likely to smoke themselves compared to youths from non-
smoker households. 
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already among young smokers (Conway and Cronan, 1992). 
Besides that, the last 10 to 20 years have seen developments to ban smoking from the 
workplace in order to protect non-smokers from passive smoking. Therefore, given that 
smoking is not allowed at the workplace, smokers are more likely to have breaks from 
working in order to smoke. Welte et al. (2000) analyze the overall economic costs attributable 
to smoking for Germany. They find productivity losses due to work- loss days and early 
retirement that sum up to about 16.4 billion DM (about 8.4 billion €) for 1993. Their work 
corroborates other findings on the relationship between tobacco consumption and aggregate 
social costs. It should, however, be noted that there are also researchers refuting the argument 
that smokers lay a financial burden on society. Among others, Manning et al. (1989) argue 
that although smokers may contribute to higher medical and insurance costs while living, 
society might also gain from tobacco taxes paid by smokers plus the savings that their early 
deaths brings to public pension plans and other kinds of old-age care. In a follow-up study, 
Manning et al. (1991) then show that calculation of the external costs of smoking is rather 
sensitive to the underlying discount rate. Without discounting, smokers appear to save non-
smokers money as smoking reduces the period of aged dependency and hence reduces 
pension payments. However, at a real discount rate of about 5%, smoking has net lifetime 
external costs of (1991) $1,000 per smoker. 
The purpose of the analysis in this subsection does not attempt to add to this ongoing 
discussion on whether or not smokers are a burden to society or whether it is them who 
subsidize non-smokers. However, the empirical literature shows that smokers are more likely 
to be absent from the workplace than non-smokers. Besides the short- and long-term medical 
effects associated with smoking, there is no substantial theoretical body explaining the link 
between smoking and absence from work. Fuchs (1982) and subsequent authors (e.g., Becker 
and Murphy, 1988; Evans and Montgomery, 1994) suggest that smokers are individuals with 
higher time preferences, i.e. they are assumed to value the negative health effects that might 
emerge in the future less than benefits from current tobacco consumption. 
This study now adds to previous evidence insofar that data from a representative 
longitudinal survey from Germany are used. This allows to account for unobservable 
heterogeneity which has hitherto not been done. Furthermore, while previous studies mainly 
employed methods for binary variables to model absence incidence or OLS when analyzing 
the number of days smokers and non-smokers were absent, the analysis here is based on 
models for count data. Such model take into account the specific characteristics of 
absenteeism as the dependent variable when measured in days. 
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4.2.1 Evidence from the literature 
There is a rather large literature on abseentism covering a wide range of aspects. For instance, 
several authors conclude in the seemingly empirical regularity that sickness absence is 
negatively correlated with the unemployment rate (see, e.g., Thalmeier, 1999 or Askildsen et 
al., 2002). Barmby et al. (2002) present a comparison of sickness absence across a range of 
countries that differ in institutional settings like sickpay regulation or family policy. As 
absence from work in general is higher among female workers, gender differences have 
attracted attention already in early work for the US (Paringer, 1983). Recently, Mastekaasa 
and Olsen (1998) as well as Bridges and Mumford (2001) conducted further research on 
absenteeism from a gender point of view.  
There are further studies that analyze the relationship between absence and, for example, 
the type of working contract or firm size. For example, and without going into details, 
Winkelmann (1996) analyzes whether worker abenteeism is different for full-time and part-
time workers. In another study, Winkelmann (1999) examines the effects of wages and firm 
size on worker absenteeism. Barmby et al. (2001) address the number of contracted work 
days and its impact on individuals’ absence behavior. While these studies focus on different 
aspects of absenteeism they all use count data models for estimation, which are also applied in 
this analysis. 
Furthermore, there already is some literature on the effect of smoking on absenteeism. 
First, there are a few early studies from the medical, psychological or occupational health 
literature. For example, while her primar interest is on the relative weight of respondents and 
its impact on absence from the workplace, Parkes (1987) finds that smoking increases 
reported absence episodes significantly. However, similar to other studies of that time and 
approach, the sample she uses is on student nurses only and it therefore is far from 
representative.4 
Large scale micro-datasets have been used as well. Ault et al. (1991) draw data from the 
1968 Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). They run Tobit-regressions and also employ 
decomposition techniques to determine whether there is absenteeism that is attributable to 
smoking behavior of workers. Their results suggest that smoking itself has no statistical 
significant effect an absence from work when other job or individual-specific characteristics 
are taken into account. They argue that smokers do not miss work because they smoke. 
Smoking behavior might rather be used as signal of other worker characteristics that are more 
                                                 
4 See Parkes (1987) for more references from that period on studies that mainly are workplace-studies. 
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likely to affect absenteeism. In particular, they suggest that it is alcohol consumption that 
might have a stronger effect an workers’ absence behavior. However, they conclude that in 
cases where employers have only limited information available on their employees’ 
characteristics, smoking behavior might be used to provide some insight into potential 
absenteeism. 
In his study on the relationship between smoking and absenteeism, Leigh (1995) uses data 
from the 1986 wave of the PSID. He also applies Tobit regressions which furthermore are 
corrected for possible sample selection biases. Besides, he investigates the effects of smoking 
for men and women separately. His findings indicate that tobacco consumption moderately 
increases absenteeism among men. Female absences are raised by a slight to nil amount. 
Data from the 1989/90 Australian National Health Survey are used by Bush and Wooden 
(1995). They estimate logit-models of absence incidence separately for males and females. 
While they also control for alcohol consumption and obesity, smoking is a strong predictor 
for the likelihood of absence from work. In particular, their findings suggest that among men, 
the probability of smokers of being absent is 66% greater than that for men who never 
smoked. While the difference is smaller for women (23% greater), it is still highly statistically 
significant. Furthermore, and in contrast to the results of Ault et al. (1991), differences in 
observable individual characteristics of smokers compared to non-smokers cannot contribute 
much to the explanation of why there is such a high abseentism among smokers. While they 
do not find substantial results for a possible effect of the quantity of tobacco consumption on 
absence incidence, they suggest that it is important to distinguish ex-smokers from other non-
smokers, with absence rates of ex-smokers being much higher than those of other non-
smokers. Including indicators on ex-smoking in their regressions they find that smoking 
cessation might increase attendance to work compared to current smokers. 
Adding to this study, Wooden and Bush (1995) argue in their analysis on the relationship 
between smoking cessation and absence from work that controlling for ex-smokers is 
particularly important because smoking cessation itself might be caused by illness to which 
smoking has contributed. Therefore, ex-smokers might have more serious health problems 
than current smokers. 
Summing up the literature on absenteeism in general and in particular that part which 
examines smoking and its relationship to absence from work, implications for the empirical 
analysis here come up. First of all, the underlying hypothesis to be tested is that smokers are 
more absent from work than non-smokers. Regarding the findings from the cited studies that 
employ models for count data, various employment related indicators should be included as 
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well. In particular, controls for part-time employment as well as fixed-term occupation, firm 
size and others should be included in the regressions. Furthermore, as men and women differ 
in smoking patterns, gender separated analyses should be undertaken. Regarding smoking 
behavior itself, estimations should further include indicators on whether the individual is an 
ex-smoker or whether she has never consumed tobacco products. While the amount of 
cigarette use of current smokers does not show to be good predictor for absence incidence in 
the study of Bush and Wooden (1995), there is no particular reason why this information 
should be disregarded. The problem of sample selection might be mitigated when using panel 
data, so that unobservable individual heterogeneity can be taken into account. In addition, 
models for count data should be applied as these excplicitely consider the specific nature of 
absenteeism measured in days. As will be outlined in the following subsection on data and the 
econometric methods used, most of the aspects mentioned will be considered in the following 
analysis. 
 
4.2.2 Data and econometric methodology: count data models 
This study focuses on the relationship between tobacco use and absence from work for 
Germany using GSOEP data. While this survey in general offers a wide range of socio-
demographic and socio-economic variables, substance use is not a major topic in the 
questionnaire. For example, as alcohol consumption may be a major factor driving individual 
behavior also on the labor market, indicators on the frequency of drinking behavior and the 
quantity consumed would be helpful. Unfortunately, no such indicators exist in the GSOEP. 
However, there are a few variables on smoking. In particular, questions covering the 
tobacco consumption of individuals are available for three waves: 1998, 1999 and 2001. The  
1998 question distinguishes both the kinds of tobacco (cigarettes, cigars or a pipe) and the 
number of cigarettes or related tobacco products consumed. The 1999 question, however, is 
different. It covers possible answers ranging from ‘Yes’ to  ‘No, but I used to smoke’ or ‘No’. 
Additional to this latter distinction, the 2001 question again asks for the quantity of tobacco 
products consumed, although without differing between the particular types of products. 
Table 4.1 presents the structure of smoking behavior in the sample used. While the official 
statistics show smoking rates of less than 30%, the smoking incidence here is higher probably 
due to the restriction on blue collar and white collar workers aged 25 to 55 years. The share of 
men smoking is higher than the share of women who smoke. The upper age class (46 to 55 
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years old) shows a lower rate of smoking for both women and men than the age classes 
beneath. As the negative health consequences of tobacco consumption mainly appear in the 
later stages of life, it might be that these consequences, once emerged, lead to quitting from 
smoking. Education and smoking is inversely related. A higher level of schooling is 
accompanied by a lower rate of smoking. This might, for example, be due to the more 
disseminated knowledge of the detrimental health effects of smoking or due to a lower rate of 
time preference among the better educated. The latter hypothesis might also cause the lower 
rate of smokers among white collar workers compared to blue collar worker.  
 
Table 4.1: Incidence of smoking in the sample of German workers 
 Smoking (respective shares) 
 Women Men All 
All 33.8 42.7 39.0 
Age:    
  25 to 35 years 36.3 43.2 41.1 
  36 to 45 years 36.3 44.8 40.8 
  46 to 55 years 28.5 39.2 34.3 
Schooling:    
  Basic schooling 41.5 50.9 47.7 
  Intermediate schooling 35.1 38.5 36.8 
  Secondary schooling 23.9 27.2 26.0 
Employment status:    
  Blue collar worker 39.6 50.4 47.8 
  White collar worker 31.9 33.0 32.4 
Source: GSOEP, 1998-2001. Own calculations, unweighted. 
 
Information on absenteeism is included annually in the GSOEP. There are two questions 
regarding to absence from work that are conditional to employment and cover whether the 
individual has been absent in the period prior to the interview. That is, the data available are 
retrospective and thus associated with the typical caveat of errors due to shortcomings in 
memories. However, as the question refers to the period prior to the interview, this kind of 
error should not pose much of a problem. The questions are in particular: ‘Were you sick from 
work for more than six weeks at one time last year?’ and ‘How many days were you not able 
to work in [year prior to the interview] because of illness? Please state all the days, not just 
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those for which you had an official note from your doctor.’ While it might be possible that 
sickness absences lasting longer than six weeks are also caused by tobacco consumption only 
the last question is used because of the responses that are given in total days, i.e. as counts. 
The sample is restricted to blue collar and white collar workers aged 25 to 55 years to 
exclude possible biases due to the worker still being in formal education or, more of a 
problem here, already are in early or regular retirement. A total of 8,365 observations for two 
waves, 1998 and 1999, is then available where information on absenteeism from 1999 and 
2000 is matched to the preceding waves. While it would be desirable to use the third wave for 
which indicators for smoking behavior are available, the 2002 data that would be needed to 
access the absence variable for 2001 is not published at the time of the analysis. 
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of absenteeism across male and female workers 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates that the distribution of days of absence is more or less similar for men 
and women. While more than 40% of female workers and close to 50% of male workers 
report to have not been absent, the bigger part of reported absence from work ranges between 
1 and 10 absent days with peaks at five and ten days. Only a minor part of workers is absent 
for longer than ten days. Note that there are peaks at multiples of 5. This might hint towards 
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either a possible measurement error in the retrospective report of days absent from work or, as 
likely, that sickness certificates are issued on a weekly basis and therefore are conditioned on 
multiples of 5. 
 
However, similar to findings of other studies (see, for example, Barmby et al., 1991), the 
fraction of women reporting absence is higher also for the German case. Therefore, 
multivariate analyses should be carried out that are separated across gender. Furthermore, the 
regression equations should also include a variety of gender-specific indicators. Above all, the 
family situation is essentially important for women. In particular, the presence of children in 
pre-school age might have a major impact (Bridges and Mumford, 2001). 
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of absenteeism across non-smoking and smoking workers 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
 
A plot of the distribution of absence from work for non-smokers and smokers hints at both  a 
higher incidence of absenteeism and longer spells of absence from work for smokers (Figure 
4.4). First, less smokers report to have not been absent and they, second, also have longer 
periods of absence as the distribution of days is slightly skewed to the right with somewhat 
stronger peaks. 
CHAPTER 4: SMOKING BEHAVIOR AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 104 
Table 4.2: Absenteeism among smoking and non-smoking German workers 
 Absence incidence  
 Non-smoker Smoker t-test 
All 52.3 56.0 -3.62 
Men 50.8 53.1 -1.74 
Women 54.1 61.3 -4.41 
Full- time 53.0 56.1 -2.85 
Part-time 49.0 55.1 -2.19 
Blue collar 50.1 56.4 -4.02 
White collar 52.4 54.5 -1.46 
Public servant 62.5 64.4 -0.48 
 Number of absent days (Std. Dev.)  
 Non-smoker Smoker t-test 
All 5.7 (8.9) 6.7 (10.0) -5.55 
Men 5.3 (8.9) 6.5 (10.0) -4.45 
Women 6.0 (9.0) 7.2 (10.1) -3.89 
Full- time 5.7 (9.1) 6.8 (10.0) -5.06 
Part-time 5.3 (8.3) 6.2 (9.8) -1.86 
Blue collar 6.5 (10.2) 7.8 (11.4) -3.99 
White collar 5.2 (8.1) 5.5 (8.4) -1.56 
Civil servant 5.8 (8.8) 6.4 (7.6) -0.85 
Notes: t-test statistic is for H0: means are equal. 
Source: GSOEP, 1998-2000. 
 
This illustrative impression is corroborated by further descriptive statistics on both incidence 
of absenteeism and the number of days  absent from work. Table 4.2 indicates that there are 
differences both in absence incidence and also in the number of absent days between smokers 
and non-smokers by personal and labor related characteristics. For example, while 54% of 
non-smoking women report to have been absent from work, 61% of women who smoke have 
missed. The t-test statistic of 4.41 clearly rejects the hypothesis of equal absence incidence for 
the two groups. A similar picture shows for blue collar workers where the t-test statistic of 
4.02 also indicates towards differences between smokers and non-smokers. Furthermore, 
smoking is associated with a higher number of absent days reported across gender and by blue 
collar workers. It might, however, be argued whether the difference of about 1 day per annum 
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is economically large, though. 
 
As information is given on the number of days that an individual has been absent from work, 
the econometric modelling of the relationship between smoking and absenteeism employs 
count data models. These models take into account several characteristics of the variable in 
question. First, measured in days, the indicator is discrete. Furthermore, there is a lower 
bound to absenteeism. That is, individuals’ absence is only observable once it occurs. 
Otherwise, the number of absence days equal zero.5 A further aspect of absenteeism is that a 
large part of workers does report to have not been absent. Therefore, there might be concern 
of the so-called overdispersion, a distributional aspect that will be discussed subsequently.  
Count data models now are well suited for the analysis of absence. In fact, as pointed out 
above, some of the literature that employs count data models also addresses absenteeism 
(above all, see the studies of Winkelmann). The idea is that absences might be thought of as 
results from a sequence of Bernoulli trials. That is, in a given period, there are n trials , where 
n is the number of working days in this period. On any of these n days, a worker is absent 
from work with probability p and she is at work with probability 1 – p. Therefore, the total 
number of days of absence Y is the sum of the n Bernoulli variables Xn 
å
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   (4.1) 
 
The resulting number of days of absence tends to a Poisson distribution with expected value 
l  as n tends to infinity under the assumption that the trials are independent and the the 
probability np /l=  is constant. Parametrization is introduced by letting 
)exp()|( bl itititit xxYE ¢==    (4.2) 
where b  is a vector of coefficients conformable to the )1( ´k -vector of covariates, itx .  
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5 It is not of relevance in this analysis whether working time that exceeds the number of contracted working 
hours may be interpreted as ‘negatve absenteeism’. Typically, such phenomena are addressed by the literature on 
unpaid overtime. 
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While the Poisson model is the standard benchmark model for count data variables, the 
required assumptions of independence and constant probability quite likely are not met in the 
application to absenteeism. First, the postulated independence of the process that generates 
absent days would require that the probability of an absence in t does not depend on whether 
or not the worker was absent in the preceding period, t – 1. However, evidence is found for 
both duration dependence (Barmby et al., 1991) and state dependence (Barmby et al., 1995). 
That is, absence spells do not occur randomly over time. Second, unobservable individual 
heterogeneity invalidates the basic Poisson model insofar that all factors that are relevant for 
establishing the expected number of days of absence cannot be controlled for. 
When both these assumptions, independence and constant probability, are violated, the 
data are likely to display overdispersion. This is a situation where, in contrast to the Poisson 
model, where the (positive)l  is equal to the mean and the variance, the cond itional mean 
exceeds the conditional variance of the number of absent days. Furthermore, excess zeros also 
lead to overdispersion (Winkelmann, 2000).  
As shown by the distributions of the counts of absent days in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 
and the descriptive statistics in Table 3.2, and further assuming that the required assumptions 
for the Poisson model are not met, overdispersion is quite likely a matter of concern. 
Therefore, a more general model that allows for this phenomenon, the negative binomial 
model (negbin), which provides a potentially more efficient estimator, is used. In particular, 
the probability model is 
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where a  is an additional parameter. This model can arise if the Bernoulli process is 
characterized by occurrence dependence (Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). However, these 
specifications assume that observations for individuals consecutive over time are independent.  
 
The panel structure of the data now allows to account for additional unobservable 
heterogeneity 
)exp()|( iititit uxxYE +¢= b    (4.5) 
A random effects estimator for the negative binomial model that can be applied to panel data 
has been introduced by Hausman et al. (1984). They start from the Poisson model and assume 
that the individual specific effect, exp(ui), is gamma distributed with E(ui) = 1 and Var(ui) = 
1/a . Further assuming that )1/( ii aa +  is distributed as beta(a;b), ia  can be integrated out 
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and the resulting joint probability function for individual i can be written as 
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Assuming that there are no random effects, a = b = 0. A standard Wald test or a likelihood 
ratio test can be employed to test for this restriction. 
 
The dependent variable used here is the annual number of days of absence from work. The 
lower limit is 0 and the theoretical upper limit is 365 or the maximum number of workdays. In 
the final sample, about 45% of the workers report to have not been absent, the largest number 
of absent days is 199. The average number of days of absence is 6.1 with standard deviation 
9.4 (Table 4.2). 
Besides the smoking related variables, a variety of socio-demographic and employment 
related covariates are included to control for effects that are assumed or known to affect 
absenteeism. In particular, two age class dummies are included, using young individuals, i.e. 
those aged between 25 to 35 years, as reference group. To control for possible cohort effects, 
these age class dummies are interacted with smoking indicators and additional regressions are 
run. Other socio-demographic variables included are a dummy on whether the individual is 
married, another one indicating whether children up to the age of 16 are living in the 
household, one dummy on whether she is from East Germany and another one on whether she 
is of Non-German origin. There are furthermore health-related regressors: a dummy capturing 
whether the individual is registered disabled, one denoting the (officially registered) degree of 
disability and two dummy variables on self- rated health: very good and good or fair. That is, a 
self-rated health status less than fair is the reference category. The labor related covariates are: 
years of education, potential experience, also squared, the period of current employment, 
dummies on whether the job is a temporary job or a part-time job. Furthermore, indicators are 
included on whether she undergoes vocational training, whether she is satisfied with her job, 
whether she works overtime and whether she is a blue collar worker or a public servant, white 
collar workers being the reference group. Gross monthly earnings and hours worked per week 
are given in natural logarithm. Categories on firm sizes larger than 20 employees are also 
included. Furthermore, eight occupational dummies and twelve branch dummies are used. 
Due to the different questions on smoking in 1998 and 1999, cross-sectional regressions 
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are estimated for both years separately. There are 4,307 male and female observations 
available for 1998 and 4,058 observations for 1999. The longitudinal regressions are then run 
using 8,365 person-year observations, 3,849 for women and 4,876 for men. 
 
4.2.3 Empirical results 
The results from the cross-sectional regressions are presented first. While these models do not 
account for individual-specific effects they may be used for comparison to the evidence from 
the literature. To economize on space, results from the control variables are not discussed in 
full detail. 6 In general, it is the better educated individual with a very good, good or fair self-
rated health who is satisfied with the job, who is less often absent. Part-time occupation is 
also associated with less absence from work for men. In contrast, individuals working in firms 
with more than 20 employees tend to be more often absent than workers in small firms. A 
higher absence rate is also found for male blue collar workers and for females with increases 
in monthly earnings. 
Smoking related findings are shown in the following tables. Table 4.3 presents results for 
1998 for which the data allow to control for the amount of cigarettes consumed. Table 4.4 
then shows findings for 1999 for which the survey allows to distinguish non-smokers, 
smokers and ex-smokers. 
 
Table 4.3 shows that, for 1998, the findings from the estimation of the negative binomial 
regressions confirm the descriptive statistics shown above for male smokers only. That is, 
compared to non-smoking males, the expected number of absent days is higher for men who 
smoke.7 Interestingly, the multivariate count data regressions do not corroborate the 
descriptive, and hence preliminary results for women: Smoking does not account for higher 
absence rates among female workers. While this contradicts prior evidence, one has to 
remember that the regression does not account for unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See Appendix for full regression results. 
7 Note that coefficients shown do not represent marginal effects and are therefore not necessarily comp arable 
across the models estimated for 1998 and 1999. 
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Table 4.3: Amount of cigarette consumption and absence from work 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1478 0.1536* — — 
 (0.0967) (0.0862)   
No. of cig. daily: up to 10 — — 0.1581 0.0144 
   (0.1765) (0.1827) 
No. of cig. daily: 10 to 20 — — 0.1355 0.2397* 
   (0.1409) (0.1283) 
No. of cig. daily: 20 to 30 — — 0.1781 0.1603 
   (0.1472) (0.1157) 
No. of cig. daily: more than 30 — — 0.0634 0.0877 
   (0.3086) (0.1717) 
Observations 1,802 2,505 1,802 2,505 
Log likelihood -4,755.72 -6,064.07 -4,755.61 -6,063.35 
Chi2 (DF) 84.24 (47) 144.38 (47) 84.47 (50) 145.82 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0007 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998. 
 
Furthermore, the level of tobacco consumption does also play no substantial role in the 
explanation of absence from work. While all coefficients are positive and are thus indicating 
towards higher absence rates for smokers, no statistical significance is again found for 
women. This holds true also for male workers except for those who smoke between 10 and 20 
cigarettes a day. Such workers have higher absence rates. However, there is only weak 
statistical significance at the 10%-level and, as for women, the finding is based on an 
estimator that does not allow to control for unobservable individual-specific effects. 
 
Examining whether having smoked in the past influences current absenteeism does not result 
in possibly expected findings. As pointed out above, it can be argued that the decision to quit 
smoking might be caused by the deleterious health effects of tobacco consumption which 
might then result in higher absenteeism. However, with the data at hand, it is not possible to 
identify the duration of the time since the cessation from smoking. That is, it cannot be 
controlled for either recent quits from smoking possibly caused by a worsening health 
condition or quits that happened long ago so that health may have improved in the meantime. 
Results thus have to be taken rather carefully. 
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Table 4.4: Smoking, ex-smoking and absence from work 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.0689 0.0562 — — 
 (0.1044) (0.0953)   
Ex-smoker -0.0424 0.0276 — — 
 (0.1312) (0.1115)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.0812 0.1814 
   (0.1738) (0.1430) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.1046 -0.2105 
   (0.2462) (0.2061) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — -0.0187 -0.6093* 
   (0.3827) (0.3147) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.0346 -0.2570 
   (0.2444) (0.2086) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — -0.0188 -0.4664 
   (0.3692) (0.3275) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35) — — -0.1740 0.2402 
   (0.2417) (0.1973) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — -0.2565 0.0463 
   (0.2082) (0.1816) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2965 -0.2588 
   (0.2359) (0.2072) 
Observations 1,687 2,371 1,687 2,371 
Log likelihood -4,430.46 -6,019.66 -4,428.30 -6,017.89 
Chi2 (DF) 84.12 (48) 110.74 (48) 88.43 (52) 114.27 (52) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0010 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1999. 
 
The findings from the cross-sectional regressions using the 1999 data indicate that neither 
current nor past smoking influences absence from work (Table 4.4). This result holds across 
gender and both for using the indicators on smoking and ex-smoking itself (M1, column 1 and 
column 2) and also using variables that interact smoking, ex-smoking and age cohorts (M2, 
column 3 and column 4). Furthermore, the only coefficient statistically different from zero 
hints towards less absence for male smokers aged 46 to 55 years compared to young male 
non-smokers. However, although shown in the Appendix only, it is more likely that it is the 
age effect which dominates this finding. 
 
Note again that the findings just presented are results from estimations of the negative 
binomial regression model. While it is not shown nor further discussed, LR-tests that test this 
model against the (nested within) Poisson model call for the negative binomial regression 
model. However, unobservable individiual heterogeneity is accounted for only in the panel 
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specification of the model, employed here as a random effects negative binomial regression 
model. Still, in order to have a benchmark for the panel estimations, pooled regressions are 
run that again ignore the covariance structure of the longitudinal data.  
 
Table 4.5: Smoking and absence from work; pooled negbin-model including control-variables 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1360** 0.0978* — — 
 (0.0685) (0.0595)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.2186* 0.1546* 
   (0.1134) (0.0909) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.2665 -0.0446 
   (0.1623) (0.1392) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2550 -0.3669 
   (0.2625) (0.2232) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.1249 -0.0924 
   (0.1575) (0.1303) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2560 -0.4401** 
   (0.2450) (0.2189) 
Observations 3,489 4,876 3,489 4,876 
Log likelihood -9,199.85 -12,099.81 -9,199.09 -12,099.46 
Chi2 (DF) 141.54 (48) 228.78 (48) 143.05 (50) 229.49 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
 
In contrast to the findings for the 1999 data and only partially in accordance with the 1998 
data, Table 4.5 then shows that smoking is associated with higher absence rates for both men 
and women (column 1 and column 2). Again using interaction variables, it is found that both 
young female and male smokers are more likely to have more absent days than their non-
smoking counterparts (column 3 and column 4). Note, however, that there is no consistent 
pattern as the coefficients for smokers older than 35 years are negative, though not 
statistically significant. Elderly non-smoking males have lower absence rates than their 
younger counterparts. 
 
Table 4.6 presents the estimation results from the random effects negative binomial regression 
model, i.e. controlling for unobservable individiual heterogeneity. Again, smoking results in 
higher absence rates for female workers; male absenteeism,  however, seems to be not affected 
by smoking (column 1 and column 2). 
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Table 4.6: Smoking and absence from work; negbin-model accounting for random effects 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1287*** 0.0132 — — 
 (0.0468) (0.0399)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.1092 0.0061 
   (0.0753) (0.0605) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.4533*** -0.1113 
   (0.1108) (0.0934) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.4523** -0.3046* 
   (0.1763) (0.1554) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.2474** -0.1275 
   (0.1053) (0.0902) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.4243** -0.3270** 
   (0.1666) (0.1480) 
Observations 3,489 4,876 3,489 4,876 
Number of individiuals  2,197 2,910 2,197 2,910 
Log likelihood -9,111.50 -12,044.41 -9,110.33 -12,044.40 
Chi2 (DF) 317.86 (48) 349.76 (48) 320.89 (50) 349.74 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
 
Using the smoking-age interaction terms, column 3 and column 4 of Table 4.6 show that 
female smokers older than 35 years have more absent days than young non-smoking women. 
However, as higher absence rates are also found for elder non-smoking women it might quite 
likely be the age effect that comes through here. A similar conclusion has to be drawn for 
males where both elderly smoking and non-smoking workers have lower absence rates than 
young non-smoking workers. However, interestingly, LR-tests suppose that the random 
effects specification is not superior to the pooled negative binomial model. It might hence be 
concluded that it is in particular both female and male young smokers who are more likely to 
be absent from work compared to their non-smoking counterparts. 
 
 
4.3 Smoking and earnings8 
The evidence from the preceding section shows some evidence that smokers are more absent 
than non-smokers. However, as pointed out, it cannot be said whether smokers are more 
                                                 
8 I am grateful to session participants at the 15th Annual EALE Conference, Seville, 2003, and in particular Prof. 
Jan C. van Ours, who gave valuable comments on this study.  
CHAPTER 4: SMOKING BEHAVIOR AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 113 
frequently exposed to illnesses that are caused by tobacco consumption or whether smokers 
are individuals with higher time preferences that are less willing to invest in human capital 
and hence select in jobs with flatter earnings profiles. This section now will add to the 
analysis ot the preceding section and examine whether smokers differ from non-smokers not 
only in absence behavior but whether differences show also in earnings. As there are 
differences in smoking behavior between men and women, the analysis will employ 
estimations separate for men and women. 
Whereas there is only scarce work that examines the impact of smoking only on earnings 
or wages, the majority of the relevant literature examines the effects of smoking in 
combination to or additional to another health indicator. Since these studies are closely related 
to the analysis here, they will be introduced briefly. 
Most of the relevant literature concentrates on the effect of alcohol use on wages (Berger 
and Leigh, 1988; Zarkin et al., 1998; MacDonald and Shields, 2001; Tekin, 2002). Results tell 
that there are both linear and U-shaped relationships between alcohol consumption and wages. 
That is, there are wage premiums for moderate drinkers in comparison to both heavy drinkers 
and non-drinkers.9 There is furthermore a small literature that addresses the impact of the use 
of illicit drugs on labor supply and wages (Gill and Michaels, 1992; Kaestner, 1991, 1994a, 
1994b) or the influence of smoking and being overweight on earnings (Berger and Leigh, 
1989). Besides these, there are a few studies that include both tobacco and alcohol use in their 
analyses (Auld, 2002; Lee, 1999; Lye and Hirschberg, 2001; Van Ours, 2002). Results from 
the latter support the positive effect of moderate alcohol use but discover wage penalties for 
smokers. As pointed out, and to the best knowledge, smoking alone and its effect on wages 
has been of interest only for Levine et al. (1997), also yielding lower wages for smokers. 
As most of the existing literature explores data for either North-America, Australia and, 
only recently, the Netherlands, examining the German case for the first time adds to the 
possibility of international comparisons. Furthermore, the panel structure of the data is used. 
This is advantageous to cross-sectional analyses as unobservable individual heterogeneity can 
be controlled for. That is, if unobservable individual factors exist that are correlated both with 
smoking and labor market outcomes, using cross-sectional data might quite likely lead to 
biased estimates. 
This section is structured as follows: next, subsection 4.3.1 provides a theoretical 
                                                 
9 These results are consistent with the findings of the medical literature that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between alcohol consumption and cardiovascular disease (see e.g. Marmot and Brunner (1991); for more 
references see Tekin (2002) or Lye and Hirschberg (2001)). 
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background and reviews shortly the results of previous research. Section 4.3.2 shortly 
presents both the data and the econometric methods used. Results are discussed in section 
4.3.3 and are followed by concluding remarks in section 4.3.4. 
 
4.3.1 Background and previous findings 
Applying the ‘rational addiction theory’ (Becker and Murphy, 1988) to smoking tells that the 
consumption of tobacco products can be seen as a result of an individual’s rational decision-
making process, taking into account both present and future benefits as well as costs of 
smoking (Becker et al., 1994; Chaloupka, 1991). This view has not been without 
contradiction in the literature as some authors find evidence for bounded rationality in the  
case of smoking (Laux, 2000; Gruber, 2000). 
However, from the theoretical point of view, the idea that smokers are individuals with 
high time preference rates is one of the possible links between smoking and earnings. If 
smokers are individuals who strongly discount their future lifetime utility, they are less likely 
to invest in productivity enhancing human capital which might then result in lower wages. A 
higher time preference of smokers might therefore affect both time spent in formal education 
investments in on-the-job training. Empirical evidence supporting the argument that smokers 
hence have lower educational attainment than non-smokers is found by Evans and 
Montgomery (1994) and implicitly though by Bantle and Haisken-DeNew (2002). 
A second theoretical argument is a potential lower productivity of smokers. A decline in 
productivity may occur, as shown above, because of increased absenteeism of smokers that 
might then affect earnings negatively. Lower earnings might also result from smokers’ lower 
physical fitness that might confine workers’ abilities which might then result in a reduced 
productivity. Discrimination against smokers might be another reason for earnings 
differentials (Levine et al., 1997). Public policies to promote knowledge about the deleterious 
effects of smoking behavior have lead to developments in the protection of non-smokers from 
passive smoking by either restricting smoking in public buildings to designated areas or even 
banning it completely. Many private employers have followed these trends and implemented 
their own smoking policies that might lead to a discrimination of smokers and result in lower 
wages. It is, however, doubtful whether the discrimination-hypothesis is applicable to the case 
here because smokers in Germany are not yet as exposed to discrimination as they are, for 
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example, in the US.10 
Levine et al. (1997) provide another potential explanation: They argue that smokers may 
be attracted to jobs that provide health insurance. They would thus be willing to accept lower 
wages in compensation. However, this argument too is not useful for the German case due to 
the differences in the social insurance systems between Germany and, for example, the US. In 
Germany, health insurance is compulsory for mainly all employees who are not self-
employed. Workers therefore do not face the choice to get jobs that are or are not providing 
health insurance benefits. 
Empirical results of previous research on substance use and its effect on earnings or wages 
support the theoretical implications insofar as there in general is a negative impact of smoking 
on wages. Levine et al. (1997) apply different methodologies to data drawn from the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Besides typical semi- logarithmic earnings regressions that 
include a full range of personal and family background characteristics, they attempt to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity by comparing siblings. As they use data from 1984 and 1991, 
they furthermore account for individual-specific effects by regressing on differenced data. Put 
differently, they apply the within estimator. However, their focus is on the wage changes 
between continuous smokers and those workers who quit smoking. Nevertheless, they find 
that smokers earn 4-8% less than non-smokers. Berger and Leigh (1989) analyze the 
relationship between earnings, smoking and being overweight. They discuss the possibility of 
simultaneity bias which might be controlled for by using instrumental variable estimators. 
While not reported in their study, they conclude that earnings does not have an influence on 
either the probability of smoking or being overweight. Therefore, they suggest that the 
earnings regressions they estimate are free of problems of endogeneity. Pertaining to the 
possible impact of smoking and being overweight itself, they do not find any statistically 
significant effects of either of these two factors on current earnings. They, however, attribute 
these findings to the structure of the cross-sectional data they use. 
Auld (2002), Lye and Hirschberg (2001) and Van Ours (2002) analyze the simultaneous 
effects of both smoking and drinking on wages and, in general, find similar results. In 
particular, Auld (2002) applies both the familiar maximum likelihood estimator and the full 
information maximum simulated likelihood (FIMSL) estimator, the latter accounting for 
endogeneity of substance use. His results suggest a positive effect of moderate alcohol use on 
wages compared to heavy drinking or abstention. Smoking is accompanied with a wage loss 
                                                 
10 Levine et al. allege that over time „... mild public intolerance of smoking has developed into fairly widespread 
hostility” (Levine et al., 1997, p. 493). 
CHAPTER 4: SMOKING BEHAVIOR AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES 
 
 116 
of 8% and, after controlling for simultaneity and endogenous selection, with wage losses of 
22%. Lye and Hirschberg (2001), also correcting for endogenous selection, do not present 
direct effects of smoking on wages but find support for the U-shaped relationship of alcohol 
use for non-smokers but not for smokers. Van Ours (2002), using a dataset from the 
Netherlands, finds no significant effects of either alcohol or tobacco use on wages of females. 
Males, however, who drink earn about 10% more than men who do not drink. This positive 
effect, though, is canceled out by the negative wage effect for male smokers of also about 
10%.11 
Most of the studies just outlined use cross-sectional data. The exception is the study of 
Levine et al. (1997) who partially use panel data. While being related to the study here in a 
broader sense, Tekin (2002) uses longitudinal data and applies panel estimators to examine 
the effect of alcohol consumption on employment and wages of Russian workers. He 
estimates models with and without controlling for unobservable heterogeneity. Without 
individual-specific effects, his results are comparable to those mentioned above. That is, 
compared to either heavy drinking or abstention, there is an earnings gain for moderate 
drinking. However, once he controls for unobservable heterogeneity, these effects either 
diminish or even vanish. As drinking behavior and smoking behavior are closely related, the 
important conclusion from his study for the following analysis is that unobservable individual 
heterogeneity has to be appropriately controlled for when estimating the relationship between 
substance use and labor market outcomes. 
 
4.3.2 Data and econometric methodology 
The data used again are drawn from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The 
sample is restricted to blue collar and white collar employees aged 25 to 55 years. As in the 
preceding chapter, the dependent variable used in all regressions is monthly gross earnings, 
controlling for weekly working hours to prevent differences in working hours from distorting 
the estimates (Anger and Schwarze, 2003). The Mincer-type earnings regression are run 
separately for men and women and include standard human capital variables and related 
background characteristics. These are in particular: length of education, potential work 
experience (also squared), the firm-specific period of employment, a dummy capturing 
                                                 
11 Using the rather poetical title “A pint a day raises a man´s pay; but smoking blows that gain away”, he makes 
the reader aware of his results already in advance. 
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whether overtime work is done or not, a part-time dummy, a blue-collar worker dummy, three 
firm-size bands, one regional dummy that equals unity if the individual lives in one of the 
East German federal states, dummies for nine occupations, and dummies for eleven 
branches.12 
One approach to examine the impact of smoking on earnings would be to estimate 
(selectivity corrected) earnings regressions separately for smokers and non-smokers. The 
wage differential between smokers and non-smokers could then be analyzed by wage 
decomposition techniques that account for differences in coefficients and personal 
characteristics (for related analyses see e.g. Berger and Leigh, 1988; Lye and Hirschberg, 
2001). Such approach is useful in order to examine possible differences between the 
characteristics of smokers and non-smokers. The analysis here, however, uses a variety of 
indicators of smoking behavior that are included in the regression equations. As outlined 
above, information of tobacco consumption is available in the GSOEP for three years at the 
time of this analysis: 1998, 1999 and 2001. In contrast to the preceding study of smoking and 
absenteeism, the present section uses all three waves as the data need not be matched with 
preceding or subsequent waves.  
Due to the differences in questions on smoking behavior, three subsamples are available 
allowing to use several indicators of smoking. First, the largest sample consists of 8,367 
observations from all three waves. This balanced panel includes a smoker-dummy. A two-
wave sample of 1998 and 2001 data additionally uses indicators of the amount of tobacco 
consumed, resulting in a quasi-continuous variable. To further test for specification 
robustness, a set of four dummy-variables is generated that covers whether the individual 
smokes up to 10 or 11 to 20 or 21 to 30 or 31 and more cigarettes or other tobacco products 
per day. The third sample available is based on data from 1999 and 2001 and includes a 
dummy on whether the individual has smoked in the past, i.e. whether the worker is an ex-
smoker. 
A first insight in the relationship between smoking and earnings is given by Table 4.7. It 
indicates that women who smoke earn slightly more than women who do not smoke. 
However, results of t-tests show that statistical differences between smokers and non-smokers 
in earnings appear only for men. That is, male smokers earn significantly less compared to the 
average male non-smoker. These preliminary findings suggest that male workers suffer a 
wage differential of about 10% because of smoking. 
                                                 
12 For details see the Appendix. 
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Table 4.7: Characteristics of smokers and non-smokers 
 Mean monthly gross earnings (in €) 
 Non-smoker Smoker t-test 
Women 1,666.61 1,673.32 -0.22 
Men 2,753.74 2,487.50 8.07 
 Means t-test 
Years spent in formal education 12.31 11.47 15.57 
Number of days absent from work 7.33 9.56 -5.35 
 Shares t-test 
Blue collar employment 0.37 0.52 -14.47 
Self-rated health is very good 0.10 0.08 2.67 
Self-rated health is worse than fair 0.07 0.09 -1.89 
Notes: H0: Means are equal. 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. 
 
As for the theoretical arguments, i.e. discrimination against smokers, a higher time preference 
rate, a higher level of days absent from work as well as a lower productivity might cause 
wage or earnings differentials between smokers and non-smokers. While discrimination is 
difficult to tackle directly, Table 4.7 shows that in the sample used here smokers spent less 
time in formal education and are more likely to hold a blue collar job, which both might hint 
towards a higher rate of time preference. While productivity cannot be measured directly here, 
the descriptive findings for self- reported health, either excellent of worse than fair, as well the 
number of days absent from work in the year preceding the interview show that smokers are 
both more likely to report a bad self- rated health and to have a higher absence rate (Table 
4.7). 
 
While most of the existing literature explores cross-sectional data, the following analysis 
mainly employs panel estimators that account for unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
However, the pooled OLS estimator will be applied as a benchmark model. 
The Mincer-type earnings function of individual i at time t is specified by 
itiititit eSXW +++¢= gbb 2
'
1ln , i=1, …, N; t=1, …, T,    (4.7) 
where Wit represents monthly gross earnings for individual i at time t, Xit is a vector of 
exogenous standard human capital variables with its associated parameters 1b , Sit is a vector 
capturing smoking behavior and ig  denotes the factor that captures the unobservable 
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individual heterogeneity. It varies across individuals but is constant over time. The 
idiosyncratic error term is represented by eit. It is assumed not to be correlated across 
individuals, i.e. 0),( =jtit eeE  for all ji ¹ , and is furthermore assumed to be uncorrelated 
with the regressors, Xit and Sit, and the individual time-invariant factor ig . Depending on the 
underlying assumptions about correlation or non-correlation of ig , the equation can be 
estimated by the fixed-effects model or the random-effects model. Furthermore, assuming that 
only some of the regressors are correlated with ig , the Hausman-Taylor IV estimator can be 
applied. For the latter model, it is assumed that the individual-specific effects are correlated 
with the years spent in education, the potential work experience, smoking behavior, East 
German origin, blue collar worker employment and being married. These covariates then are 
treated as endogenous. 
Using the panel estimators allows to account for the unobservable individual 
heterogeneity, ig . This is of relevance as a cross-sectional approach might be affected by a 
selectivity bias if unobservable factors exist that influence both smoking and earnings. The 
coefficient, 2b , would then be biased. If, for example, individuals with a high time preference 
rate base their tobacco consumption decision on the current satisfaction without considering 
the future deleterious health effects, they may also be more likely to invest less in human 
capital. Smokers may thus select in jobs with flatter age-earnings profiles. 
As another example, the cross-sectional estimate of 2b  will also be biased, if, as Levine et 
al. (1997) put it, “… people with poor judgement are likely to choose to smoke, and no 
measure of judgement is included in the regression …”. 13 In this case, the negative earnings 
effect of having a poor judgement will be reflected in the smoking indicator and hence results 
in estimates of 2b  that are biased downward. In cross-sectional applications, possible 
remedies for this spurious correlation between Si and the error term is to either include a rich 
set of personal characteristics, as possible including measures that are correlated with relevant 
unobservables. Levine et al. (1997), for example, use the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT) as such a measure.14 Another approach is the instrumental variable (IV) method 
which might also be applied in the panel framework. This latter might be particularly helpful 
if assuming that the unobservable individual heterogeneity varies over time. 
Note that while the Hausman-Taylor estimator is also an instrumental variable estimator 
                                                 
13 Levine et al. (1997), p. 496. 
14 Unfortunately, “aptitude test scores” similar to the AFQT are not available in the GSOEP. 
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there are fundamental differences in the underlying assumptions. The IV-estimators assume 
that a subset of the explanatory variables in the model are correlated with the idiosyncratic 
error eit. In contrast, recalling the presentation of Chapter 2, the Hausman-Taylor estimator 
assumes that a subset of the explanatory variables are correlated with the individual- level 
random-effects, ig , but that none of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
idiosyncratic error eit. 
To test for specification robustness, Si takes on several forms: Once, it is the binary 
indicator capturing whether the individual is a smoker or a non-smoker. Furthermore, to 
account for possible age cohort effects, variables interacting age and smoking are used instead 
of the simple smoker-dummy. Another specification includes the continuous measure of 
tobacco consumption and still another uses the vector of variables reflecting the discrete 
measure of tobacco consumed. In the semi- logarithmic specification, the coefficient, 2b , can 
approximately be interpreted as the percental earnings gains or losses of a smoker.15 
 
4.3.3 Empirical results 
Turning first to the IV approach, and reviewing shortly the outcomes of the related literature, 
one, in general, finds rather conspicuous results. In his study on the impact of alcohol and 
tobacco use, Auld (2002), for example, finds that once endogeneity is corrected for, smoking 
is associated with a wage penalty of 24%.16 In another analysis of the effect of both smoking 
and drinking on wages, Van Ours (2002) applies 2SLS and 3SLS estimates among other 
methods. While he does not find significant wage effects for females, alcohol use results in, 
according to his own opinion, implausibly high coefficients. He, thus, concludes that “… it is 
difficult to find good instrumental variables”. 17 As another example, Zarkin et al. (1998) 
simply do not report the ir results from 2SLS estimations as their instruments perform very 
poorly. 
These previous conclusions find support in the analyses here. Using both cross-sectional 
and longitudinal data, experiments with both 2SLS and 3SLS estimates in the cross-sectional 
framework as well as with the two-stage least squares within, i.e. fixed effects, estimator for 
                                                 
15 For dummy variables, the percentage change in the dependent variable is given by 1e -b . 
16 Note that in an earlier version of his paper, Auld (1998, pp. 22) concludes that cross-sectional data „… appears 
to be of limited use in unravelling the income/substance use puzzle“ and that panel data „… may be able to shed 
more light on the puzzle by controlling for both endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity to a greater extent 
than approaches possible in cross-sections.“ 
17 Van Ours (2002), p. 11. 
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the panel data all result in implausible results for the returns to smoking. To illustrate, 
depending on whether it is the cross-section or the panel that is used, results range from +33% 
to -160% (sic!) for female smokers and +18% to +97% for male smokers However, as the 
first stage regressions mostly perform rather poorly, reliability of the results can strongly be 
doubted. They thus are not presented.18 
Turning to more plausible results, note first that the findings for the control variables are 
not discussed in detail since they behave as expected.19 Regarding the indicators of the 
amount of tobacco consumed, i.e. exploring data from 1998 and 2001, the findings from the 
pooled OLS estimations only partially support the results found in the relevant literature. The 
estimation results presented in Table 4.8 show that women’s earnings by and large are not 
affected by smoking behavior.  
Both the smoker dummy variable as well as the quasi-metric measure of tobacco 
consumption are not statistically significant, no matter which estimator is used. Including 
dummy variables for the number of cigarettes smoked per day, results from the pooled OLS 
suggest that women who smoke more than 30 cigarettes suffer an earnings loss of about 12%. 
While the coefficients from the panel estimators also suggest for earnings differentials of 
about 10-15%, they are not statistically significant. Note, however, that the corresponding t-
values range from 1.40 to 1.56, i.e. the covariates are somewhat ‘close’ to statistical 
significance. 
 
Regarding male smokers, the results from the pooled estimations are more alike the findings 
from the literature. While the estimates shown in Table 4.8 suggest for earnings losses for 
smokers, the size of the differential is somewhat smaller for German males compared to the 
results from previous research (see e.g. Levine et al., 1997; Auld, 2002; Van Ours, 2002). 
That is, male smokers seem to suffer an earnings penalty of almost 2.5% compared to their 
non-smoking counterparts. 
 
 
                                                 
18 The instruments used are similar indicators that can be found in previous studies. In the cross-sectional 
application, these variables are ‘strong religious belief’ and ‘being married’ in the 2SLS estimation; these two as 
well as ‘age’, ‘non-labor income’, ‘number of children up to 3 years of age’, ‘higher education’ and ‘foreign 
nationality’ are added to the 3SLS identifying estimation. In the longitudinal framework, ‘strong religious belief’ 
could not be used as this indicator is not available for the 2001 data. 
19 Note, however, that returns to schooling are higher when estimated by the HT-IV estimator compared to the 
results from either the random effects or the fixed effects model. That finding is noteworthy as the development 
of the HT-IV estimator was induced by the shortcomings in the estimation of this explanatory variable resulting 
in estimates of returns to schooling which Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggested were too low. 
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Table 4.8: Tobacco consumption and earnings, panel regressions including control variables 
Female Pooled OLS RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0158 -0.0085 
 (0.0147) (0.0164) (0.0281) (0.0255) 
Chi2-LM-Test  570.93   
Hausman-Test  345.96 99.42 
Tobacco -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0015 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0015) 
Chi2-LM-Test  571.83   
Hausman-Test  345.04 99.77 
Up to 10 cig. per day 0.0246 0.0126 -0.0125 -0.0065 
 (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0309) (0.0282) 
11 to 20 cig. per day -0.0110 -0.0108 -0.0321 -0.0223 
 (0.0184) (0.0200) (0.0336) (0.0305) 
21 to 30 cig. per day 0.0420 0.0168 -0.0719 -0.0574 
 (0.0506) (0.0500) (0.0701) (0.0640) 
31 and more cig. per day -0.1226* -0.1069 -0.1479 -0.1257 
 (0.0673) (0.0686) (0.1000) (0.0899) 
Chi2-LM-Test  566.79   
Hausman-Test  353.68 100.01 
Male Pooled OLS RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker -0.0246*** -0.0210** -0.0054 -0.0067 
 (0.0093) (0.0100) (0.0152) (0.0140) 
Chi2-LM-Test  292.10   
Hausman-Test  244.34 85.70 
Tobacco -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Chi2-LM-Test  292.03   
Hausman-Test  245.19 85.29 
Up to 10 cig. per day -0.0446*** -0.0267* 0.0022 -0.0011 
 (0.0157) (0.0149) (0.0190) (0.0175) 
11 to 20 cig. per day -0.0106 -0.0088 0.0011 -0.0007 
 (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0174) (0.0160) 
21 to 30 cig. per day -0.0230 -0.0339** -0.0285 -0.0248 
 (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0211) 
31 and more cig. per day -0.0771*** -0.0506* -0.0180 -0.0131 
 (0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0360) (0.0331) 
Chi2-LM-Test  289.98   
Hausman-Test  247.96 84.64 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses . 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2001. Own calculations. 
 
If the metric measure of tobacco consumed is included in the regression instead of the binary 
indicator or the age-smoker interactions, the finding for smokers shrinks to an earnings loss of 
about 0,1%. This appears to be a huge drop, but one has to remember that this coefficient 
indicates the penalty for any additional unit consumed, i.e. any “marginal cigarette” smoked. 
Using the dummy-variables of the number of cigarettes smoked per day, results show that 
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male smokers seem to earn about 4.5% less when smoking up to 10 cigarettes daily and even 
seem to suffer an earnings loss of about 8% when smoking more than 30 cigarettes daily.  
 
So far, findings are in accordance with the literature. However, turning to the panel 
estimations, the picture changes. While the results from the random effects model are similar 
to the pooled OLS estimates in both size and statistical significance level, the Hausman tests 
applied suggest that it is the fixed effects model and, even more so, the HT-IV model which 
have the superior fit. As a result, smoking behavior does not affect male earnings. While most 
of the coefficients show a negative sign, pointing towards earnings losses for smokers, none 
of the estimates is statistically signicant. 
Furthermore, these findings are supported by the results of the estimations using data from 
1999 and 2001, i.e. including indicators for having smoked in the past (Table 4.9). Again, 
current smoking does not influence female earnings. While the estimates even suggest for 
earnings gains from smoking, the coefficients are not statistically significant. This 
furthermore holds when using age-smoking interacted variables except for the case of female 
workers aged 46 to 55 years. Here, findings from the HT-IV estimation suggest that smokers 
earn about 11% more than non-smokers. This result is somewhat puzzling as the age category 
does not account for variation in the data when entered by itself. 
Results for having smoked in the past might at first glance also contradict prior 
expectations. As pointed out above, it might be argued that the decision to quit smoking may 
be caused by a worsening health condition and might therefore also be associated with a 
decrease in productivity and result in lower earnings. However, ex-smoking here is associated 
with higher earnings of about 4% to 7% when applying the preferable panel estimators. 
Controlling for age cohorts, the estimates suggest that it is particularly young female smokers 
who earn about 9% to 10 % more than their non-smoking counterparts. As it is rather unlikely 
that negative health from smoking occurr in that stage of life already, productivity restrictions 
are as unlikely to emerge. Theoretical expectations of a possible correlation between quitting 
smoking and lower earnings might therefore still be valid. However, there have to be other 
factors associated with ex-smoking that affect earnings positively. 
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Table 4.9: Smoking, ex-smoking and earnings, panel regressions including control variables 
Female Pooled OLS RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0158 0.0239 0.0270 0.0359 
 (0.0153) (0.0177) (0.0330) (0.0314) 
Ex-smoker 0.0134 0.0352* 0.0689** 0.0712** 
 (0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0314) (0.0300) 
Chi2-LM-Test 299.88   
Hausman-Test  389.03 107.28 
Smoker (age 25 to 35) -0.0105 0.0140 0.0300 0.0542 
 (0.0291) (0.0308) (0.0460) (0.0444) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) -0.0359 0.0005 0.0420 0.0512 
 (0.0363) (0.0347) (0.0471) (0.0454) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0027 0.0594 0.0746 0.1079* 
 (0.0528) (0.0477) (0.0617) (0.0590) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.0064 0.0519 0.0922** 0.1038** 
 (0.0381) (0.0361) (0.0468) (0.0451) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.0031 0.0161 0.0469 0.0448 
 (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0404) (0.0389) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0329 0.0425 0.0706 0.0720 
 (0.0337) (0.0362) (0.0546) (0.0526) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) -0.0321 -0.0012 0.0248 0.0309 
 (0.0356) (0.0331) (0.0408) (0.0391) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) -0.0688 -0.0148 0.0244 0.0461 
 (0.0522) (0.0458) (0.0550) (0.0523) 
Chi2-LM-Test 298.71   
Hausman-Test  388.62 93.81 
Male Pooled OLS RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker -0.0187* -0.0135 -0.0032 0.0024 
 (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0196) (0.0183) 
Ex-smoker 0.0108 0.0052 -0.0048 0.0028 
 (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0172) (0.0162) 
Chi2-LM-Test 709.08   
Hausman-Test  301.40 81.51 
Smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.0008 0.0078 0.0226 0.0222 
 (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0253) (0.0227) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.0090 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0075 
 (0.0220) (0.0194) (0.0270) (0.0240) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0311 0.0191 0.0001 0.0212 
 (0.0334) (0.0265) (0.0329) (0.0290) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.0032 0.0172 0.0275 0.0295 
 (0.0220) (0.0195) (0.0246) (0.0221) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.0169 -0.0007 -0.0236 -0.0162 
 (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0238) (0.0213) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55) -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0234 -0.0150 
 (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0285) (0.0254) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.0220 0.0195 0.0141 0.0177 
 (0.0225) (0.0189) (0.0225) (0.0201) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0897** 0.0586** 0.0242 0.0341 
 (0.0349) (0.0281) (0.0339) (0.0301) 
Chi2-LM-Test 706.43   
Hausman-Test  307.05 53.38 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses . 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1999 and 2001. Own calculations. 
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Still another picture shows for male workers (Table 4.9). In contrast to females, ex-smokers 
do not differ in earnings from non-smokers. Furthermore, while the coefficient from the 
pooled OLS estimations suggests a 2% earnings loss for smokers, this differential vanishes 
once panel estimators are applied. Controlling for age groups, elder non-smokers also seem to 
earn about 9% more than their younger counterparts. However, this finding first decreases to 
an earnings gain of about 6% applying the random effects model and eventually is abolished 
running the fixed effects model and the HT-IV model. 
Looking at the results from the estimations using the three-wave-panel, the findings are as 
follows. Table 4.10 shows that there is again no statistical significant result for women. Even 
though the fixed effects and the HT-IV estimator show a tendency towards an earnings  loss of 
about 1.5%, the corresponding t-values are far off from any reasonable significance level. 
This further holds when using the age-smoking interaction variables. While the Hausman tests 
once more call for using the estimators which allow for correlation between the unobservable 
individual-spedific effect and all or a subset of the covariates, none of the resulting 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. That is, following from these analyses, it might 
well be concluded that smoking behavior does not affect female earnings. 
Looking at the findings for male workers in the lower half of Table 4.10, the results 
obtained from the preceding estimations are reinforced. First, using the binary indicator, the 
pooled OLS equations suggest an earnings penalty of about 2% for smokers. However, 
controlling for individual heterogeneity, the effects turn statistically insignificant in the 
random effects model and furthermore show a (statistically insignificant) positive sign for the 
fixed effects model and for the HT-IV estimation. 
Furthermore, including interaction-terms accounting for age and smoking status, the 
earnings penalty for smokers does not show anymore even for the pooled OLS estimator. 
There is, however, a positive effect for elder non-smokers suggesting that those workers earn 
about 7% more than their young non-smokers. Again, this effect diminishes when estimating 
the random effects model and eventually turns to be not statistically different from zero 
applying the fixed effects estimator or the superior HT-IV model (Hausman-Chi2-value of 
79.31). 
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Table 4.10: Smoking and earnings; panel regressions including standard control variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Female PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0066 0.0021 -0.0175 -0.0141 
—  — — — 
 (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0190) (0.0186)     
Smoker (age 25 to 35) 
—  — — — 
-0.0098 -0.0020 -0.0086 0.0024 
     (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0259) (0.0256) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0411 -0.0228 -0.0306 -0.0236 
     (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0298) (0.0293) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — -0.0086 0.0393 0.0047 0.0269 
     (0.0423) (0.0369) (0.0417) (0.0409) 
Non-smoker (age 25 to 35) (omitted reference category) (omitted reference category) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0296 -0.0070 0.0015 0.0060 
     (0.0262) (0.0230) (0.0246) (0.0241) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — -0.0664 -0.0053 0.0078 0.0274 
     (0.0407) (0.0333) (0.0349) (0.0341) 
Chi2-LM-Test 961.14   958.57   
Hausman-Test (DF)  510.93 (36) 131.03 (36)  498.56 (38) 118.72 (38) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Male PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker -0.0210*** -0.0102 0.0055 0.0051 
— — — — 
 (0.0074) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0100)     
Smoker (age 25 to 35) 
— — — — 0.0015 
0.0081 
0.0198 
0.0187 
     (0.0119) (0.0115) (0.0134) (0.0124) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0120 -0.0126 -0.0109 -0.0021 
     (0.0167) (0.0138) (0.0157) (0.0144) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — 0.0020 0.0061 -0.0049 0.0151 
     (0.0271) (0.0199) (0.0215) (0.0197) 
Non-smoker (age 25 to 35) (omitted reference category) (omitted reference category) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — 0.0056 0.0073 -0.0018 0.0067 
     (0.0160) (0.0123) (0.0131) (0.0121) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — 0.0666** 0.0362* -0.0010 0.0175 
     (0.0261) (0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0191) 
Chi2-LM-Test  2,152.62   2,145.19   
Hausman-Test (DF)  574.57 (37) 121.72 (37)  532.88 (38) 79.31 (39) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998, 1999, and 2001. Own calculations. 
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There is another aspect worth to mention. Looking at the results from both the fixed effects 
and the HT-IV estimations, the coefficients suggest an earnings gain of about 2% for male 
smokers aged 25 to 35 years. While both coefficients are not statistically significant, the 
respective t-statistics are 1.47 and 1.51, i.e. ‘close’ to statistical significance. Considering that 
the sample size is not extensive (n=1,642), the tests are not very powerful. Assuming that the 
effects would be statistically significant, such finding would suggest for a higher time 
preference rate of smokers. This is because young smokers might be imagined to select in 
jobs with flatter age-earnings profiles. Consequently, young non-smokers would be more 
likely to still invest in human capital in that stage of life and therefore show to earn less like 
their smoking counterparts. However, as the sample by general standards is of reasonable 
size, it has to be concluded that male workers, alike female workers, do not suffer in earnings 
from smoking behavior. These results again underline the importance of controlling for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
So far, the estimations analyzed whether there are earnings differentials due to tobacco 
consumption. Despite the empirical evidence that smoking does not affect earnings of 
German workers, attempts to test for the theoretical implications outlined above are 
undertaken that follow the approach of Levine et al. (1997). That is, additional regressions are 
run that inclucde indicators to crudely test for both a possible lower productivity and a higher 
time preference rate of smokers. In particular, the hypothesis of a reduced productivity is 
tested by including an indicator on whether the worker is registered disabled and hence is 
likely to have a work limitation. Furthermore, another indicator denoting whether the 
worker’s self- reported health is worse than fair is used. The rationale behind using these two 
variables is that a worker’s poor health might reflect in the smoking indicators possibly 
leading to wage or earnings penalties. However, given that the above results do not suggest 
for earnings differentials it is not too surprising that the relevant coefficients shown in the 
upper half of Table 4.11 do not alter the findings. That is, having excluded the health-related 
variables from the regressions above does not impose a bias on the effect of smoking behavior 
on earnings. 
Furthermore, a lower productivity of smokers might be reflected in a higher rate of days 
absent from work. Whereas the descriptive statistics shown above indicate that smokers are 
longer absent from work than non-smokers, the results from the regressions that use the 
retrospective number of absent days as explanatory variable neither suggest for an effect of 
absenteeism itself nor does the inclusion of that regressor affect the coefficient of workers’ 
smoking behavior (mid of Table 4.11). 
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Table 4.11: Alternative model specifications testing hypotheses; panel regressions including 
control variables 
 Females Males 
 RE FE HT-IV RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0023 -0.0175 -0.0158 -0.0102 0.0056 -0.0158 
 (0.0139) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0186) 
Registered disabled 0.0269 0.0009 0.0151 0.0109 0.0126 0.0151 
 (0.0286) (0.0365) (0.0357) (0.0189) (0.0230) (0.0357) 
Smoker 0.0018 -0.0175 -0.0160 -0.0102 0.0057 0.0049 
 (0.0139) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0100) 
Self-rated health is worse 0.0096 -0.0027 -0.0001 0.0148 0.0125 0.0132 
than fair (0.0155) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0104) 
Smoker 0.0016 -0.0175 -0.0160 -0.0104 0.0051 0.0043 
 (0.0139) (0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0101) 
Number of absent days 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Smoker -0.0998 -0.0458 -0.0520 0.1070** 0.0901 0.0804 
 (0.0912) (0.1117) (0.1093) (0.0485) (0.0550) (0.0528) 
Work experience*Smoker 0.0062 0.0025 0.0035 -0.0109** -0.0082 -0.0077 
 (0.0087) (0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0051) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002** 0.0002 0.0002 
*Smoker (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Notes: Models include all background characteristics as outlined in the text. While results from pooled OLS are 
not presented, note that they do not differe from the findings from the preceding regressions. 
Standard errors in parentheses ; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998, 1999  and 2001. Own calculations. 
 
Finally, to test for the individual’s time preference, an interaction term between the potential 
work experience and smoking status is included in the earnings equations. Given that smokers 
would be individuals with a higher time preference rate they should be less likely to invest in 
on-the-job training. Returns to work experience should therefore be lower. While the findings 
for female smokers do not support this hypothesis, the results for male workers to some extent 
are consistent with the idea of a higher rate of time preference for smokers. While the 
coefficient from the random effects model is the only one being statistically significant, the 
signs of the coefficients from both the fixed effects model and the HT-IV estimation are also 
negative and the t-statistics of 1.53 and 1.50 only closely miss the minimum statistical 
significance level. While this evidence admittedly is rather weak, one might see at least a 
tendency for support of this potential explanation. 
 
 
4.4 Smoking, absenteeism and earnings: concluding remarks 
The two preceding sections presented analyses on the relationship between smoking behavior 
and economic outcomes. In particular, it is examined whether smoking affects absence from 
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work and whether there is an impact on earnings. There are several novelties arising from the 
analyses that add to the existing evidence from the literature. First, data for Germany are used. 
As most of prior studies are based on Northern American data, the results here allow for 
international and transcontinental comparisons. Furthermore, as prior studies have mainly 
used cross-sectional data, exploring longitudinal data allows for the use of methodologies that 
are able to address problems which could not appropriately be tackled in earlier analyses. 
In the first section, absence from work is studied which is a regularly addressed topic in 
the empirical literature. However, while there is a variety of aspects that are typically thought 
to be influential in the determination of absence from work, tobacco consumption as an 
indicator of individuals’ health behavior is rarely examined. First, corroborating evidence 
from the literature, descriptive findings show that also in the German case smokers are both 
more often and longer absent from work than non-smokers. This particularly holds for women 
and blue collar workers. However, the difference of about one more absent day per year might 
be considered to be not very large economically. 
Furthermore, multivariate analyses are employed. In particular, count data models are 
applied. These models account for the specific nature of the non-negative, discrete measure 
which is exposed to exzess-zeros and overdispersion. Cont rolling for a wide range of socio-
demographic and employment related background characteristics, the findings from both 
cross-sectional and panel estimations suggest that smoking is only a weak predictor for 
absenteeism. While indicators for the amount of cigarettes consumed as well as for ex-
smoking turn out to be of no relevance in the regressions, both female and male smokers aged 
25 to 35 years have higher absence rates than their non-smoking counterparts. However, it 
may be somewhat farfetched to conclude from this result only that smokers are individuals 
with higher time preferences, which is one of the theoretical links between substance use and 
economic outcomes.  
In the following section, the relationship between smoking behavior and earnings is 
examined. The results found only partially confirms previous research. In general, similar to 
findings for the Netherlands (Van Ours, 2002), women’s earnings are not affected by 
smoking. Further, in consistence with other studies that mainly are based on cross-sectional 
data, earnings differentials are found for males when using estimators that do not account for 
unobservable individual heterogeneity. In particular, smoking seems to be associated with an 
earnings penalty of about 2% for male workers. First, compared to results from the literature, 
this differential is small. Furthermore, as the findings are based on the pooled OLS estimator, 
the result may be spurious as unobservable individual-specific effects might lead to a 
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downward bias in the smoking coefficients. Thus, panel regressions are performed that 
account for heterogeneity. In particular, the familiar random and fixed effects models are 
estimated. As these models are relying heavily on assumptions about whether there is or is not 
correlation between the individual-specific effects and the set of explanatory variables, the 
Hausman-Taylor estimator is applied. This instrumental variable estimator allows for partial 
correlation of a subset of both time-variant and time- invariant endogenous regressors with the 
individual-specific effect, while the remaining subset of covariates is assumed not to be 
correlated with it. Results from this estimator are both consistent and efficient and, 
furthermore, time- invariant regressors like schooling indicators can still be accounted for. 
While the results from the random effects model still suggest for similar findings as those 
from the pooled OLS estimation, Hausman test-statistics suggest that both the fixed effects 
model and the HT-IV model are the models with the superior fit. According to these models, 
the prior negative effect of smoking on earnings vanishes. Coefficients do statistically not 
differ from zero and, moreover, have positive signs. Using the balanced panel that is based an 
three waves, the t-test statistics even get close to the 10%-level for smokers aged 25 to 35 
years old. On a somewhat speculative ground, it may be argued that these young male 
smokers are individuals with a higher rate of time preference. While the hypothesis suggests 
that smokers select in jobs with flatter age-earnings profiles, the tendency towards higher 
earnings for young smokers seen in the data is not inconsistent with the argument. It is that 
young smokers subsequently might not invest in human capital as much as their non-smoking 
counterparts. They hence are likely to have occupational experience that non-smokers are 
only about to establish.  
Tests for a higher time preference rate of smokers as well as for another theoretical 
implication, that is whether smokers are workers with lower productivity, are also provided. 
Using indicators for an individual’s disability status, her self-rated health and the number of 
days absent from work as additional regressors in the estimations, the latter is not supported. 
However, concerning the time preference of smokers, one again finds at least weak support 
for this hypothesis. Suggesting that smokers are less likely to invest in on-the-job training 
assuming that they strongly discount future events, interaction terms between smoking status 
and work experience is additionally included. Results show at least a tendency towards lower 
returns to work experience which is consistent with prior expectations. 
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5. Atypical employment in Germany and the UK: The case 
of moonlighters 
5.1 Introduction: Some remarks on atypical employment 
The two preceding chapters have presented analyses on topics that might be considered to be 
somewhat off the labor economist’s mainstream interest. The focus of this chapter’s analysis 
now is on secondary jobholding, the so-called moonlighting.1 While this might at first glance 
be a more typical issue, the supply of labor in more than one job has not been on the top of 
labor economists’ agendas for long either. Although there is an established literature, it is far 
from extensive and only recently has there been an increasing interest in multiple jobholding 
along with the ever increasing literature on atypical employment. While this la tter term in 
general covers all phenomena that refer to non-permanent, non-full-time employment, the 
majority of the relevant literature concentrates on (female) part-time employment, fixed-term 
employment, and temporary work via temping agencies. 
 
Table 5.1: Atypical employment in the EU 
 Part-time employment 
(% of total employment) 
Fixed term employment 
(% of total employment) 
 1990 1995 2001 1985 b) 1990 1995 2001 
France 12.0 15.8 16.4 4.7 10.4 12.4 14.9 
Germany 14.1 a) 16.3 20.3 10.0 10.2 10.5 12.4 
Netherlands 32.0 37.5 42.4 7.5 7.6 11.2 14.3 
Spain 4.8 7.4 8.1 15.6 30.3 34.9 31.7 
UK 20.1 24.3 24.9 7.0 5.2 7.3 6.8 
Notes: a) Data from 1991; b) Drawn from Dolado et al. (2001). 
Source: European Co mmission (2002), Dolado et al. (2001) 
 
Table 5.1 shows that there has been an increase in both part-time employment and fixed-term 
employment in the European Union over the last 10 to 20 years.2 These developments have 
consequently attracted much interest among researchers as well as among policy-makers. 
                                                 
1 Here, ‘moonlighting’ does not refer to any kind of illicit employment that sometimes is paraphrased by that 
term too. 
2 Only a few countries from the EU are selected to illustrate the general trend. Information for the remaining 
countries are given in the respective sources. 
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Therefore, there is a vast literature covering a wide range of issues that are related with either 
form of employment. For instance, De Grip et al. (1997), examine the development of 
atypical employment in the EU for the period between 1985 and 1995 with a focus on 
occupational characteristics of workers. Bardasi and Francesconi (2003) analyze for the UK 
whether both part-time and temporary employment affects individual wellbeing, measured by 
indicators of mental health, general health status, life satisfaction and job satisfaction. The 
German case has been analyzed, e.g., by Schäfer (2000) and Klös and Schäfer (2000). The 
consequences of  temporary employment in terms of wage differentials have been examined 
by Hagen (2001) for Germany and Booth et al. (2002a) for the UK who also analyze whether 
this type of employment serves as stepping stone to permanent work (Booth et al., 2002b). 
Dolado et al. (2001) attempt to draw lessons for other countries from the development of 
fixed term employment in Spain between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s. Dekker and 
Kaiser (2000) examine for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, whether it is useful to 
distinguish between atypical or flexible employment patterns when analyzing non-standard 
employment. 
 
Multiple jobholding, on the other hand, has gone unnoticed by and large. This is somewhat 
surprising as that form of labor supply is as closely related to changes in labor market 
institutions and regulations as are both part-time and fixed term employment. The following 
analyses therefore add to the literature in several ways. First, the analysis in the following 
section, 5.2, examines moonlighting patterns for two countries that are representatives of 
different labor market regimes, Germany and the UK. While the UK labor market can be 
considered liberal, the German labor market regime is a rather restrictive one and is attributed 
by a large body of regulations. As constraints in the main job are the most prominent 
argument of the theoretical background of secondary jobholding, the comparison between 
Germany and the UK can help to explore underlying determinants other than labor market 
constraints. Furthermore, as in the preceding chapters, panel data are used, allowing to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity.  
 
The past few years have undergone a continuing strive towards deregulated labor markets in 
continental Europe, the declared aim being the enhancement of labor flexibility and mobility 
which is assumed to foster the reduction of mass unemployment. Again, there is a strong 
scientific interest in the causes and, above all, the consequences of labor market instruments. 
Consequently, there also is a growing body of literature evaluating the pros und cons of labor 
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market policies and instruments. However, besides deregulative attempts, there have also 
been reregulations in Germany following a political change in the government in 1998. Due 
to the need of coping with the financing of the social security systems in a demographically 
changing society, social security payments for the so-called ‘marginal employment’ have 
been introduced in 1999. Section 5.3 will present a brief case-study that evaluates its 
consequences for workers’ moonlighting behavior. The final section concludes. 
 
 
5.2 Moonlighting in Germany and the UK 
As outlined, it is rather surprising that there is non-extensive research on multiple jobholding. 
Even more so as it is a quite widespread phenomenon in most of the Western industrialized 
countries. For the US and Canada, there are a few studies issued by official labor statistics 
institutions that present mainly descriptive evidence for trends in moonlighting over time. 
Stinson (1997), for example, shows for the US that multiple jobholding increased from 5.2% 
of all employed persons in 1970 to over 6% in the 1990’s, mainly being induced by the 
growth of moonlighting women from 2.2% to about 6%. In Canada, moonlighting prevalence 
has also grown from 2% of all workers at the end of the 1970’s up to about 5% in 1997 
(Sussman, 1998). Again, women outnumber men (6%, compared with 5% for men). 
As will be shown in more detail followingly, secondary jobholding in Germany has 
decreased from about 9% in the mid-1980s (Schwarze and Helberger, 1987; Schwarze, 1991) 
to a rather stable rate of about 6-7% of all employed persons in the first half of the 1990s 
(Schupp et al., 1997; Schwarze, 1997; Schwarze and Heineck, 1999). Bell et al. (1997) find 
moonlighting rates of about 10% for the UK for 1991 to 1994 which is updated by the 
findings of Böheim and Taylor (2003) who report moonlighting rates of 8-10% for the period 
between 1991 and 1998. Similar to the Northern American labor markets, the prevalence of 
moonlighting in the UK is higher for women than for men. In Germany, however, the picture 
is reversed: Male moonlighting is higher than female secondary jobholding. 
The analyses here add to the literature insofar as a cross-country comparison has not been 
carried out yet. The study furthermore explores the determinants of moonlighting behavior for 
males and females separately which has been of interest for a only a few studies yet (e.g., 
Schwarze, 1991; Averett, 2001). First, a short survey of the relevant background literature is 
given. 
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5.2.1 Background and findings from the literature on moonlighting 
When asking workers why they supply labor in more than one job, answers show that 
financial concerns are the main motivation to moonlight. Among possible reasons, the ‘need 
to meet regular household expenses’ is the most important one, with about 30-35% of 
moonlighters citing that reason (Stinson, 1990; Cohen, 1994, Sussman, 1998; Averett, 2001). 
Consequently, the primary explanation for secondary jobholding used to be the notion of a 
fixed amount of hours an individual is allowed to work on her main or first job. If that number 
of hours is below the one, the individual would like to work, labor supply constraints exist. As 
will be shown in more analytical detail below, there might then be an incentive to adjust the 
difference between desired and realized hours of work by offering labor in a second job. 
However, there are also other possible reasons for moonlighting. While 10-15% of 
moonlighters want to ‘gain experience to build up a business’, more than 15% simply ‘enjoy 
the work on the second job’ (Stinson, 1990; Cohen, 1994, Sussman, 1998; Averett, 2001). 
These findings hint towards additional motives for moonlighting other than hours-constraints. 
There consequently are a few studies that extend the initial theoretical background by ideas 
that might be subsumed under the so-called ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive. In general, this 
refers to jobs that are not perfect substitutes. Typical examples are the university professor 
who uses her expertise in consulting or the musician who cannot make a living from her 
performances only and thus holds a regular job to keep up to her expenses. 
These simple examples point to possible differences between a constrained and a non-
constrained moonlighter: In the first case with hours-constraints, the main job typically is the 
higher paying one. As the earnings’ capacity in this job is limited, workers will accept lower 
wages in a second job. Lower paying second jobs may also be the case for the 
‘heterogeneous-jobs’ moonlighter: Consider the musician who might accept low earnings as 
long as she is allowed to play her music no matter whether she is hours-constrained on her 
first job or not. On the other hand, pertaining to the second example, the university 
professor’s consulting fee may break down to a rather high wage. Here, it might be the 
relative security of his academic occupation preventing that the professor engages in full-time 
consulting only. Furthermore, the academic position and its accompanying reputation might 
be the basis for consulting deals. 
There are some more explanations that are in accordance with the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ 
motive. For example, women who have young children may hold two part-time jobs that suit 
their time-allocation needs of arranging child care better than one full-time occupation. 
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Furthermore, as indicated above, workers who expect to change jobs or start their own 
business at some future point of time might be moonlighting to acquire or improve certain 
skills that are needed in the forthcoming occupation. Furthermore, job insecurity might be 
another possible reason to moonlight although there are arguments that also suggest for a 
negative effect on participation in secondary jobholding. 
Along these lines, multiple jobholding might be both a short and long run phenomenon. 
Hours-constrained workers might moonlight for one or even more shorter periods in their 
lifetime to overcome times of economic hardship. Typical examples are the need of paying 
off debts or to accumulate savings for a bigger purchase. While these financial straints in 
general might be expected to be of short run duration, secondary jobholding might also be a 
continuous phenomenon if there is a need to meet regular household expenses. 
 
The existing research on multiple jobholding covers a wide range of both theoretical and 
empirical topics. The seminal study is by Shishko and Rostker (1976), who were the first to 
combine theoretical reasoning with empirical analyses. While they acknowledge that there 
may be reasons for moonlighting other than hours constraints on the main job, the empirical 
part of their analysis is based on that rationale only. Whereas following analyses of that early 
period also focus on the ‘hours-constraints’ case (for example, O’Connell, 1979), more recent 
research also addresses other motives and different issues of interest. For instance, Schwarze 
(1991) in his comprehensive study on secondary jobholding in Germany in the mid-1980’s 
extends the theoretical background that is based on traditional neoclassical approach by 
explicitely incorporating a ‘job-quality’ factor in the model which then has to be considered 
as a ‘discrete choice’ model. This factor is qualified to capture the heterogeneous character of 
both the main and the second job as it might include aspects like, e.g., working conditons and 
job or income security. The findings from the empirical analyses that are based on cross-
sectional data from the GSOEP from 1985/86 reinforce the importance of the extended model. 
He analyzes both the traditional model by applying the Tobit-estimator and the extended 
random utility model by estimating the moonlighting participation decision using logit-
models. He concludes that the findings from the latter approach fit the data better than the 
model that is based on the assumption of underlying hours constraints only. 
The link between labor supplied in the first and the second job is analyzed by Smith 
Conway and Kimmel (1998) for US males. They use data from the SIPP and employ a 
disequilibrium model to estimate differences between those who have a second job and those 
who do not. They show that male labor supply is far more elastic than usually assumed, once 
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moonlighting is acknowledged in labor supply behaviour. Furthermore, they too find evidence 
in support of both the ‘hours-constraints’ and the ‘heterogenous-jobs’ motive.  
Also for the US, gender differences in moonlighting behaviour and moonlighting wages 
have been explored by Averett (2001). While she does not find substantive differences in the 
factors leading men and women to moonlight she concludes that the observed wage 
differential between male and female moonlighter cannot be explained by differences in 
individual characteristics. She furthermore examines non-reporting of income among multiple 
jobholders and recommends to use care when interpretating data on secondary jobholding in 
general, and financial data of moonlighters in particular. 
The dynamics of dual jobholding have been the focus of Böheim and Taylor (2003) for 
the UK as well as of Paxson and Sicherman (1996) for the US, who also model the decision to 
take second jobs and/or change main jobs as a stochastic dynamic process. The duration of 
moonlighting is addressed by Marshall (2002) and Kimmel and Smith Conway (2001). Again, 
the main results are consistent with the presence of multiple motives for dual jobholding, with 
the ‘hours-constraints’ motive being the most common. The family context of unmarried 
moonlighting individuals has been analyzed by Allen (1998), while a household production 
model including multiple jobholding behavior is outlined by Highfill et al. (1995). The 
household context is also modeled by Krishnan (1990) who explores the husband’s decision 
to moonlight together with the wife’s decision to work using a double self-selection model. 
In accordance with the ‘heterogenous-jobs’ motive, Bell et al. (1997) examine for the UK, 
whether secondary jobholding is used as a ‘hedge’ against unemployment. They analyze the 
possible link between job security and multiple jobholding. They argue that a second job 
might be hold if workers believe that their main job has a high risk of termination.They, 
however, find only weak evidence in support for their hypothesis. 
 
Sofar, with the studies on the dynamics and the duration of moonlighting being somewhat 
exceptional, the literature is mainly based on analyses of cross-sectional data. Therefore, one 
of the novelties here is the use of panel data. This allows to employ panel estimators that 
mainly have not been used before.3 That is, unobservable individual heterogeneity is 
controlled for that might lead to biased results in the case of cross-sectional estimates.  
Furthermore, as all of the preceding studies are based on single-country data, the second 
                                                 
3 As far as apparent, the exception is the study of Böheim and Taylor (2003). While their focus is on the 
dynamics of multiple jobholding, they also estimate moonlighting participation using a random-effects probit 
model. 
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novelty is the transnational comparison of the German and the British case. This is of even 
more relevance as the German labor market has to be considered highly regulated and thereby 
imposing even more restrictions on workers. Liberal regimes such as the British, on the other 
hand, might offer a wide range of options a worker might adjust to in order to achieve 
maximum utility. 
 
Evidence for existing differences in labor market regimes is provided by the OECD (OECD, 
1999). Table 5.2 shows for Germany and the UK that measuring the overall strictness of 
employment protection legislation on a scale from 0 to 6, the UK has an overall score of 0.9 
whereas Germany’s score is 2.6.  
 
Table 5.2: Summary indicators of the strictness of employment protection legislation 
Overall EPL strictness  Regular 
employment 
Temporary 
employment 
Collective 
dismissals  Version 1a Version 2b 
 Late 
1980s 
Late 
1990s 
Late 
1980s 
Late 
1990s 
Late 
1990s 
Late 
1980s 
Late 
1990s 
Late 
1990s 
Germany 2.7 2.8 3.8 2.3 3.1 3.2 (14) 2.5 (18) 2.6 (20) 
UK 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.3 2.9 0.5 (2) 0.5 (2) 0.9 (2) 
Notes: Figures in brackets show country rankings that increase with the strictness of employment protection. 
a) Average of indicators for regular contracts and temporary contracts. 
b) Weighted average of indicators for regular contracts, temporary contracts and collective dismissals. 
Source: OECD, 1999. 
 
While employment protection in Germany in terms of the overall strictness score has become 
less strict from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, the position in terms of ranking, however, 
worsened. Among the 26 OECD countries analyzed, Germany ranks at either position 18 or 
20, with only the Southern European countries having even stricter employment protection 
legislation. The UK, on the other hand, ranks at position 2, i.e. has the most liberal labor 
market regime following the US which mainly has no labor market restrictions except for 
regulations regarding collective dissmals. 
Concerning the impact of labor market restrictions on secondary jobholding, it might be 
argued that without or with only a few regulations specifically on working time, workers may 
have less incentives to moonlight. This is because it might then be expected that they will be 
able to realize the desired amount of time. However, such arguing is clearly based on the 
‘hours-constraints’ motive which has shown to be too simple to capture individual 
moonlighting behavior. The empirical analysis might therefore allow to explore whether 
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differences in the labor market regimes are associated with differences in the determinants of 
participation in secondary jobholding. 
 
5.2.2 The theory of multiple jobholding 
As noted, the standard theoretical framework that is usually employed in the analysis of 
moonlighting is based on the assumption of an hours-constrained worker. The seminal 
contribution is the study of Shishko and Rostker (1976), who explore moonlighting both 
theoretically and empirically. Extending the standard labor supply model, they argue that a 
worker who cannot spend as much time in her main job as she wants to in order to achieve the 
utility maximizing hours of work, may have an incentive to supply labor in a second  job. 
They derive a set of testable implications from comparative statics that are also adapted by 
Smith Conway and Kimmel (1998) as well as Böheim and Taylor (2003) and are therefore not 
repeated here. However, the decision of a constrained/non-constrained moonlighter can easily 
be illustrated with adaptions of the standard labor- leisure diagram. 4 
 
Consider Figure 5.1, where Y is non- labor income and w1 and w2 are the wages paid in first 
and second job respectively. T denotes total time available, H1 is the fixed hours of work in 
the first job, and h2 is the time spent in a second job. The worker is assumed to maximise her 
utility which is determined by consumption and leisure. She would like to work T-L* hours on 
her first job in order to reach utility level I*, but cannot work more than H1 hours. The 
decision to supply labor in a second job then depends on the moonlighting wage offered. 
 
The second-job reservation wage is determined by the utility level (I1) given at the 
intersection of the first-job wage line and the allowable hours H1. If the wage offered exceeds 
the reservation wage, the constrained worker will take a second job that makes her better off. 
In the diagram, the moonlighting wage, w2, is higher than the reservation wage. Therefore, the 
worker supplies h2 hours of work in a second job and thus reaches a utility level, I2, that is 
closer to the maximum utility level of the unconstrained case. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The diagrams mainly follow Averett (2001). 
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Figure 5.1: Utility maximizing hours-constrained double jobholder 
 
The decision of the non-constrained moonlighter can be depicted only for the case of a higher 
paying second job, like, for example, the professor who is engaged in consulting. Figure 5.2 
shows that situation. The individual that is non-constrained in her main job can work any 
amount of hours (h1) that falls in the given standard working time span T-H1. Work in a 
second job might nevertheless be supplied, if the wage paid at least upholds the individual’s 
utility level (I). That wage, however, has to be higher than the one paid in the first job. 
Assuming that hours of work on the second job (h2) is a choice variable, it can be argued 
that the individual facing this situation would aim at working more hours in her moonlighting 
job. However, due to the possible heterogeneous character of the two jobs, there quite likely 
are other reasons that drive the worker to supply labor in both occupations.  
 
As is furthermore easily conceivable, it is not possible to picture in the static framework the 
decision of a non-constrained double jobholder whose wage rate on the second job is lower 
than that on the main job. In this case, it should be expected that the individual would work 
more hours on her higher paying first job. Again, there might be different reasons as to why 
the individual holds two jobs. 
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Figure 5.2: Utility maximizing non hours-constrained double jobholder 
 
Schwarze (1991) provides an extension of the standard moonlighting model and includes a 
‘job-quality’ factor in the utility function of the (representative) worker. Consider 
),,( qynUU l=    (5.1) 
where nl is the share of time spent by leisure, y is income and q is an indicator for ‘job 
quality’. It includes both a set of working conditions and aspects like income security and 
social security benefits that are attributed to the job. Assuming a well behaved utility curve, 
utility is maximized subject to the total time available, 
211 nnnl ++=    (5.2) 
where ni, i=1,2, refers to the time spent in job 1 or 2. The budget constraint is given by   
YTnwTnwty ++-= 2111)1(    (5.3) 
where t is the tax rate, wi, i=1,2, is the wage in job i, T is the total time available and Y is non-
labor income. 
 
The factor that extends the traditional theoretical approach is ‘job quality’, which is given by  
Qtnnanaq +++= 12111 b    (5.4) 
where ai, i=1,2, are factors that indicate the level of satisfaction that is associated with the 
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particular job. Again, t is the tax rate and b  can be interpreted as a parameter representing 
whether the individual acknowledges the usefulness of taxation and payments to social 
security systems; Q indicates social security features that are independent from the worker’s 
employment.  
 
Schwarze (1991) also applies comparative statics and develops testable hypotheses. First, his 
findings for the impact of partial changes in both wages and non- labor income are in line with 
the usual ‘hours-constraints’ approach. 
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While there is a negative effect of an increase in either the wage in the main job or in non-
labor income, the effect of a change in the second job wage is ambiguous in sign because of 
income and substitution effects. 
Without going into detail, the partial analysis furthermore suggests that an increase in the 
tax rate has an ambiguous effect on moonlighting, depending on the individual’s ‘taxation-
acceptance’, b . Negative effects on secondary jobholding are derived for both an increase in 
the individual’s willingness to accept taxation and an increase in social security that is not 
connected to employment. 
 
As interesting are the possible effects of ‘job quality’ on workers’ moonlighting behavior. 
While it would be desirable to have a clear cut theoretical proposition, Schwarze (1991) 
shows that the quality of both first and second job are affiliated with ambiguous signs 
regarding the effect on multiple jobholding. 
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Whether improving working conditions imply an increase in the supply of labor in a second 
job depends on whether the subsequently increasing job quality results in a higher marginal 
utility of leisure. If so, moonlighting will decrease. However, it may as well be that worsening 
working conditions on the main job enhance the need to regenerate in the spare time. 
Analogously, given that working conditions improve, leisure might then not be needed that 
much to recover from stress. Consequently, secondary jobholding may increase. 
 
5.2.3 Data and econometric methods 
The data used are drawn from the GSOEP for Germany and the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) for the UK. Similar to the GSOEP, the BHPS is a nationally representative 
study providing detailed information on individual and household related characteristics on an 
annual basis. While the GSOEP started in 1984, the BHPS was implemented in 1991 (Taylor 
et al., 2001). Both surveys provide a sufficient range of questions concerning secondary 
jobholding. In the BHPS, these are in particular: (1) Has a second paid job? (2) Number of 
hours worked per month in second job? (3) Gross earnings from second jobs last month? (4) 
Occupation in second job? Similar items are available in the GSOEP: (1) Has no second paid 
job? (2) Days a month engaged in second job? (3) Average hours on these days? While 
information on gross earnings from a second job are available in each wave of the BHPS, the 
GSOEP started to collect that information in 1997 only: (4) Gross earnings from second jobs 
at this time? Information on occupational classification of the moonlighting job, on the other 
hand, is regularly available. 
 
Unlike, for example, the special supplement of the 1991 CPS on moonlighting, there is no 
question in either one of the surveys as to why the worker holds a second job. Such would 
make it rather easy to differ between a constrained and an unconstrained moonlighter. 
However, there is a variety of indicators that may help to identify whether it is because of 
hours constraints or because of other reasons, a worker might take a second job. 
Above all, both surveys provide questions on the individual’s preferences over hours 
worked. While the BHPS directly asks for preferences (“Thinking about the hours you work, 
assuming that you would be paid the same amount per hour, would you prefer to (1) work 
fewer hours (2) work more hours (3) continue same hours?”), the GSOEP asks for the desired 
number of hours (“If you could choose the extent of your hours at work, taking into account 
that your earnings would change correspondingly: How many hours per week would you like 
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to work?”). Comparing the number of desired hours with the number of hours usually worked 
per week, it is possible to generate appropriate indicators. 
While there might be the usual caveats regarding subjective indicators, analyses show that 
the reported dissatisfaction with hours work reflects actual restrictions on their choice of 
hours (Bryan, 2002). There is also evidence that subjective reports on constraints predict 
adjustments in working hours by, for example, a change of job (Böheim and Taylor, 2001). If  
hours constraints exist and if a job-change cannot, for whatever reason, be achieved in the 
short run, workers might then adjust their desired hours of work by moonlighting. 
 
In both surveys, there are further questions on attitudes and expectations towards current and 
future employment that can be used to capture ‘job quality’. To start with, information on job 
related satisfaction is used. The questions from the BHPS used cover the individual’s 
satisfaction with (1) job security (2) total pay (3) work itself. Among further job related 
questions, there is also one question about the satisfaction with the number of hours worked. 
However, that question is not used, because there is no comparable question in the GSOEP. 
Furthermore, the stated preferences identifying workers’ hours constraints quite likely cover 
(dis)satisfaction with working hours.  
There are further differences in the related indicators drawn from the GSOEP. The 
variable on dissatisfaction with job security is generated from the original variable “Are you 
concerned about your job security” where “very concerned” is used to indicate the worker’s 
dissatisfaction with job security. Next, there is no comparable question regarding a worker’s 
satisfaction with the pay she receives. Therefore, a dummy variable generated from the 
indicator of satisfaction with household- income is employed. This should be kept in mind 
when interpreting the results.5 Note also, that the scales of possible answers are different: In 
the BHPS, answers are given on a seven-point-scale from 1 ‘not satisfied at all’ to 7 
‘completely satisfied’. These are collapsed into a binary variable denoting whether the 
individual is not satisfied (answers 1 to 3 on the scale) or satisfied (answers 4 to 7 on the 
scale). The GSOEP-scale on the other hand allows for eleven possible answers with 0 
meaning ‘totally unhappy’ up to 10 ‘totally happy’. Here, answers 0 to 3 are taken to indicate 
the worker’s dissatisfaction with income. 
 
A priori expectations towards the effects of dissatisfaction with job security are ambiguous 
                                                 
5 While there is a comparable ‘satisfaction with household-income’ variable in the BHPS, it is not used because 
it is available from 1996 only. 
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and are thus in line with the theoretical arguments regarding job quality. First, it might be 
argued that secondary jobholding serves as a ‘hedge’ against unemployment (Bell et al., 
1997). However, it may also be possible that workers make even more efforts to perform well 
in their first job and are therefore less inclined to moonlight. Furthermore, as Schwarze (1991, 
p. 228) points out, it may furthermore as well be that less favorable labor market conditions  
that lead to concerns about job security in the first place may inhibit to supply a second job. 
Another indicator for (low) job quality is the (dis)satisfaction with work itself. However, 
in contrast to job security, it might well be expected that a worker who is dissatisfied with her 
first job may be more likely to hold a second job. This is because if work itself is not 
satisfying, but provides, for example, pecuniary stability, an individual might moonlight if the 
second job provides amenities other than monetary benefits.6  
Dissatisfaction with total pay or income might otherwise hint towards a limited earnings’ 
capacity that may move workers to take a second job. This is, because given the utility 
maximizing behavior of workers, it is quite plausible to assume that dissatisfaction with total 
pay is given only for cases with earnings that are ‘too low’.  
 
Both BHPS and GSOEP provide some more questions on expectations on current and future 
work which might be used as indicators of job quality. Starting in 1996, workers in the UK 
are asked whether they think that in 12 months following the interview they (1) get a better 
job with [their] current employer? (2) take up any work related training? (3) start a new job 
with a new employer? (4) start up [their] own business (a new business)? (5) give up paid 
work?7 
Similar questions are available from the GSOEP:8 “Is it likely that you will…” (1) be 
promoted in the company you currently work for, (2) gain further qualifications or education 
through courses, (3) give up your current occupation and start a completely new one, (4) will 
voluntarily become self-employed or become a freelancer and (5) give up your employment 
completely or for a period of time? It, however, has to be noted that in contrast to the BHPS, 
                                                 
6 In the middle or long run, it should, however, be expected that the individual will change to a new job that 
provides both monetary and other benefits. 
7 Note that there is a change in the questionnaire from 1998 onwards. In 1996 and 1997, the original question is 
‘How likely do think it is that you will…’. Possible answers are ‘very likely’, ‘likely’, ‘unlikely’ and ‘very 
unlikely’. Here, the first two outcomes are collapsed into a binary indicator to compare with the ‘yes-no’ 
dichotomy of the items from 1998 to 2000. 
8 Note that the corresponding questions were issued irregularly over time. In particular, the questions regarding 
promotion, starting a new job or quitting from paid employment are given in 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991-1994, 
1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001. In addition, the item covering the intention to become self-employed, is asked along 
the noted waves from 1991 onwards, the question about work related training was added in 1994. 
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which refers to the next 12 months, the GSOEP questions refer to the next 2 years following 
the interview. 
The first two items may carefully be considered to represent a better job quality on the 
first job. Remember that a priori expectations towards moonlighting behavior are ambiguous 
though. In contrast, items 3 and 4 may be understood as indicators of a lower job quality. In 
accordance with the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive, it might therefore be expected that workers 
who are likely to either start a new job/occupation or become self-employed may hold a 
second job in order to gain experience or improve skills in the new or even different 
occupation. While there is no clear theoretical proposition for a relationship between the 
expectation to give up paid employment and moonlighting, it can be assumed that this also 
captures second jobs. Therefore, a negative correlation should be observable. 
 
Information about gross hourly wages received in either the first or second job can be derived 
from the data that is given on monthly earnings and the usual number of hours worked per 
week. However, there are some limitations with those variables. First, as noted above, the 
particular sample size strongly reduces when using the GSOEP data. Out of 17 waves that are 
available in general, only the latest 5 waves include the needed information on second job 
monthly earnings. Next, affecting both the German and the British sample, there possibly 
exists a problem with sample selection. It would theoretically be needed to examine the effect 
of the (reservation) wage received in a second job for all workers. However, data on those 
wages are observable for moonlighters only. Using OLS and predicting second job wages for 
the whole sample might ignore that participation in moonlighting is not random, and hence 
self-selected.  
Heckman (1979), addressing the comparable problem of observing wages only for 
employed persons, proposed a practical solution which treats the selection problem as an 
omitted variable problem. The correction mechanism he initially proposed is known as the  
two-step Heckman-correction method and has thereafter become standard in the labor supply 
literature. This technique basically would have to be applied here as well. However, despite 
its popularity, the method is not exempt from criticism. Heckman (1979) himself already 
warns against the use of the procedure with inadequately specified selection models. Manski 
(1989) argues that the procedure lacks robustness and is sensitive to identification and Puhani 
(2000) recommends a “case by case” use of the Heckman selectivity correction and 
furthermore shows that if collinearity problems prevail,  subsample OLS is the most robust 
among the simple–to–calculate estimators.  
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Following Puhani (2000), checks for collinearity problems have been done by calculating 
R2 of the regression of the selection parameter, the so-called inverse Mills ratio, on the 
regressors of the main (second job wage) equation. 9 The corresponding R2-values range 
between 0.8355 and 0.9464 for Germany and between 0.8638 and 0.9896 for the UK which 
clearly suggests for collinearity. Due to these findings and the aforementioned considerations 
the regressions are estimated without sample selectivity correction. Note that this approach is 
not an unusual decision (see, for instance, Montenegro, 2001 or Newell and Reilly, 2001). 
 
There is another potential problem with using wages and hours on the first job, which arises 
from the possible endogeneity of the participation decision in both the first and second job 
(Smith Conway and Kimmel, 1998). If jobs are heterogenous, the worker simultaneously 
decides upon both forms of employment. Wages from and hours worked on the first job then 
are not strictly exogenous as is assumed by the traditional ‘hours constraints’ theory. While 
this argument suggests to omit using both indicators as regressors, it is plausible to assume 
that both motives are relevant. Therefore, the covariates are used but there has to be careful 
interpretation of the results. 
 
Non-labor income is another important theoretical parameter. However, there is a potential 
drawback for that indicator for the German data. Before 1995, no information regarding 
separate types of labor and non-labor income, like social assistance or other transfer benefits 
is available in the GSOEP. Therefore, a variable ‘non- labor income’ is generated by 
subtracting a worker’s earnings as well as the spouse’s labor earnings from the overall net 
household- income. While second job earnings are subtracted from that indicator where 
possible, this variable still will quite likely include earnings from moonlighting before 1997. 
Therefore, the results should again be interpreted rather carefully. 
 
Besides the factors discussed, there is a variety of other explanatory and control variables 
used in the reduced form partipation equations. Only those that are more plausibly affecting 
the decision to take a second job will be presented shortly.  
                                                 
9 The second job wage equations have been estimated using the cross-sectional data. The covariates used for 
both the German and the British sample are ‘male ’, ‘age’, ‘years of education’, ‘part-time employment’, 
‘temporary employment’. A ‘West German’ dummy variable is additionally used for the German sample. The 
Heckman-selection instruments are ‚wants to work more  hours’, ‘number of dependent children’ and ‘works in  a  
company with less than 10 (UK) or 20 (D) employees’. 
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Working overtime and get overtime hours paid10 points to hours and earnings adjustments 
that might have a negative effect on moonlighting if the ‘hours-constraints’ motive prevails. 
There can be no prior expectations regarding part-time jobs because such occupation might be 
voluntary or involuntary. If part-time jobs are accompanied with moonlighting, this might on 
the one hand hint towards an insufficient hours capacity on the first job. It might, on the other 
hand, support the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive as working part-time on a stable and secure job 
might allow to take a second job that has, for example, other non-monetary amenities. 
Furthermore, holding two part-time job might simply be a means of workers’ labor flexibility. 
Temporary employment might as well be an indicator for job quality again with ambiguous 
expectations towards the effect on moonlighting behavior. Given that the fixed-term contract 
is used for a probationary period with prospects for a permanent follow-up employment, a 
worker may have an incentive make strong efforts within that period to signal high 
productivity. Holding a second job may then be less likely. However, having a temporary job 
may also be a demand-side induced outcome of lower productivity. Therefore, secondary 
jobholding may be used as means of adapting to the possibly low labor market position of the 
worker. There is a variety of further control variables that are included in the estimations but 
are not discussed in detail to economize upon space.11 
Due to the infrequent availability of important indicators, there are different subsamples that 
are used for the estimations of the reduced form moonlighting participation equations. The 
largest sample drawn from the BHPS covers all eleven waves available, i.e. data from 1991 to 
2001. The unbalanced panel consists of 24,319 male and 26,289 female person-year-
observations. The German sample, also an unbalanced panel, basically could include data 
from 1985 to 2001, hence covering 17 waves. However, data on second job earnings are 
available from 1997 onwards only. Furthermore, indicators on job quality were issued 
irregularly. The corresponding samples therefore are based on (merely) 22,181 male and 
                                                 
10 For the GSOEP, there are further variables indicating whether the worker is compensated for overtime work 
by leisure or by both leisure and payments. In addition, for a limited range of waves, there is information on 
whether compensation by leisure is offered day- or hours-wise. While these indicators might provide further 
insights, there are not used because there are no comparable data from the BHPS. 
11 The following socio-economic characteristics are included: ‘age’ and ‘age squared’, dummies on the ‘highest 
qualificational/educational level achieved’, ‘years spent in education’, ‘person is married’, ‘spouse is employed’, 
‘number of dependent children’ and two dummies indicating whether the ‘dependent children are of age 0 to 4 
years’ or ‘5 to 15 years’. Regional dummies are included for both the British and the German sample. Job-related 
covariates are: ‘public/governmental employer‘, ‘duration of employment’, three ‘firm-size dummies’, twelve 
‘branch dummies’ and ten ‘occupational dummies’. To account for possible adjustements to desired working 
hours by a change of job, there is a further dummy variable indicating whether the individual has changed to the 
current job only recently, i.e. has ‘job tenure less than one year’. See the Appendix for descriptive statistics of 
the samples used. 
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18,263 female observations. Furtermore, all German and British samples are restricted to 
blue- and white-collar workers aged 17 to 60 years old who are full-  or part-time employed on 
their first job. 
 
As for the estimation techniques, methods for both cross-sectional and longitudinal date are 
applied. On the pooled cross-sectional level, the logit estimator is applied. To account for the 
samples being pooled over individuals and time, the estimator is adjusted for individual-
clustered groups. Furthermore, the panel structure of the data is used. Unobservable 
individual heterogeneity that might bias results from cross-sectional analyses is hence 
controlled for. 
In particular, the following structural model is considered: 
ititiity na +¢+= ßx
* ,  i = 1, …, N,  t = 1, …, T   (5.7) 
where *ity  corresponds to the latent propensity of individual i at time t to supply labor in a 
second job. ia  is the individual specific effect that differs across individuals but is constant 
over time. It accounts for intrinsic differences in tastes towards moonlighting and in other 
unobserved explanatory variables. itx  is the vector of covariates affecting 
*
ity . It also includes 
the factors that refer to both ‘hours constraints’ and the ‘heterogenous jobs’ motive. itn is the 
stochastic error term that is assumed to be IID. As *ity  is a latent variable, it is not observable. 
Instead, what one observes is 
î
í
ì >
=
otherwise.0
0 if1 *it
it
y
y     (5.8) 
Assuming an underlying logistic distribution for itn , the probability model that follows is  
 
)exp(1
)exp(
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iti
itityProb( ¢++
¢+
==
a
a
.   (5.9) 
 
As outlined in the Chapter 2, this model can be estimated using the fixed effects logit 
estimator. Note again that the conditional maximum likelihood is free of the fixed effects 
parameters, ia  (Greene, 2000). This is because a contribution to the likelihood arises from 
those groups of observations that are not always zero or one. Therefore, if the worker does not 
moonlight at all or is always moonlighting over the time period in question, her information 
does not enter the likelihood function. This, however, typically entails a huge drop in the 
number of cases that are used for estimation. However, the advantage of the model is that, 
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unlike the random effects model, the ia  are allowed to correlate with the vector of covariates 
in the fixed effects model. 
The equations have also been estimated using the random effects specification of the 
estimator. However, corresponding Hausman-tests have been calculated that all suggest for 
the fixed effects model to be the relevant one. The results from the random effects therefore 
are not presented to ease clarity of the results that are presented followingly. 
 
5.2.4 Empirical results 
To give some first impressions about the structure of secondary jobholding in both Germany 
and the UK, descriptive findings will be presented before estimation results will be discussed. 
 
Figure 5.3 shows that moonlighting is a persistent phenomenon in both countries. There,  
however, is quite some variation over time and between males and females. In Germany, it 
decreased from about 8-10% in the mid 1980s to about 7% in 2001, showing a peak around 
the German reunification in 1990 and, after an downswing in the subsequent years, increased 
again in the mid-1990s.  
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Figure 5.3: Moonlighting in Germany and the UK (% of all employed persons) 
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From 1999, social security contributions have been levied on the so-called ‘marginal 
employment’. As this type of part-time employment quite often had been supplied as a second 
job (Schwarze and Heineck, 1999; see also the analysis in the subsequent section), 
moonlighting has decreased in 2000 before slightly recovering in 2001. In the UK, secondary 
jobholding has also seen an upwards movement from about 6% in 1991, has remained on a 
high level between 1995 and 1999 before decreasing to a share of about 7% in 2001. 
 
There are further differences in moonlighting participation by gender. Corroborating prior 
results, British women hold a second job more often than British men. The difference in 
participation rates, however, is rather stable over time. In contrast, females in Germany 
mainly moonlight less often then German males, with one exception found for 1986, when 
8.5% of both male and female workers held a second job. Furthermore, unlike the British 
case, participation rates do not follow the same patterns over time. Following 1986, there is a 
rather huge gap in participation by gender which diminishes close to nil in 1994 because of 
the increase in female moonlighting. In 2001, both the male and the female secondary 
jobholding rate is again approximately the same. 
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Figure 5.4: Moonlighting in Germany and the UK (by full- and part-time employment) 
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Figure 5.4 shows that the variation in participation rates over time mainly is due to the 
changes in secondary jobholding by part-time employees. Interestingly, there is a strong 
increase in moonlighting by part-time workers in both Germany and the UK from the 
beginnings of the 1990s until 1996, reaching a level of almost 12% moonlighters in Germany 
and close to 17% in the UK. Thereafter, secondary jobholding by part-time workers decreases 
again in both countries. While German workers drop back to the level of 1994, participation 
in secondary jobholding remains on a rather high level for part-time workers in the UK.  
 
While there are also moonlighters among full-time workers, there are rather minor changes in 
participation over time. The exception are German full-time workers in 1990 when secondary 
jobholding shows a peak, possibly as a consequence of the German reunification. 
Furthermore, as part-time employment is the domain of women, it is not surprising that 
differences in participation rates between full- and part-time employees mainly follow the 
trends by gender shown above. 
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Figure 5.5: Weekly second job hours in Germany and the UK 
 
The numbers of weekly hours worked in a second job are shown in Figure 5.5. In the 1990s, 
both German and British workers engaged in a second job supplied between 5 and hours 7 per 
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week in that job. The diagram furthermore shows that the amount of hours supplied by British 
moonlighters oscillates between these upper and lower bounds without following a distinct 
pattern. German secondary labor supply has decreased strongly at the end  of the 1980s before 
recovering in the beginnings of the 1990s, but turned downwards again in recent years.12  
 
While the diagrams shown sofar allow for first insights in the structure of secondary 
jobholding in both countries, Tables 5.3 and Table 5.4 explore some of the prior expectations 
outlined above also in an illustrative approach. Table 5.3 shows the distribution of preferences 
over hours worked, the respective moonlighting rate in the samples of German and British 
workers as well as as the ratio of wages earned in the first and second job.  
The most striking feature shown is the difference in the distribution of preferences which 
clearly reflects differences in the labor market regimes. Almost  60% of workers on the liberal 
British labor market are satisified with the number of hours they work, thereby indicating that 
they achieved their optimal level of labor supply. While it at first glance may be speculative 
to attribute that finding to the liberal framework of the British labor market only, it may 
become more suggestive when looking at the figures found for the strongly regulated German 
labor market. 
In particular, it is only about 27% of German workers who do not want to change their 
labor supply. However, it is interesting to note that more than half of all employed persons 
want to work less. Rather than being restricted upwards, which is the major argument of the 
traditional moonlighting theory, these workers suffer from downwards constraints. In 
accordance with upwards restrictions it can furthe rmore be seen that almost 8% of the British 
workers and even about 17% of German workers would like to supply more hours of work.  
 
More differences appear regarding the participation in moonlighting and the ratios of wages 
in both jobs. First, although unsurprisingly, the moonlighting rate is above average among 
workers who want to work more hours. However, while the difference in moonlighting 
prevalence is of 1.8 percentage points for German workers compared to the average 
moonlighting prevalence, there is a difference of more than 4 percentage points for British 
                                                 
12 While it is not shown in detail, note that the decrease of the number of hours supplied by German 
moonlighters to a fairly constant level in the 1990s is accompanied with an inversion of secondary jobholding  
supplied either occasionally or regularly. In 1985, about 52% of second job were supplied occasionally, 35% 
were jobs held regularly (the difference in total percentage from 100% stems from the third categorie observed: 
‘work in family business’). Thereafter, occasional moonlighting decreased whereas regular moonlighting 
increased. In 1993, the shares of both types of secondary jobholding were about the same. The drift apart 
continued so that in 2001, 50% of second jobs were held regularly while about 39% were supplied occasionally. 
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employees. Next, it is found that German workers who are satisfied with their working hours 
– and hence may be considered to have achieved their optimum number of hours worked – 
hold a second job less often than average. British workers, on the other hand, do not 
moonlight more often given that they are satisfied with their working hours. Furthermore, 
while British employees who want to work less hours also moonlight less than average, their 
German counterparts hold a second job slightly above average.13 
 
Table 5.3: Moonlighting and wage ratios by preferences over hours worked 
Would like to work… Germany United Kingdom 
  more hours 16.9 7.9 
  the same hours 26.7 59.0 
  less hours 56.4 33.1 
Would like to work… Moonlighting Wage ratio Moonlighting Wage ratio 
  more hours 8.8 1.08 12.5 0.90 
  the same hours 5.3 1.09 8.5 0.95 
  less hours 7.2 0.99 6.3 0.82 
All 7.0 1.03 8.1 0.91 
Notes: Wage ratio is defined as (net wage in first job/gross wage in second job). 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Regarding the wages earned in both jobs, German workers who would prefer to supply fewer 
hours, receive wages in the second job that are higher than those in the first job. This is in 
accordance with the theoretical proposition for unconstrained moonlighters as shown in 
Figure 5.2. For British workers, second job wages are higher than first job wages 
irrespectively of what their preferences over working hours are. However, workers who 
would like to work fewer hours have second job wages that are relatively higher than those of 
moonlighters who either would prefer to work more hours or who are satisfied with their 
labor supply.  
 
Given that moonlighting wages are higher than those on the main job, one may suggest that 
there are incentives for expanding the labor supply in the second job if not completely 
                                                 
13 Note that incidence rates shown in Table 5.3 are averages over the time periods in the respective sample. 
Analogously to the diagrams, there has been some up and down over time particularly for workers who state to 
be restricted upwards. The moonlighting behavior of workers who either are satisfied with their number of hours 
worked or who want to work less is fairly stable over the periods observed. 
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switching to that job in the first place. Table 5.4 now presents further descriptive findings that 
are related with such expectations. The prospect of a better job is attributed with moonlighting 
behavior that is not far from average in both Germany and the UK. Work related training, 
however, is accompanied with slightly higher than average secondary jobholding in Britain 
and even making a difference of 2.5 percentage points for German workers.  
 
Table 5.4: Job related expectations and moonlighting incidence in Germany and the UK 
Person expects to … Germany United Kingdom 
  get a better job (UK); be promoted (D) 8.0 7.2 
  get work related training / gain further qualification 9.5 8.5 
  start a new job / new occupation 10.3 10.4 
  start own business / become self-employed 21.3 18.9 
  give up paid work / employment 7.1 6.0 
Overall moonlighting rate 7.0 8.1 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
The most striking result, however, is the moonlighting incidence among workers who either 
expect to start a new job or who expect to start to become self-employed. In both Germany 
and the UK, more than 10% of employees who are about to start a new occupation hold a 
second job and even about one in five forthcoming self-employed workers are moonlighting. 
Although preliminary, these two findings clearly support the ‘heterogenous-jobs’ motive. 
 
A last descriptive look is taken at the distributions of classifications of first and second jobs 
held by moonlighters. Table 5.5 summarizes the similarity or difference between both jobs. 
The diagonal captures ‘perfect matches’, i.e. cases for which the occupational classification of 
first and second job is the same. It is obvious that there is little correspondence between the 
category of the main job and that of the second job. As the occupations are grouped according 
to classification schemes, it would in general be possible that workers supply a first and a 
second job that corresponds to the same group. However, most of them supply labor in a job 
that is completely different according to the classification schemes which again might 
(carefully) be interpreted in support of the ‘heterogenous jobs’ motive. While it might be 
rewarding to inspect in more detail the relationship between the types of jobs held by workers 
this issue is not the focus here and is therefore not examined further.  
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Table 5.5: Occupational stratification of moonlighters in first and second job (row %) 
 Germany 
Occ. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 6.06 33.84 29.80 4.55 5.05 0.51 5.05 3.54 11.62 
2 2.42 51.32 25.05 5.27 6.26 0.77 1.76 1.21 5.93 
3 1.14 13.33 30.41 13.09 16.50 0.73 4.07 3.82 16.91 
4 1.26 10.36 16.25 20.31 20.31 1.54 2.66 5.60 21.71 
5 0.42 6.29 15.93 8.39 32.91 0.63 2.73 6.29 26.42 
6 — — 7.89 1.32 17.11 19.74 3.95 6.58 43.42 
7 0.56 4.84 9.19 2.82 7.34 2.02 34.11 6.69 32.42 
8 1.78 4.07 8.14 1.53 14.50 4.83 14.25 7.63 43.26 
9 1.62 3.24 11.89 3.51 11.35 2.70 9.46 3.24 52.97 
 United Kingdom 
Occ. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 18.41 16.11 19.95 7.16 5.88 21.48 4.09 1.79 5.12 
2 6.06 47.16 27.27 3.41 1.70 9.85 2.27 0.57 1.70 
3 2.46 8.95 52.13 7.61 5.15 11.41 6.71 1.57 4.03 
4 4.33 5.23 11.36 17.49 3.14 29.30 17.94 1.64 9.57 
5 2.64 1.06 7.12 1.32 44.06 17.41 6.07 6.60 13.72 
6 2.19 2.03 7.82 9.70 3.76 46.48 8.92 2.66 16.43 
7 4.89 4.23 7.82 10.75 5.21 32.90 16.29 2.28 15.64 
8 1.57 0.94 12.58 3.46 9.75 37.74 7.55 10.38 16.04 
9 3.90 1.46 4.88 3.17 8.29 27.32 5.37 2.68 42.93 
Notes: First job in rows, second job in columns. Note that because of the different classification schemes (see 
below), the distributions cannot be directly compared. Further recoding would be needed first. 
D: N=5,608; Occupational coding follows the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) 
UK: N=4,088; Occupational coding follows the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
Source: GSOEP and BHPS, 1991-2000. 
 
Subsequently, the results from applying both the pooled logit estimator and the (conditional) 
fixed effects estimator are presented.14 Note that the estimations from the pooled data are 
clustered on individuals. However, these results are based on an estimator that does not 
control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. Still, they are used as benchmark 
comparable to both prior results from previous research that has mainly been conducted with 
cross-sectional data and the findings from the following panel estimations.  
                                                 
14 Again, note that random effects logit models have been estimated. However, the results from these estimations 
are not shown as Hausman-test statistics reject the assumption of individual specific-effects that are uncorrelated 
with the regressors. 
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All models are estimated separately for men and women. Furthermore, the regressions include 
information on the individual’s working hours preferences and whether the worker is 
dissatisfied with job security, pay/household income or the job itself. Due to limited 
availability of important indicators as outlined above, the following tables first show the 
results from estimations that include (predicted) wages from a second job as regressors. 
Thereafter, estimations are presented that do not include information on second job wages, 
but use indicators for further job related expectations. To keep the presentation coherent, 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 show the respective findings for male workers, while Table 5.8 and 
Table 5.9 present the results for female employees. Finally, note that only the more important 
indicators are discussed.15  
 
As is expected, Table 5.6 shows that the desire to work more hours is a strong predictor for 
moonlighting behavior of male workers in both Germany and the UK. For the latter case, 
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity even is attributed with an increase in the change in 
the logit and a change in statistical significance from the 10%-level to the 1%-level.  
 
As suggested by the descriptive findings, there are differences between German and British 
workers who want to work less hours. Although the results from the fixed effects model is not 
statistically significant, there is a tendency towards the 10%-level for British males with a z-
value of 1.61. Furthermore, the coefficient is negative and thus in accordance with theory. 
German males are different insofar that the desire to work fewer hours is correlated with a 
higher likelihood of holding a second job. This might come along with the descriptive finding 
of higher wages achieved in the second job (Table 5.3). 
 
Whereas the a priori expectations suggest for an ambiguous effect, job security does not play 
a role in the decision of males to moonlight. While there is no effect at all for British workers, 
the result from the pooled logit model for German workers at first suggests for a negative 
impact. However, this finding vanishes when using the fixed effects estimator to control for 
individual-specific effects. A similar outcome is found for dissatisfaction with pay or 
                                                 
15 There is a range of further control variables that is included in the regressions. To summarize, there is 
evidence that the length of education as well as the type of qualification achieved does not affect moonlighting 
participation in both Germany and the UK. Furthermore, there is weak evidence from the pooled cross-sectional 
regressions that agricultural workers are more likely to have a second job in both countries. Being a female 
technician, professional or clerk also affects moonlighting positively. On the other hand, German males who are 
occupied as professional, metal or constructional worker, and British men who are clerks or provide personal 
services are less likely to supply labor in more than one job.  
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household income. While there first seems to be a weak positive effect for both British and 
German men, the coefficients decrease when applying the panel estimator and they are not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 5.6: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for males in Germany and the UK, 
including additional control variables 
 D UK 
 Pooled Logit FE Logit Pooled Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.5144*** 0.5341*** 0.2291* 0.4317*** 
 (0.0981) (0.1720) (0.1201) (0.1577) 
… work less hours  0.2735*** 0.3652*** 0.0067 -0.1710 
 (0.0817) (0.1399) (0.0779) (0.1065) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.2926*** 0.1165 0.0298 0.0515 
 (0.1001) (0.1832) (0.0797) (0.1030) 
… with pay/household-income 0.2304** 0.0119 0.1450* 0.1105 
 (0.1033) (0.1936) (0.0742) (0.1016) 
… with job itself -0.0356 0.0911 0.1191 0.2203* 
 (0.1320) (0.2207) (0.0848) (0.1171) 
Log of gross hourly wage in second job+ 0.1229 0.4554 -0.4797* -0.2323 
 (0.2996) (0.3982) (0.2872) (0.3666) 
Log of net hourly wage in first job 0.0409 -0.3600 -0.3263** -1.1362*** 
 (0.1184) (0.2470) (0.1509) (0.2038) 
Log of non-labor income 0.0036 -0.0476* 0.0212 -0.0329 
 (0.0121) (0.0257) (0.0285) (0.0380) 
Weekly working hours 0.0039 0.0005 -0.0117** -0.0327*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0072) 
Works overtime 0.1218* -0.0361 0.1069 0.2954** 
 (0.0693) (0.1214) (0.1065) (0.1480) 
Overtime work is paid 0.0916 0.1024 -0.1625 -0.4019** 
 (0.0805) (0.1394) (0.1149) (0.1613) 
Part-time employment 0.9305*** 1.1461*** 0.3790* -0.0770 
 (0.1810) (0.4050) (0.2168) (0.3046) 
Temporary employment 0.2958*** 0.4557** 0.0824 -0.4417** 
 (0.1103) (0.2115) (0.1397) (0.2032) 
Has recently changed job -0.0243 -0.2845* 0.0636 0.0192 
 (0.0860) (0.1469) (0.0722) (0.1042) 
Job tenure -0.0096* -0.0096 0.0103 0.0187 
 (0.0057) (0.0218) (0.0083) (0.0134) 
Public/Governmental employer 0.2975** -0.0003 -0.0878 0.2798 
 (0.1278) (0.2880) (0.1424) (0.2081) 
Spouse is employed 0.1877* 0.0051 -0.0403 -0.2040 
 (0.1024) (0.2058) (0.0970) (0.1308) 
N / Groups 22,181 2,323 / 620 24,319 3,915 / 605 
Chi2 345.33 53.70 309.16 115.95 
Log likelihood -5,853.83 -832.53 -5,973.34 -1408.18 
Notes: + predicted wage. 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
There is mixed evidence for possible effects of wages. The (predicted) second job wage does 
not influence the moonlighting decision of German male workers. For British males, the 
pooled estimation results suggest for a negative impact of second job wages on moonlighting 
participation, therefore indicating that the income effect would dominate the substitution 
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effect. However, controlling for unobservable heterogeneity returns a coefficient that is not 
statistically significant anymore, although there still is a negative sign. In line with the 
theoretical implications, increasing first job wages, on the other hand, are a strong 
disincentive for British workers to supply labor in a second job. German males are not 
affected, although the negative coefficient from the fixed effects estimation shows a z-value 
of about 1.45, which may carefully be taken as a tendency in support of a priori expectations. 
Findings for non-labor income are in line with theory for German males only, where fixed 
effects estimation suggests for a (weak) negative impact on secondary jobholding. The 
negative coefficient that is found for British male workers, however, is not statistically 
significant. 
Table 5.6 furthermore shows that an increase in weekly working hours does not affect the 
moonlighting participation of German workers. However, there is a negative effect for British 
men. Given that the number of working hours also is a downwards limit, the recreational 
aspect of leisure time may be more important although wages in second jobs tend to be higher 
than first job wages (recall the wage ratios shown in Table 5.3). On the other hand, and 
somewhat surprisingly, the fixed effects regression suggests that working overtime influences 
the moonlighting decision positively for British male workers. However, given that overtime 
work is paid, the likelihood of secondary jobholding decreases. This again is not too 
surprising, as these workers are able to adjust a possibly given hours standard in their first job 
by working overtime with the same employer. As it is plausible to assume that overtime hours 
are compensated with wages that are relatively higher than the first-job wage, they do not face 
the need to moonlight. Moonlighting participation of German men, on the other hand, is not 
affected by overtime work.16 
 
Both temporary and part-time employment are good predictors for secondary jobholding 
among German males. The results from both the pooled and the fixed effects regression return 
coefficients that are strongly statistically significant. While the estimation of the pooled data 
for British workers also suggest that part-time employment affects the moonlighting decision 
positively, accounting for individual heterogeneity abolishes that effect. Furthermore, the 
findings from the fixed effects regression imply that British males, who have a fixed term 
                                                 
16 As outlined above (Footnote 82), there are GSOEP-variables indicating whether overtime work is 
compensated hours -wise or even day-wise. However, experiments with these indicators, which are not available 
in the BHPS, did not return in non-trivial results. 
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contract, are less likely to hold a second job. Although the different labor market regimes in 
Germany and the UK strongly affect both part-time and temporary employment regulations, it 
cannot, however, be said whether these differences cause the differences in the effects. 
 
Although a change of job may be a possible adjustment to job constraints, the relevant 
indicator does not suggest for effects on secondary jobholding. The exception is found for the 
fixed effects model for German male workers for whom a recent job change weakly affects 
moonlighting negatively. This, however, is a rather plausible finding, given that a job change 
should increase a worker’s utility.  
While job tenure does not have an impact on the participation in double jobholding, 
having a public employer seems to suggest for a positive impact on moonlighting for German 
workers first. However, the effect is again cleared away by the panel estimator. A similar 
result is found for whether there is an employed spouse: The pooled logit regression first 
implies that male German workers are more likely to participate in secondary jobholding; the 
effect is abolished once unobservable heterogeneity is accounted for. 
 
Table 5.7 presents the results from the regressions that do not include information on second 
job wages. However, the data allow to include additional indicators that are related to 
workers’ expectations regarding current and future employment. These indicators might be 
thought as further proxies for job quality and therefore being theoretically linked to secondary 
jobholding.  
 
First, regarding the variables that are included in both regressions, there are not many 
differing findings which supports the robustness of the specified model. While the effects of 
preferences towards working more or less hours are basically the same for German males, the 
effect for British workers shown above vanishes once the additional job quality proxies are 
included. Furthermore, the positive effect of part-time employment and temporary 
employment found from the fixed effects regressions for German males become statistically 
insignificant. Having a public employer now seems to have a positive impact on secondary 
jobholding for British males. However, applying the fixed effects estimator, this effect 
vanishes. 
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Table 5.7: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for 
males in Germany and the UK, including additional control variables 
 D UK 
 Pooled Logit FE Logit Pooled Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.5342*** 0.6684** 0.0983 0.2410 
 (0.1223) (0.2960) (0.1505) (0.2656) 
… work less hours  0.2841*** 0.4330* -0.0620 -0.1180 
 (0.1058) (0.2296) (0.0946) (0.1686) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.3159** -0.1516 -0.0662 0.1017 
 (0.1251) (0.2923) (0.0975) (0.1708) 
… with household-income/pay 0.0993 -0.2000 0.1326 -0.2084 
 (0.1328) (0.3351) (0.0922) (0.1646) 
… with job itself 0.1887 0.4411 0.0655 0.4208** 
 (0.1528) (0.3572) (0.1035) (0.1922) 
Expects to be promoted/get a better job 0.1196 0.2773 -0.3172*** -0.3461* 
 (0.1060) (0.2500) (0.1043) (0.1875) 
… get job related training/courses 0.0684 0.1115 0.2042** -0.0789 
 (0.0868) (0.2099) (0.0889) (0.1522) 
… start a new job 0.3088** 0.1821 0.1015 0.4226** 
 (0.1384) (0.3356) (0.0995) (0.1805) 
… become self-employed/start up own business 1.0250*** -0.0977 0.9435*** 0.3106 
 (0.1665) (0.3426) (0.1442) (0.2667) 
… quit from paid employment -0.0307 -0.9328* -0.6724* 0.0065 
 (0.2112) (0.5208) (0.3573) (0.6943) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.0626 -0.4353 -0.2542* -1.2022*** 
 (0.1310) (0.4460) (0.1445) (0.3255) 
Log of non-labor income 0.0092 -0.0221 0.0081 -0.0091 
 (0.0145) (0.0382) (0.0322) (0.0628) 
Weekly working hours -0.0016 0.0041 -0.0143** -0.0433*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0192) (0.0063) (0.0115) 
Works overtime 0.1876** 0.1340 0.0254 0.2149 
 (0.0836) (0.1954) (0.1276) (0.2426) 
Overtime work is paid 0.1340 -0.2191 -0.0251 -0.4550* 
 (0.0956) (0.2135) (0.1359) (0.2628) 
Part-time employment 0.7782*** 0.6649 0.6239*** -0.7048 
 (0.2159) (0.6653) (0.2393) (0.4610) 
Temporary employment 0.2868** 0.5348 0.0945 -0.6402** 
 (0.1363) (0.3560) (0.1676) (0.3197) 
Has recently changed job -0.1301 -0.3447 0.0855 -0.0433 
 (0.1113) (0.2502) (0.0901) (0.1612) 
Job tenure -0.0089 -0.0258 0.0112 -0.0089 
 (0.0064) (0.0357) (0.0096) (0.0211) 
Public/Governmental employer 0.2613* 0.6418 0.4685*** 0.4091 
 (0.1476) (0.5537) (0.1336) (0.4064) 
Spouse is  employed 0.2334** 0.0178 -0.0633 -0.2033 
 (0.1158) (0.3352) (0.1115) (0.2184) 
N / Groups 12,773 856 / 315 13,569 1,492 / 375 
Chi2 358.18 37.30 232.75 100.90 
Log likelihood -3,401.69 -291.32 -3,429.80 -499.73 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Only a few of the variables additionally included result in statistically significant coefficients. 
However, these few effects are in line with theoretical expectations. Expecting to get a better 
job with the current employer decreases the likelihood of moonlighting for British males. For 
this group, the prospect of job related training furthermore seems to have a negative impact 
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which would contradict prior arguments. Again, unobservable heterogeneity causes spurios 
correlation in the pooled estimation so that the result from the fixed effects estimation 
suggests for no effect. Starting up a new job in the near future affects secondary jobholding 
positively. While statistical signifcance for German worker is found for the pooled data only, 
the initially insignificant coefficient shown for British males turns statistically significant in 
the fixed effects estimation. 17 The prospect of becoming self-employed is associated with a 
higher likelihood for moonlighting in both countries when estimating the pooled logit model. 
Although these effects vanish in the fixed effects model, it might still be suggested that 
second job may be used to achieve or improve skills that are needed in the forthcoming new 
occupation.  
Being about to quit from paid employment is attributed with weak evidence of a lower 
likelihood of holding a second job for German males. The likewise negative effect returned 
from the pooled model for British workers vanishes in the panel estimation. 
 
Pertaining to the results for female employees in Germany and the UK, Table 5.8 presents the 
findings from regressions that include (predicted) second job wages. Table 5.9 then shows the 
results from the models that explore the effects of the job related expectations just discussed 
for male workers. 
 
First, note that there are not many differences between the results found for men and those 
found for women. Furthermore, the differing findings between Germany and the UK mainly 
are the same for women. The wage earned in the second job, for instance, does not play a role 
in the moonlighting participation decision (Table 5.8). Wages in the first job lowers the 
likelihood of holding a second job mainly for British women and to some extent also for 
German women. However, while there is no effect using the pooled model, the coefficient 
from the fixed effects estimation is statistically significant at the 10%-level only. The findings 
for the impact of non- labor income are similar: While there are rather strong negative effects 
on secondary jobholding for British females, the likewise negative effect that is returned from 
the pooled model for German women is cleared away when controlling for individual-specific 
effects. Note, however, that the negative sign pertains and that there is a z-value of 1.63. 
 
 
                                                 
17 However, the fixed effects model performs poorly (Prob > Chi2 = 0.2383). 
CHAPTER 5: ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY AND THE UK: THE CASE OF MOONLIGHTERS 
 
 162 
Table 5.8: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for females in Germany and the 
UK, including additional control variables 
 D UK 
 Pooled Logit FE Logit Pooled Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.3856*** 0.2887 0.0033 -0.1688 
 (0.1123) (0.2028) (0.0942) (0.1135) 
… work less hours  0.2050** 0.5134*** -0.2059*** -0.0753 
 (0.0938) (0.1726) (0.0732) (0.0967) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.0921 0.1001 0.0819 0.2080** 
 (0.1091) (0.2145) (0.0690) (0.0906) 
… with pay/household-income 0.1474 -0.0469 0.1702*** 0.2401*** 
 (0.1136) (0.2047) (0.0626) (0.0843) 
… with job itself -0.1168 -0.5622** -0.0709 0.0448 
 (0.1381) (0.2504) (0.0810) (0.1028) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.1079 -0.4641* -0.3237*** -0.9214*** 
 (0.1221) (0.2411) (0.1017) (0.1360) 
Log of gross wage in second job (predicted) -0.0495 -0.4046 -0.0285 -0.0427 
 (0.3028) (0.4616) (0.2082) (0.2536) 
Log of non-labor income -0.0368*** -0.0485 -0.0618** -0.0859*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0297) (0.0252) (0.0330) 
Weekly working hours -0.0052 -0.0223** -0.0216*** -0.0369*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0106) (0.0056) (0.0070) 
Works overtime 0.3686*** 0.3656** 0.1267 0.1555 
 (0.0807) (0.1423) (0.0998) (0.1243) 
Overtime work is paid 0.1574 -0.1028 -0.0596 -0.2669* 
 (0.1172) (0.1989) (0.1167) (0.1434) 
Part-time employment 0.2952*** 0.3536 0.4910*** 0.5336*** 
 (0.1093) (0.2285) (0.1316) (0.1597) 
Temporary employment 0.3570*** 0.7628*** 0.0375 0.1735 
 (0.1161) (0.2421) (0.0975) (0.1383) 
Has recently changed job -0.0794 -0.1178 0.0134 0.0505 
 (0.0935) (0.1570) (0.0676) (0.0861) 
Job tenure -0.0043 0.0059 -0.0166* -0.0363*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0238) (0.0094) (0.0136) 
Public/Governmental employer -0.1409 0.2092 0.1095 0.2073 
 (0.1153) (0.2598) (0.0989) (0.1294) 
Spouse is employed -0.1498 -0.0482 -0.1377 -0.1172 
 (0.1567) (0.3485) (0.0861) (0.1263) 
N / Groups 18,262 1,687/466 26,289 5,935 / 846 
Chi2 228.99 66.24 510.58 248.31 
Log likelihood -4,239.30 -590.48 -7,442.67 -2,128.84 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Similar to the findings for men, there a discrepancies between German and British women for 
the effects of the preferences over hours worked. First, German females who want to work 
fewer hours are more likely to moonlight. As for their male counterparts, this effect may 
result because of higher second job wages. British women who are in favor for less hours, on 
the other hand, seem to be likely to hold a second job. However, this effect is based on the 
pooled regression, and turns statistically insignificant using the panel estimator. 
A likewise findings exists for German women who are upwards hours-constrained: the 
result from the pooled logit model strongly suggests for a positive impact on secondary 
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jobholding, the fixed effects estimator, however, returns no statistically significant effect. 
Furthermore, there is an interesting and also somewhat puzzling finding for British women. 
While there seems to be no effect in the pooled estimation, there is a tendency towards a 
negative effect in the panel model (Table 5.8). Anticipating the following results from the 
subsequent estimation, this coefficient even turns statistically significant (Table 5.9). This 
implies that British females who want to work more hours are less likely to moonlight. While 
this might surprise at first glance, it may well be that these women are able to adjust to 
working more hours in other ways as by taking a second job.18 
 
Regarding job related aspects that may hint towards job quality, the dissatisfaction with job 
security and, even stronger, the dissatisfaction with the current pay affects moonlighting 
participation of British women positively. While there are no likewise effects for German 
females, the result from the fixed effects estimation for this group suggests that being 
dissatisfied with the job itself decreases the likelihood of holding a second job. According to 
the theoretical notions it may well be that the recreational aspect of leisure time is relatively 
more valuable, given that the main job is tiring or physically demanding and hence causing 
that the worker is dissatisfied. 
Similar to the findings for men, an increase in weekly working hours seems to affect in 
particular British female moonlighting participation negatively. Analogously, working 
overtime is a predictor for the secondary jobholding of German women. Compared to the 
findings for male’s, this effect is even stronger. However, as there is no impact of paid 
overtime on moonlighting for German women, it can only be speculated whether the 
additional hours worked are compensated by leisure which then may be used to supply 
another job. British women, on the other hand, are less likely to moonlighting given that 
overtime hours worked are paid. 
Not quite surprisingly, part-time employment is a good predictor for female moonlighting 
in both countries. However, while it should be noted that the coefficient from the fixed effects 
estimation for German women is statistically insignificant (z-value of 1.54), it may 
furthermore be that there are different reasons driving such an effect. On the quite liberal 
British labor market, women on the one hand may voluntarily supply labor in two jobs that 
better suit their needs of flexible working time, for example, when taking care of children. 
While that argument may also hold for Germany, it may as well be assumed that part-time 
                                                 
18 As Böheim and Taylor (2001) show, such adjustment quite likely might be the change to another job. 
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occupation is of involuntary nature on the strongly regulated German labor market. Therefore, 
female part-timers may face the need to adjust their working hours in case they want to work 
more hours.  
Temporary employment affects the moonlighting participation decision for German 
women only which again reflects the across-countries finding for men. While a recent change 
of jobs does not affect moonlighting participation, the result for job tenure suggests that the 
longer British women are working for the same employer, the less likely they have a second 
job. While it furthermore may be expected that an employed spouse may be an disincentive 
for the secondary jobholding of women, no statistically significant effect is found. Based on 
the result from the fixed effects estimation, having a public employer is attributed with a 
tendency towards affecting female moonlighting in the UK positively (z-value of 1.60). 
 
The findings from Table 5.9 indicate that also for women, the model is quite robust when 
including the additional variables which indicate the worker’s job related expectations. First, 
the findings for preferences over hours worked and its effect on moonlighting are as indicated 
above for both British and German women. The positive effect of dissatisfaction with job 
security found for British women, however, is cleared away. Corroborating the results of Bell 
et al. (1997), it might therefore well be concluded that moonlighting does not serve as hedge 
against unemployment. Another difference is also found for German females who are 
dissatisfied with the job itself. While the initial results from the fixed effects estimation 
suggest for a lower propensity to hold a second job, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant anymore in this model specification. 
 
The results for both first job wages and non-labor income remain the same as in the former 
model. A high level of weekly working hours, however, returns no effects from the panel 
estimations, although the coefficients still are negative. While mainly all other regressors, i.e. 
(paid) overtime work, part-time or fixed term employment, change of jobs and an employed 
spouse, imply the same effects as before, the statistically significant coefficient found for the 
job tenure of British women returns not to be significant anymore. There therefore is no 
‘loyality effect’ in the sense that job duration would affect moonlighting behavior negatively. 
Furthermore, the tendency towards a positive effect on secondary jobholding of having a 
public employer is reinforced: Results from the fixed effects logit model suggest that British 
females working with a public or governmental employer are more likely to hold a second 
job. 
CHAPTER 5: ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY AND THE UK: THE CASE OF MOONLIGHTERS 
 
 165 
Table 5.9: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for 
females in Germany and the UK, including additional control variables 
 D UK 
 Pooled Logit FE Logit Pooled Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.3663*** 0.3368 -0.0058 -0.3069* 
 (0.1373) (0.3375) (0.1171) (0.1858) 
… work less hours  0.2207* 0.4880* -0.3078*** 0.0158 
 (0.1176) (0.2701) (0.0920) (0.1520) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.2224 0.0857 -0.0284 -0.0231 
 (0.1394) (0.3210) (0.0898) (0.1513) 
… with household-income/pay -0.0258 -0.2351 0.1155 0.3794*** 
 (0.1441) (0.3492) (0.0803) (0.1414) 
… with job itself 0.1909 -0.1348 -0.1931* -0.0953 
 (0.1668) (0.3713) (0.1040) (0.1678) 
Expects to be promoted/get better job -0.0222 0.7465** -0.0094 0.0766 
 (0.1426) (0.3423) (0.0916) (0.1559) 
… get job related training/courses 0.0887 0.0145 0.1272* -0.1253 
 (0.1014) (0.2327) (0.0742) (0.1279) 
… start a new job 0.1096 -0.0391 0.2930*** 0.4242*** 
 (0.1622) (0.3781) (0.0857) (0.1438) 
… become self-employed/start up own business 1.2987*** 0.6187 0.8136*** 0.9125*** 
 (0.1859) (0.4491) (0.1605) (0.3373) 
… quit from paid employment -0.4423** -0.3304 -0.5065** -0.2075 
 (0.2037) (0.4541) (0.2058) (0.3416) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.1261 -0.5423 -0.2363** -0.7513*** 
 (0.1415) (0.3966) (0.1164) (0.2267) 
Log of non-labor income -0.0310** -0.0602 -0.0695** -0.1748*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0499) (0.0282) (0.0598) 
Weekly working hours -0.0096 -0.0189 -0.0220*** -0.0069 
 (0.0060) (0.0179) (0.0066) (0.0123) 
Works overtime 0.5263*** 0.5595** 0.1358 0.0690 
 (0.0991) (0.2317) (0.1203) (0.2127) 
Overtime work is paid 0.2143 -0.4159 0.0166 -0.2438 
 (0.1355) (0.3031) (0.1362) (0.2316) 
Part-time employment 0.2230* 0.5379 0.4342*** 1.0034*** 
 (0.1255) (0.3641) (0.1509) (0.2619) 
Temporary employment 0.3591** 0.7546** 0.0725 0.2521 
 (0.1419) (0.3829) (0.1228) (0.2378) 
Has recently changed job -0.1014 0.0859 0.0660 0.0897 
 (0.1178) (0.2634) (0.0828) (0.1399) 
Job tenure -0.0060 0.0374 -0.0056 -0.0336 
 (0.0087) (0.0361) (0.0106) (0.0241) 
Public/Governmental employer -0.0531 0.1919 0.0975 0.5670** 
 (0.1364) (0.3982) (0.1145) (0.2409) 
Spouse is employed -0.1807 0.2774 -0.0007 -0.0497 
 (0.1735) (0.5278) (0.1009) (0.2438) 
N / Groups 10,535 676/257 14,718 2,141 / 517 
Chi2 239.79 47.81 406.43 150.43 
Log likelihood -2,506.19 -219.92 -4,104.96 -723.32 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Including the additional regressors that indicate job related expectations, the findings suggest 
for similar effects as those for men. For instance, the prospect of either starting a new job or 
of becoming self-employed is associated with a higher likelihood of moonlighting for British 
females. The changes in the logit even increase from 0.3 to 0.4 and from 0.8 to 0.9 when 
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controlling for individual-specific effects. For German women, the likewise effect found from 
the pooled logit model vanishes using the panel estimator.  
Such effects can also be seen for the expectation of putting down paid employment: While 
the pooled model suggests for a negative effect on secondary jobholding for females from 
both countries, the fixed effects estimation returns coefficients that still are negative but 
statistically insignficant. There is a somewhat mixed evidence for the impact of the prospect 
of either expecting to get job related courses or the prospect of getting a better job with the 
current employer. While prior expectations may suggest for a negative relationship between 
both aspects and secondary jobholding, the regressions mainly imply for no effects at all. 
Furthermore, both unexpected and puzzling, fixed effects estimation for German women 
results in a logit increase of about 0.75, i.e. a rather strong positive effect on moonlighting 
participation. 
 
Summing up briefly, there is evidence of both similarities and discrepancies in the 
determinants of secondary jobholding in Germany and  the UK. For instance, the factors that 
may be derived from the traditional moonlighting theory basically behave the same. That is, 
first job wages and non- labor income affect secondary jobholding negatively in both countries 
and also across gender. While these effects are in accordance with the ‘hours constraints’ 
motive of multiple jobholding, there is also a variety of effects that support the ‘heterogenous 
jobs’ motive. Above all, the prospect of changing to a new job or of starting up an own 
business in the near future is associated with a higher propensity to moonlight. One possible 
and quite plausible reason can be that skills needed for the new job are achieved or improved 
on the second job. It may furthermore as well be that the new job will be gradually established 
from a moonlighting job held prior to the switch in employment.  
 
 
5.3 Imposing social security payments on ‘marginal employment’ 
and its impact on moonlighters in Germany 
The focus of the previous section has been on the determinants of multiple jobholding. 
Althought the two countries compared are rather different in terms of labor market regimes, 
the analysis has shown that the underlying factors that drive the decision to offer labor in 
more than one job are not too different. However, it is well known that labor market 
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institutions play an important role in the determination of both the structure and the 
development of different types of employment also including secondary jobholding. 
Besides that, there is an increasing literature that addresses the consequences of active 
labor market policies (ALMP) and attempts to evaluate the quality of such means. Research 
on ALMP typically addresses issues such as, for instance, public employment services, labor 
market training or subsidized employment. The analysis in this section, however, will 
examine the introduction of compulsory social security contributions that were levied on the 
so-called ‘marginal employment’ in Germany and its consequences on secondary jobholding. 
Obviously, this policy measure does not belong to the core of ALMP. Still, as it was a distinct 
change in the institutional framework, it may therefore be considered as a kind of ‘natural 
experiment’ out of which valuable insights may be derived from in regard of the design of 
policy instruments. 
 
5.3.1 Background 
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, there has been a general change in the structure 
of employment towards new forms of atypical employment like, e.g., part-time employment, 
temporary work or, a German peculiarity, ‘marginal employment’. The literature suggests that 
structural changes in both the demand of labor and in the supply of labor are driving forces 
for that development.  
On the demand side, employers are increasingly interested in full utilization of available 
capacities. Therefore, more flexible types of employment grow more important. Furthermore, 
there may also be a desire to be able to quickly react to short term market fluctuations. Fixed 
term contracts may, for example, be a possible way of adjusting a firm’s labor force without 
bearing the risk of having high dismissal costs in case of negative developments. 
On the supply side, individuals have, on the one hand, simply reacted to the changes in 
labor demand. On the other hand, there have also been changes in the structure of individuals’ 
preferences towards both the amount of time supplied as paid employment as well as towards 
the ‘timing’ over the life cycle. That is, compared to the traditional permanent, full-time 
employment, individuals’ labor histories nowadays are more heterogenous inasmuch as there 
are more changes of jobs which may or may not deviate from the standard type of 
employment. Furthermore, in Germany, the age of entry in the labor market increases and the 
age of exit from it decreases. 
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These trends, together with the ongoing demographical change towards an on average older 
society, raise increasing worries for German policy makers. This is because social security 
systems in Germany mainly rest upon the traditional standard type full-time employment. In 
general, payments to the social security systems are a fixed percentage from gross earnings to 
be paid half by the employer and half by the employee. Furthermore, payments are 
compulsory for basically all workers in the private as well as the public sector given that 
workers’ earnings do not exceed an upper earnings level (the so-called ‘Beitragsbemessungs-
grenze’ or ‘Jahresentgeltgrenze’).19 
Entitlements to benefits from the social security systems then mainly depend on workers’ 
past contributions. However, there are also redistributional aspects. Health insurance, for 
instance, is free for family members given that there is one employed and hence health 
insured person. The typical example is the family with a male bread-winner whose (not 
employed) wife and children are free from compulsory health insurance payments. Therefore, 
the system gives little incentives for particularly male workers to deviate from the standard 
type of employment. 
While male workers therefore in general are entitled to sufficient old age benefits, the 
situation has been different for women and particularly married women. While women in 
general are more prone to supply part-time labor, the group of married women in Germany 
has had barely no incentive to supply regular part-time employment as they would have 
suffered from a restrictively high marginal tax rate of up to even 100%, which they take over 
from their husbands (Schwarze, 1998). Therefore, there rather have been strong incentives to 
supply labor as so-called ‘marginal employment’. Prior to the reform that is examined here, a 
worker was marginally employed given that her monthly earnings did not exceed 630 DM20 
or given that a total of up to 15 working hours per week were supplied by the worker. Prior to 
the reform that went into effect on April, 1st 1999, a worker was free from the otherwise 
compulsory social security payments given that she was subject to these standards.21 
 
                                                 
19 In 2002, the upper level was at 3.375 € gross monthly earnings pertaining to health insurance. Pension 
insurance payments were levied on all workers who did not earn more than 4.500 € (West) or 3.750 € (East) per 
month. These latter thresholds were raised to 5.100 € (West) and 4.250 € per month in 2003, thereby extending 
the tax base (http://www.bma.bund.de). Furthermore, while health insurance is not compulsory beyond the stated 
level of earnings, the limits for pension insurance refer to the maximum level of payments only. 
20 The limit was adjusted to 325 € when the Euro was introduced as official currency in 2002. 
21 Besides the standards mentioned, a worker is also considered to be marginally employed if two or more ‘mini-
jobs’ are supplied or given that the job is of short-term nature. While the latter has not been affected by the 
changes of the reform, social security payments were compulsory in the first case also prior to the reform 
(Rudolph, 1999). 
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The drawback of that kind of employment was that workers mainly did not gain own 
entitlements to social security benefits, in particular old age pension benefits. Therefore, one 
of the goals of the reform was to enable particularly married women to build up their own 
entitlements in order to make them less dependent on their spouse’s incomes. 
Furthermore, there were increasing tendencies that employers opted to convert regular 
full-time or part-time jobs into marginal jobs in order to evade the employer’s share of the 
social security payments (Rudolph, 1998). While this, generally speaking, may be considered 
to be a normal optimizing behavior, the financing of the social security systems would 
increasingly have suffered from such trends. Consequently, the reform also aimed at slowing 
down if not limiting the extension of that type of employment. 
 
However, except for the compulsory social security payments, the reform had different effects 
on workers who only held one ‘mini- job’ or on workers who supplied marginal employment 
as a second job.  
 
· Given that the worker offers one ‘mini-job’ only, earnings from marginal employment 
are exempt from taxation if there are no further incomes. Labor costs for employers by 
and large are the same as duty payments are replaced by social security payments. 
· Given that the ‘mini- job’ is a second job, the tax burden increases as there is no 
possibility to evade payment of both earnings taxes and social security payments. 
Therefore, labor costs for employers increase and net earnings of workers decrease. 
 
Table 5.10 sums up the general institutional framework of marginal employment and the 
incentives for both labor supply and labor demand prior to and after the reform. 
As the reform induced both incentives and disencentives to supply marginal employment, the 
total employment effects could not be assessed ex ante. Reactions to that policy instrument 
were to be expected both on the labor demand side and the labor supply side. This is, because 
on the one hand, social security payments are part of total labor costs that employers have to 
bear. Such might be followed by a decrease in the demand of that kind of employment.  
 
On the other hand, both workers’ wages and conditions to entitlements to future benefits from 
the social security systems are affected. Due to the substitution- and income effect of wage 
changes, labor supply reactions a priori typically are ambiguous. Furthermore, while 
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marginally employed workers are to pay 12% of earnings to the old age insurance funds, this 
will not add to sufficient future benefits if the worker does not pay the difference between that 
‘flat’ rate and the regular rate (about 19% of earnings). However, as that payment is not 
compulsory, it is not very surprising that a cross-sectional analysis that was carried out shortly 
after the reform finds that only about 2.5% of all workers who then were marginally 
employed used that option (Apel et al., 1999). 
 
Table 5.10: Institutional framework of marginal employment prior to and after the reform 
 Prior to the reform After the reform 
 
Marginal 
employment 
· no social security payments 
 
· lump sum wage tax (20%, to be 
paid by the employer) 
 
 
+ strong incentive for married 
women and students to offer 
that type of labor 
· ‘flat’ social security payments 
(12% old age insurance; 10% 
health insurance) 
· exempt from taxation, given 
there are no further incomes 
 
± still an incentive for married 
women, but less so for students 
to offer that type of labor 
 
Secondary 
jobholding 
· no social security payments 
 
· lump sum wage tax (20%, to be 
paid by the employer) 
 
+ incentive to offer that type of 
labor as second job 
· social security payments (fixed 
percentage from all earnings) 
· lump sum wage tax (20%, to be 
paid by the employer) 
 
-  disincentive to supply that type 
of labor as second job as net 
earnings decrease 
-  disencentive to demand that 
type of labor as second job as 
labor costs increase 
 
As outlined, there are differences in the effects between the group of workers with one ‘mini-
job’ only and those who are moonlighting. As there is a small literature that addresses the 
consequences mainly for the first group (e.g., Heineck and Schwarze, 2001 or Heineck, 
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2002), the focus of the following analysis is on the reaction of workers holding the ‘mini- job’ 
as a second job. In general, there are several options, a moonlighter could have chosen. These 
are: 
 
· forego the additional income and quit from moonlighting; 
· maintain the second job accepting the decreasing net earnings; 
· expand secondary jobholding to sustain the prior earnings level; 
· switch to illicit, and thus illegal work (given the employer’s willingness to do so); 
· expand working hours in the main job (either by a higher number or regular working 
hours or by paid overtime). 
 
However, as shown by the analysis in the preceding section, moonlighting incidence is higher 
among workers who would like to work more hours. And as possible hours constraints in the 
first job are one of the theoretical arguments for secondary jobholding, it is questionable 
whether the last option is feasible. Consequently, holding a second job indicates that workers 
are not satisfied with either the working hours or the working conditions of the first job. It 
therefore may not be expected that quitting from secondary jobholding would be the most 
likely option. 
 
5.3.2 Data and methods 
The study in this section uses data that again are drawn from the GSOEP. As shown in the 
preceding section, the GSOEP is an appropriate data-source when addressing multiple 
jobholding. The focus here lies on the examination of the dynamics of secondary jobholding 
and its relationship to the reform of ‘marginal employment’. Therefore, the samples for the 
following multivariate analyses are restricted to male and female workers who were 
moonlighting in 1998.  
 
The attempt to evaluate the reform of the ‘marginal employment’ faces a methodological 
problem that is also encountered when examining ALMP (see, e.g., Heckman et al., 1999, or 
Schmidt, 2000). Typically, such policy instruments are not designed as controlled 
experiments. It therefore is difficult to isolate the ‘pure’ impact of the labor market policy. 
The problem is that individuals’ (re)actions to policy measures are observable only in a 
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insufficient way compared to the ideal, but impossible case of observing the individual’s 
outcome in reaction to the ALMP in comparison to the individual’s outcome given that she 
would not be subject to the policy measure. 
Therefore, the relevant point is to find a sensible and feasible (pseudo-)contrafactual 
situation. As the reform was implemented in 1999, there will be an analysis of the changes in 
secondary jobholding between 1998 and 2000 that will be compared to changes in 
moonlighting between 1994 and 1996. The latter period of time is chosen as reference as there 
have not been any changes in the institutional conditions. To some extent, it will then be 
possible to put down the differences in the changes to the workers’ reactions to the reform. 
However, it should be noted that this approach is limited compared to controlled 
experiments: First, due to data size limitations, it is not possible to examine and compare the 
same group of workers and their behavior. Furthermore, there were differences in the cyclical 
and hence national economic situation between the two periods of time. 
 
Besides comparisons of descriptive findings, multivariate methods are applied. Recall that 
there is a range of possible options a worker might chose as reaction to the changes induced 
by the reform. While it would be relevant to include each option into the analysis, sample size 
restrictions allow to model the following alternatives only. Given that worker i was 
moonlighting in 1998, her options in 2000 are modelled as: 
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One appropriate model to apply is the multinomial logit model (Long 1997): 
å = ¢
¢
===
J
j ji
mi
ii my
1
i,19982000,
)ßx(exp
ßx(exp
1)y,x (Pr
)
  (5.10) 
where ,0ß1 =  m = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, ..., m. 
 
While it would be possible to use the odds-ratio formulation of the model and then depict the 
results by the odds ratio plot (see Chapter 3.3), marginal effects are calculated in this analysis. 
This is because there is a wider range of possible factors affecting the decision to hold a 
second job so that the graphical illustration would turn out be excessive.  
 
CHAPTER 5: ATYPICAL EMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY AND THE UK: THE CASE OF MOONLIGHTERS 
 
 173 
The marginal effects can be calculated for continuous variables as  
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For dummy variables changes in the predicted probabilities are computed as discrete change 
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The coefficients resulting from these computations can be interpreted as a change in the 
predicted probability of outcome m for a (unit or discrete) change in the covariate xk, holding 
all other variables at their mean. 
 
5.3.3 Empirical results 
Before presenting the results from the multivariate analyses, there will be a brief discussion of 
some descriptive findings that reflect the changes in secondary jobholding between 1998 and 
2000 which is compared to the ‘natural dynamics’ that has taken place in the reference period 
between 1994 and 1996. 
 
Table 5.11: Dynamics of multiple jobholding, all employed persons  
 1996 
 
1994  
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 53.8 39.7 (6.5) 
Employed, but not moonlighting 3.1 84.8 12.1 
 2000 
 
1998  
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 44.5 48.0 (7.5) 
Employed, but not moonlighting 2.6 86.3 11.1 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Following the reform, there has been a remarkable downswing in multiple jobholding: The 
moonlighting rate decreased from 8.3% in 1998 to 6.0% in 2000 which projects to about 
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770 000 workers (Heineck and Schwarze, 2001).22 While this may seem to be an outstanding 
trend downwards, Table 5.11 shows that secondary jobholding in general is a rather dynamic 
type of employment.23  
Regarding the reference period, only about half of the workers were moonlighting in 
1994, while about 40% did not have a second job in 1996. Besides, there has been a small 
inflow into moonlighting: some 3% of workers picked up a second job between these two 
points of time. 
 
Introducing compulsory social security payments seems to have had a substantial negative 
impact on secondary jobholding. Compared to the reference period, there is a difference of 
about 9 percentage points indicating that fewer workers maintained moonlighting from 1998 
to 2000: only some 45% of prior moonlighters still held on to their second job. 
Furthermore, the inflow to moonlighting also decreased slightly to 2.6% which is 0.5 
percentage points lower in comparison to the inflow between 1994 and 1996. 
 
Table 5.12: Dynamics of multiple jobholding, married women 
 1996 
 
1994 
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 55.8 39.8 (4.4) 
Employed, but not moonlighting 2.4 82.9 14.7 
 2000 
 
1998  
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 32.0 56.7 (11.3) 
Employed, but not moonlighting 2.4 84.9 12.7 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
Addressing one of the bigger groups of moonlighters, Table 5.12 shows that the downturn in 
secondary jobholding is mainly caused by the behavior of women and, in  particular, married 
women. While the changes in the reference period are quite similar to the changes shown for 
                                                 
22 Note that the descriptive findings indicated above show a decrease of 8.7% to 6.9%. The differences in 
numbers may be attributed to the fact, that Heineck and Schwarze (2001) used preliminary data for 2000. 
23 This is even more visible in comparison to full-time or part-time employment. Heineck and Schwarze (2001), 
for example, find that in both periods in question, more than 85% of full-time workers and about 62% of part-
time workers maintain their type of employoment. 
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all employed persons, there has been a strong decrease in moonlighting by this group between 
1998 and 2000. Compared to the reference period, there is a difference of more than 20 
percentage points: While more than 55% of married women continued to moonlight between 
1994 and 1996, only 32% of married women were willing to do so after the implementation 
of the reform. 24 
 
However, as indicated by the stylized facts in the preceding section, there has also been a 
normalization in secondary jobholding behavior inasmuch as the moonlighting rate slightly 
increased again from 2000 to 2001. In terms of employment transitions between these two 
years, Table 5.13 shows that the dynamics have returned to and even exceed the ‘natural’ 
transition rates as shown for the reference period of 1994 to 1996. In particular, some 58% of 
either all workers and almost 56% of married women who held a second job in 2000 were still 
moonlighting in 2001. 
 
Table 5.13: Dynamics of multiple jobholding (2000-2001), all employed persons  
All persons 2001 
 
2000  
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 58.1 36.7 5.2 
Employed, but not moonlighting 2.8 89.6 7.5 
Not employed 0.8 10.8 88.4 
Married women 2001 
 
2000  
Employed and 
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
 
Not employed 
Employed and Moonlighting 55.7 35.5 (8.8) 
Employed, but not moonlighting 2.3 87.8 9.9 
Not employed (0.3) 8.6 91.1 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
 
While Table 5.13 shows that secondary jobholding in Germany recovered from the shock of 
the 1999 reform, the following results illustrate which determinants may have prompted 
workers to either maintain their second jobs or quit from moonlighting. 
                                                 
24 Analyzing all women results in mainly the same findings: only some 34% of 1998 moonlighters are holding a 
second job in 2000 while 54% quit from moonlighting. 
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Table 5.14 shows that only a few of the covariates contribute to the variation in the data. First, 
neither the wage earned in the first job nor in the second job affect the decision to quit from or 
to maintain secondary jobholding. This also holds for the level of the partner’s earnings and  
the level of non- labor income in 1998. However, and although the change in the predicted 
probabilitly is rather small (-0.0155), the marginal effect found for the change in non- labor 
income between 1998 and 2000 suggests that an increasing non- labor income between these 
two years affects moonlighting participation negatively. 
A tendency towards a reverse result is found for the share of second job earnings in the 
1998 household-income: Although the effect is not statistically significent (z-value of 1.5), 25 
a higher share of second job earnings may have affected the worker’s decision to maintain 
moonlighting in 2000. Another predictor for the worker’s reaction to the reform is the 
indicator on whether second jobs were held regular. Given that moonlighting was done only 
occassionally in 1998, the likelihood of still holding a second job in 2000 decreases. 
However, this finding is not surprising as the reference individual is the moonlighter working 
in a family business. 
 
Furthermore, the type of employer is also relevant: While moonlighting in firms does not 
affect the participation or, better, the continuation decision, moonlighting in private 
households leads to a positive change of 0.16 in the predicted probability of secondary 
jobholding in 2000. A similar finding exists for the type of occupation in the second job. 
While working as clerk or in manufacturing does not have an impact on moonlighting in 
2000, having a service second job in 1998 affects the maintenance of moonlighting 
positively. 26 The predicted probability changes by about 0.3. 
Being a white-collar worker in 1998 does not affect the moonlighting decision after the 
reform. However, compared to blue-collar workers, civil servants are more likely to continue 
their second job in 2000. While part-time employment seems to affect moonlighting 
negatively, the marginal effect is not statistically significant (z-value of 1.2). On the other 
hand, having a fixed-term contract in 1998 has a positive effect on the continuation of 
secondary jobholding in 2000; the predicted probability changes by 0.2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
25 Note that the sample size (N=322) is not quite extensive. 
26 Sample size restrictions prohibit the use of more occupational dummies. 
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Table 5.14: Moonlighting status of 1998 moonlighters in 2000, marginal effects of the 
multinomial logit model 
 Employed and  
moonlighting 
Employed, but 
not moonlighting 
Not employed 
Log of net wage in first job 0.1065 -0.1010 -0.0054 
 (0.1089) (0.1082) (0.0155) 
Log of gross wage in second job 0.0327 -0.0322 -0.0004 
 (0.0479) (0.0477) (0.0074) 
(Non-labor income)/100 0.0047 -0.0040 -0.0006 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0009) 
(Difference in non-labor income 1998 to 2000)/100 -0.0155** 0.0138** 0.0016* 
 (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0009) 
(Spouse’s earnings)/100 0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0002 
 (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0005) 
Share of transfer benefits in hh-income 0.0061 -0.0059 -0.0002 
 (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0017) 
Share of second job earnings in hh-income 0.0066 -0.0064 -0.0002 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0008) 
Second job is supplied occasionally -0.2745* 0.2882* -0.0136 
 (0.1587) (0.1590) (0.0181) 
Second job is supplied regularly -0.0773 0.1110 -0.0337 
 (0.1578) (0.1585) (0.0344) 
Second job supplied in a firm -0.0592 0.0582 0.0010 
 (0.0717) (0.0715) (0.0114) 
Second job supplied in private household 0.1629* -0.1663* 0.0034 
 (0.0907) (0.0889) (0.0183) 
Second job occupation: Clerks 0.0130 -0.0025 -0.0105 
 (0.1327) (0.1325) (0.0125) 
Second job occupation: Services 0.2192** -0.2528*** 0.0335 
 (0.1008) (0.0920) (0.0458) 
Second job occupation: Manufacturing -0.1286 0.1191 0.0095 
 (0.1431) (0.1440) (0.0336) 
Desire to work more hours 0.2553*** -0.2613*** 0.0060 
 (0.0935) (0.0912) (0.0247) 
Desire to work fewer hours 0.1705* -0.1899** 0.0194 
 (0.0950) (0.0948) (0.0166) 
First job is part-time employment -0.1354 0.1166 0.0188 
 (0.1122) (0.1130) (0.0295) 
First job is temporary employment 0.1919* -0.2107** 0.0188 
 (0.1036) (0.0974) (0.0395) 
White-collar worker 0.0549 -0.0456 -0.0092 
 (0.0826) (0.0824) (0.0141) 
Civil servant 0.2222* -0.2153* -0.0068 
 (0.1199) (0.1186) (0.0162) 
Works overtime 0.0384 -0.0173 -0.0211 
 (0.0692) (0.0688) (0.0167) 
Overtime is paid -0.0548 0.0578 -0.0030 
 (0.0899) (0.0898) (0.0128) 
Overtime compensation by leisure in days 0.0141 -0.0261 0.0120 
 (0.0719) (0.0717) (0.0132) 
Notes: N=322; LR Chi2-value=93.07; Prob > Chi2 = 0.0065; Log likelihood = -221.39; Pseudo R2 = 0.1737 
Further socio-demographic control variables included are: Age and age squared, a male dummy, a married 
woman dummy, the number of children aged up to 4 years or aged 5 to 15 years, a West German dummy and the 
number of years spent in education. Note that all these coefficients returned trivial results so that they need not 
be presented here. 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2000. Own calculations. 
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Neither working overtime itself nor overtime compensation by additional payments or leisure 
has a statistically significant effect on moonlighting participation in 2000. Finally, an 
interesting result is found for the preferences over hours worked. First, it is not surprising that 
the desire to work more hours is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of 
continued moonlighting after the reform. On the other hand, it is rather puzzling that a similar 
effect arises for the 1998 moonlighters who want to work fewer hours. However, as shown in 
the preceding section, it is quite likely that there are also reasons other than hours restrictions 
on the first job to pick up a second job. 
 
As the downturn in secondary jobholding was mainly caused by the decrease in female 
moonlighting participation, further multivariate regressions are carried out. While it would be 
interesting and relevant to analyze the group of married women, such approach results in a 
sample size that is far too small (N=59) to get reliable statistical findings. Therefore, the 
following analysis uses data on all women who were moonlighting in 1998 (N=115). 
Furthermore, as there are too few observations in the ‘not employed’ category, the limited 
sample size only allows to apply the familiar logit model. Table 5.15 presents both the 
coefficients and the marginal effects from that estimation. 
 
Due to sample size limitations, the model estimated performs rather poorly (Prob > Chi2 = 
0.0943). Again, only a few of the regressors explain variation in the data. First, the wage in 
the second job as well as non- labor income in 1998 and the difference in non- labor income 
prior to and after the reform does not affect women’s moonlighting decision in 2000 
(although the latter shows the expected negative sign). While this also applies to the earnings 
of the husband, the female’s net wage in the first job tends to affect secondary jobholding 
positively; a z-value of 1.55 indicates that with a larger sample, statistical significance may 
show. 
Furthermore, occasional moonlighting in 1998 is associated with a rather strong decrease 
in the predicted probability (-0.53) of secondary jobholding in 2000. However, while that 
finding repeats and reinforces the result shown for all workers, female employees who were 
regularly moonlighting prior to the reform are as well less likely to hold a second job two 
years after. The predicted probability decreases by even 0.54. 
On the other hand, as above, moonlighting in private households and moonlighting as 
service worker leads to continuing secondary employment also after the reform. 
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Table 5.15: Moonlighting participation of 1998 female moonlighters in 2000 
 Coefficient Marginal effect 
Log of net wage in first job 1.0526 0.2600 
 (0.6739) (0.1669) 
Log of gross wage in second job 0.2100 0.0518 
 (0.3762) (0.0929) 
(Non-labor income)/100 0.0465 0.0115 
 (0.0346) (0.0085) 
(Difference in non-labor income 1998 to 2000)/100 -0.0231 -0.0057 
 (0.0406) (0.0100) 
(Spouse’s earnings)/100 0.0131 0.0032 
 (0.0151) (0.0037) 
Share of second job earnings in hh-income 0.0171 0.0042 
 (0.0293) (0.0072) 
Second job is supplied occasionally -2.7184** -0.5298*** 
 (01.360) (0.1824) 
Second job is supplied regularly -2.4544* -0.5436** 
 (01.280) (0.2168) 
Second job supplied in a firm -0.3361 -0.0828 
 (0.5579) (0.1367) 
Second job supplied in private household 1.6202** 0.3734** 
 (0.7916) (0.1503) 
Second job occupation: Clerks 0.7238 0.1789 
 (0.7087) (0.1708) 
Second job occupation: Services 1.7903** 0.4085*** 
 (0.7215) (0.1340) 
Second job occupation: Manufacturing 0.6378 0.1578 
 (1.5772) (0.3786) 
Civil servant 0.9289 0.2260 
 (1.3131) (0.2959) 
First job is temporary employment 0.1007 0.0249 
 (0.9857) (0.2453) 
Works overtime 0.0658 0.0162 
 (0.5345) (0.1318) 
Overtime is paid -0.6024 -0.1438 
 (0.6684) (0.1513) 
Overtime compensation by leisure in days -0.3592 -0.0886 
 (0.5458) (0.1343) 
Desire to work more hours 1.3385* 0.3220** 
 (0.7401) (0.1637) 
Desire to work fewer hours 0.9275 0.2241 
 (0.7242) (0.1681) 
Constant -4.7081 — 
 (4.7033)  
Notes: N=115; LR Chi2-value=33.48; Prob > Chi2 = 0.0943; Log likelihood = -62.44; Pseudo R2 = 0.2114 
Further socio-demographic control variables included are: Age and age squared, the number of years spent in 
education and a dummy indicating whether dependent children are living in the household. Note that again all 
these coefficients returned trivial results so that they are not be presented here. 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2000. Own calculations. 
 
In contrast to the finding for all workers, neither temporary employment nor being a female 
civil servant does affect the moonlighting participation decision in 2000. Regarding the desire 
to work either more or less hours, it is now found that only those female moonlighters who 
want to work more hours are more likely to still hold a second job after the reform.  
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter presents analyses on an underresearched issue of labor supply, secondary 
jobholding. While there is an established, though small literature on the so-called 
moonlighting, the studies here provide some novelties.  
Following a brief analytical outline of the two most prominent theoretical arguments of 
moonlighting, the ‘hours-constraints’ motive and the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive, the first 
section presents a cross-national comparison, something which has hitherto not been carried 
out. This is of even more relevance as the countries in question, Germany and the UK, are 
proponents of rather different labor market regimes. The analysis furthermore uses 
longitudinal data so that panel estimators can be applied which only very recently has been 
done once before (Böheim and Taylor, 2003). In contrast to prior analyses that are based on 
cross-sectional data, it is then possible to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity. 
Thereafter, the second section briefly evaluates the consequences of imposing social 
security payments on the so-called ‘marginal employment’ in Germany. As this type of part-
time employment is often supplied as second job, the reform that was implemented in 1999 
was followed by a strong decrease in moonlighting participation. However, simply 
recognizing such a decline would quite likely lead to wrong conclusions. The analysis 
therefore uses an approach that is also applied in the evaluation of active labor market 
policies. In particular, the development of secondary jobholding prior to and after the reform 
is referred to a (pseudo-)contrafactual situation so that the analysis disentangles ‘natural’ 
dynamics in moonlighting from the effects that were induced by the reform. Furthermore, 
multivariate analyses examine the determinants that affect the decision to maintain secondary 
jobholding after the reform. 
 
The results from the comparative analysis that is carried out in the first section show evidence 
in support of the two most important theoretical rationales. That is, workers who suffer from 
hours-constraints on their first job are more likely to moonlight in order to narrow the gap 
between the individual optimum and the hours they are allowed to work. This is a quite 
plausible finding for the German labor market which, according to analyses of the OECD, is 
one of the most restrictive regimes. However, this result might be somewhat surprising in case 
of the British labor market which can be considered to be of one the most liberal and  hence 
presumably more flexible regimes. In fact, descriptive findings suggest that, in contrast to 
German workers, the main part of British workers achieve a satisfactory solution regarding 
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the number of working hours. 
While hours-constraints may neverthe less occur on flexible labor markets too, this 
argument is only one of the theoretical reasons as to why workers should offer a second job. 
Consequently, the analyses also provide evidence for the so-called ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ 
motive. That is, workers need not be hours-constrained but, for instance, may hold their main 
job for the sake of pecuniary stability and security and take a second job that provides other 
then monetary benefits. A further explanation is that workers strive to acquire skills or get 
experience in occupations other than the current job. Evidence for this phenomenon is found 
for both German and British men and women, who either desire or expect to get a new job or 
start their own business. However, it has to be noted that the reason for the desire to change is 
not clear-cut: It might either be constraints in working time and hence a limited earnings’ 
capacity of individuals or, supporting the heterogeneity of jobs, it might be other benefits that 
come along with the new job. 
 
Summing up, it is interesting to note that there rather are more similarities than discrepancies 
in the determinants of secondary jobholding in Germany and the UK. That is, the distinct 
differences in labor market regimes do not transmit into individual labor supply behavior that 
differs much with respect to secondary jobholding. 
 
However, the second section of this chapter shows, that changes in the institutional 
framework may have a strong impact on labor supply and, in particular, secondary 
jobholding. In a (quasi) ‘natural experiment’ setting, the 1999 reform of imposing social 
security payments on ‘marginal employment’ in Germany and its consequences for secondary 
jobholding are examined. A priori, it however could not be said whether labor supply 
decreases given that net earnings from second jobs are lower due to the compulsory social 
security payments. Workers may as well try to compensate this loss by supplying even more 
moonlighting hours. However, the extent of labor supply is not of further interest here. 
Focusing on participation itself, the analyses of transitions out of and into secondary 
jobholding prior to and after the reform, i.e. 1998 and 2000, show that the reform caused a 
stronger decline in moonlighting participation compared to the ‘natural dynamics’ of the 
reference period, 1994 to 1996. However, further findings for the subsequent year show that 
reactions to the reform may be considered as a kind of exogeneous shock which has been 
overcome quickly: Between 2000 and 2001, transitions out of and into moonlighting 
normalized and got back to a level comparable to the reference period. 
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Examining the determinants that may have caused 1998 moonlighters to maintain their second 
jobs after the reform, it is found that not many of the indicators available have explanatory 
power. On the one hand, an increasing non- labor income between 1998 and 2000 affects 
continued moonlighting participation negatively. A similar result is found for occasional 
secondary jobholding which also had a negative impact.  
On the other hand, one of the primary factors thought of driving secondary jobholding, the 
desire to work more hours, has a positive effect which is further also found for moonlighting 
jobs in service or given that the employer was a private household. Here, workers are more 
likely to still hold a second job in 2000. 
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6. Summary and conclusion 
This thesis basically is a collection of three essays on topics in the fields of empirical labor 
supply research. Following a short outline of some of the econometric methods used in the 
applied analyses, the first essay presents studies on the impact of religion and individuals’ 
behavior on labor participation and earnings. Both participation and earnings are also 
addressed by the second essay that examines possible differences between workers who 
smoke and those who do not smoke. Finally, the third essay analyzes patterns of secondary 
jobholding in Germany and the UK, thus comparing two different labor market regimes. 
Furthermore, this last essay includes a brief evaluation of imposing compulsory social 
security payments on ‘marginal employment’ in Germany and its consequences for 
moonlighting workers. 
 
At first glance, there seems to be not much of common ground. Indeed, all questions 
addressed do not belong to the mainstream canon of labor economics. Above all, this applies 
to the first essay on the effects, religious behavior and attitudes may have on individuals’ 
labor market outcomes. In general, economists are hesitative regarding the appartently 
irrational belief in a superior order. However, the growing research on the ‘Economics of 
Religion’ shows that the economic approach to religious behavior is relevant and achieves 
useful results. The analyses carried out add to previous research. There are three smaller 
studies that offer several novelties. In contrast to the bulk of the corresponding literature that 
is generally based on cross-sectional Northern American data, it is mainly German data that 
are used. This allows for transnational comparisons which, however, are not the focus. Still, 
such research might be of future interest as the structures of religious markets and religious 
bodies in Germany and, above all, the US are quite different. Another asset is the use of 
longitudinal data that allows to apply more appropriate panel estimation techniques. 
 
Furthermore, there are different questions of interest that are addressed in the chapter. First, a 
comparative context is chosen to analyze the impact of religion on individuals’ attitudes 
towards female labor participation, given by attitudes towards the more traditional gender role 
model of the inner-household allocation of labor and by attitudes towards full-time 
employment of mothers. Furthermore, husbands’ attitudes and their religiosity are used to 
predict employment participation of wives’. Three cross-sections drawn from the ISSP 
covering West Germany, East Germany, Italy, New Zealand and the UK are used. The 
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empirical findings support a priori, maybe unsurprising expectations insofar that males, 
adherents to more hierarchical religions, like Roman Catholicism, and religiously active 
persons are associated with less favorable attitudes towards female or mothers’ labor 
participation. This being a general finding for all countries examined, there are differences 
between the countries. For example, West Germany and Italy are the least liberal with regard 
to female employment. While that finding may have been expected for Italy, given that more 
than 90% of the population are Roman Catholics, it is interesting to note such a result for 
West Germans. 
Furthermore, the same data are used to analyze possible effects of husbands’ religiosity on 
wives’ employment. Unsurprisingly, it is found that husbands with traditional attitudes affect 
their wives’ labor participation negatively. However, neither denominational affiliation nor 
regular church attendance of males seems to have a similar effect. As this may be lead back to 
the use of cross-sectional data, the subsequent section presents a more detailed analysis of the 
possible effects religion might have on the labor supply of married women. In particular, 
panel data from the GSOEP are used and panel estimations are carried out in addition to 
cross-sectional analyses.  
The following study examines hypotheses derived from both sociological and economic 
theory. As above, these suggest that membership to strict religious groups may have a 
negative effect on women’s employment participation. Again, the household context also 
plays an important role insofar that marital composition might either add to or counteract this 
effect. Inner- faith marriages should influence female labor supply negatively only when both 
spouses are member of a strict religious group. The a priori effects of inter-faith marriages, 
however, are ambiguous depending on the attitudes of either wife or husband and on the 
bargaining power of the spouses. 
The empirical evidence found suggest for only weak and indirect support of the 
hypotheses suggested. First, there are no clear-cut patterns of the effects of denominational 
affiliation on female labor supply. This, however, is not surprising given that membership to a 
church may be a rather weak indicator for religious attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, both the 
religious belief and religious participation along with denominational affiliation are included 
in the analyses. Results from both cross-sectional and panel estimations suggest that female 
labor participation is affected by strong religious belief as well as regular participation. 
Furthermore, husbands with a strong religious belief also seem to affect female labor 
participation negatively.  
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The last section of this chapter presents a study on the relationship between male religious 
behavior and their earnings. The GSOEP provides information for both East German and 
West German men, which is of high interest, as there have been fundamentally different 
religious traditions in the decades before reunification. Consequently, it is not surprising that 
the results differ in various ways. First, there seems to be no association between religious 
attitudes or religious behavior and earnings of East German workers. West German workers, 
on the other hand, who are denominationally affiliated seem to bear an earnings penalty of 6-
8%. However, these findings arise from cross-sectional estimations. 
Using panel data, and applying the standard panel estimation techniques, i.e. random 
effects and fixed effects estimators, the negative effects mainly vanish. Furthermore, the 
Hausman-Taylor IV estimator is applied as well. This estimator overcomes the potential 
drawback of assuming either correlation between the individual-specific effects and the set of 
covariates or not. Findings from the fixed effects model and the Hausman-Taylor IV model 
imply that male earnings in West Germany are not affected by religious affiliation, belief or 
participation. However, there is some evidence for earnings penalties for believers and strong 
believers in East Germany. 
 
The second essay includes two studies on the relationship between tobacco consumption and, 
on the one hand, absenteeism, i.e. absence from the work place and earnings on the other 
hand. The corresponding literature suggests some few theoretical ideas as to why smokers 
may be more absent or may earn less than non-smokers, the latter being an empirical 
regularity for the Northern American regions. In particular, it may be argued that smokers are 
individuals with higher time preference rates. Another hypothesis suggests that smokers may 
be less productive due to the deleterious health effects from tobacco consumption. The 
analyses presented are in line with the prior essay insofar that they provide evidence for 
Germany using longitudinal data. Again, existing research has mainly used cross-sectional 
data for the US or Canada. However, smoking may quite likely be assumed to be correlated 
with unobservable individual effects which strongly calls for the application of panel 
estimators that account for heterogeneity. 
The first study corroborates existing evidence and shows that, also in the German case, 
smokers seem to be both more often and longer absent from work than non-smokers. On the 
other hand, the difference of about one  more absent day per year may be considered to be not 
large economically. Furthermore, count data models are applied that account for the specific 
characteristic when measuring absence as counts. The findings from both cross-sectional and 
CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 186 
panel estimations suggest that smoking behavior is a weak predictor for absence from the 
workplace. The results imply that only young female and male smokers have higher absence 
rates than their non-smoking counterparts.  
The analysis on smoking and absenteeism has more of an explorative character than the 
subsequent study which addresses the relationship between smoking behavior and earnings. 
Here, (crude) tests for theoretical implications are provided as well. In particular, it is tested 
whether smokers may be individuals with a higher time preference rate or whether smokers 
are workers with lower productivity. First, however, results from earnings regressions only 
partially confirm previous research. Women’s earnings in Germany are not affected by 
tobacco consumption. On the other hand, there seem to be earnings differentials for males. 
Compared to prior results, the differential of about 2%, however, is rather small. Furthermore, 
this finding is based on the pooled OLS estimator and is hence not accounting for 
unobservable individual-specific effects. Therefore, as in the preceding chapter, panel 
regressions are performed. Again, the random effects model, the fixed effects model and the 
Hausman-Taylor IV estimator are employed.  
Rather unsurprisingly, the (negative) findings from the random effects model are rejected 
in favor of both the fixed effects model and the HT-IV model. According to these models, the 
prior negative effect of smoking on earnings vanishes. While the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, they furthermore show positive signs. Using a three-waves balanced 
panel, the t-test statistics for young male smokers indicate that coefficients are ‘almost 
statistically significant’. On a somewhat speculative ground, it may be argued that young 
male smokers are individuals with a higher rate of time preference. This is because young 
males who smoke may not invest in human capital as much as their non-smoking counterparts 
given a higher time preference rate. They thus may be likely to have occupational experience 
that non-smokers are only about to establish which results in a tendency of higher earnings.  
Furthermore, crude tests have been employed to examine further hypotheses. While a 
lower productivity of smokers cannot be supported, additional regressions suggest, though 
weakly, that smokers have lower returns to work experience. This is in line with higher time 
preference rates assuming that smokers are less likely to invest in on-the-job training.  
 
The third and final essay analyzes secondary jobholding. Alike the other two topics, 
moonlighting is also a rather neglected issue. Recently, however, has there been an increase in 
literature because of the likewise increasing interest in atypical employment, like part-time or  
fixed term employment. The essay consists of a study of the underlying patterns of secondary 
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jobholding and of another study that addresses the impact of a policy measure on that type of 
employment. 
First, the theory of multiple jobholding is briefly discussed. There are two more prominent 
theoretical arguments: The primary explanation is given by the case of workers who have a 
limited earnings’ capacity because of  a fixed number of hours they are allowed to work in 
their first job. The second motive to hold a second job arises from possible heterogeneous 
character of jobs so that, for example, one job might be the prerequisite for the other. Both 
motives, the ‘hours-constraints’ motive and the ‘heterogeneous-jobs’ motive are addressed in 
the analysis of the first section of the chapter. Examining Germany and the UK, the study 
follows a comparative approach, something which has hitherto not been done. Furthermore, 
the countries chosen represent two quite different labor market regimes making the analysis 
even more interesting as well as relevant. Again, as in the two preceding chapters, 
longitudinal data are used and panel estimators are applied. 
The results from the multivariate analyses show that there rather are more similarities than 
discrepancies in the determinants of secondary jobholding in Germany and the UK. There is 
evidence in support of both theoretical rationales. That is, in both countries there is a group of 
workers who are hours-constrained on their first job and thus have an incentive to moonlight 
given that their individual optimum hours worked is not achieved by the hours restricitions. 
However, descriptive findings suggest that the bulk of British workers are satisfied with the 
number of hours they work and thus may be considered to have achieved the individual 
optimum. In contrast, German workers are mainly dissatisfied with their working hours but 
are restricted downwards. These differences do not come surprising given that Germany is 
one of the most restrictive regimes, according to the OECD. 
Furthermore, the analyses also provide evidence for the heterogeneous character of jobs. 
In both countries, for example, indicators on the prospect of starting a new occupation or of 
becoming self-employed are good predictors for secondary jobholding. This might be 
explained by workers holding a second job in order to acquire or to improve in skills other 
than those demanded in the current job.  
 
Despite the evidence that the differences in labor market regimes do not to result in large 
differences in moonlighting behavior in Germany and the UK, the subsequent and hence last 
section shows, that secondary jobholding may still be affected by changes in the institutional 
framework. 
In particular, the analysis concentrates on a quasi ‘natural experiment’: In 1999, a reform 
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went into effect that imposed compulsory social security payments on ‘marginal employment’ 
in Germany. However, prior to the reform, moonlighting jobs quite often categorized as 
marginal employment given the typically small number of hours that is supplied and the 
corresponding low earnings that are obtained. The reform was accompanied by both decreases 
in the moonlighting net wages and increases in labor costs due to employer’s share of social 
security payments. Still, a priori, it could not be said whether labor supply would decrease 
because of the income- and substitution-effects of a wage change. Descriptive findings 
nevertheless show that the reform was followed by a strong decrease in moonlighting 
participation.  
However, it may be misleading to simply acknowledge a decline. Therefore, a reference 
period that was not burdened by institutional changes is used as (pseudo-)contrafactual 
situation in order to disentangle the ‘natural dynamics’ of secondary jobholding from the 
effects that were induced by the reform. Compared to these ‘natural’ transitions, findings still 
suggest for a strong negative impact of the reform. It should, however, also be noted that 
workers overcame that exogeneous shock quite quickly insofar that in the subsequent year, 
the transitions out of and into secondary jobholding in general got back to the ‘natural’ level.  
Finally, multivariate analyses are used to explore the determinants that affected 1998 
moonlighters in their decision to maintain secondary jobholding after the reform. However, 
the results are rather unsatisfactory insofar that only a few of the indicators available have 
explanatory power. On the one hand, occasional secondary jobholding in 1998 and an 
increasing non-labor income between 1998 and 2000 affects continued moonlighting 
participation negatively. On the other hand, although not too surprising, the desire to work 
more hours has a positive effect on keeping up the moonlighting job. A more interesting 
finding is found for secondary jobs in service or given that the employer was a private 
household. Here, workers also are more likely to still hold a second job in 2000. 
 
Despite the fact that the topics analyzed do belong to rather different branches of research, 
one methodological mainline result arises from the analyses carried out: the need to account 
for unobservable individual heterogeneity. Most of prior research on which the studies here 
are based use cross-sectional data. However, as has been shown by the analyses that explore 
longitudinal data, prior results are mainly not supported by the findings in this thesis. On the 
other hand, as the GSOEP is the primary data source used, it would in general be correct to 
assume that the theoretical arguments simply do not hold for the German case. However, it is 
more plausible to assume that taking into account individual-specific effects cause the 
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reversal of results. 
 
The material collected in this thesis does not attempt to answer each question from the fields 
examined. It rather has to be seen as a small contribution to the existing literature and as a 
first step towards future research that will likewise show that seemingly off-mainstream 
research may contribute to enhance economists’ understanding of the underlying patterns of 
individuals’ behavior in general and particularly individuals’ labor supply decisions. 
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Note that the numbering of the tables in the Appendix corresponds to the numbering of the 
tables in the chapters. Therefore, the gaps in numbering are by intention. Furthermore, there 
are tables that correspond to Figures shown in the text. Eventually, there are also tables in the 
text that either are collapsed to economize upon space or split in two or more parts due to the 
comprised presentation of only the relevant variables in the text. 
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Table D-3.1: Religion and attitudes towards gender role and female full-time employment; descriptive 
statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
A man’s job: earn money, a woman’s job: home and family 0.2425 (0.4286) 
Family suffers when the woman has a full-time job 0.4223 (0.4939) 
Catholic and regular attendance 0.1363 (0.3432) 
Muslim and regular attendance 0.0008 (0.0293) 
Protestant and regular attendance 0.0521 (0.2222) 
Other denomination and regular attendance 0.0094 (0.0966) 
No denomination and regular attendance 0.0034 (0.0586) 
Catholic and no regular attendance 0.1757 (0.3806) 
Muslim and no regular attendance 0.0008 (0.0293) 
Protestant and no regular attendance 0.2488 (0.4323) 
Other denomination, no regular attendance 0.0165 (0.1274) 
No denomination and no regular attendance 0.2677 (0.4428) 
West German and regular attendance 0.0508 (0.2196) 
East German and regular attendance 0.0124 (0.1108) 
Italian and regular attendance 0.0816 (0.2738) 
New Zealander and regular attendance 0.0364 (0.1874) 
British and regular attendance 0.0298 (0.1700) 
West German and no regular attendance 0.1988 (0.3991) 
East German and no regular attendance 0.1591 (0.3658) 
Italian and no regular attendance 0.0859 (0.2802) 
New Zealander and no regular attendance 0.1505 (0.3576) 
British and no regular attendance 0.1223 (0.3277) 
Denomination: Catholic  0.3133 (0.4638) 
Denomination: Muslim 0.0018 (0.0425) 
Denomination: Protestant 0.3036 (0.4598) 
Denomination: Other denomination 0.0271 (0.1624) 
Denomination: No denomination 0.3375 (0.4729) 
Nationality: West German 0.2595 (0.4384) 
Nationality: East German 0.2104 (0.4076) 
Nationality: Italian 0.1691 (0.3748) 
Nationality: New Zealander 0.1904 (0.3927) 
Nationality: British 0.1703 (0.3759) 
Male 0.4792 (0.4995) 
Age: 20 to 35 years old 0.3474 (0.4761) 
Age: 36 to 50 years old 0.3592 (0.4798) 
Age: 51 to 64 years old 0.2932 (0.4552) 
Married 0.6878 (0.4634) 
Is not employed 0.3331 (0.4713) 
Has full-time employment 0.5391 (0.4984) 
Has part-time employment 0.1250 (0.3308) 
Public servant 0.1700 (0.3757) 
Has higher education 0.3955 (0.4889) 
Number of persons in household 3.0909 (1.3886) 
Lives in rural area 0.2094 (0.4069) 
Lower social class 0.2035 (0.4026) 
Has left-wing political attitude 0.3157 (0.4648) 
Has right-wing political attitude 0.2256 (0.4180) 
Year of observation: 1991 0.3688 (0.4825) 
Year of observation: 1994 0.3873 (0.4871) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.2437 (0.4293) 
Notes: N=11,570 observations. 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. 
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Table A-3.1: Denominational affiliation, religious participation and attitudes towards gender role and 
female full-time employment; including control variables 
 Man’s job: earn money; woman’s: 
home and family 
Family suffers when woman/ wife 
has a full-time job 
Catholic and regular attendance 0.0393*** 0.0230* 0.1003*** 0.0353** 
 (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0163) (0.0169) 
Muslim and regular attendance 0.4343*** 0.4424*** 0.1932 0.3059** 
 (0.1673) (0.1663) (0.1637) (0.1431) 
Protestant and regular attendance -0.0033 0.0083 -0.0199 0.0661*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0196) (0.0225) (0.0242) 
Other denomination and regular attendance 0.1926*** 0.1953*** 0.1092** 0.1499*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0502) (0.0507) (0.0512) 
No denomination and regular attendance 0.1851** 0.1908** 0.0810 0.2012** 
 (0.0815) (0.0824) (0.0805) (0.0783) 
Muslim and no regular attendance 0.0634 0.0744 -0.1467 -0.0665 
 (0.1457) (0.1498) (0.1415) (0.1619) 
Protestant and no regular attendance -0.0318*** -0.0252** -0.0666*** -0.0045 
 (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0143) 
Other denomination, no regular attendance 0.0211 0.0238 -0.0218 0.0126 
 (0.0313) (0.0320) (0.0367) (0.0382) 
No denomination and no regular attendance -0.1478*** -0.1164*** -0.1900*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0106) (0.0124) (0.0145) 
Nationality: East German — -0.1177*** — -0.1848*** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0138) 
Nationality: Italian — -0.0400*** — 0.0803*** 
  (0.0125)  (0.0175) 
Nationality: New Zealander — -0.1000*** — -0.1618*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0155) 
Nationality: British — -0.0445*** — -0.1707*** 
  (0.0122)  (0.0144) 
Male 0.1015*** 0.0964*** 0.0858*** 0.0747*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0106) 
Age: 20 to 35 years old -0.1436*** -0.1550*** -0.1417*** -0.1586*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0126) (0.0128) 
Age: 36 to 50 years old -0.0949*** -0.1033*** -0.0778*** -0.0888*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0125) (0.0127) 
Family status: married 0.0091 0.0091 0.0300*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0116) 
Has full-time employment -0.0940*** -0.0934*** -0.0761*** -0.0780*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0118) (0.0120) 
Has part -time employment -0.0721*** -0.0681*** -0.0404*** -0.0289* 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0157) (0.0160) 
Public servant -0.0372*** -0.0386*** -0.0208 -0.0300** 
 (0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0135) (0.0136) 
Has higher education -0.1385*** -0.1276*** -0.1288*** -0.1103*** 
 (0.0081) (0.0085) (0.0102) (0.0108) 
Number of persons in household 0.0049 0.0086** 0.0190*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0042) 
Lives in rural area -0.0069 0.0219** -0.0086 0.0109 
 (0.0097) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0127) 
Lower social class 0.0148 0.0375*** -0.0476*** -0.0204 
 (0.0106) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0134) 
Has left-wing political attitude -0.0445*** -0.0552*** -0.0553*** -0.0501*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0112) (0.0118) 
Has right-wing political attitude 0.0214** 0.0139 0.0176 0.0286** 
 (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0124) (0.0127) 
Year of observation: 1994 -0.0189** -0.0317*** 0.0821*** 0.0658*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0110) (0.0112) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0047 0.0186* -0.0495*** -0.0278** 
 (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0128) (0.0132) 
Chi2 1,466.61 1,589.89 1,216.56 1,565.65 
Log likelihood -5,676.14 -5,614.50 -7,271.47 -7,096.92 
Notes: Discrete changes following probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 11,570. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.2: Nationality, religious involvement and attitudes towards gender role and female full-time 
employment; including control variables 
 Man’s job: earn money; woman’s: 
home and family 
Family suffers when woman/ wife 
has a full-time job 
West German and regular attendance 0.0759*** 0.0468** 0.1268*** 0.0951*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0201) (0.0236) (0.0245) 
East German and regular attendance -0.0583** -0.0722*** -0.0226 -0.0458 
 (0.0293) (0.0273) (0.0424) (0.0416) 
Italian and regular attendance 0.0224 -0.0061 0.1838*** 0.1448*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0174) (0.0202) (0.0229) 
New Zealander and regular attendance 0.0484** 0.0281 -0.0141 -0.0353 
 (0.0245) (0.0235) (0.0275) (0.0273) 
British and regular attendance 0.0381 0.0185 -0.0651** -0.0862*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0249) (0.0280) (0.0276) 
East German and no regular attendance -0.1547*** -0.1334*** -0.1864*** -0.1479*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0141) (0.0155) 
Italian and no regular attendance 0.0025 -0.0215 0.1395*** 0.1081*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0213) 
New Zealander and no regular attendance -0.1210*** -0.1179*** -0.1354*** -0.1301*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0159) (0.0161) 
British and no regular attendance -0.0470*** -0.0339** -0.1371*** -0.1202*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0161) 
Denomination: Catholic — 0.0887*** — 0.1130*** 
  (0.0138)  (0.0156) 
Denomination: Muslim — 0.3655*** — 0.2158** 
  (0.1168)  (0.1084) 
Denomination: Protestant — 0.0758*** — 0.1017*** 
  (0.0113)  (0.0126) 
Denomination: Other denomination — 0.1629*** — 0.1367*** 
  (0.0311)  (0.0309) 
Male 0.0915*** 0.0967*** 0.0702*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0089) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
Age: 20 to 35 years old -0.1557*** -0.1505*** -0.1603*** -0.1519*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Age: 36 to 50 years old -0.1054*** -0.1005*** -0.0906*** -0.0832*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0126) (0.0127) 
Family status: married 0.0109 0.0103 0.0365*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0116) (0.0116) 
Has full-time employment -0.0932*** -0.0935*** -0.0750*** -0.0752*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0119) (0.0119) 
Has part -time employment -0.0687*** -0.0680*** -0.0264* -0.0268* 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Public servant -0.0366*** -0.0370*** -0.0284** -0.0289** 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0136) (0.0136) 
Has higher education -0.1362*** -0.1329*** -0.1195*** -0.1148*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Numer of persons in household 0.0086** 0.0072** 0.0210*** 0.0197*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Lives in rural area 0.0236** 0.0220** 0.0083 0.0054 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
Lower social class 0.0421*** 0.0420*** -0.0174 -0.0174 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
Has left-wing political attitude -0.0572*** -0.0565*** -0.0466*** -0.0462*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0117) (0.0118) 
Has right-wing political attitude 0.0152 0.0122 0.0333*** 0.0267** 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0127) (0.0128) 
Year of observation: 1994 -0.0278*** -0.0306*** 0.0717*** 0.0698*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0100 0.0199* -0.0465*** -0.0314** 
 (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0130) (0.0132) 
Chi2 1,495.67 1,579.20 1,431.45 1,519.39 
Log likelihood -5,661.61 -5,619.85 -7,164.02 -7,120.05 
Notes: Discrete changes following probit regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. N = 11,570. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.5: Husbands’ attitudes, religious involvement and labor participation of wives 
 Wife is participating in paid employment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
“A man’s job is …” -0.1715*** — — — 
 (0.0196)    
“Family suffers …” — -0.1683*** — — 
  (0.0177)   
“A man’s job is …” * regular church attendance — — -0.1833*** — 
   (0.0318)  
“Family suffers …”  * regular church attendance — — — -0.1511*** 
    (0.0278) 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0388 -0.0368 -0.0319 -0.0283 
 (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0287) 
Denomination: Muslim -0.1929 -0.2164 -0.2267 -0.2295 
 (0.1662) (0.1633) (0.1607) (0.1598) 
Denomination: Protestant -0.0508** -0.0561** -0.0623*** -0.0581** 
 (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0230) 
Denomination: Other denomination -0.0281 -0.0386 -0.0284 -0.0282 
 (0.0562) (0.0563) (0.0561) (0.0561) 
Nationality: East German 0.1826*** 0.1816*** 0.2013*** 0.2036*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0263) (0.0262) 
Nationality: Italian 0.0155 0.0292 0.0183 0.0249 
 (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0302) (0.0301) 
Nationality: New Zealander 0.2149*** 0.2136*** 0.2350*** 0.2319*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
Nationality: British 0.1655*** 0.1513*** 0.1758*** 0.1735*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0282) (0.0272) (0.0273) 
Age: 20 to 35 years old 0.0468* 0.0515** 0.0605** 0.0621*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0238) (0.0238) 
Age: 36 to 50 years old 0.1255*** 0.1310*** 0.1350*** 0.1367*** 
 (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
Has higher education 0.0478** 0.0526*** 0.0675*** 0.0715*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0191) 
Has full-time employment 0.3435*** 0.3572*** 0.3506*** 0.3512*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) 
Has part-time employment 0.2846*** 0.2859*** 0.2855*** 0.2838*** 
 (0.0294) (0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0294) 
Public servant -0.0071 -0.0094 -0.0002 0.0025 
 (0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
Numer of persons in household -0.0464*** -0.0448*** -0.0461*** -0.0454*** 
 (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
Lives in rural area 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0047 -0.0060 
 (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0219) 
Lower social class -0.0102 -0.0233 -0.0111 -0.0141 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
Has left-wing political attitude 0.0514** 0.0516** 0.0574*** 0.0577*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
Has right-wing political attitude 0.0545** 0.0549** 0.0560** 0.0587*** 
 (0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0218) 
Year of observation: 1994 -0.0445** -0.0310 -0.0383** -0.0359* 
 (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0010 -0.0065 -0.0031 -0.0003 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0239) 
Chi2 677.81 689.84 634.50 631.38 
Log likelihood -2,262.74 -2,256.73 -2,284.40 -2,285.96 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 3,806. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: ISSP, 1991, 1994 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table D-3.2: Religion and the labor supply of married women; descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables:   
Cross-section: 1=not employed, 2=part -time employed, 3=full-time employed 2.0833 (0.8391) 
Longitudinal: 0=not employed, 1=in paid employment 0.6715  (0.4696) 
Explanatory variables:   
Cross-sectional sample (n= 1,763)   
Model specification 1:   
Both spouses Catholic (reference category) 0.2473  (0.4315) 
Both spouses Protestant 0.1815  (0.3855) 
Both spouses other Christian 0.0380  (0.1912) 
Both spouses other religious affiliation (mainly Muslim) 0.0850  (0.2790) 
Both spouses no religious affiliation 0.1979  (0.3985) 
Wife Catholic, spouse different affiliation 0.0748  (0.2632) 
Wife Protestant, spouse different affiliation 0.1134  (0.3172) 
Wife other Christian, spouse different affiliation 0.0136  (0.1159) 
Wife other religious affiliation, spouse different affiliation  0.0045  (0.0672) 
Wife no religious affiliation, spouse different affiliation 0.0272  (0.1627) 
Model specification 2:   
Catholic woman and (strong) religious belief (reference category) 0.1843  (0.3878) 
Protestant woman and (strong) religious belief 0.1344  (0.3412) 
Other Christian woman and (strong) religious belief  0.0385  (0.1926) 
Woman with other religious affiliation and (strong) religious belief  0.0692  (0.2538) 
Woman with no religious affiliation and (strong) religious belief 0.0147  (0.1205) 
Catholic woman and no religious belief 0.1389  (0.3460) 
Protestant woman and no religious belief 0.1656  (0.3718) 
Other Christian woman and no religious belief  0.0107  (0.1032) 
Woman with other religious affiliation and no religious belief  0.0215  (0.1452) 
Woman with no religious affiliation and no religious belief 0.2217  (0.4155) 
Model specification 3:   
Catholic woman who regularly attends church (reference category) 0.1287  (0.3350) 
Protestant woman who regularly attends church 0.0516  (0.2213) 
Other Christian woman who regularly attends church 0.0260  (0.1594) 
Woman with other religious affiliation who regularly attends church 0.0340  (0.1813) 
Woman with no religious affiliation who regularly attends church 0.0034  (0.0582) 
Catholic woman who does not attends church 0.1945  (0.3959) 
Protestant woman who regularly attends church  0.2484  (0.4322) 
Other Christian woman who regularly attends church 0.0232  (0.1507) 
Woman with other religious affiliation who regularly attends church 0.0567  (0.2313) 
Woman with no religious affiliation who regularly attends church 0.2331  (0.4229) 
Longitudinal sample I (n=7,543)   
Wife: Faith is very important 0.1150  (0.3191) 
Wife: Faith is important 0.2811  (0.4496) 
Wife: Faith is less important 0.3680  (0.4822) 
Wife: Faith is not important 0.2357  (0.4244) 
Husband: Faith is very important 0.0876  (0.2827) 
Husband: Faith is important 0.2300  (0.4208) 
Husband: Faith is less important 0.3847  (0.4865) 
Husband: Faith is not important 0.2976  (0.4572) 
Longitudinal sample II (n=17,657)   
Wife: attends church once a week 0.1001  (0.3001) 
Wife: attends church once a month 0.1042  (0.3055) 
Wife: attends church less regular 0.3150  (0.4645) 
Wife: never attends church (reference category) 0.4806  (0.4996) 
Husband: attends church once a week 0.0914  (0.2882) 
Husband: attends church once a month 0.0825  (0.2752) 
Husband: attends church less regular 0.2872  (0.4524) 
Husband: never attends church (reference category) 0.5387  (0.4985) 
Other control variables (n=17,657)   
Age 39.7268  (8.3529) 
Age (squared) 1647.99  (676.1186) 
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(Table D-3.2 continued)   
Number of children aged 0 to 6 years 0.3686  (0.6596) 
Number of children aged 7 to 16 years 0.6836  (0.8799) 
Years of education 11.5990  (2.3362) 
Non-labor income 3537.079  (1919.619) 
Self reported health is fair or worse 0.4483  (0.4973) 
Registered disabled 0.0492  (0.2164) 
Resident of West Germany 0.6792  (0.4667) 
Municipal size: 2,000 or less (reference category) 0.1214  (0.3266) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000 0.1145  (0.3184) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000 0.2315  (0.4218) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 0.1760  (0.3808) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 0.0853  (0.2794) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 0.1592  (0.3659) 
Municipal size: 500,000 or more 0.1118  (0.3151) 
Year of observation 95.9609  (2.2017) 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table F-3.5 (corresponding to Figure 3.5): Multinomial logit model (M1) , comparison group: not 
employed 
M1 Coefficients ( ß ) Odds ratios (exp(ß )) 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Both spouses Protestant -0.0441  0.3984**  0.9568  1.4896** 
 (0.2187) (0.1810) (0.2093) (0.2696) 
Both spouses other Christian  0.0921 -0.7283*  1.0965  0.4827* 
 (0.3618) (0.3809) (0.3968) (0.1839) 
Both spouses other religious affiliation -0.8503*** -0.9162***  0.4273***  0.4000*** 
 (0.3185) (0.2706) (0.1361) (0.1083) 
Both spouses no religious affiliation  0.5175**  0.1014  1.6778**  1.1068 
 (0.2306) (0.2280) (0.3870) (0.2525) 
W: Catholic, spouse different affiliation -0.3524  0.1859  0.7029  1.2043 
 (0.3048) (0.2341) (0.2143) (0.2820) 
W: Protestant, spouse different affiliation -0.2751  0.2033  0.7595  1.2255 
 (0.2539) (0.2074) (0.1929) (0.2542) 
W: other Christian, spouse different affiliation -0.3339  0.5415  0.7161  1.7186 
 (0.6486) (0.5114) (0.4645) (0.8790) 
W: other affiliation, spouse diff. affiliation  1.4314 -0.1451  4.1846  0.8649 
 (0.9401) (1.2609) (3.9342) (1.0906) 
W: no affiliation, spouse different affiliation  0.0357 -0.3627  1.0364  0.6957 
 (0.4159) (0.4258) (0.4311) (0.2963) 
Age  0.3265***  0.2701***  1.3861***  1.3102*** 
 (0.0956) (0.0866) (0.1326) (0.1135) 
Age (squared) -0.0045*** -0.0034***  0.9955***  0.9966*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Years of education  0.2483***  0.1108***  1.2819***  1.1172*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0321) (0.0473) (0.0359) 
Non-labor income -0.0005*** -0.0001***  0.9995***  0.9999** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
No. of children aged 0 to 6 years -2.3966*** -0.8657  0.0910***  0.4208*** 
 (0.2221) (0.1320) (0.0202) (0.0556) 
No. of children aged 7 to 16 years -0.8104*** -0.1048  0.4446***  0.9004 
 (0.1012) (0.0757) (0.0450) (0.0682) 
Self reported health is fair or worse -0.1890 -0.1729  0.8277  0.8412 
 (0.1497) (0.1337) (0.1239) (0.1125) 
Registered disabled -1.2944*** -0.6406**  0.2740***  0.5270** 
 (0.3391) (0.2721) (0.0929) (0.1434) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000  0.2491  0.4859  1.2829  1.6256 
 (0.3159) (0.3038) (0.4054) (0.4940) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000  0.1119  0.3098  1.1184  1.3632 
 (0.2767) (0.2687) (0.3096) (0.3664) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.2443  0.1144  0.7833  1.1213 
 (0.2884) (0.2820) (0.2260) (0.3163) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000  0.0667  0.4153  1.0691  1.5149 
 (0.3376) (0.3175) (0.3610) (0.4810) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 -0.0113  0.5121*  0.9887  1.6689* 
 (0.2967) (0.2862) (0.2934) (0.4778) 
Municipal size: 500,000 or more  0.1578  0.3218  1.1710  1.3797 
 (0.3230) (0.3149) (0.3784) (0.4346) 
Resident of West Germany -0.2790  0.4310**  0.7565  1.5389** 
 (0.2028) (0.2092) (0.1535) (0.3219) 
Constant -5.2557*** -6.4520*** — — 
 (1.9581) (1.7629)   
Log likelihood -1,532.63 
Chi2 775.38 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 1,763 observations. 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table F-3.6 (corresponding to Figure 3.6): Multinomial logit model (M2), comparison group: not 
employed 
M2 Coefficients ( ß ) Odds ratios (exp(ß )) 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Protestant*Believer  0.0169  0.5506***  1.0170  1.7343*** 
 (0.2487) (0.2106) (0.2530) (0.3654) 
Other Christian*Believer  0.1316 -0.2686  1.1407  0.7644 
 (0.3745) (0.3496) (0.4272) (0.2673) 
Oth. Affiliation *Believer -0.6661* -0.8721***  0.5137*  0.4181*** 
 (0.3479) (0.3068) (0.1787) (0.1283) 
Catholic*Non-Believer  0.0796  0.3126  1.0829  1.3670 
 (0.2469) (0.2029) (0.2675) (0.2775) 
Protestant*Non-Believer -0.0483  0.4142**  0.9528  1.5132** 
 (0.2392) (0.1965) (0.2280) (0.2975) 
Other Christian*Non-Believer  0.0744  0.4820  1.0772  1.6195 
 (0.6592) (0.5864) (0.7102) (0.9498) 
Other affiliation*Non-Believer -0.1355 -0.3986  0.8732  0.6713 
 (0.5249) (0.4809) (0.4584) (0.3228) 
No affiliation*Non-Believer  0.5733**  0.3310  1.7742**  1.3924 
 (0.2400) (0.2291) (0.4259) (0.3191) 
Age  0.3319***  0.2666***  1.3937***  1.3056*** 
 (0.0953) (0.0864) (0.1329) (0.1129) 
Age (squared) -0.0045*** -0.0033***  0.9954***  0.9966*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010) 
Years of education  0.2416***  0.1101***  1.2733***  1.1164*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0318) (0.0463) (0.0355) 
Non-labor income -0.0005*** -0.0001**  0.9995***  0.9999** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
No. of children aged 0 to 6 years -2.3852*** -0.8530***  0.0921***  0.4261*** 
 (0.2215) (0.1317) (0.0204) (0.0561) 
No. of children aged 7 to 16 years -0.7909*** -0.0939  0.4534***  0.9103 
 (0.1006) (0.0756) (0.0457) (0.0689) 
Self reported health is fair or worse -0.1990 -0.1647  0.8195  0.8481 
 (0.1487) (0.1335) (0.1219) (0.1132) 
Registered disabled -1.2812*** -0.6684**  0.2777***  0.5125** 
 (0.3384) (0.2724) (0.0940) (0.1396) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000  0.2475  0.4947  1.2809  1.6401 
 (0.3160) (0.3039) (0.4048) (0.4986) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000  0.0666  0.2886  1.0689  1.3346 
 (0.2767) (0.2692) (0.2958) (0.3594) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.2756  0.0583  0.7591  1.0600 
 (0.2901) (0.2832) (0.2203) (0.3003) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000  0.0062  0.3547  1.0062  1.4258 
 (0.3372) (0.3173) (0.3394) (0.4524) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 -0.0271  0.4655  0.9732  1.5929 
 (0.2966) (0.2866) (0.2887) (0.4567) 
Municipal size: 500,000 or more  0.1611  0.2538  1.1749  1.2890 
 (0.3231) (0.3159) (0.3797) (0.4072) 
Resident of West Germany -0.2912  0.4860**  0.7473  1.6259** 
 (0.2065) (0.2104) (0.1544) (0.3421) 
Constant -5.4430*** -6.6122*** — — 
 (1.9483) (1.7611)   
Log likelihood -1,540.72 
Chi2 759.21 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 1,763 observations. 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table F-3.7 (corresponding to Figure 3.7): Multinomial logit model (M3), comparison group: not 
employed 
M3 Coefficients ( ß ) Odds ratios (exp(ß )) 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
Protestant*Churchgoer  0.5058  0.8689***  1.6584  2.3845*** 
 (0.3892) (0.3122) (0.6455) (0.7446) 
Other Christian*Churchgoer -0.0303 -0.0701  0.9702  0.9323 
 (0.5206) (0.3986) (0.5051) (0.3717) 
Other affiliation*Churchgoer -0.2791 -1.2280**  0.7564  0.2929** 
 (0.4764) (0.4777) (0.3604) (0.1399) 
Catholic*Non-Churchgoer  0.6433**  0.5256**  1.9028**  1.6916** 
 (0.2559) (0.2078) (0.4871) (0.3516) 
Protestant *Non-Churchgoer  0.3167  0.5515***  1.3727  1.7360*** 
 (0.2451) (0.1997) (0.3365) (0.3468) 
Other Christian *Non-Churchgoer  0.8431*  0.2164  2.3236*  1.2416 
 (0.4545) (0.4618) (1.0561) (0.5734) 
Other affiliation *Non-Churchgoer -0.0830 -0.3247  0.9203  0.7227 
 (0.3849) (0.3256) (0.3543) (0.2354) 
No affiliation*Non-Churchgoer  0.9116***  0.3328  2.4885***  1.3950 
 (0.2668) (0.2441) (0.6640) (0.3405) 
Age  0.3179***  0.2579***  1.3744***  1.2942*** 
 (0.0956) (0.0866) (0.1314) (0.1122) 
Age (squared) -0.0043*** -0.0032***  0.9956***  0.9967*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) 
Years of education  0.2470***  0.1161***  1.2802***  1.1232*** 
 (0.0365) (0.0318) (0.0468) (0.0358) 
Non-labor income -0.0005*** -0.0001**  0.9995***  0.9999** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 
No. of children aged 0 to 6 years -2.4232*** -0.8853***  0.0886***  0.4126*** 
 (0.2226) (0.1325) (0.0197) (0.0547) 
No. of children aged 7 to 16 years -0.7611*** -0.0777  0.4671***  0.9252 
 (0.1017) (0.0765) (0.0475) (0.0709) 
Self reported health is fair or worse -0.2086 -0.1883  0.8117  0.8283 
 (0.1493) (0.1339) (0.1212) (0.1109) 
Registered disabled -1.3006*** -0.6819**  0.2724***  0.5056** 
 (0.3382) (0.2727) (0.0921) (0.1379) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000  0.2401  0.5190*  1.2714  1.6804* 
 (0.3167) (0.3033) (0.4027) (0.5098) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000  0.0484  0.2987  1.0496  1.3481 
 (0.2774) (0.2685) (0.2912) (0.3620) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.3103  0.0880  0.7332  1.0920 
 (0.2906) (0.2825) (0.2131) (0.3086) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 -0.0127  0.3684  0.9874  1.4455 
 (0.3378) (0.3171) (0.3335) (0.4584) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 -0.0353  0.4887*  0.9653  1.6302* 
 (0.2969) (0.2863) (0.2867) (0.4668) 
Municipal size: 500,000 or more  0.1165  0.2902  1.1236  1.3367 
 (0.3236) (0.3148) (0.3636) (0.4208) 
Resident of West Germany -0.2868  0.4214**  0.7506  1.5241** 
 (0.2078) (0.2119) (0.1561) (0.3231) 
Constant -5.6012*** -6.5891 — — 
 (1.9536) (1.7645)   
Log likelihood -1,535.26 
Chi2 770.12 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. N = 1,763 observations. 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.7-I: Strength of religious belief and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation 
including control variables 
 M1 M2 M3 
W: Faith is very important -0.3361 — -0.0533 
 (0.5191)  (0.5468) 
W: Faith is important -0.0452 — 0.0185 
 (0.3727)  (0.3853) 
W: Faith is less important 0.1353 — 0.1396 
 (0.2825)  (0.2875) 
H: Faith is very important — -1.1696** -1.1324* 
  (0.5620) (0.5875) 
H: Faith is important — -0.3141 -0.3042 
  (0.3512) (0.3620) 
H: Faith is less important — 0.0494 0.0409 
  (0.2435) (0.2481) 
Age 1.2967*** 1.2831*** 1.2820*** 
 (0.2121) (0.2132) (0.2131) 
Age (squared) -0.0123*** -0.0121*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Number of children aged 0 to 6 -0.5130 -0.5159 -0.5163 
 (0.3784) (0.3825) (0.3825) 
Number of children aged 7 to 16 -0.3406 -0.3246 -0.3201 
 (0.2492) (0.2501) (0.2504) 
Years of education 5.2635*** 5.0187*** 5.0183*** 
 (1.7609) (1.8099) (1.8195) 
Non-labor income -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Self reported health is fair or worse 0.0288 0.0709 0.0621 
 (0.1924) (0.1926) (0.1935) 
Registered disabled -1.1179* -1.1697** -1.1451** 
 (0.5761) (0.5781) (0.5793) 
Resident of West Germany 1.1391* 1.1870* 1.1894* 
 (0.6589) (0.6526) (0.6625) 
Municipal size: 2,000 or less  0.0082 -0.0659 -0.0358 
 (0.5332) (0.5249) (0.5308) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000 -0.6830 -0.7029 -0.6830 
 (0.6745) (0.6618) (0.6654) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000 -0.3911 -0.3315 -0.3009 
 (0.8251) (0.8201) (0.8240) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.7687 -0.8717 -0.8074 
 (1.0483) (1.0283) (1.0390) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 -0.0586 0.1132 0.1063 
 (0.7027) (0.6969) (0.7044) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 0.8933 0.9799 0.9730 
 (0.8633) (0.8641) (0.8660) 
Log likelihood -305.47 -303.27 -303.04 
Chi2 283.47  287.87  288.34 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 1,245/489 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 to 1999. Own calculations. 
 
 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 3 
 214 
Table A-3.7-II: Strength of religious belief and employment participation, fixed effects logit 
estimation including control variables 
 M4 M5 
W: F. is very important*H: F. is (very) important -0.8535 — 
 (0.5941)  
W: F. is very important*H: F. is less/not important 0.8502 — 
 (0.9715)  
W: F. is important*H: F. is (very) important -0.3445 — 
 (0.4533)  
W: F. is important*H: F. is less/not important 0.0375 — 
 (0.4017)  
W: F. is less important*H: F. is (very) important -0.0997 — 
 (0.4713)  
W: F. is less important*H: F. is less/not important 0.1231 — 
 (0.2866)  
W: F. is less/not important*H: F. is (very) important -1.0497 — 
 (1.0942)  
W: F. is (very) important*H: F. is (very) important — -0.5491 
  (0.3658) 
W: F. is (very) important*H: F. is less/not important — -0.0757 
  (0.3032) 
W: F. is less/not important* H: F. is (very) important — -0.3172 
  (0.3831) 
Age 1.3307*** 1.2956*** 
 (0.2150) (0.2124) 
Age (squared) -0.0127*** -0.0123*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Number of children aged 0 to 6 -0.4717 -0.5076 
 (0.3802) (0.3808) 
Number of children aged 7 to 16 -0.3141 -0.3423 
 (0.2497) (0.2508) 
Years of education 4.8772*** 5.0333*** 
 (1.6832) (1.8010) 
Non-labor income -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Self reported health is fair or worse 0.0481 0.0645 
 (0.1931) (0.1921) 
Registered disabled -1.1744** -1.1930** 
 (0.5796) (0.5761) 
Resident of West Germany 1.0906* 1.1410* 
 (0.6623) (0.6565) 
Municipal size: 2,000 or less  0.0366 0.0101 
 (0.5372) (0.5354) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000 -0.6995 -0.7055 
 (0.6769) (0.6703) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000 -0.3725 -0.3652 
 (0.8335) (0.8201) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -1.0039 -0.8512 
 (1.0374) (1.0283) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 0.0018 0.0518 
 (0.7166) (0.6963) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 0.9825 0.9406 
 (0.8975) (0.8666) 
Log likelihood -303.32 -304.85 
Chi2  287.78  284.70 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 1,245/489 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 to 1999. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.8-I: Church attendance and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation 
including control variables 
 M1 M2 M3 
W: attends church at least once a week -0.4115** — -0.3613* 
 (0.1794)  (0.1963) 
W: attends church once a month -0.0650 — -0.1021 
 (0.1377)  (0.1493) 
W: attends church less regular 0.0836 — 0.0404 
 (0.0939)  (0.1006) 
H: attends church once a week — -0.3270* -0.1674 
  (0.1964) (0.2146) 
H: attends church once a month — 0.0558 0.1208 
  (0.1511) (0.1641) 
H: attends church less regular — 0.1436 0.1343 
  (0.0959) (0.1027) 
Age 0.9239*** 0.9184*** 0.9201*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0833) (0.0833) 
Age (squared) -0.0082*** -0.0081*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Number of children aged 0 to 6 -0.9666*** -0.9653*** -0.9714*** 
 (0.1340) (0.1339) (0.1338) 
Number of children aged 7 to 16 -0.4014*** -0.4050*** -0.4051*** 
 (0.0909) (0.0908) (0.0909) 
Years of education 0.0258 0.0269 0.0266 
 (0.0572) (0.0571) (0.0572) 
Non-labor income -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Self reported health is fair or worse 0.0120 0.0167 0.0150 
 (0.0733) (0.0733) (0.0734) 
Registered disabled -1.3709*** -1.3818*** -1.3798*** 
 (0.2316) (0.2319) (0.2319) 
Resident of West Germany 0.6521** 0.6392* 0.6416* 
 (0.3274) (0.3277) (0.3277) 
Municipal size: 2,000 or less  0.5126** 0.5077** 0.5157** 
 (0.2409) (0.2402) (0.2408) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000 0.2873 0.2883 0.2909 
 (0.2462) (0.2455) (0.2461) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000 0.5278* 0.5322* 0.5330* 
 (0.2824) (0.2821) (0.2823) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.0714 -0.0839 -0.0783 
 (0.3991) (0.3997) (0.3998) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 -0.2025 -0.1948 -0.2026 
 (0.3022) (0.3017) (0.3022) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 0.1848 0.1982 0.1832 
 (0.3929) (0.3928) (0.3931) 
Log likelihood -2,674.07 -2,674.39 -2,671.98 
Chi2  1,196.82  1,196.18  1,201.00 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 8,773/1,801 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1992, 1994 to 2001. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.8-II: Church attendance and employment participation, fixed effects logit estimation 
including control variables 
 M4 M5 
W: once a week*H: once a week/month -0.3691* — 
 (0.2070)  
W: once a week*H: less often/never -0.5923** — 
 (0.2924)  
W: once a month*H: once a week/month -0.1266 — 
 (0.1737)  
W: once a month*H: less often/never 0.0063 — 
 (0.1726)  
W: less often*H: once a week/month 0.0205 — 
 (0.2124)  
W: less often*H: less often/never 0.0930 — 
 (0.0969)  
W: never*H: once a week/month 0.0597 — 
 (0.3142)  
W: once a week/month*H: once a week/month — -0.2525* 
  (0.1469) 
W: once a week/month*H: less often/never — -0.1692 
  (0.1468) 
W: less often/never*H: once a week/month — -0.0138 
  (0.1846) 
Age 0.9214*** 0.9262*** 
 (0.0834) (0.0834) 
Age (squared) -0.0082*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Number of children aged 0 to 6 -0.9648*** -0.9580*** 
 (0.1342) (0.1342) 
Number of children aged 7 to 16 -0.4002*** -0.3987*** 
 (0.0911) (0.0909) 
Years of education 0.0251 0.0232 
 (0.0573) (0.0572) 
Non-labor income -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Self reported health is fair or worse 0.0121 0.0161 
 (0.0734) (0.0733) 
Registered disabled -1.3737*** -1.3682*** 
 (0.2319) (0.2316) 
Resident of West Germany 0.6478** 0.6510** 
 (0.3274) (0.3270) 
Municipal size: 2,000 or less  0.5103** 0.5143** 
 (0.2408) (0.2404) 
Municipal size: 2,000 to 5,000 0.2860 0.2910 
 (0.2461) (0.2456) 
Municipal size: 5,000 to 20,000 0.5295* 0.5349* 
 (0.2823) (0.2822) 
Municipal size: 20,000 to 50,000 -0.0764 -0.0734 
 (0.3991) (0.3990) 
Municipal size: 50,000 to 100,000 -0.1988 -0.1870 
 (0.3023) (0.3020) 
Municipal size: 100,000 to 500,000 0.1764 0.1943 
 (0.3932) (0.3928) 
Log likelihood -2,673.41 -2,676.48 
Chi2  1,198.15  1,192.00 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 8,773/1,801 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1992, 1994 to 2001. Own calculations. 
 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 3 
 217 
Table D-3.3: Religion and male earnings; descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Log of monthly gross earnings 8.2799 (0.4806) 
Denomination: Catholic* 0.2880 (0.4529) 
Denomination: Protestant* 0.2563 (0.4366) 
Denomination: Other Christian* 0.0388 (0.1932) 
Denomination: Other religious affiliation* 0.0530 (0.2242) 
Denomination: No religious affiliation* 0.3652 (0.4816) 
Religious belief is very important** 0.0713 (0.2574) 
Religious belief is important** 0.2283 (0.4198) 
Religious belief is less important** 0.4010 (0.4901) 
Religious belief is not important at all** 0.2992 (0.4579) 
Religious participation: once a week 0.0775 (0.2674) 
Religious participation: once a month 0.0796 (0.2707) 
Religious participation: less regular 0.2896 (0.4535) 
Religious participation: never 0.5531 (0.4971) 
Age: 25 to 35 years old 0.3651 (0.4814) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old 0.3397 (0.4736) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.2951 (0.4561) 
Married 0.7333 (0.4422) 
Non-German origin 0.1700 (0.3756) 
East German citizen 0.2910 (0.4542) 
West German region: North 0.1318 (0.3383) 
West German region: Mid-West 0.3130 (0.4637) 
West German region: South 0.2638 (0.4407) 
Log of hours worked per week 3.7579 (0.2029) 
Working overtime 0.5395 (0.4984) 
Years of education 11.798 (2.5222) 
Schooling: Basic schooling (Hauptschule) 0.3539 (0.4782) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling (Realschule) 0.3019 (0.4591) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling (Abitur) 0.1500 (0.3571) 
Schooling: No completed schooling 0.0395 (0.1949) 
No vocational training 0.1511 (0.3582) 
Vocational training 0.7660 (0.4233) 
University degree 0.1474 (0.3545) 
Blue-collar worker 0.5863 (0.4924) 
In public service 0.1552 (0.3621) 
Has part-time employment 0.0155 (0.1236) 
Potential work experience 21.1095 (9.0315) 
Potential work experience (squared) 527.177 (410.3449) 
Firm size: < 20 employees 0.1913 (0.3933) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees 0.2431 (0.4289) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees 0.2508 (0.4335) 
Firm size: > 2000 employees 0.2400 (0.4271) 
Occupation: Manager 0.0485 (0.2149) 
Occupation: Academics 0.1126 (0.3161) 
Occupation: Professionals  0.1313 (0.3378) 
Occupation: Clerks 0.0657 (0.2478) 
Occupation: Services 0.0291 (0.1683) 
Occupation: Agriculture 0.0092 (0.0959) 
Occupation: Crafts 0.3269 (0.4691) 
Occupation: Manufacturing 0.1614 (0.3679) 
Occupation: Elementary 0.0721 (0.2587) 
Occupation: Other 0.0007 (0.0270) 
Branch: Agriculture 0.0228 (0.1495) 
Branch: Mining/Oil/Gas 0.0371 (0.1890) 
Branch: Textiles 0.0111 (0.1051) 
Branch: Wood/Paper 0.0269 (0.1619) 
Branch: Chemicals/Plastics/Glas 0.0697 (0.2547) 
Branch: Metal 0.2580 (0.4375) 
Branch: Water/Energy 0.0184 (0.1345) 
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(Table D-3.3 continued)   
Branch: Construction 0.1371 (0.3439) 
Branch: Trade/Retail 0.0878 (0.2831) 
Branch: Transport 0.0687 (0.2530) 
Branch: Banking/Insurance 0.0279 (0.1649) 
Branch: Other services 0.1329 (0.3395) 
Year of observation: 1990 0.0873 (0.2824) 
Year of observation: 1992 0.1099 (0.3127) 
Year of observation: 1994 0.1073 (0.3095) 
Year of observation: 1995 0.1112 (0.3144) 
Year of observation: 1996 0.1072 (0.3094) 
Year of observation: 1997 0.1043 (0.3057) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.1081 (0.3105) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.1092 (0.3120) 
Year of observation: 2001 0.1550 (0.3619) 
Notes: N=24,522; *: N=2,524; **: N= 4,077. 
Source: GSOEP. 
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Table A-3.11/12-I: Religion and earnings; cross-sectional regressions, West German men 
 Table A3.11-I Table A3.12-I 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0623*** — — — — 
 (0.0195)     
Denomination: Protestant -0.0656*** — — — — 
 (0.0198)     
Denomination: Other Christian -0.0446 — — — — 
 (0.0351)     
Denomination: Oth. Rel. affiliation -0.0783** — — — — 
 (0.0321)     
Religious belief is very important — -0.0651** — — — 
  (0.0278)    
Religious belief is important — -0.0204 — — — 
  (0.0199)    
Religious belief is less important — -0.0233 — — — 
  (0.0178)    
Rel. participation: Once a week — — -0.0589** — — 
   (0.0243)   
Rel. participation: Once a month — — -0.0065 — — 
   (0.0238)   
Rel. participation: Less regular — — -0.0151 — — 
   (0.0152)   
Catholic, religious belief — — — -0.0721***  
    (0.0235)  
Catholic, no religious belief — — — -0.0663***  
    (0.0220)  
Protestant, religious belief — — — -0.0592**  
    (0.0294)  
Protestant, no religious belief — — — -0.0767***  
    (0.0216)  
Other Christian, religious belief — — — -0.0562  
    (0.0403)  
Other Christian, no rel. belief — — — -0.0391  
    (0.0561)  
Other religion, religious belief — — — -0.0769**  
    (0.0353)  
Other religion, no rel. belief — — — -0.1129**  
    (0.0494)  
No religion, religious belief — — — -0.0792  
    (0.0526)  
Catholic, religious participation — — — — -0.0611** 
     (0.0258) 
Catholic, no rel. participation — — — — -0.0650*** 
     (0.0207) 
Protestant, rel. participation — — — — -0.1157** 
     (0.0478) 
Protestant, no rel participation — — — — -0.0628*** 
     (0.0201) 
Oth. Christian, rel. participation — — — — -0.0317 
     (0.0500) 
Oth. Christian, no rel. participation — — — — -0.0556 
     (0.0434) 
Other religion, rel. participation — — — — -0.1063*** 
     (0.0411) 
Other religion, no rel. participation — — — — -0.0636* 
     (0.0372) 
No religion, rel. participation — — — — -0.1722 
     (0.1135) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0403 -0.0399 -0.0407 -0.0393 -0.0398 
 (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0276) (0.0277) (0.0277) 
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(Table A-3.11/12-I continued)      
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0238 -0.0273 -0.0298 -0.0237 -0.0192 
 (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.0485) (0.0486) 
Married 0.0559*** 0.0537*** 0.0544*** 0.0544*** 0.0562*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Years of education 0.0187** 0.0195** 0.0199** 0.0186** 0.0189** 
 (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
Vocational training 0.0033 0.0038 0.0042 0.0032 0.0032 
 (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
University degree 0.1321*** 0.1349*** 0.1331*** 0.1362*** 0.1347*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0403) 
Schooling: Basic schooling 0.0435** 0.0422** 0.0394** 0.0450** 0.0438** 
 (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.1027*** 0.1065*** 0.1080*** 0.1048*** 0.1038*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.0813** 0.0783** 0.0800** 0.0799** 0.0791** 
 (0.0353) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1501*** -0.1458*** -0.1474*** -0.1511*** -0.1504*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
In public service -0.0404 -0.0443 -0.0447 -0.0425 -0.0400 
 (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0273) 
Has part-time employment -0.5983*** -0.6093*** -0.6118*** -0.5990*** -0.5986*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0623) 
Potential work experience 0.0407*** 0.0410*** 0.0418*** 0.0404*** 0.0409*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Potential work experience (sqd.) -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.3580*** 0.3545*** 0.3518*** 0.3586*** 0.3602*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0399) 
Working overtime 0.0637*** 0.0653*** 0.0653*** 0.0625*** 0.0625*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.1979*** -0.2013*** -0.1989*** -0.1979*** -0.1989*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.1119*** -0.1129*** -0.1123*** -0.1128*** -0.1132*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) (0.0186) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0620*** -0.0595*** -0.0590*** -0.0620*** -0.0621*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) 
West German region: North -0.0240 -0.0133 -0.0160 -0.0228 -0.0272 
 (0.0202) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0203) 
West German region: Mid-West -0.0028 -0.0030 -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0051 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148) 
Non-German origin 0.0288 0.0312 0.0253 0.0306 0.0299 
 (0.0234) (0.0209) (0.0205) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Constant 6.4041*** 6.3674*** 6.3589*** 6.4151*** 6.3970*** 
 (0.1877) (0.1876) (0.1878) (0.1883) (0.1878) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 43.15 43.68 43.71 38.93 38.96 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.5867 0.5842 0.5844 0.5877 0.5879 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; N= 1,445 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.11/12-II: Religion and earnings; cross-sectional regressions, East German men 
 Table A3.11-II Table A3.12-II 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0001 — — — — 
 (0.0557)     
Denomination: Protestant -0.0077 — — — — 
 (0.0294)     
Religious belief is very important — -0.1538** — — — 
  (0.0669)    
Religious belief is important — 0.0116 — — — 
  (0.0394)    
Religious belief is less important — -0.0051 — — — 
  (0.0239)    
Rel. participation: Once a week — — -0.0639 — — 
   (0.0604)   
Rel. participation: Once a month — — -0.0293 — — 
   (0.0654)   
Rel. participation: Less regular — — 0.0375 — — 
   (0.0296)   
Catholic and religious belief — — — -0.0625 — 
    (0.0703)  
Catholic and no religious belief — — — 0.1007 — 
    (0.0880)  
Protestant and religious belief — — — -0.0062 — 
    (0.0475)  
Protestant and no religious belief — — — -0.0078 — 
    (0.0345)  
No religion and religious belief — — — 0.0206 — 
    (0.0721)  
Catholic and religious participation — — — — -0.0480 
     (0.0740) 
Catholic and no rel. participation — — — — 0.0562 
     (0.0818) 
Protestant and religious participation — — — — -0.0205 
     (0.0657) 
Protestant and no rel. participation — — — — -0.0062 
     (0.0316) 
No religion and rel. participation — — — — -0.1380 
     (0.1488) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0515 -0.0489 -0.0519 -0.0523 -0.0542 
 (0.0496) (0.0495) (0.0495) (0.0499) (0.0499) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.0105 0.0147 0.0121 0.0095 0.0104 
 (0.0783) (0.0779) (0.0781) (0.0784) (0.0784) 
Married 0.0532** 0.0551** 0.0548** 0.0555** 0.0566** 
 (0.0269) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0271) 
Years of education 0.1017*** 0.0996*** 0.0991*** 0.0961*** 0.1015*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0317) (0.0318) (0.0322) (0.0320) 
Vocational training -0.0850* -0.0891* -0.0876* -0.0832* -0.0870* 
 (0.0497) (0.0496) (0.0499) (0.0499) (0.0499) 
University degree -0.1965* -0.1921* -0.1905* -0.1768 -0.1971* 
 (0.1136) (0.1124) (0.1125) (0.1145) (0.1138) 
Schooling: Basic schooling 0.2996** 0.3049** 0.3041** 0.2868** 0.3031** 
 (0.1293) (0.1290) (0.1290) (0.1297) (0.1295) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.2057* 0.2124* 0.2115* 0.2008* 0.2088* 
 (0.1119) (0.1115) (0.1116) (0.1121) (0.1121) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling -0.0973 -0.0893 -0.0844 -0.0869 -0.0954 
 (0.1305) (0.1297) (0.1301) (0.1308) (0.1310) 
Blue-collar worker -0.0758* -0.0756* -0.0760* -0.0778* -0.0756* 
 (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0448) (0.0449) (0.0449) 
In public service -0.0561 -0.0589 -0.0607 -0.0601 -0.0588 
 (0.0411) (0.0409) (0.0411) (0.0412) (0.0412) 
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(Table A-3.11/12-II continued)      
Has part-time employment -0.9250*** -0.9336*** -0.9574*** -0.9251*** -0.9284*** 
 (0.1879) (0.1872) (0.1889) (0.1881) (0.1881) 
Potential work experience 0.0132 0.0130 0.0134 0.0133 0.0134 
 (0.0104) (0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Potential work exp erience (squared) -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0004* 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.0474 0.0457 0.0472 0.0423 0.0449 
 (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0551) (0.0554) (0.0553) 
Working overtime 0.0508** 0.0515** 0.0522** 0.0503** 0.0491** 
 (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0233) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.3147*** -0.3090*** -0.3169*** -0.3139*** -0.3158*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0364) (0.0364) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.1546*** -0.1520*** -0.1564*** -0.1558*** -0.1560*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0325) (0.0327) (0.0328) (0.0328) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0285 -0.0226 -0.0286 -0.0263 -0.0281 
 (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0382) (0.0383) (0.0383) 
Non-German origin -0.6622** -0.6667*** -0.6542** -0.6587** -0.6620** 
 (0.2578) (0.2568) (0.2573) (0.2580) (0.2581) 
Constant 6.6859*** 6.7069*** 6.7154*** 6.7762*** 6.7030*** 
 (0.4688) (0.4683) (0.4678) (0.4740) (0.4697) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 11.84 11.79 11.69 11.08 11.07 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 0.4869 0.4922 0.4901 0.4891 0.4887 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; N= 567 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1997 and 1998. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.13-I: Denominational affiliation and earnings; West German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0617*** -0.0531*** -0.0427 -0.0409 
 (0.0173) (0.0185) (0.0340) (0.0261) 
Denomination: Protestant -0.0701*** -0.0577*** -0.0191 -0.0194 
 (0.0174) (0.0189) (0.0355) (0.0273) 
Denomination: Other Chris tian -0.0379 -0.0304 -0.0078 -0.0019 
 (0.0299) (0.0319) (0.0529) (0.0409) 
Denomination: Other religious affiliation -0.0241 -0.0169 0.0153 0.0127 
 (0.0285) (0.0310) (0.0570) (0.0439) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0151 -0.0032 0.0018 -0.0011 
 (0.0230) (0.0182) (0.0190) (0.0148) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.0255 0.0201 0.0140 0.0108 
 (0.0369) (0.0290) (0.0304) (0.0237) 
Married 0.0469*** 0.0386*** 0.0228 0.0224 
 (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0196) (0.0151) 
Vocational training 0.0485*** 0.0594*** -0.1364 0.0271 
 (0.0159) (0.0193) (0.1638) (0.0611) 
University degree 0.1801*** 0.2176*** 0.1550 0.1849*** 
 (0.0267) (0.0305) (0.1502) (0.0591) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0489*** 0.0712*** — 0.1365*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0209)  (0.0475) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.1464*** 0.1713*** — 0.4576*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0307)  (0.1432) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1319*** -0.0975*** 0.0368 0.0251 
 (0.0208) (0.0202) (0.0300) (0.0227) 
In public service -0.0436** -0.0542** -0.0820** -0.0754*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0318) (0.0226) 
Has part-time employment -0.3322*** -0.2988*** -0.2597*** -0.2866*** 
 (0.0564) (0.0498) (0.0576) (0.0435) 
Potential work experience 0.0374*** 0.0362*** -0.0202 0.0396*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0041) (0.0352) (0.0041) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.4109*** 0.3691*** 0.2789*** 0.3130*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0348) (0.0437) (0.0323) 
Working overtime 0.0572*** 0.0476*** 0.0393*** 0.0374*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0098) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.1827*** -0.1745*** -0.1412*** -0.1513*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0284) (0.0202) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.0963*** -0.0900*** -0.0707*** -0.0753*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0154) (0.0223) (0.0160) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0713*** -0.0494*** -0.0127 -0.0179 
 (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0192) (0.0140) 
West German region: North -0.0296* -0.0308 -0.1512* -0.0674* 
 (0.0166) (0.0201) (0.0839) (0.0359) 
West German region: M id-West 0.0008 -0.0078 -0.2276*** -0.0630** 
 (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0718) (0.0276) 
Non-German origin -0.0431** -0.0527** — -0.2760** 
 (0.0184) (0.0223)  (0.1207) 
Year of observation: 1997 0.2426*** 0.2430*** 0.6548*** 0.2371*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0106) (0.2440) (0.0157) 
Constant 6.3452*** 6.4615*** 8.0673*** 6.6143*** 
 (0.1496) (0.1405) (0.7548) (0.1647) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 65.12 3,228.30 50.12 3,784.36 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 1,642/821 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1990 and 1997. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.13-II: Denominational affiliation and earnings; East German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Denomination: Catholic -0.0217 -0.0199 0.0292 0.0093 
 (0.0422) (0.0456) (0.1206) (0.0894) 
Denomination: Protestant -0.0031 -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0096 
 (0.0222) (0.0235) (0.0483) (0.0363) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0182 -0.0308 -0.0649* -0.0687** 
 (0.0356) (0.0332) (0.0384) (0.0296) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0084 -0.0311 -0.0957 -0.0908* 
 (0.0575) (0.0536) (0.0617) (0.0479) 
Married 0.0563** 0.0542** 0.0612 0.0390 
 (0.0230) (0.0246) (0.0535) (0.0410) 
Vocational training -0.0514 -0.0498 0.0332 -0.0309 
 (0.0412) (0.0452) (0.1858) (0.0731) 
University degree 0.1010** 0.1221** 0.0675 0.1150 
 (0.0456) (0.0489) (0.2238) (0.0805) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0898*** 0.0927*** — 0.1603*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0287)  (0.0576) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.1555*** 0.1660*** — 0.3658*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0487)  (0.1304) 
Blue-collar worker -0.0799*** -0.0770*** -0.0450 -0.0561** 
 (0.0271) (0.0265) (0.0355) (0.0273) 
In public service 0.0367 0.0315 -0.0011 0.0156 
 (0.0288) (0.0282) (0.0374) (0.0269) 
Has part-time employment -0.3138* -0.2959* -0.2106 -0.2566 
 (0.1780) (0.1716) (0.2135) (0.1580) 
Potential work experience 0.0168** 0.0226*** -0.0052 0.0404*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0780) (0.0074) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.1681*** 0.1543*** 0.1041 0.1190** 
 (0.0511) (0.0505) (0.0686) (0.0493) 
Working overtime 0.0632*** 0.0583*** 0.0299 0.0429** 
 (0.0180) (0.0177) (0.0238) (0.0170) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.2087*** -0.1809*** -0.0583 -0.1049*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0419) (0.0297) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.0987*** -0.0839*** -0.0085 -0.0394 
 (0.0258) (0.0256) (0.0356) (0.0254) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0594** -0.0486* 0.0054 -0.0185 
 (0.0252) (0.0248) (0.0339) (0.0242) 
Non-German origin -0.2900 -0.2933 — -0.0945 
 (0.1790) (0.2000)  (1.5904) 
Year of observation: 1997 0.9911*** 0.9854*** 1.2710** 0.9558*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0215) (0.5371) (0.0255) 
Constant 6.4422*** 6.4378*** 7.3274*** 6.3470*** 
 (0.2507) (0.2462) (1.4742) (0.2528) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 96.03 5,093.96 126.05 7,966.52 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 882/441 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1990 and 1997. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.14-I: Religious belief and earnings; West German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Religious belief is very important -0.0469*** -0.0282 -0.0106 -0.0089 
 (0.0182) (0.0177) (0.0205) (0.0169) 
Religious belief is important 0.0023 -0.0089 -0.0108 -0.0109 
 (0.0129) (0.0122) (0.0139) (0.0115) 
Religious belief is less important -0.0048 -0.0068 -0.0064 -0.0066 
 (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0112) (0.0093) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0144 -0.0158 -0.0173 -0.0177* 
 (0.0170) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0100) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.0085 -0.0029 -0.0137 -0.0131 
 (0.0288) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0167) 
Married 0.0681*** 0.0618*** 0.0507*** 0.0520*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0120) (0.0155) (0.0128) 
Vocational training 0.0449*** 0.0640*** 0.2783** 0.0544 
 (0.0119) (0.0174) (0.1170) (0.0507) 
University degree 0.2101*** 0.2858*** 0.9448*** 0.4469*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0257) (0.2029) (0.0530) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0875*** 0.0981*** 0.0000 0.1049 
 (0.0124) (0.0188) (0.0000) (0.0787) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.1533*** 0.1715*** 0.0000 0.1155 
 (0.0181) (0.0262) (0.0000) (0.1645) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1656*** -0.1163*** -0.0537*** -0.0554*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0138) (0.0168) (0.0138) 
In public service -0.0028 -0.0310* -0.0311 -0.0312* 
 (0.0171) (0.0177) (0.0227) (0.0185) 
Has part-time employment -0.1532*** -0.0953*** -0.0748** -0.0747*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0249) 
Potential work experience 0.0328*** 0.0319*** 0.1565*** 0.0356*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0512) (0.0048) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.3595*** 0.2344*** 0.1799*** 0.1859*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0219) (0.0232) (0.0191) 
Working overtime 0.0520*** 0.0381*** 0.0278*** 0.0284*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0064) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.2027*** -0.1056*** 0.0088 -0.0013 
 (0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0201) (0.0164) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.1169*** -0.0593*** 0.0009 -0.0031 
 (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0155) (0.0127) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0606*** -0.0144 0.0208 0.0177 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0133) (0.0109) 
Non-German origin -0.0078 -0.0244 0.0000 -0.1597 
 (0.0128) (0.0188) (0.0000) (0.1545) 
West German region: North -0.0271** -0.0524*** -0.1222** -0.1168*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0185) (0.0513) (0.0371) 
West German region: Mid-West -0.0158* -0.0260* 0.0013 -0.0220 
 (0.0096) (0.0142) (0.0493) (0.0327) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0985*** 0.0988*** -0.3864* 0.0935*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0075) (0.2035) (0.0151) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.1107*** 0.1107*** -0.4949* 0.1050*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0079) (0.2543) (0.0184) 
Constant 6.7256*** 7.1301*** 4.7658*** 7.2382*** 
 (0.1113) (0.0956) (1.0517) (0.1479) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 24.24 844.77 13.98 838.28 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 2,913/971 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 and 1999. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.14-II: Religious belief and earnings; East German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Religious belief is very important -0.1010** -0.0786* -0.0656 -0.0682 
 (0.0437) (0.0471) (0.0617) (0.0502) 
Religious belief is important -0.0340 -0.0451* -0.0495 -0.0522* 
 (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0329) (0.0267) 
Religious belief is less important -0.0022 0.0094 0.0134 0.0152 
 (0.0166) (0.0144) (0.0162) (0.0131) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0014 -0.0121 -0.0026 -0.0063 
 (0.0323) (0.0222) (0.0229) (0.0186) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.0492 -0.0010 -0.0044 -0.0089 
 (0.0521) (0.0347) (0.0353) (0.0287) 
Married 0.0830*** 0.0570** 0.0344 0.0331 
 (0.0213) (0.0223) (0.0280) (0.0228) 
Vocational training -0.0375 -0.0731 0.0000 -0.0021 
 (0.0367) (0.0555) (0.0000) (0.8503) 
University degree 0.1580*** 0.1253** -0.5027* -0.0253 
 (0.0418) (0.0540) (0.2609) (0.0945) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0457* 0.0496 — 0.0500 
 (0.0241) (0.0364)  (0.6481) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.0217 0.1067* — 0.3450 
 (0.0416) (0.0583)  (0.9319) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1285*** -0.1346*** -0.0959*** -0.1001*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0271) (0.0349) (0.0283) 
In public service -0.0051 0.0062 0.0245 0.0255 
 (0.0255) (0.0244) (0.0308) (0.0250) 
Has part-time employment -0.2520*** -0.2008*** -0.1896*** -0.1910*** 
 (0.0818) (0.0606) (0.0631) (0.0513) 
Potential work experience 0.0057 0.0201*** -0.3034* 0.0168 
 (0.0077) (0.0066) (0.1606) (0.0292) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.0308 0.0414 0.0355 0.0386 
 (0.0364) (0.0279) (0.0296) (0.0241) 
Working overtime 0.0524*** 0.0237* 0.0142 0.0130 
 (0.0160) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0108) 
Firm size: < 20 emp loyees -0.2837*** -0.1821*** -0.1108*** -0.1125*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0247) (0.0298) (0.0242) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.1445*** -0.0847*** -0.0469* -0.0483** 
 (0.0225) (0.0212) (0.0251) (0.0204) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0151 0.0176 0.0271 0.0273 
 (0.0249) (0.0232) (0.0269) (0.0219) 
Non-German origin -0.1398 -0.1011 — -2.7965 
 (0.1492) (0.2305) (0.0000) (14.9630) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.1637*** 0.1583*** 1.4870** 0.2135* 
 (0.0190) (0.0132) (0.6381) (0.1142) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.1829*** 0.1786*** 1.8398** 0.2482* 
 (0.0193) (0.0142) (0.7975) (0.1426) 
Constant 7.9366*** 7.7475*** 13.8544*** 7.8046*** 
 (0.1679) (0.1455) (2.9858) (1.2840) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 24.24 844.77 13.98 838.28 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 1,164/388 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1994, 1998 and 1999. Own calculations. 
 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 3 
 227 
Table A-3.15-I: Religious participation and earnings; West German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Religious participation: once a week -0.0162** -0.0016 -0.0032 -0.0012 
 (0.0072) (0.0076) (0.0085) (0.0077) 
Religious participation: once a month 0.0044 0.0124** 0.0070 0.0091 
 (0.0071) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0060) 
Religious participation: less regular 0.0193*** 0.0119*** 0.0032 0.0050 
 (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0039) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0247*** -0.0109* -0.0105* -0.0104* 
 (0.0083) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0055) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old 0.0068 0.0012 -0.0078 -0.0039 
 (0.0139) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0091) 
Married 0.0672*** 0.0559*** 0.0396*** 0.0453*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0060) 
Vocational training 0.0493*** 0.0507*** -0.0012 0.0376*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0073) (0.0111) (0.0088) 
University degree 0.2066*** 0.2590*** 0.1374*** 0.2065*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0115) (0.0222) (0.0153) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0322*** 0.0185* — 0.0614*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0101)  (0.0205) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.1068*** 0.1229*** — 0.3648*** 
 (0.0083) (0.0138)  (0.0443) 
Schooling: No completed schooling -0.0005 -0.0350** — 0.0273 
 (0.0095) (0.0178)  (0.0341) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1662*** -0.0964*** -0.0211*** -0.0353*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0067) 
In public service -0.0150* -0.0341*** -0.0385*** -0.0386*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0091) (0.0079) 
Has part-time employment -0.4754*** -0.3302*** -0.2063*** -0.2598*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0133) 
Potential work experience 0.0355*** 0.0368*** 0.0201*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0040) (0.0017) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0007*** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.4522*** 0.3269*** 0.2577*** 0.2768*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0092) 
Working overtime 0.0502*** 0.0286*** 0.0237*** 0.0248*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0031) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.1765*** -0.0858*** -0.0339*** -0.0548*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0064) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.0992*** -0.0364*** -0.0118** -0.0215*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0052) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0466*** -0.0074 0.0015 -0.0026 
 (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0047) 
Non-German origin -0.0160*** -0.0268*** — -0.1399*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0102)  (0.0421) 
West German region: North -0.0096* -0.0070 -0.0788*** -0.0434*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0099) (0.0251) (0.0145) 
West German region: M id-West 0.0084* 0.0255*** -0.0482** -0.0067 
 (0.0044) (0.0078) (0.0207) (0.0114) 
Constant 6.1030*** 6.4303*** 7.0440*** 6.5519*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0408) (0.0748) (0.0460) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Year of observation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 390.08 12,087.86 147.72 10,296.33 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals : 17,386/5,283 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table A-3.15-II: Religious participation and earnings; East German men 
 PR RE FE HT-IV 
Religious participation: once a week -0.0409** -0.0242 0.0329 0.0338 
 (0.0187) (0.0259) (0.0390) (0.0345) 
Religious participation: once a month -0.0247 -0.0132 0.0126 0.0142 
 (0.0199) (0.0205) (0.0250) (0.0221) 
Religious participation: less regular 0.0158* 0.0112 0.0156 0.0164* 
 (0.0089) (0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0098) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0271* -0.0195* -0.0210* -0.0209** 
 (0.0140) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0098) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0102 -0.0128 -0.0151 -0.0137 
 (0.0230) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0153) 
Married 0.0419*** 0.0292*** 0.0170 0.0185 
 (0.0082) (0.0101) (0.0136) (0.0119) 
Vocational training 0.0097 0.0418*** 0.0477** 0.0625*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0160) (0.0238) (0.0184) 
University degree 0.1584*** 0.1778*** 0.0983*** 0.1255*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0194) (0.0339) (0.0234) 
Schooling: Intermediate schooling 0.0563*** 0.0883*** — 0.1563*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0150)  (0.0522) 
Schooling: Secondary schooling 0.0828*** 0.1729*** — 0.4259*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0232)  (0.0815) 
Schooling: No completed schooling -0.2140*** -0.2479*** — -0.1741 
 (0.0568) (0.0819)  (0.2562) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1033*** -0.0650*** -0.0318*** -0.0333*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0099) (0.0112) (0.0099) 
In public service 0.0026 -0.0048 -0.0080 -0.0078 
 (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0102) 
Has part-time employment -0.3186*** -0.2308*** -0.1777*** -0.1828*** 
 (0.0291) (0.0232) (0.0243) (0.0214) 
Potential work experience 0.0140*** 0.0217*** 0.0127 0.0294*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0110) (0.0031) 
Potential work experience (squared) -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.1803*** 0.1195*** 0.0919*** 0.0944*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0131) 
Working overtime 0.0608*** 0.0424*** 0.0313*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0052) 
Firm size: < 20 employees -0.2279*** -0.1291*** -0.0882*** -0.0922*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0100) (0.0110) (0.0096) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees -0.1110*** -0.0565*** -0.0330*** -0.0352*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0083) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees -0.0393*** -0.0145* -0.0016 -0.0025 
 (0.0099) (0.0088) (0.0094) (0.0083) 
Non-German origin -0.0820* -0.0350 — -0.0979 
 (0.0434) (0.0698)  (1.3690) 
Constant 6.2163*** 6.3030*** 6.6923*** 6.2241*** 
 (0.0739) (0.0643) (0.1962) (0.0886) 
12 Branch / 9 Occupational dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 Year of observation dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-/Chi2-value 338.76 22,324.30 384.11 24,095.56 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; Number of observations/individuals: 7,136/1,746 
Statistical significance levels: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table D-4.1: Smoking and absenteeism, descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of absent days 5.9402 (9.3310) 
Smoker 0.3894 (0.4876) 
Smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.1569 (0.3637) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.1490 (0.3561) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0834 (0.2765) 
Non-smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.2186 (0.4133) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.2179 (0.4128) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.1739 (0.3790) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35)* 0.0510 (0.2200) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45)* 0.0783 (0.2687) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55)* 0.0630 (0.2431) 
No. of cigarettes smoked daily: up to 10** 0.0619 (0.2411) 
No. of cigarettes smoked daily: 10 to 20** 0.1260 (0.3319) 
No. of cigarettes smoked daily: 20 to 30** 0.1444 (0.3515) 
No. of cigarettes smoked daily: more than 30** 0.0471 (0.2119) 
Aged 25 to 35 years 0.3756 (0.4843) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.3670 (0.4820) 
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.2573 (0.4372) 
Male 0.5829 (0.4931) 
Married 0.7008 (0.4578) 
Non-German origin 0.1128 (0.3164) 
East German citizen 0.2754 (0.4467) 
Children up to age 16 in household 0.4841 (0.4997) 
Self-rated health is very good 0.1010 (0.3013) 
Self-rated health is good or fair 0.8222 (0.3823) 
Self-rated health is worse than fair 0.0755 (0.2642) 
No. of visits to a physician 1.7737 (2.8209) 
Registered disabled 0.0443 (0.2058) 
Level of disability 1.9397 (10.0280) 
Blue-collar worker 0.4029 (0.4905) 
White-collar worker 0.5258 (0.4993) 
Public servant 0.0687 (0.2530) 
Is satisfied with job 0.4723 (0.4992) 
Undergoes vocational training 0.0356 (0.1853) 
Log of monthly gross earnings 8.2217 (0.5227) 
Log of hours worked per week 3.6455 (0.3339) 
Works overtime 0.5463 (0.4978) 
Temporary job 0.0693 (0.2540) 
Full-time job 0.8433 (0.3634) 
Part-time job 0.1566 (0.3634) 
Period of employment 9.2444 (8.4106) 
Years of education 12.1019 (2.5801) 
Potential work experience 21.1663 (8.5234) 
Potential work experience (squared) 520.6541 (383.7575) 
Occupation: Management 0.0430 (0.2029) 
Occupation: Professional 0.1408 (0.3478) 
Occupation: Technician 0.2212 (0.4151) 
Occupation: Clerk 0.1231 (0.3286) 
Occupation: Service 0.0933 (0.2909) 
Occupation: Agriculture 0.0068 (0.0822) 
Occupation: Craft 0.1974 (0.3981) 
Occupation: Plant operator 0.0985 (0.2980) 
Occupation: Elementary 0.0705 (0.2560) 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 4 
 230 
(Table D-4.1 continued)      
Branch: Agriculture 0.0133 (0.1149) 
Branch: Mining/Oil/Gas 0.0259 (0.1589) 
Branch: Textiles 0.0117 (0.1076) 
Branch: Wood/Paper 0.0234 (0.1512) 
Branch: Chemicals/Plastics/Glas 0.0563 (0.2305) 
Branch: Metal 0.1661 (0.3722) 
Branch:Water/Energy 0.0133 (0.1149) 
Branch: Construction 0.0661 (0.2484) 
Branch: Trade/Retail 0.1213 (0.3265) 
Branch: Transport 0.0524 (0.2230) 
Branch: Banking/Insurance 0.0398 (0.1955) 
Branch: Other Services 0.2974 (0.4571) 
Firm size: < 20 employees 0.2243 (0.4172) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees 0.2967 (0.4568) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees 0.2429 (0.4288) 
Firm size: >= 2000 employees 0.2307 (0.4213) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.5148 (0.4998) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.4851 (0.4998) 
Notes: N=8,365; * N=4,058; ** N=4,307 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 1999. 
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Table A-4.3: Amount of cigarette consumption and absence from work 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1478 0.1536* — — 
 (0.0967) (0.0862)   
No. of cig. daily: up to 10 — — 0.1581 0.0144 
   (0.1765) (0.1827) 
No. of cig. daily: 10 to 20 — — 0.1355 0.2397* 
   (0.1409) (0.1283) 
No. of cig. daily: 20 to 30 — — 0.1781 0.1603 
   (0.1472) (0.1157) 
No. of cig. daily: more than 30 — — 0.0634 0.0877 
   (0.3086) (0.1717) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.1925 0.0447 0.1964 0.0507 
 (0.1966) (0.1706) (0.1977) (0.1705) 
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.3620 -0.2984 0.3621 -0.3034 
 (0.3329) (0.3044) (0.3332) (0.3048) 
Married -0.0511 0.0323 -0.0543 0.0292 
 (0.1034) (0.1117) (0.1040) (0.1119) 
Children up to the age of 16 0.0736 -0.0229 0.0722 -0.0247 
 (0.1114) (0.1006) (0.1117) (0.1007) 
East-German citizen 0.1033 0.1171 0.1026 0.1113 
 (0.1154) (0.1157) (0.1166) (0.1162) 
Non-German origin 0.3439** 0.2683* 0.3526** 0.2752** 
 (0.1676) (0.1397) (0.1691) (0.1402) 
Registered disabled 0.3782 0.7064 0.3785 0.7186 
 (0.5746) (0.5114) (0.5770) (0.5125) 
Level of disability -0.0005 -0.0046 -0.0005 -0.0048 
 (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) 
Self-rated health is very good -0.6939*** -0.9444*** -0.6987*** -0.9622*** 
 (0.2141) (0.2003) (0.2149) (0.2012) 
Self-rated health is good or fair -0.3625** -0.6214*** -0.3660** -0.6312*** 
 (0.1613) (0.1589) (0.1620) (0.1593) 
Years of education -0.0531* -0.0582** -0.0528* -0.0585** 
 (0.0290) (0.0270) (0.0290) (0.0270) 
Experience -0.0419 -0.0149 -0.0418 -0.0172 
 (0.0370) (0.0356) (0.0373) (0.0356) 
Experience (squared) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) 
Period of employment -0.0049 -0.0062 -0.0049 -0.0061 
 (0.0068) (0.0065) (0.0069) (0.0065) 
Temporary job -0.1062 0.0326 -0.1069 0.0266 
 (0.1815) (0.1897) (0.1817) (0.1897) 
Part-time job 0.1563 -0.7322** 0.1576 -0.7248** 
 (0.1389) (0.3588) (0.1395) (0.3605) 
Satisfied with job -0.1928** -0.0717 -0.1934** -0.0708 
 (0.0923) (0.0837) (0.0923) (0.0837) 
Log of monthly gross earnings 0.5333*** 0.1582 0.5337*** 0.1655 
 (0.1561) (0.1715) (0.1562) (0.1712) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.1234 -0.0301 0.1250 -0.0055 
 (0.1901) (0.2505) (0.1909) (0.2517) 
Works overtime -0.1253 0.0576 -0.1236 0.0614 
 (0.0945) (0.0892) (0.0948) (0.0892) 
Blue-collar worker -0.0629 0.5564*** -0.0596 0.5591*** 
 (0.1641) (0.1474) (0.1648) (0.1473) 
Public servant -0.1300 0.3470* -0.1290 0.3401* 
 (0.2146) (0.1896) (0.2146) (0.1895) 
Undergoes vocational training -0.0909 -0.2218 -0.0936 -0.2257 
 (0.2418) (0.2219) (0.2423) (0.2219) 
Firm size: 20 to 200 0.1518 0.2345* 0.1521 0.2251* 
 (0.1245) (0.1209) (0.1246) (0.1218) 
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(Table A-4.3 continued)     
Firm size: 200 to 2000 0.2319* 0.3160** 0.2311* 0.3106** 
 (0.1358) (0.1357) (0.1359) (0.1358) 
Firm size: more than 2000 0.3641** 0.4251*** 0.3658** 0.4200*** 
 (0.1461) (0.1393) (0.1464) (0.1397) 
Constant -1.2385 1.4249 -1.2438 1.3093 
 (1.1321) (1.5428) (1.1332) (1.5444) 
Observations 1,802 2,505 1,802 2,505 
Log likelihood -4,755.72 -6,064. -4,755.61 -6,063.35 
Chi2 (degree of freedom) 84.24 (47) 144.38 (47) 84.47 (50) 145.82 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0007 0.0000 0.0017 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998. 
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Table A-4.4: Smoking, ex-smoking and absence from work 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.0689 0.0562 — — 
 (0.1044) (0.0953)   
Ex-smoker -0.0424 0.0276 — — 
 (0.1312) (0.1115)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.0812 0.1814 
   (0.1738) (0.1430) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.1046 -0.2105 
   (0.2462) (0.2061) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — -0.0187 -0.6093* 
   (0.3827) (0.3147) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.0346 -0.2570 
   (0.2444) (0.2086) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — -0.0188 -0.4664 
   (0.3692) (0.3275) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35) — — -0.1740 0.2402 
   (0.2417) (0.1973) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — -0.2565 0.0463 
   (0.2082) (0.1816) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2965 -0.2588 
   (0.2359) (0.2072) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.0255 -0.3642** — — 
 (0.2100) (0.1644)   
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.0846 -0.7195** — — 
 (0.3446) (0.2902)   
Married -0.0154 -0.0879 -0.0154 -0.0762 
 (0.1052) (0.1101) (0.1064) (0.1107) 
Children up to age 16 in household 0.0189 0.0576 0.0108 0.0418 
 (0.1156) (0.0986) (0.1154) (0.0991) 
East-German citizen -0.1087 -0.0286 -0.1008 -0.0315 
 (0.1109) (0.1180) (0.1111) (0.1180) 
Non-German origin 0.1490 0.1032 0.1508 0.0864 
 (0.1693) (0.1314) (0.1693) (0.1317) 
Registered disabled 0.2771 0.1857 0.2981 0.2184 
 (0.5478) (0.4358) (0.5482) (0.4400) 
Level of disability 0.0020 0.0087 0.0014 0.0080 
 (0.0114) (0.0091) (0.0114) (0.0092) 
Self-rated health is very good -0.8135*** -0.7726*** -0.8147*** -0.7501*** 
 (0.2244) (0.2103) (0.2239) (0.2108) 
Self-rated health is good or fair -0.3310** -0.5213*** -0.3341** -0.5045*** 
 (0.1590) (0.1627) (0.1589) (0.1629) 
Years of education -0.0629** -0.0304 -0.0662** -0.0332 
 (0.0289) (0.0259) (0.0289) (0.0259) 
Experience 0.0073 0.0308 0.0069 0.0253 
 (0.0366) (0.0343) (0.0369) (0.0346) 
Experience (squared) -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0000 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Period of employment 0.0034 -0.0017 0.0035 -0.0017 
 (0.0068) (0.0063) (0.0068) (0.0064) 
Temporary job -0.2614 -0.1662 -0.2715 -0.1744 
 (0.1691) (0.1726) (0.1693) (0.1726) 
Part-time job 0.0333 -0.3704 0.0303 -0.3499 
 (0.1426) (0.3769) (0.1432) (0.3774) 
Satisfied with job -0.1195 -0.1766** -0.1175 -0.1723** 
 (0.0917) (0.0829) (0.0914) (0.0828) 
Log of monthly gross earnings 0.0754 -0.1585 0.0709 -0.1447 
 (0.1552) (0.1692) (0.1557) (0.1691) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.2999 0.0086 0.3079 0.0130 
 (0.1890) (0.2540) (0.1881) (0.2534) 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 4 
 234 
(Table A-4.4 continued)     
Works overtime 0.1286 -0.1372 0.1380 -0.1457* 
 (0.0965) (0.0868) (0.0964) (0.0869) 
Blue collar worker 0.1395 0.1098 0.1425 0.1166 
 (0.1566) (0.1453) (0.1566) (0.1453) 
Public servant -0.1313 0.0241 -0.1224 0.0347 
 (0.2192) (0.1986) (0.2187) (0.1990) 
Undergoes vocational training -0.0865 -0.0643 -0.1185 -0.0583 
 (0.2461) (0.2386) (0.2467) (0.2393) 
Firm size: 20 to 200 0.2141* 0.1762 0.2049 0.1760 
 (0.1272) (0.1205) (0.1275) (0.1206) 
Firm size: 200 to 2000 0.4838*** 0.3400** 0.4535*** 0.3364** 
 (0.1354) (0.1373) (0.1363) (0.1375) 
Firm size: more than 2000 0.5205*** 0.3377** 0.4877*** 0.3301** 
 (0.1518) (0.1404) (0.1523) (0.1409) 
Constant 1.0030 3.7148** 1.0548 3.5562** 
 (1.2728) (1.5252) (1.2792) (1.5302) 
8 Occupational / 12 Branch dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,687 2,371 1,687 2,371 
Log likelihood -4,430.46 -6,019.66 -4,428.30 -6,017.89 
Chi2 (degree of freedom) 84.12 (48) 110.74 (48) 88.43 (52) 114.27 (52) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0010 0.0000 0.0012 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1999. 
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Table A-4.5: Smoking and absence from work; pooled nbreg-model 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1360** 0.0978* — — 
 (0.0685) (0.0595)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.2186* 0.1546* 
   (0.1134) (0.0909) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.2665 -0.0446 
   (0.1623) (0.1392) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2550 -0.3669 
   (0.2625) (0.2232) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.1249 -0.0924 
   (0.1575) (0.1303) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.2560 -0.4401** 
   (0.2450) (0.2189) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.0869 -0.1387 — — 
 (0.1416) (0.1179)   
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.1863 -0.4670** — — 
 (0.2366) (0.2093)   
Married -0.0256 -0.0275 -0.0187 -0.0292 
 (0.0729) (0.0779) (0.0733) (0.0780) 
Children up to age 16 in household 0.0475 0.0070 0.0440 0.0047 
 (0.0798) (0.0700) (0.0798) (0.0700) 
East-German citizen -0.0188 0.0275 -0.0206 0.0272 
 (0.0791) (0.0817) (0.0792) (0.0817) 
Non-German origin 0.2373** 0.1762* 0.2348** 0.1713* 
 (0.1168) (0.0954) (0.1167) (0.0956) 
Registered disabled 0.3256 0.3396 0.3228 0.3394 
 (0.3985) (0.3266) (0.3976) (0.3266) 
Level of disability 0.0009 0.0038 0.0010 0.0038 
 (0.0081) (0.0070) (0.0081) (0.0070) 
Self-rated health is very good -0.7405*** -0.8675*** -0.7314*** -0.8704*** 
 (0.1532) (0.1436) (0.1532) (0.1436) 
Self-rated health is good or fair -0.3072*** -0.5673*** -0.3025*** -0.5677*** 
 (0.1129) (0.1132) (0.1128) (0.1132) 
Years of education -0.0514** -0.0410** -0.0525*** -0.0411** 
 (0.0202) (0.0185) (0.0202) (0.0185) 
Experience -0.0148 0.0094 -0.0184 0.0095 
 (0.0257) (0.0244) (0.0259) (0.0246) 
Experience (squared) -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Period of employment -0.0001 -0.0035 -0.0002 -0.0036 
 (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0045) 
Has temporary employment -0.1547 -0.0616 -0.1562 -0.0614 
 (0.1217) (0.1260) (0.1216) (0.1259) 
Has parttime employment 0.0981 -0.5473** 0.1015 -0.5427** 
 (0.0978) (0.2582) (0.0979) (0.2584) 
Satisfied with job -0.1480** -0.1261** -0.1447** -0.1258** 
 (0.0639) (0.0584) (0.0640) (0.0584) 
Log of monthly gross earnings 0.2786*** -0.0181 0.2883*** -0.0168 
 (0.1080) (0.1201) (0.1083) (0.1200) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.2381* 0.0024 0.2320* 0.0077 
 (0.1304) (0.1765) (0.1306) (0.1769) 
Works overtime -0.0008 -0.0426 0.0019 -0.0445 
 (0.0668) (0.0619) (0.0669) (0.0620) 
Blue collar worker 0.0452 0.3261*** 0.0440 0.3269*** 
 (0.1118) (0.1021) (0.1118) (0.1021) 
Public servant -0.1319 0.1989 -0.1293 0.1971 
 (0.1529) (0.1363) (0.1526) (0.1366) 
Undergoes vocational training -0.1351 -0.1221 -0.1341 -0.1186 
 (0.1689) (0.1599) (0.1690) (0.1600) 
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(Table A-4.5 continued)     
Firm size: 20 to 200 0.1701* 0.1857** 0.1640* 0.1821** 
 (0.0878) (0.0849) (0.0879) (0.0851) 
Firm size: 200 to 2000 0.3377*** 0.3111*** 0.3281*** 0.3085*** 
 (0.0949) (0.0956) (0.0954) (0.0957) 
Firm size: more than 2000 0.4277*** 0.3666*** 0.4216*** 0.3651*** 
 (0.1032) (0.0980) (0.1033) (0.0981) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0459 -0.0932* 0.0452 -0.0933* 
 (0.0624) (0.0562) (0.0624) (0.0562) 
Constant -0.1697 2.7014** -0.2179 2.6468** 
 (0.8452) (1.0759) (0.8445) (1.0792) 
8 Occupational / 12 Branch dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,489 4,876 3,489 4,876 
Log likelihood -9,199.85 -12,099.81 -9,199.09 -12,099.46 
Chi2 (degree of freedom) 141.54 (48) 228.78 (48) 143.05 (50) 229.49 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
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Table A-4.6: Smoking and absence from work; nbreg-model accounting for random effects 
 M1 M2 
 Women Men Women Men 
Smoker 0.1287*** 0.0132 — — 
 (0.0468) (0.0399)   
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — 0.1092 0.0061 
   (0.0753) (0.0605) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.4533*** -0.1113 
   (0.1108) (0.0934) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.4523** -0.3046* 
   (0.1763) (0.1554) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — 0.2474** -0.1275 
   (0.1053) (0.0902) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — 0.4243** -0.3270** 
   (0.1666) (0.1480) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.2832*** -0.1225 — — 
 (0.0963) (0.0799)   
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.3982** -0.3208** — — 
 (0.1610) (0.1426)   
Married -0.0172 -0.0908* -0.0192 -0.0911* 
 (0.0513) (0.0515) (0.0513) (0.0515) 
Children up to age 16 in household 0.1038* 0.0643 0.1054* 0.0648 
 (0.0546) (0.0473) (0.0545) (0.0473) 
East-German citizen -0.1734*** -0.0778 -0.1726*** -0.0777 
 (0.0544) (0.0551) (0.0544) (0.0552) 
Non-German origin 0.0267 0.0726 0.0314 0.0727 
 (0.0804) (0.0616) (0.0804) (0.0616) 
Registered disabled 0.4163* 0.3866** 0.4204* 0.3866** 
 (0.2296) (0.1686) (0.2290) (0.1687) 
Level of disability -0.0041 -0.0011 -0.0040 -0.0011 
 (0.0047) (0.0034) (0.0047) (0.0034) 
Self-rated health is very good -0.6073*** -0.7772*** -0.6088*** -0.7773*** 
 (0.1066) (0.0941) (0.1066) (0.0942) 
Self-rated health is good or fair -0.2869*** -0.4717*** -0.2921*** -0.4720*** 
 (0.0728) (0.0674) (0.0728) (0.0675) 
Years of education -0.0474*** -0.0469*** -0.0477*** -0.0469*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0128) 
Experience -0.0534*** -0.0067 -0.0533*** -0.0065 
 (0.0182) (0.0166) (0.0182) (0.0167) 
Experience (squared) 0.0006 0.0002 0.0006 0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Period of employment -0.0041 -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0007 
 (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0029) 
Temporary job -0.2121** -0.1076 -0.2132** -0.1071 
 (0.0899) (0.0848) (0.0899) (0.0849) 
Part-time job 0.1655** -0.3493* 0.1626** -0.3491* 
 (0.0710) (0.1933) (0.0710) (0.1933) 
Satisfied with job -0.1216*** -0.1106*** -0.1192*** -0.1109*** 
 (0.0441) (0.0399) (0.0441) (0.0399) 
Log of monthly gross earnings 0.3735*** 0.1382* 0.3752*** 0.1388* 
 (0.0752) (0.0762) (0.0753) (0.0763) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.2376** -0.1538 0.2289** -0.1537 
 (0.0995) (0.0999) (0.0997) (0.1000) 
Works overtime -0.0279 -0.0377 -0.0280 -0.0376 
 (0.0468) (0.0412) (0.0468) (0.0412) 
Blue collar worker -0.0177 0.2408*** -0.0197 0.2411*** 
 (0.0830) (0.0741) (0.0830) (0.0742) 
Public servant 0.0915 0.2439*** 0.0887 0.2443*** 
 (0.0987) (0.0876) (0.0989) (0.0876) 
Undergoes vocational training 0.0126 -0.0849 0.0123 -0.0853 
 (0.1130) (0.1105) (0.1130) (0.1105) 
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(Table A-4.6 continued)     
Firm size: 20 to 200 0.1450** 0.1331** 0.1452** 0.1330** 
 (0.0648) (0.0604) (0.0648) (0.0604) 
Firm size: 200 to 2000 0.4067*** 0.3043*** 0.4075*** 0.3041*** 
 (0.0676) (0.0654) (0.0676) (0.0654) 
Firm size: more than 2000 0.3923*** 0.3234*** 0.3954*** 0.3233*** 
 (0.0736) (0.0680) (0.0736) (0.0681) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.0006 -0.0864** -0.0007 -0.0864** 
 (0.0429) (0.0383) (0.0429) (0.0383) 
Constant -3.6698*** -0.6539 -3.6386*** -0.6562 
 (0.5790) (0.6883) (0.5795) (0.6893) 
8 Occupational / 12 Branch dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,489 4,876 3,489 4,876 
Number of individiuals  2,197 2,910 2,197 2,910 
Log likelihood -9,111.50 -12,044.41 -9,110.330 -12,044.40 
Chi2 (degree of freedom) 317.86 (48) 349.76 (48) 320.89 (50) 349.74 (50) 
Prob > Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 – 2000. 
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Table D-4.2: Smoking and earnings, descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. 
Log of monthly gross earnings 8.2518 (0.5602) 
Smoker 0.3904 (0.4878) 
Smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.1398 (0.3468) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.1664 (0.3725) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0841 (0.2776) 
Non-smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.1991 (0.3993) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.2422 (0.4284) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.1681 (0.3740) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35)* 0.0494 (0.2168) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45)* 0.0885 (0.2841) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55)* 0.0674 (0.2507) 
Tobacco, i.e. cig. smoked daily 6.7628 (10.373) 
No. of cig. smoked daily: up to 10* 0.1077 (0.3100) 
No. of cig. smoked daily: 10 to 20* 0.2007 (0.4006) 
No. of cig. smoked daily: 20 to 30* 0.0543 (0.2266) 
No. of cig. smoked daily: more than 30* 0.0202 (0.1408) 
Male  0.5887 (0.4920) 
Married  0.7128 (0.4524) 
Aged 25 to 35 years 0.3389 (0.4733) 
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.4087 (0.4916) 
Aged 46 to 55 years 0.2523 (0.4343) 
Non-German origin 0.1229 (0.3284) 
East German citizen 0.2742 (0.4461) 
Years of education 11.9505 (2.4651) 
Blue-collar worker 0.4327 (0.4954) 
White-collar worker 0.5672 (0.4954) 
Log of hours worked per week 3.6401 (0.3549) 
Works overtime 0.5533 (0.4971) 
Has temporary employment 0.0393 (0.1943) 
Has part-time employment 0.1410 (0.3480) 
Period of employment 9.6522 (8.0332) 
Potential work experience 21.5136 (7.9380) 
Potential work experience (squared) 525.8411 (355.8965) 
Has vocational training 0.7638 (0.4247) 
Has university degree 0.1493 (0.3565) 
Has no vocational training 0.1447 (0.3518) 
Occupation: Management 0.0426 (0.2021) 
Occupation: Professional 0.1113 (0.3146) 
Occupation: Technician 0.2280 (0.4195) 
Occupation: Clerk 0.1296 (0.3359) 
Occupation: Service 0.0822 (0.2747) 
Occupation: Agriculture 0.0065 (0.0808) 
Occupation: Craft 0.2140 (0.4101) 
Occupation: Plant operator 0.1119 (0.3153) 
Occupation: Elementary 0.0705 (0.2560) 
Branch: Agriculture 0.0123 (0.1102) 
Branch: Mining/Oil/Gas 0.0302 (0.1712) 
Branch: Textiles 0.0108 (0.1037) 
Branch: Wood/Paper 0.0258 (0.1585) 
Branch: Chemicals/Plastics/Glas 0.0644 (0.2455) 
Branch: Metal 0.2044 (0.4033) 
Branch:Water/Energy 0.0144 (0.1193) 
Branch: Construction 0.0645 (0.2457) 
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(Table D-4.2 continued)     
Branch: Trade/Retail 0.1257 (0.3315) 
Branch: Transport 0.0485 (0.2148) 
Branch: Banking/Insurance 0.0439 (0.2050) 
Branch: Other Services 0.2533 (0.4349) 
Firm size: < 20 employees 0.2099 (0.4073) 
Firm size: 20 to 199 employees 0.3038 (0.4599) 
Firm size: 200 to 1999 employees 0.2557 (0.4363) 
Firm size: >= 2000 employees 0.2244 (0.4172) 
Year of observation: 1998 0.3333 (0.4714) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.3333 (0.4714) 
Year of observation: 2001 0.3333 (0.4714) 
Notes: N=8,367; * N=5,578 
Source: GSOEP, 1998-2000. 
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Table A-4.8-I: Tobacco consumption (binary indicator) and earnings, panel regressions 
 Females Males 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0158 -0.0085 -0.0246*** -0.0210** -0.0054 -0.0067 
 (0.0147) (0.0164) (0.0281) (0.0255) (0.0093) (0.0100) (0.0152) (0.0140) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0189 -0.0055 -0.0047 -0.0135 0.0081 0.0014 -0.0131 -0.0044 
 (0.0297) (0.0251) (0.0282) (0.0253) (0.0174) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0128) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0285 0.0130 0.0113 0.0296 0.0509* 0.0295 -0.0145 0.0151 
 (0.0479) (0.0384) (0.0414) (0.0375) (0.0303) (0.0222) (0.0240) (0.0212) 
Years of education 0.0344*** 0.0403*** — 0.0972*** 0.0290*** 0.0388*** — 0.0945*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0051)  (0.0147) (0.0028) (0.0032)  (0.0073) 
Work experience 0.0162*** 0.0184*** 0.0085 0.0176** 0.0294*** 0.0331*** 0.0293*** 0.0412*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0118) (0.0078) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0061) (0.0045) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Job tenure 0.0065*** 0.0064*** -0.0007 0.0063*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** -0.0000 0.0039*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Has temporary employment  -0.1006*** -0.0807*** -0.0703** -0.0677** -0.1329*** -0.0925*** -0.0550** -0.0766*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0305) (0.0351) (0.0301) (0.0243) (0.0203) (0.0226) (0.0196) 
Has part -time employment -0.0461*** -0.0653*** -0.0550** -0.0502** -0.5293*** -0.5886*** -0.5715*** -0.6033*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0247) (0.0195) (0.0477) (0.0436) (0.0526) (0.0438) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.9108*** 0.8294*** 0.6566*** 0.7316*** 0.3968*** 0.2716*** 0.1686*** 0.2268*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0261) (0.0219) (0.0260) (0.0225) (0.0259) (0.0225) 
Works overtime -0.0049 0.0013 0.0072 -0.0047 0.0555*** 0.0427*** 0.0234** 0.0313*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0159) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0080) 
Blue collar worker -0.1558*** -0.1160*** -0.0120 -0.0273 -0.1417*** -0.1160*** -0.0116 -0.0267 
 (0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0318) (0.0284) (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0213) (0.0187) 
East German citizen -0.1709*** -0.1613*** — 0.1983* -0.2959*** -0.3106*** — -0.6532*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0201)  (0.1052) (0.0112) (0.0144)  (0.0840) 
Non-German origin 0.0280 0.0333 — 0.2205*** 0.0047 0.0008 — -0.0298 
 (0.0256) (0.0321)  (0.0538) (0.0142) (0.0183)  (0.0350) 
Married -0.0303* -0.0386** -0.0208 -0.0308 0.0367*** 0.0236** -0.0165 -0.0063 
 (0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0323) (0.0293) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0174) (0.0159) 
Constant 4.2529*** 4.4541*** 5.7704*** 4.0015*** 6.4282*** 6.7058*** 7.6084*** 6.1610*** 
 (0.1162) (0.1197) (0.2098) (0.2104) (0.1121) (0.1028) (0.1352) (0.1325) 
F/Chi2 165.17 4,511.25 29.41 2,916.62 122.55 3,150.63 21.83 1,918.17 
Observations/Individuals 2,294 / 1,147 3,284 / 1,642 
Notes: All models also include control variables for occupation, branch of employment, firm size as well as time of observation. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. 
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Table A-4.8-II: Tobacco consumption (quasi-metric) and earnings, panel regressions 
 Females Males 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Tobacco -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0019 -0.0015 -0.0009** -0.0009** -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0182 -0.0049 -0.0039 -0.0125 0.0080 0.0013 -0.0129 -0.0043 
 (0.0297) (0.0251) (0.0282) (0.0253) (0.0174) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0128) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0275 0.0137 0.0123 0.0306 0.0506* 0.0300 -0.0135 0.0156 
 (0.0478) (0.0384) (0.0414) (0.0374) (0.0304) (0.0222) (0.0240) (0.0212) 
Years of education 0.0339*** 0.0399*** — 0.0967*** 0.0291*** 0.0388*** — 0.0942*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0051)  (0.0147) (0.0028) (0.0032)  (0.0073) 
Work experience 0.0166*** 0.0186*** 0.0080 0.0175** 0.0294*** 0.0332*** 0.0294*** 0.0413*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0117) (0.0078) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0061) (0.0045) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Job tenure 0.0065*** 0.0064*** -0.0007 0.0063*** 0.0043*** 0.0043*** -0.0001 0.0039*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Has temporary employment -0.1007*** -0.0805*** -0.0693** -0.0669** -0.1332*** -0.0925*** -0.0546** -0.0765*** 
 (0.0344) (0.0305) (0.0351) (0.0301) (0.0243) (0.0203) (0.0226) (0.0196) 
Has part -time employment -0.0459*** -0.0653*** -0.0550** -0.0501** -0.5290*** -0.5879*** -0.5715*** -0.6030*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0247) (0.0195) (0.0477) (0.0436) (0.0526) (0.0437) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.9122*** 0.8304*** 0.6571*** 0.7319*** 0.3974*** 0.2724*** 0.1693*** 0.2276*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0193) (0.0261) (0.0219) (0.0261) (0.0226) (0.0260) (0.0225) 
Works overtime -0.0043 0.0017 0.0073 -0.0044 0.0555*** 0.0424*** 0.0234** 0.0312*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0159) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0080) 
Blue-collar worker -0.1553*** -0.1159*** -0.0123 -0.0274 -0.1417*** -0.1160*** -0.0116 -0.0267 
 (0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0318) (0.0284) (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0212) (0.0187) 
East German citizen -0.1726*** -0.1629*** — 0.2007* -0.2969*** -0.3117*** — -0.6538*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0202)  (0.1054) (0.0112) (0.0145)  (0.0839) 
Non-German origin 0.0271 0.0324 — 0.2210*** 0.0043 0.0006 — -0.0299 
 (0.0256) (0.0321)  (0.0540) (0.0142) (0.0183)  (0.0350) 
Married -0.0313* -0.0392** -0.0200 -0.0301 0.0366*** 0.0234** -0.0165 -0.0062 
 (0.0160) (0.0180) (0.0323) (0.0293) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0174) (0.0159) 
Constant 4.2572*** 4.4589*** 5.7792*** 4.0110*** 6.4214*** 6.7003*** 7.6067*** 6.1622*** 
 (0.1160) (0.1195) (0.2096) (0.2099) (0.1122) (0.1027) (0.1350) (0.1324) 
F/Chi2 165.24 4,512.53 29.46 2,904.46 122.42 3,148.83 21.85 1,919.94 
Notes: See above; Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.  
 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 4 
 243 
Table A-4.8-III: Tobacco consumption (no. of cigarettes smoked) and earnings, panel regressions 
 Females Males 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Up to 10 cig. per day 0.0246 0.0126 -0.0125 -0.0065 -0.0446*** -0.0267* 0.0022 -0.0011 
 (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0309) (0.0282) (0.0157) (0.0149) (0.0190) (0.0175) 
11 to 20 cig. per day -0.0110 -0.0108 -0.0321 -0.0223 -0.0106 -0.0088 0.0011 -0.0007 
 (0.0184) (0.0200) (0.0336) (0.0305) (0.0113) (0.0118) (0.0174) (0.0160) 
21 to 30 cig. per day 0.0420 0.0168 -0.0719 -0.0574 -0.0230 -0.0339** -0.0285 -0.0248 
 (0.0506) (0.0500) (0.0701) (0.0640) (0.0171) (0.0166) (0.0230) (0.0211) 
31 and more cig. per day -0.1226* -0.1069 -0.1479 -0.1257 -0.0771*** -0.0506* -0.0180 -0.0131 
 (0.0673) (0.0686) (0.1000) (0.0899) (0.0278) (0.0270) (0.0360) (0.0331) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0188 -0.0054 -0.0035 -0.0118 0.0074 0.0008 -0.0132 -0.0044 
 (0.0297) (0.0252) (0.0283) (0.0253) (0.0174) (0.0133) (0.0145) (0.0128) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0289 0.0129 0.0125 0.0310 0.0506* 0.0293 -0.0133 0.0160 
 (0.0478) (0.0384) (0.0415) (0.0374) (0.0303) (0.0223) (0.0241) (0.0212) 
Years of education 0.0345*** 0.0403*** — 0.0968*** 0.0292*** 0.0389*** — 0.0941*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0051)  (0.0148) (0.0028) (0.0032)  (0.0073) 
Work experience 0.0166*** 0.0187*** 0.0075 0.0175** 0.0296*** 0.0332*** 0.0291*** 0.0413*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0118) (0.0078) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0061) (0.0045) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0003** -0.0004*** -0.0004** -0.0004** -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Job tenure 0.0067*** 0.0065*** -0.0008 0.0063*** 0.0044*** 0.0043*** -0.0001 0.0039*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Has temporary employment  -0.0999*** -0.0802*** -0.0685* -0.0662** -0.1338*** -0.0931*** -0.0549** -0.0765*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0305) (0.0352) (0.0302) (0.0242) (0.0203) (0.0227) (0.0196) 
Has part -time employment -0.0465*** -0.0657*** -0.0555** -0.0503*** -0.5298*** -0.5878*** -0.5705*** -0.6020*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0247) (0.0195) (0.0477) (0.0436) (0.0527) (0.0437) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.9104*** 0.8296*** 0.6565*** 0.7310*** 0.3985*** 0.2726*** 0.1692*** 0.2273*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0262) (0.0219) (0.0260) (0.0226) (0.0260) (0.0225) 
Works overtime -0.0053 0.0016 0.0082 -0.0036 0.0554*** 0.0426*** 0.0234** 0.0313*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0134) (0.0160) (0.0135) (0.0096) (0.0082) (0.0093) (0.0080) 
Blue collar worker -0.1594*** -0.1188*** -0.0128 -0.0280 -0.1429*** -0.1167*** -0.0129 -0.0276 
 (0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0320) (0.0285) (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0213) (0.0187) 
East German citizen -0.1736*** -0.1638*** — 0.2026* -0.2958*** -0.3114*** — -0.6517*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0202)  (0.1058) (0.0112) (0.0145)  (0.0839) 
Non-German origin 0.0292 0.0337 — 0.2223*** 0.0059 0.0014 — -0.0294 
 (0.0256) (0.0321)  (0.0542) (0.0142) (0.0183)  (0.0350) 
Married -0.0309* -0.0387** -0.0190 -0.0289 0.0350*** 0.0228** -0.0163 -0.0061 
 (0.0160) (0.0181) (0.0324) (0.0293) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0175) (0.0159) 
Constant 4.2518*** 4.4531*** 5.7889*** 4.0110*** 6.4196*** 6.7008*** 7.6089*** 6.1630*** 
 (0.1161) (0.1197) (0.2101) (0.2110) (0.1122) (0.1028) (0.1354) (0.1324) 
F/Chi2 153.74 4,519.55 27.19 2,892.98 114.16 3,158.88 20.19 1,923.13 
Notes: See above; Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.  
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Table A-4.9-I: Smoking, ex-smoking and earnings, panel regressions 
 Females Males 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker  0.0158 0.0239 0.0270 0.0359 -0.0187* -0.0135 -0.0032 0.0024 
 (0.0153) (0.0177) (0.0330) (0.0314) (0.0104) (0.0117) (0.0196) (0.0183) 
Ex-smoker 0.0134 0.0352* 0.0689** 0.0712** 0.0108 0.0052 -0.0048 0.0028 
 (0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0314) (0.0300) (0.0120) (0.0121) (0.0172) (0.0162) 
Age: 36 to 45 years old -0.0279 -0.0126 0.0106 -0.0129 0.0160 0.0028 -0.0133 -0.0044 
 (0.0301) (0.0271) (0.0319) (0.0294) (0.0175) (0.0134) (0.0151) (0.0135) 
Age: 46 to 55 years old -0.0328 0.0013 0.0234 0.0195 0.0608** 0.0315 -0.0077 0.0179 
 (0.0477) (0.0405) (0.0454) (0.0421) (0.0303) (0.0223) (0.0248) (0.0221) 
Years of education 0.0325*** 0.0381*** — 0.0809*** 0.0291*** 0.0394*** — 0.0957*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0052)  (0.0173) (0.0027) (0.0032)  (0.0075) 
Work experience 0.0114* 0.0083 0.0018 -0.0069 0.0233*** 0.0246*** 0.0187*** 0.0299*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0132) (0.0100) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0054) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Job tenure 0.0063*** 0.0063*** -0.0021 0.0049*** 0.0043*** 0.0050*** 0.0023 0.0049*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0010) 
Has temporary employment  -0.0511 0.0085 0.0109 0.0215 -0.1325*** -0.0886*** -0.0550** -0.0739*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0307) (0.0346) (0.0314) (0.0247) (0.0197) (0.0219) (0.0193) 
Has part -time employment -0.0501*** -0.0627*** -0.0206 -0.0251 -0.4284*** -0.4446*** -0.3918*** -0.4515*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0173) (0.0236) (0.0202) (0.0460) (0.0442) (0.0570) (0.0467) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.8783*** 0.7533*** 0.5152*** 0.5873*** 0.3904*** 0.2935*** 0.2113*** 0.2640*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0250) (0.0223) (0.0262) (0.0222) (0.0256) (0.0226) 
Works overtime 0.0036 0.0138 0.0124 0.0050 0.0634*** 0.0350*** 0.0137 0.0226*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0129) (0.0149) (0.0135) (0.0095) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0076) 
Blue collar worker -0.1591*** -0.1271*** -0.0361 -0.0547* -0.1445*** -0.1194*** -0.0186 -0.0322* 
 (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0321) (0.0297) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0178) 
East German citizen -0.1385*** -0.1177*** — 0.6300*** -0.2904*** -0.3076*** — -0.7293*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0201)  (0.1308) (0.0111) (0.0146)  (0.0899) 
Non-German origin 0.0361 0.0443 — 0.3391*** 0.0037 -0.0009 — -0.0571 
 (0.0257) (0.0330)  (0.0671) (0.0140) (0.0184)  (0.0367) 
Married -0.0272* -0.0404** 0.0079 -0.0200 0.0323*** 0.0327*** 0.0248 0.0356** 
 (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0359) (0.0338) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0186) (0.0173) 
Constant 4.4417*** 4.8159*** 6.0945*** 4.7312*** 6.5379*** 6.7259*** 7.5353*** 6.1488*** 
 (0.1197) (0.1260) (0.2166) (0.2478) (0.1144) (0.1042) (0.1380) (0.1409) 
F/Chi2 159.13 3,976.85 18.77 1,819.65 123.39 2,977.22 13.88 1,613.03 
Notes: N=5,578; All models also include control variables for occupation, branch of employment, firm size as well as time of observation. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.  
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Table A-4.9-II: Smoking, ex-smoking (interaction-terms) and earnings, panel regressions 
 Females Males 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker (age 25 to 35) -0.0105 0.0140 0.0300 0.0542 0.0008 0.0078 0.0226 0.0222 
 (0.0291) (0.0308) (0.0460) (0.0444) (0.0167) (0.0171) (0.0253) (0.0227) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) -0.0359 0.0005 0.0420 0.0512 0.0090 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0075 
 (0.0363) (0.0347) (0.0471) (0.0454) (0.0220) (0.0194) (0.0270) (0.0240) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0027 0.0594 0.0746 0.1079* 0.0311 0.0191 0.0000 0.0212 
 (0.0528) (0.0477) (0.0617) (0.0590) (0.0334) (0.0265) (0.0329) (0.0290) 
Ex-smoker (age 25 to 35) 0.0064 0.0519 0.0922** 0.1038** 0.0032 0.0172 0.0275 0.0295 
 (0.0381) (0.0361) (0.0468) (0.0451) (0.0220) (0.0195) (0.0246) (0.0221) 
Ex-smoker (age 36 to 45) 0.0031 0.0161 0.0469 0.0448 0.0169 -0.0007 -0.0236 -0.0162 
 (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0404) (0.0389) (0.0188) (0.0179) (0.0238) (0.0213) 
Ex-smoker (age 46 to 55) 0.0329 0.0425 0.0706 0.0720 -0.0004 -0.0039 -0.0234 -0.0150 
 (0.0337) (0.0362) (0.0546) (0.0526) (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0285) (0.0254) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) -0.0321 -0.0012 0.0248 0.0309 0.0220 0.0195 0.0141 0.0177 
 (0.0356) (0.0331) (0.0408) (0.0391) (0.0225) (0.0189) (0.0225) (0.0201) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) -0.0688 -0.0148 0.0244 0.0461 0.0897** 0.0586** 0.0242 0.0341 
 (0.0522) (0.0458) (0.0550) (0.0523) (0.0349) (0.0281) (0.0339) (0.0301) 
Years of education 0.0326*** 0.0381*** — 0.0995*** 0.0291*** 0.0393*** — 0.0909*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0052)  (0.0194) (0.0027) (0.0032)  (0.0083) 
Work experience 0.0115* 0.0079 0.0015 0.0093 0.0221*** 0.0240*** 0.0190*** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0132) (0.0116) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0058) 
Work experience (squared) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Job tenure 0.0063*** 0.0063*** -0.0021 0.0030* 0.0044*** 0.0050*** 0.0021 0.0052*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
Has temporary employment  -0.0532 0.0076 0.0111 0.0218 -0.1320*** -0.0885*** -0.0557** -0.0695*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0307) (0.0347) (0.0317) (0.0247) (0.0197) (0.0219) (0.0187) 
Has part -time employment -0.0504*** -0.0625*** -0.0203 -0.0302 -0.4246*** -0.4421*** -0.3896*** -0.4389*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0237) (0.0206) (0.0461) (0.0442) (0.0570) (0.0460) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.8791*** 0.7541*** 0.5154*** 0.5788*** 0.3911*** 0.2938*** 0.2126*** 0.2565*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0251) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0223) (0.0257) (0.0220) 
Works overtime 0.0038 0.0140 0.0122 0.0056 0.0626*** 0.0345*** 0.0133 0.0201*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0130) (0.0149) (0.0137) (0.0095) (0.0077) (0.0086) (0.0073) 
Blue collar worker -0.1590*** -0.1273*** -0.0372 -0.0536* -0.1439*** -0.1197*** -0.0193 -0.0321* 
 (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0322) (0.0300) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0199) (0.0172) 
East German citizen -0.1374*** -0.1175*** — 0.6839*** -0.2908*** -0.3076*** — -0.7849*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0202)  (0.1394) (0.0111) (0.0146)  (0.0974) 
Non-German origin 0.0349 0.0423 — 0.3727*** 0.0023 -0.0017 — -0.0803* 
 (0.0257) (0.0330)  (0.0720) (0.0140) (0.0184)  (0.0414) 
Married -0.0265* -0.0393** 0.0084 -0.0161 0.0328*** 0.0324*** 0.0235 0.0316* 
 (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0360) (0.0342) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0186) (0.0165) 
Constant 4.4457*** 4.8182*** 6.0906*** 4.2352*** 6.5409*** 6.7221*** 7.5159*** 6.2888*** 
 (0.1201) (0.1265) (0.2182) (0.3123) (0.1145) (0.1044) (0.1384) (0.1599) 
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(Table A-4.9-II continued)         
F/Chi2 144.89 3,986.24 16.92 1,711.94 112.39 2,980.72 12.62 1,458.91 
Notes: See above; Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations.  
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Table A-4.10-I: Smoking and earnings; panel regressions (females) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 PR RE FE HT-IV PR RE FE HT-IV 
Smoker 0.0066 0.0021 -0.0175 -0.0141 —  — — — 
 (0.0118) (0.0139) (0.0190) (0.0186)     
Smoker (age 25 to 35) —  — — — -0.0098 -0.0020 -0.0086 0.0024 
     (0.0213) (0.0219) (0.0259) (0.0256) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0411 -0.0228 -0.0306 -0.0236 
     (0.0275) (0.0257) (0.0298) (0.0293) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — -0.0086 0.0393 0.0047 0.0269 
     (0.0423) (0.0369) (0.0417) (0.0409) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0296 -0.0070 0.0015 0.0060 
     (0.0262) (0.0230) (0.0246) (0.0241) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — -0.0664 -0.0053 0.0078 0.0274 
     (0.0407) (0.0333) (0.0349) (0.0341) 
East German citizen -0.1537*** -0.1236*** — 0.6111*** -0.1536*** -0.1238*** — 0.6768*** 
 (0.0129) (0.0191)  (0.1142) (0.0129) (0.0191)  (0.1218) 
Non-German origin 0.0171 0.0308 — 0.3192*** 0.0157 0.0296 — 0.3487*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0306)  (0.0622) (0.0207) (0.0306)  (0.0659) 
Married -0.0274** -0.0437*** -0.0046 -0.0182 -0.0269** -0.0430*** -0.0045 -0.0141 
 (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0254) (0.0246) (0.0129) (0.0162) (0.0254) (0.0249) 
Aged 25 to 35 years -0.0285 -0.0117 -0.0068 -0.0170 —  — — — 
 (0.0240) (0.0208) (0.0220) (0.0212)     
Aged 36 to 45 years -0.0420 0.0090 0.0084 0.0187 — — — — 
 (0.0390) (0.0313) (0.0320) (0.0308)     
Years of education 0.0327*** 0.0412*** — 0.0794*** 0.0328*** 0.0412*** — 0.0926*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0048)  (0.0154) (0.0036) (0.0048)  (0.0171) 
Experience 0.0146*** 0.0156*** 0.0108 0.0108 0.0147*** 0.0154*** 0.0110 0.0239*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0099) (0.0073) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0099) (0.0086) 
Experience (squared) -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0002 -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Period of employment 0.0066*** 0.0061*** -0.0012 0.0037*** 0.0065*** 0.0061*** -0.0012 0.0026* 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
Has temporary employment  -0.0646** -0.0055 0.0085 0.0123 -0.0662** -0.0067 0.0076 0.0118 
 (0.0279) (0.0239) (0.0248) (0.0237) (0.0279) (0.0239) (0.0248) (0.0239) 
Has part-time employment -0.0610*** -0.0908*** -0.0628*** -0.0626*** -0.0609*** -0.0907*** -0.0628*** -0.0654*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0161) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.8841*** 0.7008*** 0.5172*** 0.5609*** 0.8851*** 0.7017*** 0.5173*** 0.5558*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0180) (0.0171) 
Works overtime -0.0025 0.0152 0.0181* 0.0134 -0.0023 0.0153 0.0181* 0.0134 
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(Table A-4.10-I continued)         
 (0.0117) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0117) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0102) 
Blue collar worker -0.1601*** -0.1064*** -0.0272 -0.0409* -0.1596*** -0.1069*** -0.0276 -0.0391* 
 (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0228) (0.0219) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0228) (0.0221) 
Firm size 1 to 20 -0.2710*** -0.2298*** -0.1106*** -0.1797*** -0.2713*** -0.2300*** -0.1113*** -0.1776*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0257) (0.0224) (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0258) (0.0227) 
Firm size 20 to 200 -0.1094*** -0.0795*** -0.0142 -0.0582*** -0.1080*** -0.0785*** -0.0141 -0.0573*** 
 (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0226) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0227) (0.0205) 
Firm size 200 to 2000 -0.0302* -0.0027 0.0378* 0.0162 -0.0290* -0.0017 0.0378* 0.0170 
 (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0205) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0205) (0.0189) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.0299** 0.0317*** 0.0443*** 0.0351*** 0.0298** 0.0317*** 0.0444*** 0.0284*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0080) (0.0132) (0.0085) (0.0100) (0.0088) 
Year of observation: 2001 0.0738*** 0.0840*** 0.1238*** 0.0947*** 0.0733*** 0.0839*** 0.1238*** 0.0760*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0091) (0.0193) (0.0098) (0.0134) (0.0092) (0.0193) (0.0137) 
Constant 4.3646*** 4.8958*** 6.1191*** 4.7149*** 4.3638*** 4.8958*** 6.1142*** 4.3389*** 
 (0.0949) (0.1056) (0.1662) (0.2098) (0.0951) (0.1058) (0.1667) (0.2626) 
F/Chi2 243.49 4,896.75 37.41 2,526.14 232.37 4,907.10 35.50 2,423.49 
Notes: N/Individuals=3,441 / 1,147; All models also include control variables for occupation and branch of employment. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. 
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Table A-4.10-II: Smoking and earnings; panel regressions (males) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 OLS FE RE HT-IV OLS FE RE HT-IV 
Smoker -0.0210*** 0.0055 -0.0102 0.0051 — — — — 
 (0.0074) (0.0105) (0.0082) (0.0100)     
Smoker (age 25 to 35) — — — — 0.0015 0.0198 0.0081 0.0187 
     (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0115) (0.0124) 
Smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — -0.0120 -0.0109 -0.0126 -0.0021 
     (0.0167) (0.0157) (0.0138) (0.0144) 
Smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — 0.0020 -0.0049 0.0061 0.0151 
     (0.0271) (0.0215) (0.0199) (0.0197) 
Non-smoker (age 36 to 45) — — — — 0.0056 -0.0018 0.0073 0.0067 
     (0.0160) (0.0131) (0.0123) (0.0121) 
Non-smoker (age 46 to 55) — — — — 0.0666** -0.0010 0.0362* 0.0175 
     (0.0261) (0.0209) (0.0194) (0.0191) 
Aged 25 to 35 years -0.0048 -0.0147 -0.0055 -0.0067 — — — — 
 (0.0142) (0.0110) (0.0105) (0.0102)     
Aged 36 to 45 years 0.0400 -0.0112 0.0192 0.0122 — — — — 
 (0.0249) (0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0167)     
East German citizen -0.2915*** — -0.3155*** -0.7097*** -0.2913*** — -0.3159*** -0.7375*** 
 (0.0090)  (0.0140) (0.0802) (0.0090)  (0.0140) (0.0906) 
Non-German origin -0.0030 — -0.0089 -0.0540 -0.0043 — -0.0096 -0.0639 
 (0.0114)  (0.0177) (0.0350) (0.0114)  (0.0177) (0.0406) 
Married 0.0332*** 0.0026 0.0251** 0.0134 0.0334*** 0.0024 0.0248** 0.0115 
 (0.0086) (0.0133) (0.0100) (0.0127) (0.0086) (0.0133) (0.0100) (0.0123) 
Years of education 0.0297*** — 0.0441*** 0.0956*** 0.0297*** — 0.0440*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0023)  (0.0030) (0.0065) (0.0023)  (0.0030) (0.0074) 
Experience 0.0306*** 0.0269*** 0.0327*** 0.0381*** 0.0294*** 0.0269*** 0.0324*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0033) (0.0043) 
Experience (squared) -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Period of employment 0.0044*** 0.0006 0.0044*** 0.0033*** 0.0045*** 0.0006 0.0044*** 0.0031*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
Has temporary employment  -0.1390*** -0.0469*** -0.0721*** -0.0600*** -0.1391*** -0.0473*** -0.0725*** -0.0568*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0191) (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0134) 
Has part-time employment -0.4896*** -0.4576*** -0.5050*** -0.4948*** -0.4850*** -0.4581*** -0.5043*** -0.4872*** 
 (0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0345) (0.0346) (0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0345) (0.0340) 
Log of hours worked per week 0.3329*** 0.1403*** 0.1943*** 0.1672*** 0.3331*** 0.1403*** 0.1945*** 0.1610*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0206) (0.0168) (0.0161) (0.0153) 
Works overtime 0.0602*** 0.0214*** 0.0339*** 0.0259*** 0.0595*** 0.0213*** 0.0337*** 0.0245*** 
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 (0.0078) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0078) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0055) 
Blue collar worker -0.1458*** -0.0177 -0.0963*** -0.0269** -0.1453*** -0.0181 -0.0967*** -0.0258** 
 (0.0125) (0.0141) (0.0117) (0.0131) (0.0125) (0.0141) (0.0117) (0.0128) 
Firm size 1 to 20 -0.2159*** -0.0027 -0.1203*** -0.0547*** -0.2172*** -0.0034 -0.1211*** -0.0441*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0167) (0.0131) (0.0142) (0.0123) (0.0167) (0.0131) (0.0142) 
Firm size 20 to 200 -0.1406*** 0.0124 -0.0727*** -0.0243** -0.1411*** 0.0120 -0.0729*** -0.0166 
 (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.0107) (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0134) (0.0107) (0.0114) 
Firm size 200 to 2000 -0.0629*** 0.0165 -0.0254** -0.0042 -0.0634*** 0.0164 -0.0257** 0.0001 
 (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0102) (0.0123) (0.0103) (0.0106) 
Year of observation: 1999 0.0169* 0.0325*** 0.0178*** 0.0179*** 0.0173** 0.0325*** 0.0179*** 0.0194*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0087) (0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0047) 
Year of observation: 2001 0.0717*** 0.1222*** 0.0758*** 0.0784*** 0.0723*** 0.1223*** 0.0760*** 0.0829*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0106) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0106) (0.0053) (0.0071) 
Constant 6.6517*** 7.7090*** 6.9135*** 6.4021*** 6.6528*** 7.7032*** 6.9097*** 6.4571*** 
 (0.0896) (0.0974) (0.0809) (0.1116) (0.0896) (0.0974) (0.0809) (0.1334) 
F/Chi2 179.01 3,382.31 27.77 2,004.44 171.11 3,392.63 26.44 1,873.39 
Notes: N/Individuals=4,926 / 1,642; All models also include control variables for occupation and branch of employment. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: GSOEP, own calculations. 
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Table D-5.1: Moonlighting in Germany and the UK, descriptive statistics 
 UK Germany 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Has a second job 0.0814 (0.2735) 0.0730 (0.2602) 
Would like to work more hours 0.0777 (0.2677) 0.1550 (0.3619) 
Would like to work the same hours 0.5854 (0.4926) 0.2709 (0.4444) 
Would like to work less hours  0.3301 (0.4702) 0.5740 (0.4944) 
Is dissatisfied with job security 0.2593 (0.4382) 0.1465 (0.3536) 
Is dissatisfied with pay 0.3573 (0.4792) 0.0978 (0.2971) 
Is dissatisfied with work itself 0.1843 (0.3878) 0.0558 (0.2296) 
Expects to be promoted/get a better job 0.1699 (0.3756) 0.1295 (0.3358) 
Expects to get job related training/courses  0.4342 (0.4956) 0.3315 (0.4707) 
Expects to start a new job 0.1770 (0.3817) 0.0709 (0.2566) 
Expects to become self-employed/start up own business 0.0294 (0.1690) 0.0297 (0.1698) 
Expects to give up paid employment 0.0240 (0.1531) 0.0437 (0.2045) 
Log of gross hourly wage in second job (observed) 1.9624 (1.0051) 3.0196 (0.8720) 
Log of gross hourly wage in second job+ 1.9878 (0.3592) 2.9700 (0.3044) 
Log of net hourly wage in first job 1.5709 (0.4508) 2.6031 (0.5094) 
Log of non-labor income 4.5987 (1.4888) 5.3188 (3.1355) 
Weekly working hours 38.3189 (13.5631) 38.6080 (11.4540) 
Works overtime 0.4746 (0.4993) 0.4826 (0.4997) 
Overtime work is paid 0.2620 (0.4397) 0.1484 (0.3555) 
Public/Governmental employer 0.1832 (0.3868) 0.2630 (0.4402) 
Part-time employment 0.2055 (0.4041) 0.1540 (0.3610) 
Temporary employment 0.0580 (0.2337) 0.1355 (0.3423) 
Has recently changed job 0.2978 (0.4573) 0.1443 (0.3514) 
Job tenure 4.8356 (5.8732) 8.8616 (9.0052) 
Spouse is employed 0.6279 (0.4833) 0.4290 (0.4949) 
Age  38.0833 (10.7304) 38.4608 (10.977) 
Age squared 1565.481 (836.211) 1599.731 (860.289) 
Male  0.4805 (0.4996) 0.5484 (0.4976) 
Married  0.8035 (0.3973) 0.6189 (0.4856) 
Number of dependent children 0.7465 (0.9966) 0.6192 (0.8978) 
Has children in the age of up to 4 years 0.1519 (0.3589) 0.1132 (0.3169) 
Has children in the age 5 to 15 years 0.3569 (0.4790) 0.3341 (0.4716) 
Years of education 12.7531 (2.8186) 11.6673 (3.0277) 
Education (UK/D): Degree  0.3577 (0.4793) 0.1504 (0.3575) 
Education (UK): A-levels  0.1258 (0.3317) —  
Education (UK): O-levels  0.3127 (0.4636) —  
Education (D): Vocational training —  0.6940 (0.4608) 
Education (UK/D): No qualification 0.1477 (0.3548) 0.1352 (0.3419) 
Occupation (UK/D): Manager 0.1318 (0.3383) 0.0329 (0.1785) 
Occupation (UK/D): Professional 0.1021 (0.3028) 0.1206 (0.3256) 
Occupation (UK/D): Technician 0.1075 (0.3097) 0.2079 (0.4058) 
Occupation (UK/D): Clerk 0.1922 (0.3940) 0.1196 (0.3245) 
Occupation (UK/D): Craft worker  0.1024 (0.3032) 0.0883 (0.2837) 
Occupation (UK): Personal services 0.1054 (0.3070) —  
Occupation (UK): Sales  0.0704 (0.2559) —  
Occupation (D): Service-Sales worker —  0.1059 (0.3077) 
Occupation (UK/D): Machine operator 0.0930 (0.2905) 0.0883 (0.2837) 
Occupation (UK/D): Other/Elementary 0.0743 (0.2623) 0.0764 (0.2657) 
Occupation (D): Agricultural worker —  0.0091 (0.0953) 
Branch: Agriculture 0.0092 (0.0958) 0.0126 (0.1115) 
Branch: Energy & Water supplies 0.0205 (0.1419) 0.0104 (0.1016) 
Branch (UK): Minerals & Chemicals  0.0320 (0.1760) —  
Branch (D): Minerals  —  0.0239 (0.1528) 
Branch (D): Chemicals  —  0.0455 (0.2084) 
Branch: Metal 0.0908 (0.2873) 0.1541 (0.3610) 
Branch: Manufacturing 0.0890 (0.2848) —  
Branch: Construction 0.0322 (0.1767) 0.0764 (0.2656) 
Branch: Distribution, Trade & Retail 0.1757 (0.3806) 0.1276 (0.3337) 
APPENDIX – CHAPTER 5 
 252 
(Table D-5.1 continued)     
Branch: Transport & Communication 0.0578 (0.2334) 0.0493 (0.2165) 
Branch: Banking, Finance & Insurance 0.1262 (0.3321) 0.0369 (0.1885) 
Branch: Other 0.3340 (0.4716) 0.3147 (0.4644) 
Branch (D): Textiles —  0.0107 (0.1029) 
Branch (D): Wood/Paper —  0.0227 (0.1492) 
Firm size (UK): 1 to 9 employees 0.1729 (0.3782) —  
Firm size (UK): 10 to 24 employees 0.1571 (0.3639) —  
Firm size (UK): 25 to 199 employees 0.3562 (0.4788) —  
Firm size (UK): 200 to 999 employees 0.1936 (0.3951) —  
Firm size (UK): more than 1000 employees 0.1003 (0.3004) —  
Firm size (D): 1 to 19 employees —  0.2455 (0.4304) 
Firm size (D): 20 to 199 employees —  0.2927 (0.4550) 
Firm size (D): 200 to 1999 employees —  0.2183 (0.4131) 
Firm size (D): 2000 and more employees —  0.2136 (0.4098) 
Notes: Includes further controls for regions and year of observation. 
Source: BHSP, GSOEP. 
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Table A-5.6: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for males in Germany and the UK, 
including additional control variables 
 Germany UK 
 Logit FE Logit Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.5144*** 0.5341*** 0.2291* 0.4317*** 
 (0.0981) (0.1720) (0.1201) (0.1577) 
… work less hours  0.2735*** 0.3652*** 0.0067 -0.1710 
 (0.0817) (0.1399) (0.0779) (0.1065) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.2926*** 0.1165 0.0298 0.0515 
 (0.1001) (0.1832) (0.0797) (0.1030) 
… with pay/household-income 0.2304** 0.0119 0.1450* 0.1105 
 (0.1033) (0.1936) (0.0742) (0.1016) 
… with job itself -0.0356 0.0911 0.1191 0.2203* 
 (0.1320) (0.2207) (0.0848) (0.1171) 
Log of net hourly wage in first job 0.0409 -0.3600 -0.3263** -1.1362*** 
 (0.1184) (0.2470) (0.1509) (0.2038) 
Log of gross hourly wage in second job (predicted) 0.1229 0.4554 -0.4797* -0.2323 
 (0.2996) (0.3982) (0.2872) (0.3666) 
Log of non-labor income 0.0036 -0.0476* 0.0212 -0.0329 
 (0.0121) (0.0257) (0.0285) (0.0380) 
Weekly working hours 0.0039 0.0005 -0.0117** -0.0327*** 
 (0.0049) (0.0102) (0.0058) (0.0072) 
Works overtime 0.1218* -0.0361 0.1069 0.2954** 
 (0.0693) (0.1214) (0.1065) (0.1480) 
Overtime work is paid 0.0916 0.1024 -0.1625 -0.4019** 
 (0.0805) (0.1394) (0.1149) (0.1613) 
Part-time employment 0.9305*** 1.1461*** 0.3790* -0.0770 
 (0.1810) (0.4050) (0.2168) (0.3046) 
Temporary employment 0.2958*** 0.4557** 0.0824 -0.4417** 
 (0.1103) (0.2115) (0.1397) (0.2032) 
Has recently changed job -0.0243 -0.2845* 0.0636 0.0192 
 (0.0860) (0.1469) (0.0722) (0.1042) 
Job tenure -0.0096* -0.0096 0.0103 0.0187 
 (0.0057) (0.0218) (0.0083) (0.0134) 
Public/Governmental employer 0.2975** -0.0003 -0.0878 0.2798 
 (0.1278) (0.2880) (0.1424) (0.2081) 
Spouse is employed 0.1877* 0.0051 -0.0403 -0.2040 
 (0.1024) (0.2058) (0.0970) (0.1308) 
Age  0.0666** -0.0326 0.0514 0.2528*** 
 (0.0313) (0.1510) (0.0338) (0.0750) 
Age squared -0.0009** -0.0006 -0.0008* -0.0025*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
Married 0.0395 0.0084 -0.0677 0.3752** 
 (0.1287) (0.3052) (0.1055) (0.1676) 
Number of children 0.0592 -0.2693 0.0983 0.0148 
 (0.0768) (0.1911) (0.0688) (0.1038) 
Has children in age of up to 4 years  -0.1793 0.1440 0.0295 0.1500 
 (0.1312) (0.2802) (0.1140) (0.1577) 
Has children in age of 5 to 15 years -0.1395 0.0809 0.0038 0.1501 
 (0.1361) (0.2807) (0.1237) (0.1689) 
Years of education 0.0333 — 0.0357 — 
 (0.0247)  (0.0282)  
Constant -4.9040*** — -2.3565*** — 
 (0.8255)  (0.7439)  
N / Groups 22,181 2,323 / 620 24,319 3,915 / 605 
Chi2 345.33 53.70 309.16 115.95 
Log likelihood -5,853.83 -832.53 -5,973.34 -1408.18 
Notes: Includes further qualificational, occupational, branch, regional and year of observation controls . 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table A-5.7: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for males in 
Germany and the UK, including additional control variables 
 Germany UK 
 Logit FE Logit Logit FE Logit 
Would like to work more hours 0.5342*** 0.6684** 0.0983 0.2410 
 (0.1223) (0.2960) (0.1505) (0.2656) 
… work less hours  0.2841*** 0.4330* -0.0620 -0.1180 
 (0.1058) (0.2296) (0.0946) (0.1686) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.3159** -0.1516 -0.0662 0.1017 
 (0.1251) (0.2923) (0.0975) (0.1708) 
… with household-income 0.0993 -0.2000 0.1326 -0.2084 
 (0.1328) (0.3351) (0.0922) (0.1646) 
… with job itself 0.1887 0.4411 0.0655 0.4208** 
 (0.1528) (0.3572) (0.1035) (0.1922) 
Expects to be promoted 0.1196 0.2773 -0.3172*** -0.3461* 
 (0.1060) (0.2500) (0.1043) (0.1875) 
… get job related training/courses 0.0684 0.1115 0.2042** -0.0789 
 (0.0868) (0.2099) (0.0889) (0.1522) 
… start a new job 0.3088** 0.1821 0.1015 0.4226** 
 (0.1384) (0.3356) (0.0995) (0.1805) 
… start up own business/become self-employed 1.0250*** -0.0977 0.9435*** 0.3106 
 (0.1665) (0.3426) (0.1442) (0.2667) 
… quit from paid employment -0.0307 -0.9328* -0.6724* 0.0065 
 (0.2112) (0.5208) (0.3573) (0.6943) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.0626 -0.4353 -0.2542* -1.2022*** 
 (0.1310) (0.4460) (0.1445) (0.3255) 
Log of non-labor income 0.0092 -0.0221 0.0081 -0.0091 
 (0.0145) (0.0382) (0.0322) (0.0628) 
Weekly working hours -0.0016 0.0041 -0.0143** -0.0433*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0192) (0.0063) (0.0115) 
Works overtime 0.1876** 0.1340 0.0254 0.2149 
 (0.0836) (0.1954) (0.1276) (0.2426) 
Overtime work is paid 0.1340 -0.2191 -0.0251 -0.4550* 
 (0.0956) (0.2135) (0.1359) (0.2628) 
Part-time employment 0.7782*** 0.6649 0.6239*** -0.7048 
 (0.2159) (0.6653) (0.2393) (0.4610) 
Temporary employment 0.2868** 0.5348 0.0945 -0.6402** 
 (0.1363) (0.3560) (0.1676) (0.3197) 
Has recently changed job -0.1301 -0.3447 0.0855 -0.0433 
 (0.1113) (0.2502) (0.0901) (0.1612) 
Job tenure -0.0089 -0.0258 0.0112 -0.0089 
 (0.0064) (0.0357) (0.0096) (0.0211) 
Public/Governmental employer 0.2613* 0.6418 0.4685*** 0.4091 
 (0.1476) (0.5537) (0.1336) (0.4064) 
Spouse is employed 0.2334** 0.0178 -0.0633 -0.2033 
 (0.1158) (0.3352) (0.1115) (0.2184) 
Age 0.0754** 0.1372 0.0361 -0.0345 
 (0.0353) (0.2409) (0.0370) (0.1688) 
Age squared -0.0010** -0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (0.0004) (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0022) 
Married 0.0856 0.1248 -0.0984 0.0086 
 (0.1490) (0.4328) (0.1189) (0.2709) 
Number of children 0.0927 -0.1976 0.0826 0.1983 
 (0.0843) (0.2768) (0.0743) (0.1883) 
Has children in age of up to 4 years -0.2204 0.0036 -0.0616 0.0598 
 (0.1481) (0.3815) (0.1395) (0.2684) 
Has children in age of 5 to 15 years -0.1597 0.4305 0.1389 0.3696 
 (0.1500) (0.4378) (0.1419) (0.2935) 
Years of education 0.0407* — 0.0125 — 
 (0.0223)  (0.0200)  
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Constant -4.8245*** — -2.5340*** — 
 (0.7055)  (0.7251)  
N / Groups 12,773 856 / 315 13,569 1,492 / 375 
Chi2 358.18 37.30 232.75 100.90 
Log likelihood -3,401.69 -291.32 -3,429.80 -499.73 
Notes: Includes further qualificational, occupational, branch, regional and year of observation controls . 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table A-5.8: Participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for females in Germany and the UK, 
including additional control variables 
 Germany UK Germany UK 
 Logit FE Logit Logit FE Logit 
Wants to work more hours 0.3856*** 0.2887 0.0033 -0.1688 
 (0.1123) (0.2028) (0.0942) (0.1135) 
Wants to work less hours 0.2050** 0.5134*** -0.2059*** -0.0753 
 (0.0938) (0.1726) (0.0732) (0.0967) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.0921 0.1001 0.0819 0.2080** 
 (0.1091) (0.2145) (0.0690) (0.0906) 
Is dissatisfied with houshold-income 0.1474 -0.0469 0.1702*** 0.2401*** 
 (0.1136) (0.2047) (0.0626) (0.0843) 
Is dissatisfied with job itself -0.1168 -0.5622** -0.0709 0.0448 
 (0.1381) (0.2504) (0.0810) (0.1028) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.1079 -0.4641* -0.3237*** -0.9214*** 
 (0.1221) (0.2411) (0.1017) (0.1360) 
Log of gross wage in second job (predicted) -0.0495 -0.4046 -0.0285 -0.0427 
 (0.3028) (0.4616) (0.2082) (0.2536) 
Log of non-labor income -0.0368*** -0.0485 -0.0618** -0.0859*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0297) (0.0252) (0.0330) 
Weekly working hours -0.0052 -0.0223** -0.0216*** -0.0369*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0106) (0.0056) (0.0070) 
Works overtime 0.3686*** 0.3656** 0.1267 0.1555 
 (0.0807) (0.1423) (0.0998) (0.1243) 
Overtime work is paid 0.1574 -0.1028 -0.0596 -0.2669* 
 (0.1172) (0.1989) (0.1167) (0.1434) 
Part-time employment 0.2952*** 0.3536 0.4910*** 0.5336*** 
 (0.1093) (0.2285) (0.1316) (0.1597) 
Temporary employment 0.3570*** 0.7628*** 0.0375 0.1735 
 (0.1161) (0.2421) (0.0975) (0.1383) 
Has recently changed job -0.0794 -0.1178 0.0134 0.0505 
 (0.0935) (0.1570) (0.0676) (0.0861) 
Job tenure -0.0043 0.0059 -0.0166* -0.0363*** 
 (0.0082) (0.0238) (0.0094) (0.0136) 
Public/Governmental employer -0.1409 0.2092 0.1095 0.2073 
 (0.1153) (0.2598) (0.0989) (0.1294) 
Age 0.0018 0.2241 -0.1377 -0.1172 
 (0.0340) (0.1634) (0.0861) (0.1263) 
Age squared -0.0002 -0.0042** 0.0292 0.1426** 
 (0.0004) (0.0021) (0.0285) (0.0588) 
Married -0.2190 -0.0479 -0.0005 -0.0013* 
 (0.1558) (0.3913) (0.0004) (0.0007) 
Spouse is employed -0.1498 -0.0482 -0.1324 -0.0944 
 (0.1567) (0.3485) (0.0888) (0.1337) 
Number of children 0.0301 -0.2368 -0.0690 -0.2487*** 
 (0.1001) (0.2941) (0.0609) (0.0912) 
Has children in age up to 4 years -0.4225** -0.3131 -0.5337*** -0.5886*** 
 (0.2143) (0.4440) (0.1086) (0.1397) 
Has children in age of 5 to 15 years 0.0456 0.3991 0.1053 0.0757 
 (0.1771) (0.4086) (0.1122) (0.1439) 
Years of education 0.0336 — 0.0195 — 
 (0.0274)  (0.0231)  
Constant -3.1407*** — -2.2867*** — 
 (0.8892)  (0.6785)  
N / Groups 18,262 1,687/466 26,289 5,935 / 846 
Chi2 228.99 66.24 510.58 248.31 
Log likelihood -4,239.30 -590.48 -7,442.67 -2,128.84 
Notes: Includes further qualificational, occupational, branch, regional and year of observation controls . 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table A-5.9: Job related expectations and participation in moonlighting, panel regressions for females 
in Germany and the UK, including additional control variables 
 Germany UK Germany UK 
 Logit FELogit Logit FELogit 
Wants to work more hours 0.3663*** 0.3368 -0.0058 -0.3069* 
 (0.1373) (0.3375) (0.1171) (0.1858) 
… work less hours  0.2207* 0.4880* -0.3078*** 0.0158 
 (0.1176) (0.2701) (0.0920) (0.1520) 
Is dissatisfied with job security -0.2224 0.0857 -0.0284 -0.0231 
 (0.1394) (0.3210) (0.0898) (0.1513) 
… with pay/household-income -0.0258 -0.2351 0.1155 0.3794*** 
 (0.1441) (0.3492) (0.0803) (0.1414) 
… with job itself 0.1909 -0.1348 -0.1931* -0.0953 
 (0.1668) (0.3713) (0.1040) (0.1678) 
Expects to be promoted -0.0222 0.7465** -0.0094 0.0766 
 (0.1426) (0.3423) (0.0916) (0.1559) 
… get job related training/courses 0.0887 0.0145 0.1272* -0.1253 
 (0.1014) (0.2327) (0.0742) (0.1279) 
… start a new job 0.1096 -0.0391 0.2930*** 0.4242*** 
 (0.1622) (0.3781) (0.0857) (0.1438) 
… start up own business/become self-employed 1.2987*** 0.6187 0.8136*** 0.9125*** 
 (0.1859) (0.4491) (0.1605) (0.3373) 
… quit from paid employment -0.4423** -0.3304 -0.5065** -0.2075 
 (0.2037) (0.4541) (0.2058) (0.3416) 
Log of net wage in first job 0.1261 -0.5423 -0.2363** -0.7513*** 
 (0.1415) (0.3966) (0.1164) (0.2267) 
Log of non-labor income -0.0310** -0.0602 -0.0695** -0.1748*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0499) (0.0282) (0.0598) 
Weekly work hours -0.0096 -0.0189 -0.0220*** -0.0069 
 (0.0060) (0.0179) (0.0066) (0.0123) 
Works overtime 0.5263*** 0.5595** 0.1358 0.0690 
 (0.0991) (0.2317) (0.1203) (0.2127) 
Overtime work is paid 0.2143 -0.4159 0.0166 -0.2438 
 (0.1355) (0.3031) (0.1362) (0.2316) 
Part-time employment 0.2230* 0.5379 0.4342*** 1.0034*** 
 (0.1255) (0.3641) (0.1509) (0.2619) 
Temporary employment 0.3591** 0.7546** 0.0725 0.2521 
 (0.1419) (0.3829) (0.1228) (0.2378) 
Has recently changed job -0.1014 0.0859 0.0660 0.0897 
 (0.1178) (0.2634) (0.0828) (0.1399) 
Job tenure -0.0060 0.0374 -0.0056 -0.0336 
 (0.0087) (0.0361) (0.0106) (0.0241) 
Public/Governmental employer -0.0531 0.1919 0.0975 0.5670** 
 (0.1364) (0.3982) (0.1145) (0.2409) 
Spouse is employed -0.1807 0.2774 -0.0007 -0.0497 
 (0.1735) (0.5278) (0.1009) (0.2438) 
Age -0.0175 0.2716 -0.0176 0.0218 
 (0.0383) (0.2431) (0.0343) (0.1453) 
Age squared 0.0001 -0.0051* 0.0002 -0.0015 
 (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.0004) (0.0018) 
Married -0.2280 -1.1516 -0.0087 -0.0163 
 (0.1756) (0.7025) (0.1005) (0.2550) 
Number of children 0.0269 -0.2785 -0.0636 -0.0917 
 (0.1198) (0.4922) (0.0698) (0.1724) 
Has children in age up to 4 years -0.4043 0.3250 -0.4324*** -0.5854** 
 (0.2475) (0.7048) (0.1308) (0.2402) 
Has children in age of 5 to 15 years 0.0671 0.6485 0.2410* -0.0865 
 (0.2082) (0.6802) (0.1314) (0.2479) 
Years of education 0.0213 — 0.0089 — 
 (0.0238)  (0.0190)  
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(Table A-5.9 continued)     
Constant -2.8554*** — -1.1622 — 
 (0.7400)  (0.8265)  
Observations 10,535 676/257 14,718 2141/517 
Chi2 239.79 47.81 406.43 150.43 
Log likelihood -2,506.19 -219.92 -4,104.96 -723.32 
Notes: Includes further qualificational, occupational, branch, regional and year of observation controls . 
Source: BHPS, GSOEP. Own calculations. 
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Table D-5.2: Imposing social security contributions on marginal employment, descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Has second job in 2000 0.5279 (0.4999) 
Job status in 2000: 1=employed, but not moonlighting; 2=employed and 
moonlighting; 3=not employed 
1.5931 (0.5683) 
Log of net wage in first job 4.1909 (0.4227) 
Log of gross wage in second job 3.0463 (0.7873) 
(Non-labor income)/100 4.0672 (6.6908) 
(Difference in non-labor income 1998 to 2000)/100 1.1860 (6.8789) 
Share of transfer benefits in household-income 3.9140 (5.3976) 
Share of second job earnings in household-income 11.8092 (9.0810) 
(Spouse’s earnings)/100 9.0735 14.2749) 
Second job is supplied in family business (reference category) 0.0527 (0.2239) 
Second job is supplied regularly 0.5931 (0.4920) 
Second job is supplied occasionally 0.3540 (0.4789) 
Second job supplied in a firm 0.4875 (0.5006) 
Second job supplied in private households 0.1614 (0.3685) 
Second job supplied: other employer (reference category) 0.3788 (0.4858) 
Second job occupation: Clerks 0.0807 (0.2728) 
Second job occupation: Services 0.0869 (0.2822) 
Second job occupation: Manufacturing 0.0559 (0.2300) 
First job is part-time employment 0.1459 (0.3536) 
White-collar worker 0.5559 (0.4976) 
Civil servant 0.3881 (0.4880) 
First job is temporary employment 0.0869 (0.2822) 
Works overtime 0.5931 (0.4920) 
Overtime work is paid 0.1832 (0.3874) 
Overtime compensation by leisure in days 0.4565 (0.4988) 
Desire to work more hours 0.2080 (0.4065) 
Desire to work the same hours (reference category) 0.1490 (0.3567) 
Desire to work fewer hours 0.6428 (0.4799) 
Years of education 12.6350 (2.7225) 
Age 38.8602 (9.7585) 
Age squared  1605.05 (793.665) 
Male  0.6428 (0.4799) 
Married woman 0.1832 (0.3874) 
Dependent children in household 0.3788 (0.4858) 
Number of children aged up to 4 years 0.1180 (0.3765) 
Number of children aged 5 to 15 years 0.5279 (0.8542) 
West German resident 0.7888 (0.4087) 
Notes: N=322 observations.   
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2000.   
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Table A-5.14: Moonlighting status of 1998 moonlighters in 2000, multinomial logit model 
 Employed, but not 
moonlighting 
Not employed 
Log of net wage in first job -0.4233 -0.5673 
 (0.4467) (1.0751) 
Log of gross wage in second job -0.1328 -0.0903 
 (0.1953) (0.5148) 
(Non-labor income)/100 -0.0179 -0.0524 
 (0.0261) (0.0672) 
(Difference in non-labor income 1998 to 2000)/100 0.0597** 0.1382*** 
 (0.0279) (0.0453) 
Share of transfer benefits in household-income -0.0246 -0.0266 
 (0.0386) (0.1183) 
Share of second job earnings in household-income -0.0267 -0.0303 
 (0.0182) (0.0603) 
(Spouse’s earnings)/100 -0.0064 -0.0205 
 (0.0120) (0.0372) 
Second job is supplied occasionally 1.1743* -0.4866 
 (0.6986) (1.4902) 
Second job is supplied regularly 0.3984 -1.5763 
 (0.6622) (1.3554) 
Second job supplied in a firm 0.2403 0.1813 
 (0.2919) (0.7893) 
Second job supplied in private households -0.7047* -0.0627 
 (0.4075) (1.0960) 
Second job occupation: Clerks -0.0299 -1.0659 
 (0.5384) (1.8504) 
Second job occupation: Services -1.1135** 0.9049 
 (0.5134) (1.1348) 
Second job occupation: Manufacturing 0.5091 0.7760 
 (0.5976) (1.5024) 
First job is part-time employment 0.5191 1.1748 
 (0.4685) (1.0955) 
White-collar worker -0.2044 -0.6925 
 (0.3370) (0.8684) 
Civil servant -0.9673 -0.9393 
 (0.6080) (1.7899) 
First job is temporary employment -0.9084* 0.5440 
 (0.4990) (1.3696) 
Works overtime -0.1113 -1.2673 
 (0.2818) (0.8002) 
Overtime is paid 0.2296 -0.1081 
 (0.3644) (1.0099) 
Overtime compensation by leisure in days -0.0844 0.7344 
 (0.2932) (0.8204) 
Desire to work more hours -1.1455** -0.0612 
 (0.4532) (1.4053) 
Desire to work fewer hours -0.7424* 1.1536 
 (0.3952) (1.3439) 
Years of education 0.0302 -0.1346 
 (0.0646) (0.1920) 
Age 0.0344 -0.0439 
 (0.1193) (0.2984) 
Age squared -0.0010 0.0007 
 (0.0014) (0.0036) 
Male -0.5087 -0.7731 
 (0.4079) (1.1343) 
Married woman -0.0781 1.1682 
 (0.5667) (1.5142) 
Number of children aged up to 4 years -0.1743 0.9883 
 (0.4338) (0.9574) 
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(Table A-5.14 continued)   
Number of children aged 5 to 15 years 0.0866 0.0911 
 (0.2368) (0.7364) 
West German resident 0.0168 0.8380 
 (0.3985) (1.1613) 
Constant 3.1541 2.3738 
 (2.7694) (7.2001) 
Notes: Base category: Employed and moonlighting  
N=322; LR Chi2-value=93.07; Prob > Chi2 = 0.0065; Log likelihood = -221.39; Pseudo R2 = 0.1737 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2000. Own calculations. 
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Table A-5.15: Moonlighting participation of 1998 female moonlighters in 2000 
 Coefficient Marginal effect 
Log of net wage in first job 1.0526 0.2600 
 (0.6739) (0.1669) 
Log of gross wage in second job 0.2100 0.0518 
 (0.3762) (0.0929) 
(Non-labor income)/100 0.0465 0.0115 
 (0.0346) (0.0085) 
(Difference in non-labor income 1998 to 2000)/100 -0.0231 -0.0057 
 (0.0406) (0.0100) 
(Spouse’s earnings)/100 0.0131 0.0032 
 (0.0151) (0.0037) 
Share of second job earnings in hh-income 0.0171 0.0042 
 (0.0293) (0.0072) 
Second job is supplied occasionally -2.7184** -0.5298*** 
 (01.360) (0.1824) 
Second job is supplied regularly -2.4544* -0.5436** 
 (01.280) (0.2168) 
Second job supplied in a firm -0.3361 -0.0828 
 (0.5579) (0.1367) 
Second job supplied in private household 1.6202** 0.3734** 
 (0.7916) (0.1503) 
Second job occupation: Clerks 0.7238 0.1789 
 (0.7087) (0.1708) 
Second job occupation: Services 1.7903** 0.4085*** 
 (0.7215) (0.1340) 
Second job occupation: Manufacturing 0.6378 0.1578 
 (1.5772) (0.3786) 
Civil servant 0.9289 0.2260 
 (1.3131) (0.2959) 
First job is temporary employment 0.1007 0.0249 
 (0.9857) (0.2453) 
Works overtime 0.0658 0.0162 
 (0.5345) (0.1318) 
Overtime is paid -0.6024 -0.1438 
 (0.6684) (0.1513) 
Overtime compensation by leisure in days -0.3592 -0.0886 
 (0.5458) (0.1343) 
Desire to work more hours 1.3385* 0.3220** 
 (0.7401) (0.1637) 
Desire to work fewer hours 0.9275 0.2241 
 (0.7242) (0.1681) 
Age -0.0937 -0.0231 
 (0.1982) (0.0489) 
Age squared 0.0012 0.0003 
 (0.0025) (0.0006) 
Years of education 0.1540 0.0380 
 (0.1134) (0.0279) 
Dependent children in household 0.1671 0.0414 
 (0.5974) (0.1482) 
Constant -4.7081 — 
 (4.7033)  
Notes: N=115; LR Chi2-value=33.48; Prob > Chi2 = 0.0943; Log likelihood = -62.44; Pseudo R2 = 0.2114 
Source: GSOEP, 1998 and 2000. Own calculations. 
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Summary in German1 
 
Die vorgelegte Dissertation umfasst empirische Studien aus dem Bereich der Arbeits-
ökonomik, mit dem Schwerpunkt auf der Analyse des Arbeitsangebots und der Analyse von 
Verdienstfunktionen. Diese beiden Aspekte werden hier unter verschieden anmutenden 
Fragestellungen beleuchtet und hieraus abgeleitete Thesen werden auf der Grundlage von 
Mikrodatensätzen überprüft. Es kommen sowohl standardmäßige wie auch weniger häufig in 
der Literatur vorzufindende ökonometrische Methoden zur Anwendung. 
 
Die Dissertation bietet somit verschiedene Neuerungen: Zum einen werden Fragestellungen 
untersucht, die eher nicht zum Mainstream der Arbeitsökonomie zu zählen scheinen und 
daher in der Literatur bisher wenig Beachtung fanden. Da existierende Analysen zu den im 
Weiteren noch näher erläuterten Themen zumeist auf der Untersuchung US-amerikanischer 
Daten basieren, können hier mit der überwiegenden Nutzung deutscher Mikrodaten einerseits 
Einsichten zur Stichhaltigkeit der in der Literatur vorgebrachten Hypothesen gewonnen 
werden und andererseits können die erzielten Ergebnisse zukünftige komparative Studien 
ermöglichen bzw. erleichtern. Unter einem technischen Aspekt ist weiterhin anzuführen, dass 
in dieser Arbeit vorwiegend Methoden zur Analyse von Panel-Daten herangezogen werden, 
was im Allgemeinen den bisher zumeist auf Querschnittsdaten begründeten Untersuchungen 
vorzuziehen ist. 
 
Die Fragestellungen an sich umfassen die Aspekte Religion, Gesundheitsverhalten und 
atypische Beschäftigung.  Die Dissertation ist folglich ent sprechend aufgebaut: Nach einem 
einleitenden Abschnitt (Kapitel 2), der die häufiger in der Arbeit verwendeten 
ökonometrischen Methoden einführend darstellt, widmet sich das anschließende Kapitel den 
Folgen individueller Religiosität auf einerseits Einstellungen zur Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen 
bzw. Müttern und andererseits den zu beobachtenden ‚outcomes’, ob also Religion die 
Erwerbspartizipation und die Erwerbsverdienste beeinflusst (Kapitel 3). 
 
Hieran schließt sich ein Kapitel an, welches Analysen über den Zusammenhang zwischen 
                                                 
1 Diese Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache dient zur Erfüllung der Anforderung gemäß §6 Abs. 6 der 
Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Bamberg vom 14. 
Juli 1982, zuletzt geändert durch die „Achte Satzung zur Änderung der Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät 
Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität Bamberg vom 31. Juli 2002“. 
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individuellem Gesundheitsverhalten und, wieder, ökonomischen Ausprägungen beinhaltet 
(Kapitel 4). Das Gesundheitsverhalten von Individuen bzw. Erwerbstätigen wird am Indikator 
‚Tabakkonsum’ festgemacht und es wird untersucht, ob und wie sich erwerbstätige Raucher 
von Nichtrauchern bezüglich der Fehlzeiten, also der Abwesenheit vom Arbeitsplatz 
unterscheiden und ob sich Differenzen in den Verdiensten ergeben. 
 
Das letzte inhaltliche Kapitel umfasst Studien, die sich mit einer Erscheinungsform der 
sogenannten atypischen Beschäftigung, der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit, befassen (Kapitel 5). 
Zunächst wird in einer Deutschland und Großbritannien vergleichenden Studie analysiert, ob 
und welche Differenzen es in den Determinanten der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit gibt. Daran 
anschließend werden quasi in einer Art Fallstudie für Deutschland die Auswirkungen einer 
Änderungen der Rahmenbedingungen für Nebenerwerbstätigkeit auf das Verhalten von 
Nebenerwerbstätigen  untersucht. Konkret: Es wird analysiert, ob und wie sich die Einführung 
der Sozialversicherungspflicht für geringfügige Beschäftigungsverhältnisse im Jahr 1999 auf 
die Partizipation in der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit ausgewirkt hat. 
 
Der Aufbau der Arbeit im Einzelnen gliedert sich wie folgt: Kapitel 2 stellt die in dieser 
Arbeit häufiger zugrundeliegenden Schätztechniken dar. Hierbei sind die aufgeführten Panel-
Methoden random-effects und fixed-effects mehr oder minder Standard in der empirischen 
Literatur. Daneben wird jedoch auch auf den von Hausman und Taylor entwickelten 
Instrument-Variablen (HT-IV) Schätzer eingegangen, der bislang selten in der empirischen 
Literatur Verwendung gefunden hat. Dieser Schätzer hat im Vergleich zu den vorgenannten 
den Vorteil, dass er den Anwender nicht einer ‚Alles-oder-Nichts’ Entscheidung bezüglich 
der unterstellten Korrelation zwischen individuenspezifischen Effekten und den erklärenden 
Variablen aussetzt. Der HT-IV Schätzer basiert auf der Annahme, dass jeweilige Teilmengen 
von zeitinvarianten und über die Zeit variierenden Regressoren mit den individuenspezifi-
schen Effekten korrelieren wie auch nicht korrelieren. Der Schätzer ist konsistent und 
effizient und hat überdies den Vorteil, dass er keine über das Sample hinausgehenden 
Instrumente verwendet. 
 
Kapitel 3 beinhaltet Fragestellungen aus der sogenannten ‘Religionsökonomik’ (Iannaccone, 
1998). Zunächst wird in einer komparativen Studie untersucht, ob und wie sich Religiosität 
auf die Einstellungen zur Frauenerwerbstätigkeit auswirkt. Hierfür werden Daten des ISSP für 
drei Wellen aus den 1990er Jahren herangezogen. Obwohl die Surveys unterschiedliche 
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Befragungsschwerpunkte haben, beinhalten sie doch zwei Indikatoren, die für die Analyse 
hier geeignet erscheinen. Diese sind a) die Einstellung zur traditionellen Rollenaufteilung 
zwischen den Geschlechtern und b) die Einstellung zu Vollzeit beschäftigten Müttern. Die 
Teilstichprobe der Männer wird sodann verwendet, um die Auswirkung auf das 
Erwerbsverhalten der Ehefrauen zu untersuchen. Die Länder, die zur Analyse herangezogen 
werden, West- und Ostdeutschland, Italien, Neuseeland und Großbritannien, können als 
Repräsentanten unterschiedlicher Regime verstanden werden, die sich sowohl hinsichtlich 
ihrer religiös-kulturellen Geschichte wie auch in ihren Wohlfahrtssystemen unterscheiden. 
Letztere können Frauenerwerbstätigkeit gleichfalls entscheidend beeinflussen, etwa durch die 
Ausgestaltung von Kinderbetreuungseinrichtungen. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse legen zunächst nicht überraschend nahe, dass allgemein 
Männer, Angehörige hierarchischer Religionen, wie etwa dem Katholizismus, sowie religiös 
aktive Individuen weniger zu liberalen Einstellungen hinsichtlich der Erwerbstätigkeit von 
Frauen neigen. Daneben gibt es gleichwohl Unterschiede zwischen den betrachteten Ländern. 
West-Deutsche und Italiener stellen die konservativsten Personen. Zwar mag dies für Italien 
mit einem Bevölkerungsanteil von über 90% Katholiken geradezu erwartungsgemäß sein, 
jedoch ist dieser Befund für West-Deutschland eher überraschend. 
Die ISSP-Daten werden sodann herangezogen, um die Auswirkungen der Religiosität von 
Ehemännern auf das Erwerbsverhalten der Ehefrauen zu untersuchen. Zunächst findet man, 
wiederum eher nicht überraschend, dass die Präsenz von Gatten mit traditonellen Ansichten 
die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Erwerbsbeteiligung von Ehefrauen negativ beeinflussen.  
Darüber hinaus haben jedoch weder konfessionelle Zugehörigkeit noch regelmäßige religiöse 
Aktivitäten einen statistisch bedeutsamen Effekt. Es gilt hierbei gleichwohl zu beachten, dass 
lediglich Querschnittsdaten zur Analye herangezogen werden konnten. Die anschließende 
Studie verwendet daher die Paneldaten des Sozio-oekonomischen Panels (SOEP), um 
zusätzliche, geeignetere Methoden auf die Fragestellung eines möglichen Effekts von 
Religion und Religiosität auf das Arbeitsangebot verheirateter Frauen anwenden zu können. 
 
Die hierfür durchgeführte Studie bezieht ihre zu testenden Hypothesen sowohl aus der 
ökonomischen wie auch der soziologischen Theorie. Diesen Thesen zufolge  lässt sich a priori 
erwarten, dass die Zugehörigkeit zu eher strikten religiösen Kirchen oder Gruppen einen 
negativen Effekt auf Frauenerwerbstätigkeit hat. Darüber hinaus spielt der Haushaltskontext 
eine gleichsam gewichtige Rolle. Hierbei kann sodann die konfessionelle Zusammensetzung 
der Paare den angeführten Effekt verstärken oder abmildern. Bei Paaren mit gemeinsamer 
SUMMARY IN GERMAN 
 
 266 
Zugehörigkeit zu strikten religiösen Gruppen ist ebenfalls ein negativer Effekt zu erwarten. 
Paaren mit heterogener Konfessionalität ist vorab indes kein eindeutiger Effekt zuzuordnen. 
Hier kommt zusätzlich der Verhandlungsmacht der Ehepartner bei z.B. möglichen Konflikten 
über die konfessionelle Erziehung gemeinsamer Kinder eine entscheidende Bedeutung zu. 
Die empirischen Resultate können die Thesen nur schwach und eher indirekt stützen. Es 
gibt z.B. keine eindeutigen Strukturen, die einen Effekt konfessioneller Zugehörigkeit auf die 
Frauenerwerbstätigkeit nachzeichnen können. Allerdings ist die konfessionelle Zugehörigkeit 
ein schwacher Indikator für Religiosität. Daher werden Indikatoren für sowohl religiösen 
Glauben wie für die Teilnahme an religiösem Leben zur weiteren Untersuchung 
herangezogen. Hier zeigen sich sodann für Querschnitts- wie für Panel-Schätzungen, dass 
starker religiöser Glaube und höher-frequente Teilnahme an religiösem Leben Einfluss auf 
das Erwerbsverhalten von verheirateten Frauen hat. Zudem zeigt sich wiederum, dass die 
Präsenz von Ehemännern mit starker religiöser Überzeugung gleichfalls negativ auf die 
Erwerbsbeteiligung ihrer Frauen wirkt. 
 
Die genannten Indikatoren werden auch im letzten Abschnitt dieses Kapitels herangezogen, 
welcher sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen Religiosität und Verdiensten von Männern in 
Deutschland befasst. Die Erkenntnisse bisheriger Studien zeigen, dass Religion sowohl 
positive wie negative Auswirkungen haben kann. So mag einerseits eine ablehnden Haltung 
gegenüber der Aufhäufung irdischer und mithin materieller Güter vorherrschen, was sich in 
niedrigeren Verdiensten niederschlagen könnte. Andererseits sieht z.B. Max Webers 
‚Protestantische Arbeitsethik’ keinen Widerspruch in irdischem, sich in Vermögen 
niederschlagendem Streben und göttlichem Wohlgefallen. Hier wäre also ein eher positiver 
Einfluss zu erwarten.  
Die nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg stark unterschiedliche Historie Ost- und West-
deutschlands auch in Bezug auf die Entwicklung der Kirchen und des religiösen Lebens zeigt 
sich sodann auch in den empirischen Ergebnissen. Zunächst scheint auf der Grundlage von 
Querschnittsdaten für ostdeutsche Männer kein Zusammenhang zwischen Religiosität und 
Verdiensten zu bestehen; Westdeutsche Erwerbstätige mit konfessioneller Bindung 
verzeichnen hingegen Lohnabschläge von 6-8%. Allerdings verlieren sich diese negativen 
Effekte bei der Anwendung geeigneterer Panelmethoden, so dass das möglicherweise nicht 
unerwartete Ergebnis, dass weder Konfession, noch religiöser Glaube noch Teilnahme an 
religiösem Leben sich auf Verdienste von Männer auswirkt, zumindest für Westdeutschland 
gestützt werden kann. Für ostdeutsche Männer bestätigt sich hingegen, dass ein starker 
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religiöser Glauben mit niedrigeren Verdiensteinkommen einhergeht. 
 
Eine Untersuchung von möglichen Verdienstdifferentialen wird auch im sich anschließenden 
vierten Kapitel vorgenommen. Konkret wird untersucht, ob sich Unterschiede in den 
Erwerbseinkommen zwischen Rauchern und Nichtrauchern ergeben und insbesondere ob, wie 
für die USA in etlichen Studien belegt, Raucher auch in Deutschland niedrigere Verdienste 
als Nichtraucher beziehen. Die theoretische Grundlage ist hier jedoch alles andere als 
reichhaltig. Unter den wenigen Argumenten, die Lohnabschläge bei Rauchern hypo-
thetisieren, findet sich die Aussage, dass Raucher Individuen mit höherer Zeitpräferenzrate 
seien. Demnach wären Raucher weniger bereit, in Humankapital zu investieren, was sich 
sodann in niedrigeren Einkünften zeigen würde. Neben der Analyse der Verdienstdifferentiale 
an sich werden vereinfachte Tests für solche theoretischen Aussagen durchgeführt. 
Vor dieser Studie wird jedoch zunächst der Frage nachgegangen, ob sich Raucher in 
einem anderen Bereich des Erwerbsverhaltens von Nichtrauchern unterscheiden, nämlich ob 
Raucher höhere Fehlzeiten aufweisen. Auch hier könnte eine höhere Zeitpräferenz zu 
gleichsam häufigerer Abwesenheit vom Arbeitsplatz führen. Zudem würden höhere 
Fehlzeiten auf eine möglicherweise niedrigere Produktivität von Rauchern hinweisen, was ein 
weiteres in der Literatur angeführtes Argument für niedrigere Einkommen ist. 
 
Die Resultate der empirischen Analysen deuten sodann darauf hin, dass Raucher häufigere 
und längere Fehlzeiten als Nichtraucher aufzeigen. Da sich dieser Unterschied auf etwa einem 
Arbeitstag pro Jahr beläuft, mag man die ökonomische Bedeutung indes als nicht gar so 
bedeutsam auslegen. Die Anwendung von Zähldatenmodellen legt überdies nahe, dass mit der 
Ausnahme für junge männliche wie weibliche Raucher Tabakkonsum nur ein schwacher 
statistischer Indikator für die Abwesenheit vom Arbeitsplatz ist. Die sich anschließende 
Analyse der Verdienste von Rauchern und Nichtrauchern zeigt, dass in der Literatur 
vorzufindende Erkenntnisse nur teilweise für den deutschen Fall bestätigt werden können. So 
sind die Verdienste von Frauen nicht von Tabakkonsum beeinträchtigt. Rauchende Männer 
hingegen scheinen einen Verdienstabschlag in Höhe von etwa 2% zu tragen. Da dies jedoch 
aus der Anwendung des OLS-Schätzers auf der Grundlage gepoolter Daten resultiert, 
verwundert es nicht, dass die vorzuziehenden Methoden für Paneldaten ein anderes Ergebnis 
hervortreten lassen. Demnach sind auch die Erwerbseinkommen von Männern nicht vom 
Rauchverhalten betroffen. Vielmehr noch deutet sich ein möglicher positiver Effekt für die 
Gruppe junger Raucher an. Hier mag folglich spekuliert werden, ob diese Erwerbstätigen 
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Individuen mit höherer Zeitpräferenzrate sind. So kann argumentiert werden, dass junge, 
rauchende Männer nicht im gleichem Maße wie nichtrauchende junge Männer in 
Humankapital investieren. Dies mag sich sodann in für diese Gruppe längerer 
Erwerbstätigkeit und mithin in der Tendenz zu relativ höheren Verdiensten zeigen. Weiterhin 
belegen die durchgeführten, vereinfachten Tests nicht, dass Raucher Individuen mit 
geringerer Produktivität sind. Es findet sich allerdings (statistisch schwache) Evidenz für 
geringere Renditen für Arbeitserfahrung, also die Zeiten möglicher Erwerbstätigkeit. Dies ist 
sodann wieder in Übereinstimmung mit der Annahme höherer Zeitpräferenzraten unter 
Rauchern, was sich hier in einer geringeren Neigung zur Investition in ‚on-the-job’ Training 
ausdrücken könnte. 
 
Studien zur Nebenerwerbstätigkeit werden im letzten Essay, Kapitel 5, dargestellt. Zwar gibt 
es eine reichhaltige empirische Literatur zu atypischer Beschäftigung, jedoch stehen hier vor 
allem Teilzeiterwerbstätigkeit und befristete Beschäft igung im Mittelpunkt des Interesses. 
Nebenerwerbstätigkeit, welche gleichfalls als Ausprägung atypischer Beschäftigung 
betrachtet werden kann, ist bisher ein eher wenig beachteter Untersuchungsgegenstand, 
obwohl die vorliegenden Studien zeigen, dass ein von Erwerbstätigen ausgeführter zweiter 
Job alles andere als eine Ausnahmeerscheinung ist.  
Zunächst wird die Theorie der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit kurz diskutiert. War es anfänglich 
noch vor allem die Annahme der Existenz von Arbeitszeitbeschränkungen, die Erwerbstätige 
zur Aufnahme eines zweiten Jobs bewegen können, so ist in jüngerer Zeit vermehrt auf die 
mögliche Heterogenität von Beschäftigungen als Grund der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit verwiesen 
worden. Evidenz für beide Motive findet sich folglich auch in der sodann dargestellten 
komparativen Analyse, welche die Determinanten der Nebenerwerbstätigkeit in 
Großbritannien und Deutschland untersucht. Diese Länder weisen große Unterschiede 
hinsichtlich der Institutionen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt auf, mit Großbritannien als Fürsprecher 
eines sehr liberalen, Deutschland hingegen als Vertreter eines eher restriktiven 
Arbeitsmarktregimes. Hier würde folglich die ausschließliche Annahme von Arbeitszeitbe-
schränkungen für den Fall des britischen Arbeitsmarktes, auf dem mit höherer Wahr-
scheinlichkeit optimale, den Präferenzen der Akteure entsprechende Verhandlungsergebnisse 
realisiert werden können, zu kurz greifen.  
Basierend auf Analysen der Mikrodaten des SOEP für Deutschland und des BHPS für 
Großbritannien zeigt sich, dass die zugrundeliegenden Determinanten der Nebenerwerbstätig-
keit mehr Ähnlichkeiten als Unterschiede aufweisen und beide theoretischen Hauptmotive 
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empirisch stützen. In beiden Ländern gibt es Gruppen von Erwerbstätigen, die sich im 
Hauptjob Arbeitszeitbeschränkungen ausgesetzt sehen. Gegeben dass der im Zweitjob 
erzielbare Lohn den Anspruchslohn übersteigt, haben diese Erwerbstätigen einen Anreiz, 
mehr Arbeit in Form einer weiteren Beschäftigung anzubieten, um sich somit besser zu 
stellen. Daneben gibt es jedoch auch Evidenz für den heterogenen Charakter von Tätigkeiten. 
Zum Beispiel sind die Aussicht, eine neue Beschäftigung aufzugreifen oder gar selbstständig 
zu werden, gute Indikatoren einer höheren Wahrscheinlichkeit, einen Zweitjob innezuhaben. 
Dies kann damit erklärt werden, dass eine solche weitere Beschäftigung herangezogen werden 
kann, um Fähig- und Fertigkeiten, die für kommende Aufgaben benötigt werden, zu erwerben 
oder zu verbessern. 
 
Obwohl also die vorhandenen Unterschiede in den Arbeitsmarktregimes sich nicht in großen 
Unterschieden im Nebenerwerbstätigkeitsverhalten niederschlagen, bleibt die Zweitbeschäf-
tigung, wie jede andere Form der Erwerbsätigkeit auch, Gegenstand institutioneller 
Rahmenbedingungen. Wie sich eine Änderung solcher Rahmenbedingungen auswirken kann, 
zeigt die letzte Studie. Die dargestellte Analyse untersucht ein gleichsam ‚natürliches 
Experiment’, dass sich auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt vollzogen hat. So wurde im Jahr 
1999 die Sozialversicherungspflicht für geringfügige Beschä ftigung eingeführt. Vor dieser 
Reform wurden viele Nebenerwerbstätigkeiten im Rahmen dieser Beschäftigungsform 
geführt. Die sodann obligatorischen Sozialversicherungsabgaben durch die paritätische 
Belastung von Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer hatten eine Anhebung der Arbeitskosten auf 
Arbeitgeberseite wie auch eine Senkung des Nettolohns im Zweitjob zur Folge. Gleichwohl 
konnte aufgrund des Einkommens- und Substitutionseffektes einer solchen Lohnsenkung a 
priori nicht gesagt werden, ob weniger zweite Jobs angeboten würden.  
Wenngleich erste, deskriptive Ergebnisse auf ein starkes Sinken der Nebenerwerbstätig-
keit hindeuten, könnte eine solch vereinfachte Analyse irreführen. Folglich ist hier eine 
(pseudo-)kontrafaktische Situation herangezogen worden, um die ‚normale’ Entwicklung von 
den durch die Reform bedingten Änderungen isolieren zu können. Es zeigt sich, dass 
Nebenerwerbstätigkeit eine eher hohen Schwankungen unterworfene Beschäftigungsform ist. 
Gleichwohl hatte die Einführung der Sozialversicherungspflicht zunächst große, negative 
Auswirkungen. Allerdings scheinen sich Nebenerwerbstätige dieser Art exogenen Schocks 
schnell angepasst zu haben, denn es zeigt sich weiterhin, dass sich im zweiten Jahr nach der 
Reform die ‚natürliche Dynamik’ im großen und ganzen wieder auf dem Niveau der Jahre vor 
der Reform befand. 
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Die Ergebnisse multivariater Analysen, die mögliche Determinanten der Entscheidung, eine 
Zweitbeschäftigung auch nach der Reform beizubehalten, sind indes eher unzufriedenstellend. 
Nur wenige der herangezogenen Größen können zur Erklärung der Variation in den Daten 
beitragen. Nicht überraschend zeigt sich zum Beispiel, dass sich vor der Reform nur 
gelegentlich ausgeübte Nebenerwerbstätigkeit negativ auf die Kontinuität der Zweitbeschäfti-
gung auswirkt. Gleichfalls nicht überraschend ist der positive Effekt des Wunschs nach einer 
höheren Arbeitszeit. Erwerbstätige, die in 1998 einen Zweitjob als Dienstleistung oder in 
privaten Haushalten ausgeübt haben, neigen gleichfalls eher dazu, diesen in 2000 beibehalten 
zu haben. 
 
Es kann nicht abgestritten werden, dass die drei hier dargelegten Essays recht 
unterschiedliche Fragestellungen zum Inhalt haben. Dennoch hebt sich zum einen in allen 
Studien ein Hauptergebnis methodischer Natur hervor: die Notwendigkeit, in derartigen 
empirischen Studien die sogenannte unbeobachtete individuelle Heterogenität zu 
berücksichtigen. Während sich nämlich die Ergebnisse bisheriger Untersuchungen 
überwiegend auf die Analysen von Querschnittsdaten beziehen, so finden diese in den 
Resultaten der Panel-Analysen hier überwiegend keine empirische Unterstützung. Es ist 
allerdings zu beachten, dass das SOEP die vorrangig verwendete Datenquelle ist. Man kann 
also nicht auszuschließen, dass bisher vorliegende theoretische Überlegungen für Deutschland 
schlicht nicht haltbar sind. Gleichwohl dürfte es plausibler sein anzunehmen, dass individuen-
spezifische Effekte die hier bestehenden Ergebnisse erklären. 
 
Zum anderen sollte das hier zusammgetragene Material nicht als letzte Antwort auf die 
erörterten Fragen verstanden werden. Vielmehr ist darin ein kleiner Beitrag zur vorhandenen 
empirischen Literatur zu sehen und als erster Schritt zukünftiger Arbeit aufzufassen, die 
zeigen wird, dass die ökonomische Analyse vermeintlich abwegiger Fragestellungen sehr 
wohl dazu beitragen kann, das Verständnis individuellen Verhaltens im Allgemeinen und von 
Arbeitsangebotsentscheidungen im Besonderen zu erweitern. 
